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Introduction from the FIDE 2020 Board
It was in a small pub in Tallinn in 2012, late at night, that a group of Dutch jurists visiting
the bi-annual Congress of the International Federation for European Law (FIDE) in Estonia,
brought up the bold idea of bringing FIDE to The Netherlands. Eight years later, the
Netherlands Association of European Law (NVER), has the honour of welcoming the
members of FIDE in The Hague at the XXIX FIDE Congress. Or rather: welcoming them
back to The Hague. Twice before did the FIDE convene in the Dutch seat of government:
in 1963 and in 1984. Much like the European Union itself, The Hague has changed since
1984. It has grown, its skyline has been transformed and its position as an international
city of peace and justice consolidated, also with the presence of Europol and Eurojust.
The impact of FIDE as an organisation, and of its members, on the development of
European law has been well-documented.1 From the outset FIDE formed a unique
transnational network bringing together key actors who stood at the basis of the ‘new legal
order’,2 who shaped European law as a discipline in its own right, and who legitimised the
Court’s “‘constitutional’ understanding of European Law” at its early conferences in The
Hague (1963) and Paris (1965).3
Whereas in the early 1960s European lawhad yet to achieve its full potential, participants
of the 1984 Congress may have considered primacy and direct effect as largely settled, as
the European Communities were to embark on Jacques Delors’ internal market project.
At the same time, they would not have imagined the exponential growth in services and
the exciting, yet also disruptive, effects of the internet and new technology. In 2020, after
years of crises that have shaken the European Union to its very foundations, it seems once
again in need of FIDE to act as “the wheeling flank of the army of European jurists”,4 to
understand, explain and defend a Union that is based on the rule of law and, notably, on
1 J. Laffranque, ‘FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 Years of the International Federation for
European Law’, Juridica International XVIII, 2011, pp. 173-181. See for example also S. Lee Mudge & A.
Vauchez, ‘Building Europe on a Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational
Politics’ AJS Vol. 118, No. 2, 2012, pp. 449-492. The Spanish FIDE 2010 organisation did a fantastic job in
makingmuch of the FIDE archive accessible to itsmembers: www.fide-europe.org/members-login/, visited
1 February 2020.
2 Judgment of 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
3 M. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: The History of the Legal Service
of The European Executive, 1952-65, Contemporary European History Vol. 21, No. 3, 2012, p. 395.
4 A. de Vreese, Droit communautaire et droit national, 14 Cahiers de Bruges, Vol. 14, No. 399, 1965, quoted
in A. Vauchez, Brokering Europe: Euro-Lawyers and the Making of a Transnational Polity, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 137.
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common values the members of FIDE hold dear. In our modern society, European
cooperation is not just an option; it is a necessity.
In keeping with good practice and tradition, the XXIX FIDE Congress addresses three
main topics for which distinguished General Rapporteurs have been invited to draft a
questionnaire on the current relevant legal issues on a European and national level.
Rapporteurs from the FIDE Members Associations and prominent experts from the EU
institutions have responded with country and institutional reports. Based on this input,
the General Rapporteurs compiled a General Report on each topic. You will find all the
reports in the FIDE XXIX Congress Publications
While in the early days the Commission’s Legal Service would ask FIDE to report on
certain questions,5 the current selection of the three main topics is the result of lively
discussions. The organisers of the FIDE XXIX Congress took advantage of valuable
contributions from the FIDE Steering Committee, by bringing together the Netherlands
academic community and benefiting greatly from the input from practitioners, as well as
FIDE members, colleagues and friends in the European Institutions and Member States.
The three topics under discussion at the FIDE 2020 Congress revisit some of the classic
tenets of EU law, whilst bringing to the table new questions that are triggered by the needs
of modern society. Our aim has been to appeal to both specialists and general EU lawyers.
The topics that were selected for the FIDE 2020 Congress are the following:
1. National Courts and the Enforcement of EU Law: The Pivotal Role of National Courts
in the EU Legal Order
2. TheNewEUData ProtectionRegime: SettingGlobal Standards for theRight to Personal
Data Protection
3. EU Competition Law and the Digital Economy: Protecting Free and Fair Competition
in an Age of Technological (R)evolution
The XXIX FIDE Congress Publications are the result of the work of a great variety of EU
jurists who, in true European spirit, joined efforts to provide the General Rapporteurs with
answers to their questionnaires in various national reports. TheGeneral Rapporteurs have
compared, evaluated and brought together the insights from the national reports in their
General Reports. Together with the Institutional Reports written by experts from the
Institutions, and a special report on the EFTA Court, the Congress Publications thus
present the state of the art on the three topics of the XXIX FIDE Congress.
European Union law cannot be considered in isolation. To foster a multidisciplinary
law-in-context approach, European thinkers from other disciplines – historians, political
scientists and economists – have been actively invited to contribute to sessions of the XXIX
FIDE Congress to reflect on the way ahead. After years of turmoil, the question poses itself:
5 Rasmussen, 2012, p. 384.
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will Europe muddle through, or is there reason to hope for a new European réveil? For a
Europe that can lead the way in a Green Revolution, that remains a champion of
fundamental rights protection and that fosters growth and innovation?
The FIDE 2020 Congress also looks at the critical role national and European judges
– who in many Member States function under increased scrutiny and pressure – play in
safeguarding the very foundations upon which our legal order was built: the values listed
in the Treaty on European Union.
The book that you are currently holding – or reading off your screen – serves to prove
that FIDE cherishes tradition but embraces the future. From the outset, we have sought
to involve a new generation of European lawyers. Renaming the PhD seminar as the ‘Young
FIDE Seminar’ reflects the ambition to draw in young EU lawyers from a broad range of
professional backgrounds. For the first time also young rapporteurs have been asked to
report to the FIDE Congress on the discussions at the Young FIDE Seminar.
We are delighted that once more the Congress proceedings will be available to the
general public through open access. We extend a heartfelt thank you to all our rapporteurs,
our editors and our publisher for making this publication possible. Likewise, we would
like to take this opportunity to thank all the volunteers, speakers, sponsors, our Congress
Bureau and all those who have in one way or the other contributed to the realisation of
the XXIX FIDE Congress in The Hague. We hope that FIDE will continue to inspire, to
unite and to prepare for a common European future.
The FIDE 2020 Board
Corinna Wissels (President), Member of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Dutch Council of State
Marleen Botman (Social Programme Officer), Attorney-at-law at Pels Rijcken &
Droogleever Fortuijn
Herman van Harten (Secretary General), Judge at the District Court of The Hague
Marlies Noort (Treasurer), Agent before the Court of Justice of the EU, Dutch Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Jorrit J. Rijpma (Scientific ProgrammeOfficer), JeanMonnet Professor, Leiden Law School
xi
Introduction from the FIDE 2020 Board
Introduction from the Editor
Before you lies volume 2 of the XXIX FIDE Congress Publications, bringing together the
General, Institutional and National reports on the topic of the new EU data protection
regime.
On 25 May 2018, the EU’s new regulatory framework for the protection of personal
data entered into force. It covers the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data under
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of criminal justice under the so-called Law
Enforcement Directive.
Albeit it a very specialised area of EU law, it raises general questions of EU regulation,
governance, enforcement and fundamental rights protection. It is a dynamic area inwhich
the stakes are high and the Court of Justice of the European Union has showed willingness
to show its teeth.
It is an area that directly affects businesses and the lives of people. In an increasingly
digitised world, personal data constitute a commodity, a threat to privacy, as well as an
opportunity for innovation and growth. Almost thirty years after the first legally binding
international instrument in the field of data protection, theCouncil of Europe’s Convention
108 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data
was opened for signature, historian Yuval Noah Harari labelled datism, the “universal
narrative that legitimises the authority of algorithms and Big Data” an existential threat
to humankind.1
Importantly, the effects of the EU’s data protection regime are felt well beyond the
borders of the European Union. Not only do the new rules have a global reach, they have
also acted, in thewords of the late EuropeanData Protection SupervisorGiovanni Buttarelli,
as “a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard.”2 Moreover, the EU regime is not
just forming a blue print for the regulation of data processing around the world, it is also
fuelling further initiatives at EU level for the ethical regulation of technology, data and
artificial intelligence.3
This work is a first attempt to take stock of the implementation, application and
interpretation of the EU’s new regulatory framework for data protection. As such it presents
1 Y.N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, London, Penguin, 2017, p. 428.
2 G. Buttarelli, ‘The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard, International Data
Privacy Law, Vol. 6, No 2, 2016, p. 77.




the reader with a unique comparative perspective and state of the art overview of the EU’s
data protection rules in the Member States, the EEA and Switzerland. The General
Rapporteur, Orla Lynskey, and the Institutional RapporteursHerkeKranenborg andAnna
Buchta, have brought together the findings of the national reports, as well as have given
an overview of developments at EU level in their respective reports.
As editor of this volume I have had the honour and privilege of reading all reports
prior to the FIDE congress and to have been in close contact with many of the experts in
this field who have contributed to this publication. I would like to thank them for their
hard work and patience in handling the deadlines and numerous requests for additional
editing or information. A special word of thanks also goes to Carina vanOs for her editorial
assistance.
In the words of former Justice Commissioner Vera Jurová the GDPR is “still […] a
baby that is growing fast and is doing well. But we need to continue to nurture it well.”4
May this edited volume serve as food for thought.
Jorrit J. Rijpma
Jean Monnet Professor, Leiden Law School
4 SpeechCommissioner Jurová, 13 June 2019:www.ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_
19_2999, visited 1 February 2020.
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IntroductionduComitéDirecteurduCongrès
de la FIDE 2020
C’est dans un petit bar á Tallinn en 2012, tard dans la nuit, qu’un groupe de juristes
néerlandais, en visite au congrès biennal de la Fédération Internationale pour le Droit
Européen (FIDE) se tenant en Estonie, a évoqué l’idée audacieuse d’organiser ce congrès
au Pays-Bas. Huit années plus tard, l’Association Néerlandaise de Droit Européen (NVER
– Nederlandse Vereniging voor Europees Recht) a l’honneur d’accueillir les membres de
la FIDE à La Haye pour la vingt-neuvième édition de ce congrès ou, plus exactement, de
les accueillir à nouveau à La Haye. En effet, la FIDE s’est déjà réunie deux fois dans la ville
où siège le gouvernement néerlandais: en 1963 et en 1984. À l’instar de l’Union elle-même,
La Haye a changé depuis 1984. Elle a grandi, sa skyline s’est transformée et sa position de
ville internationale de la paix et de la justice s’est consolidée, notamment avec la présence
d’Europol et Eurojust.
L’influence de la FIDE, tant l’organisation elle-même que ses membres, sur le
développement du droit européen est bien connue.1 Dès son commencement, la FIDE a
formé un réseau transnational unique rassemblant les acteurs clef qui ont constitué la base
du « nouvel ordre juridique »,2 façonné le droit européen en une véritable discipline
autonome et légitimé, lors des premières conférences à La Haye en 1963 et Paris en 1965,
« l’interprétation constitutionnelle du droit européen » retenue par la Cour de justice.3
Si au début des années 1960, le droit européen n’avait pas encore atteint son plein
potentiel, les personnes participant au congrès de 1984 considéraient certainement que
les principes de l’effet direct et de la primauté étaient bien établis au moment même où les
Communautés européennes s’embarquaient sur le projet, initié par Jacques Delors, de
marché intérieur. En revanche, ils n’auraient pas pu imaginer la croissance exponentielle
dans les services et les effets aussi formidables que perturbants d’Internet et des nouvelles
technologies. En 2020, après les années de crise qui ont fait trembler les fondations mêmes
de l’Union, il semble que celle-ci ait à nouveau besoin que la FIDE agisse comme « l’aile
1 J. Laffranque, « FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 Years of the International Federation
for European Law », Juridica International XVIII, 2011, p. 173 à 181. Voir également S. Lee Mudge et A.
Vauchez, « Building Europe on a Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Pol-
itics » AJS Vol. 118, n° 2, 2012, p. 449 à 492. L’équipe organisant le Congrès de la FIDE en Espagne a fait
un travail remarquable en rendant une grande partie des archives de la FIDE accessible à ses membres:
https://www.fide-europe.org/members-login/, page consultée le 1er février 2020.
2 Arrêt du 5 février 1963, van Gend & Loos (26/62, EU:C:1963:1).
3 M. Rasmussen, « Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: The History of the Legal Service
of The European Executive, 1952-65 », Contemporary European History Vol. 21 n° 3. 2012, p. 395.
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marchante de l’armée des juristes européens »,4 afin de comprendre, expliquer et défendre
une Union fondée sur l’État de droit et notamment sur les valeurs communes qui sont
chères auxmembres de la FIDE.Dans la sociétémoderne, la coopération européenne n’est
pas simplement une option, c’est une nécessité.
Comme le veut la tradition, ce XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE abordera trois sujets
principaux pour lesquels d’éminents rapporteurs généraux ont été invités à rédiger un
questionnaire portant sur les actuelles questions juridiques pertinentes tant au niveau
européen qu’au niveau national. Des rapporteurs issus des associations membres de la
FIDE et des experts éminents issus des institutions de l’Union ont répondu sous la forme
de rapports nationaux et institutionnels. Sur cette base, les rapporteurs généraux ont
préparé un rapport général sur chaque thème. Tous les rapports seront disponibles dans
les présentes publications du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE.
Alors qu’aux débuts de la FIDE, le service juridique de la Commission lui demandait
de rendre compte de certaines questions,5 de nos jours le choix des trois principaux sujets
est le résultat de vives discussions. Les organisateurs du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE ont
profité des précieuses contributions du comité directeur de la FIDE en rassemblant la
communauté universitaire des Pays-Bas et en tirant un grand avantage de l’apport des
praticiens, de même que des membres de la FIDE, collègues et amis dans les institutions
européennes et les États membres. Les trois thèmes qui seront discutés lors du Congrès
de la FIDE 2020 revisitent certains des thèmes classiques du droit de l’Union tout en y
incluant de nouvelles problématiques qui sont nées des besoins de la société moderne.
Nous avons souhaité faire appel autant aux spécialistes qu’aux généralistes du droit de
l’Union.
Les sujets choisis pour le Congrès de la FIDE 2020 sont les suivants:
1. Les juridictions nationales et l’application du droit de l’Union: le rôle central des
juridictions nationales dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union;
2. Le nouveau régime de protection des données de l’Union: la fixation de normes
mondiales pour le droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel;
3. Le droit de la concurrence de l’Union et l’économie numérique: la protection d’une
concurrence libre et non faussée à l’heure d’une (r)évolution technologique.
Les publications du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE résultent du travail d’un grand nombre
de juristes de droit de l’Union qui, dans le plus pur esprit européen, ont uni leurs forces
pour répondre dans leurs rapports nationaux aux questionnaires des rapporteurs généraux.
Les rapporteurs généraux ont comparé, évalué et rassemblé les éclairages des différents
4 A. de Vreese, « Droit communautaire et droit national », 14 Cahiers de Bruges Vol. 14, n° 399, 1965, cité
dans: A. Vauchez, «Brokering Europe: Euro-Lawyers and theMaking of a Transnational Polity », Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 137.
5 Rasmussen, 2012, p. 384.
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rapports nationaux dans leurs rapports généraux. Avec les rapports institutionnels, rédigés
par des experts des institutions, et un rapport spécial de la Cour AELE, les publications
du Congrès présentent, sous l’éclairage le plus récent, les trois sujets choisis pour le
XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE.
Le droit de l’Union européenne ne peut pas être pris de façon isolée. Pour promouvoir
une approche pluridisciplinaire qui place le droit dans son contexte, des penseurs européens
issus d’autres disciplines – historiens, politologues et économistes – ont été activement
invités à contribuer aux sessions du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE afin de réfléchir à la
route qui se présente devant nous. Après des années de trouble, une question se pose.
L’Europe continuera-t-elle à avancer en pataugeant ou existe-t-il des raisons d’espérer
qu’un réveil européen ait lieu? Peut-on espérer une Europe qui montre la voie vers une
révolution écologique, qui demeure une championne de la protection des droits
fondamentaux et qui encourage la croissance et l’innovation?
Le Congrès de la FIDE 2020 se penche également sur le rôle critique que jouent les
juges nationaux et européens – qui dans de nombreux États membres font l’objet d’un
examen approfondi et d’une pression grandissante – dans la protection des fondements
mêmes sur lesquels notre ordre juridique est construit, à savoir les valeurs énumérées dans
le traité sur l’Union européenne.
Le livre que vous avez entre les mains – ou que vous lisez sur un écran – est la preuve
que la FIDE chérit la tradition tout en embrassant l’avenir. Depuis le commencement de
cette aventure, nous avons cherché à impliquer une nouvelle génération de juristes
européens. Le fait d’avoir renommé le séminaire doctoral en « Young FIDE Seminar »
reflète notre ambition d’attirer de jeunes juristes en droit européen issus de parcours
professionnels variés. De même, c’est la première fois qu’il a été demandé à de « jeunes
rapporteurs » de présenter, lors du Congrès de la FIDE, les discussions qui ont eu lieu lors
du Young FIDE Seminar.
Nous nous réjouissons qu’une fois de plus les travaux du Congrès soient mis à la
disposition du public en accès libre. Nous remercions chaleureusement tous nos
rapporteurs, nos éditeurs et notre maison d’édition pour avoir permis la publication du
présent ouvrage. De même, nous remercions tous les bénévoles, orateurs, sponsors, le
Bureau du Congrès et tous ceux qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, ont contribué à la
réalisation du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE à La Haye. Qu’il nous soit permis d’espérer
que la FIDE continuera à inspirer, unifier et préparer un futur européen commun.
Le comité directeur du Congrès de la FIDE 2020
Corinna Wissels (Présidente), membre de la section du contentieux administratif du
Conseil d’État néerlandais
Marleen Botman (Chargée du programme social), avocate au cabinet Pels Rijcken &
Droogleever Fortuijn
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Herman vanHarten (Secrétaire Général), juge au tribunal de première instance de LaHaye
Marlies Noort (Trésorière), agent du ministère néerlandais des affaires étrangères devant
la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne
Jorrit Rijpma (Chargé du programme scientifique), professeur Jean Monnet, faculté de
droit de l’université de Leyde
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Introduction de l’Éditeur
Vous avez devant vous le volume 2 des publications du XXIXème Congrès de la FIDE qui
rassemble le rapport général et les rapports institutionnels et nationaux sur le thème du
nouveau régime de protection des données de l’Union. Le nouveau cadre réglementaire
de l’Union pour la protection des données à caractère personnel est entré en vigueur le 25
mai 2018. Il couvre la protection des personnes physiques en ce qui concerne le traitement
de données à caractère personnel et les règles en matière de libre circulation des données
à caractère personnel en application du règlement général sur la protection des données
(règlement 2016/679, ci-après le « RGPD »), ainsi que le traitement, par les autorités
compétentes, de données à caractère personnel à des fins d’enquêtes pénales en application
de la directive sur l’application de la législation (directive 2016/680, ci-après la « DAL »).
Bien qu’il s’agisse d’un domaine très spécialisé du droit de l’Union, il soulève des
questions générales en termes de réglementation de l’Union, de gouvernance, d’application
et de protection des droits fondamentaux. C’est un domaine dynamique dans lequel les
enjeux sont élevés et la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a d’ailleurs montré qu’elle
était prête à montrer les dents.
C’est un domaine qui touche directement la vie des gens et des entreprises. En effet,
dans un monde de plus en plus numérique, les données à caractère personnel constituent
tout à la fois une marchandise, une menace pour la vie privée et une chance pour
l’innovation et la croissance. Presque trente ans après l’ouverture à la signature du premier
instrument international juridiquement contraignant dans le domaine de la protection
des données, à savoir la Convention n° 108 du Conseil de l’Europe pour la protection des
personnes à l’égard du traitement automatisé des données à caractère personnel, l’historien
Yuval Noah Harari a inventé le terme « dataïsme » pour décrire le « discours universel qui
légitime l’autorité des algorithmes et des mégadonnées » et qui constitue, selon lui, une
menace existentielle pour l’humanité.1
Il importe de préciser que les effets du régime de l’Union en matière de protection des
données se font ressentir bien au-delà des frontières de l’Union européenne.Non seulement
les nouvelles règles ont une portée mondiale, mais surtout elles ont agi, pour reprendre
les mots de feu Giovanni Buttarelli, ancien contrôleur européen de la protection des
données, « comme un appel de clairon pour l’établissement d’un nouvel étalon-or
numérique mondial ».2 En outre, non seulement le régime de l’Union constitue un modèle
pour la réglementation du traitement des données dans le monde entier, mais il alimente
1 Y.N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Penguin, 2017, p. 428
2 G. Buttarelli, « The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard », International Data
Privacy Law, Vol. 6, n° 2, 2016, p. 77.
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également d’autres initiatives au niveau de l’Union pour la réglementation éthique des
technologies, des données et de l’intelligence artificielle.3
Le présent volume est une première tentative d’inventorier la mise en œuvre,
l’application et l’interprétation du nouveau cadre réglementaire de l’Union pour la
protection des données. En tant que tel, il offre au lecteur une perspective comparative
unique et une vision d’ensemble et à jour des règles européennes de protection des données
dans les États membres, l’AELE et la Suisse. Dans leurs rapports respectifs, la rapporteure
généraleOrla Lynskey et les rapporteurs institutionnels,HerkeKranenborg etAnnaBuchta,
ont rassemblé les conclusions des rapports nationaux et ont donné une vue d’ensemble
des évolutions au niveau de l’Union.
En ma qualité d’éditeur du présent volume, j’ai eu l’honneur et le privilège de lire tous
les rapports avant le Congrès et d’être en contact étroit avec un grand nombre des experts
de ce domaine qui ont contribué à cette publication. Je souhaite les remercier pour leur
travail assidu et leur patience face aux délais à respecter et aux diverses demandes de
révision oud’informations supplémentaires. J’aimerais aussi remercier tout particulièrement
Carina van Os pour l’assistance rédactionnelle qu’elle a fourni.
Pour reprendre les propos de Mme Věra Jourová, ancienne Commissaire européenne
à la Justice, le RGPD est « encore […] un bébé qui grandit vite et est en bonne santé, mais
il faut que nous continuions à bien le nourrir ».4 Que le présent volume puisse constituer
un carburant pour cette réflexion.
Jorrit J. Rijpma
Professeur Jean Monnet, faculté de droit de l’université de Leyde
3 Voir, par exemple, la mise en place par la Commission européenne d’un groupe d’experts de haut niveau
sur l’intelligence artificielle: ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-
intelligence, page consultée le 1er février 2020.
4 Discours deMme la Commissaire européenneVěra Jourová, 13 juin 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_2999, page consultée le 1er février 2020.
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Begrüßung durch das Organisationskomitee
von FIDE 2020
Es war in einer kleinen Kneipe im Jahr 2012 am späten Abend als die Idee geboren wurde,
den FIDE-Kongress in dieNiederlande zu holen. EineGruppe niederländischer Juristinnen
und Juristen, die an dem alle zwei Jahre stattfindenden Kongress der Internationalen
Föderation für Europarecht (FIDE) – in 2012 in Estland – teilnahmen, hatte damals diese
kühne Idee. Acht Jahre später hat die Niederländische Vereinigung für das Europarecht
(NVER) die Ehre, die FIDE-Mitglieder in Den Haag zum XXIX FIDE-Kongress zu
begrüßen.Oder besser: Sie zumerneutenMal inDenHaagwillkommen zuheißen. Zweimal
zuvor tagte FIDE in der Stadt, die gleichzeitig niederländischer Regierungssitz ist: 1963
und 1984. Ähnlich wie die Europäische Union selbst hat sich Den Haag seit 1984 stark
verändert. Die Stadt ist gewachsen, ihre Skyline hat sich gewandelt und sie hat ihre Stellung
als internationale Stadt des Friedens und derGerechtigkeit gefestigt, auch dank der Präsenz
von Europol und Eurojust.
Der Einfluss vonFIDEalsOrganisation sowie von ihrenMitgliedern auf die Entwicklung
des EU-Rechts ist gut dokumentiert.1 Von Anfang an bildete FIDE einen einzigartigen,
länderübergreifendenVerbund, derwichtigeAkteure zusammenbrachte, die amFundament
der “neuen Rechtsordnung”2 arbeiteten, die das Europarecht als eigenständige Disziplin
ausgestalteten und die schließlich das “verfassungsmäßige” Verständnis des Gerichtshofs
vom EU-Recht auf den ersten Konferenzen in Den Haag (1963) und Paris (1965)
legitimierten.3
Währenddas EuroparechtAnfangder 1960er Jahre noch lange nicht sein volles Potential
ausgeschöpft hatte, mögen die Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer des FIDE-Kongresses
von 1984 den Vorrang und die direkte Wirkung des EU-Rechts als weitgehend geklärt
angesehen haben, zu einem Zeitpunkt, an dem die Europäischen Gemeinschaften das
Binnenmarktprojekt von Jacques Delors in Angriff nehmen sollten. Gleichzeitig konnten
sich diese Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer das exponentielle Wachstum im
1 J. Laffranque, ‘FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 Years of the International Federation for
European Law’, Juridica International XVIII, 2011, S. 173-181. Siehe auch: S. Lee Mudge & A. Vauchez,
‘Building Europe on aWeak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational Politics’AJS 118
(2012), Ausgabe 2, S. 449-492. Die spanische FIDE-Organisation des Jahres 2010 hat hier eine exzellente
Arbeit geleistet, indem sie einen Großteil des FIDE-Archivs für Mitglieder zugänglich gemacht hat: https://
www.fide-europe.org/members-login/, besucht am 1 Februar 2020.
2 Urteil vom 5 Februar 1963, Entscheidung 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van
Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
3 M. Rasmussen, ‘Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: The History of the Legal Service
of The European Executive, 1952-65, Contemporary European History 21 (2012), Ausgabe 3, S. 395.
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Dienstleistungsbereich und die spannenden – teilweise auch mit Gefahren behafteten –
Auswirkungen des Internets sowie neuer Technologien gewiss nicht vorstellen. Im Jahr
2020, nach langen Jahren verschiedenster Krisen, die die EU in ihren Grundfesten
erschüttert haben, scheint die Europäische Union FIDE erneut zu benötigen, damit diese
erneut als “wheeling flank of the army of European jurists “4 handeln kann. Aber auch um
eine Union, die auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit und gemeinsamen Werten beruht, welche den
FIDE-Mitgliedern sehr am Herzen liegen, besser zu verstehen, sie besser zu erklären und
zugleich zu verteidigen. In unserer modernen Gesellschaft ist die europäische
Zusammenarbeit nichtmehr nur eineMöglichkeit, sondern vielmehr eineNotwendigkeit.
Guten Traditionen folgend behandelt der XXIX. FIDE-Kongress drei Hauptthemen.
Für diese Themen haben namhafte generelle Berichterstatterinnen und Berichterstatter
Fragebögen zu aktuellen Rechtsfragen auf europäischer und nationaler Ebene erstellet.
Berichterstatterinnen undBerichterstatter der FIDE-Mitgliederverbände und ausgewiesene
Expertinnen und Experten der EU-Organe haben diese Fragebögen mit Länderberichten
und institutionellen Berichten beantwortet. Auf Grundlage dieses Inputs haben die
generellen Berichterstatterinnen undBerichterstatter einenGesamtbericht zu jedemThema
erstellt. Sie finden alle diese Berichte in den Kongresspublikationen zum XXIX.
FIDE-Kongress.
Während in den ersten Jahren noch der Juristische Dienst der Europäischen
Kommission FIDE gebeten hatte, über bestimmte Themen und Fragen zu berichten,5 ist
die aktuelle Auswahl der drei Hauptthemen das Ergebnis lebhafter Diskussionen. Die
Organisatoren des XXIX. FIDE-Kongresses nutzten die sehr hilfreichen Beiträge die durch
das FIDE-Präsidium, durch den niederländischen akademischen Verbund, sowie durch
Praktikerinnen und Praktiker, FIDE-Mitglieder, Kollegeninnen und Kollegen, sowie
Bekannte innerhalb der EU Organe und in den Mitgliedstaaten beigesteuert wurden. Die
drei Themen, die auf demFIDE-Kongress 2020 diskutiert werden, greifen einerseits einige
der klassischen Themenfelder des EU-Rechts auf und bringen gleichzeitig neue
Fragestellungen, die sich in einer modernen Gesellschaft ergeben, auf den Tisch. Unser
Ziel war es stets, sowohl Spezialistinnen und Spezialisten als auch allgemeine EU-Juristinnen
und -Juristen anzusprechen.
Die Themen, die für den FIDE-Kongress im Jahr 2020 ausgesucht wurden, lauten:
1. Nationale Gerichte und die Durchsetzung von EU-Recht: Die entscheidende Rolle
nationaler Gerichte in der Rechtsordnung der Europäischen Union.
2. Das neue EU-Datenschutzregime: Setzen globaler Standards für das individuelle Recht
auf Datenschutz.
4 A. de Vreese, ‘Droit communautaire et droit national’, 14 Cahiers de Bruges 14 (1985), Ausgabe 399, zitiert
in: A. Vauchez, ‘Brokering Europe: Euro-Lawyers and the Making of a Transnational Polity’, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2015, S. 137.
5 Rasmussen, 2012, S. 384.
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3. EU-Wettbewerbsrecht und die Digitalwirtschaft: Schutz von freiem und fairem
Wettbewerb in Zeiten von technischer (R)Evolution.
Die Publikationen zumXXIX. FIDE-Kongresses sind das Ergebnis derArbeit einerVielzahl
von EU-Rechtswissenschaftlerinnen und -Rechtswissenschaftlern, die sich im wahrhaft
europäischenGeiste zusammengetan haben, umden generellen Berichterstatterinnen und
Berichterstatter durchdie verschiedenennationalenBerichteAntworten auf ihre Fragebögen
zu geben.Die generellen Berichterstatterinnen undBerichterstatter haben die Erkenntnisse
aus den nationalen Berichten verglichen, ausgewertet und in ihren Generalberichten
zusammengeführt. Zusammen mit den institutionellen Berichten, die von Expertinnen
und Experten der EU-Organe verfasst wurden, und einem Sonderbericht über den
EWR-Gerichtshof stellen die Kongresspublikationen somit den aktuellen Wissensstand
zu den drei Themenfeldern des XXIX. FIDE-Kongresses dar.
Das Recht der Europäischen Union kann nicht isoliert betrachtet werden. Um einen
fächerübergreifenden “Law-in-Context”-Ansatz zu fördern, wurden europäische
Denkerinnen undDenker aus anderen Fachbereichen undDisziplinen – insbesondere aus
den Bereichen Geschichte, Politikwissenschaft und Wirtschaftswissenschaft – eingeladen,
aktiv zu den Sitzungen des XXIX. FIDE-Kongresses beizutragen, um gemeinsam über den
anstehenden Weg zu reflektieren. Nach Jahren des Aufruhrs stellt sich die folgende Frage:
Wird sich Europa einfach irgendwie durchschlagen oder gibt es Grund zur Hoffnung auf
ein neues europäisches Erwachen (einen „réveil”)? Für ein Europa, das in einer grünen
Revolution die Führung übernehmen kann, das sich weiterhin für den Schutz der
Grundrechte einsetzt und Wachstum und Innovation fördert?
Der in 2020 stattfindende FIDE-Kongress befasst sich auch mit der kritischen Rolle,
die nationale siwue europäische Richterinnen und Richter - die in vielen Mitgliedstaaten
unter verstärkter Kontrolle und unter Druck arbeiten - bei der Sicherung der Grundlagen
unsere Rechtsordnung spielen: nämlich, der Sicherung der imVertrag über die Europäische
Union aufgeführten Grundwerte.
Der Band, den Sie gerade in den Händen halten - oder gegebenenfalls auch auf Ihrem
Bildschirm lesen - dient als Beweis dafür, dass FIDE sowohl die Tradition pflegt als auch
die Zukunft im Auge hat. Von Anfang an haben wir versucht, eine neue Generation
europäischer Juristinnen und Juristen einzubeziehen. Die Umbenennung des vormaligen
Doktorandenseminars in “Young FIDE Seminar” zeugt von dem Bestreben, junge
EU-Juristeninnen und -Juristen aus einem breiten beruflichen Spektrum anzusprechen.
Zum ersten Mal wurden auch “Junge Berichterstatterinnen und Berichterstatter” gebeten,
dem FIDE-Kongress über die Diskussionen während des Young FIDE Seminars zu
berichten.
Wir freuen uns sehr, dass die Kongressprotokolle erneut der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich
gemacht werden können (“open access”).Wir danken allen unseren Berichterstatterinnen
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und Berichterstattern, unseren Bearbeiterinnen und Bearbeitern und dem Verlag recht
herzlich für die Ermöglichung dieser Publikation. Ebenso möchten wir diese Gelegenheit
nutzen, um allen Freiwilligen, Rednerinnen und Rednern, Sponsoren, dem Kongressbüro
und all denjenigen zu danken, die auf die eine oder andere Weise zur Durchführung des
XXIX. FIDE-Kongresses inDenHaag beigetragen haben.Wir hoffen, dass FIDEweiterhin
inspiriert, vereint und uns auf eine gemeinsame europäische Zukunft vorbereiten wird.
Das FIDE-Organisationskomitee,
Corinna Wissels (Präsidentin), Staatsrat in der Verwaltungsrechtsdivision des
Niederländischen Verfassungsrates
MarleenBotman (Koordinatorin des Rahmenprogramms), Rechtsanwältin bei Pels Rijcken
& Droogleever Fortuijn
Herman van Harten (Geschäftsführer), Richter am Amtsgericht Den Haag
Marlies Noort (Kassenwartin), Bevollmächtigte vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof,
Außenministerium der Niederlande
Jorrit Rijpma (Koordinator des wissenschaftlichen Programms), Jean Monnet Professor,
Universität Leiden, Juristische Fakultät (Leiden Law School)
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Vorwort des Bearbeiter
Vor Ihnen liegt Band 2 der XXIX. FIDE-Kongresspublikationen, der die allgemeinen,
institutionellen und nationalen Berichte zum Thema der neuen EU-Datenschutzregelung
beinhaltet.
Am 25. Mai 2018 trat der neue EU-Rechtsrahmen für den Schutz personenbezogener
Daten in Kraft. Er umfasst den Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung
personenbezogenerDatenunddieVorschriftenüber den freienVerkehr personenbezogener
Daten gemäß der Allgemeinen Datenschutzgrundverordnung (DSGVO) sowie die
Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten durch zuständige Behörden für die Zwecke der
Strafverfolgung gemäß der sogenannten Strafverfolgungsrichtlinie.
Obwohl es sich um einen sehr spezifischen Bereich des EU-Rechts handelt, wirft dieser
Themenbereich doch allgemeine Fragen der EU-Regulierung, der Governance, der
Durchsetzung und des Schutzes der Grundrechte auf. Es ist ein dynamischer Bereich, in
dem viel auf dem Spiel steht und der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union hat die
Bereitschaft erkennen lassen, sprichwörtlich seine Zähne zu zeigen.
Es ist ein Thema, das das Leben der Menschen und auch Unternehmen direkt berührt.
In einer zunehmend digitalisierten Welt stellen persönliche Daten gleichzeitig eine Ware,
eine Bedrohung der Privatsphäre und eine Chance für Innovation und Wachstum dar.
Fast dreißig Jahre nach dem das erste rechtsverbindliche internationale Instrument im
Bereich des Datenschutzes zur Ratifikation gestellt wurde, nämlich dem Übereinkommen
Nr. 108 des Europarates zum Schutz des Menschen bei der automatischen Verarbeitung
personenbezogener Daten, bezeichnet der Historiker Yuval Noah Harari den „Datismus”,
nämlich die „universelle Erzählung, die die Autorität von Algorithmen und großen Daten
legitimiert “, als eine existenzielle Bedrohung für die Menschheit.1
Bedeutsam ist ferner, dass dieAuswirkungen der EU-Datenschutzregelungenweit über
die Grenzen der Europäischen Union hinaus spürbar sind. Die neuen Regeln haben nicht
nur eine globale Reichweite, sondern sie fungieren auch, wie der vor Kurzem verstorbene
Europäische Datenschutzbeauftragte Giovanni Buttarelli sagte, als “ein Appell für einen
neuen globalen digitalenGoldstandard”.2 Darüber hinaus bilden die EU-Regelungen nicht
nur eine Anleitung für die Regulierung der Datenverarbeitung global, sondern sie treiben
1 Auf Englisch: „universal narrative that legitimises the authority of algorithms and Big Data”; Y.N. Harari,
Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Penguin, 2017, S. 428
2 Auf Englisch: „a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard”; G. Buttarelli, ‘The EU GDPR as a clarion
call for a new global digital gold standard, International Data Privacy Law 6 (2016), Ausgabe 2, S. 77.
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auch weitere Initiativen auf EU-Ebene für die ethische Regulierung von Technologie,
Daten und künstlicher Intelligenz voran.3
Dieses Band ist einVersuch, eine erste Bestandsaufnahme derUmsetzung, Anwendung
und Interpretation des neuen EU-Datenschutzrechtsrahmen zu erstellen. Als solches bietet
er den Leserinnen und Lesern eine einzigartige vergleichende Perspektive und einen
Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der Anwendung der EU-Datenschutzvorschriften
innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten, in dem EWR und in der Schweiz. Die generelle
Berichterstatterin,Orla Lynskey, unddie institutionellenBerichterstatter,HerkeKranenborg
und Anna Buchta, haben in ihren jeweiligen Berichten die Erkenntnisse der nationalen
Berichte sowie die entsprechenden Entwicklungen auf EU-Ebene zusammengetragen.
Als Bearbeiter dieses Bandes hatte ich die Ehre und das Privileg, alle Berichte vor dem
FIDE-Kongress lesen zu können und standmit vielen der Expertinnen undExperten dieses
Themenbereichs, die zu dieser Publikation beigetragen haben, in engem Kontakt. Ich
möchte ihnen für ihre harte Arbeit und ihre Geduld, insbesondere mit Blick auf die
Abgabefrist sowie auf verschiedenste Bitten um zusätzliche Bearbeitung oder Anfragen
zu zusätzlichen Informationen, danken. Ein besonderes Wort des Dankes gilt auch Carina
van Os für ihre redaktionelle Unterstützung.
Nach den Worten der ehemaligen Justizkommissarin Vera Jurová ist das DSGVO
„immer noch […] ein Baby, das schnell wächst und dem es gut geht. Aber wir müssen es
weiterhin gut ernähren.”4 In diesem Sinne, möge dieser Band als sinnbildliche geistige
Nahrung dienen.
Jorrit J. Rijpma
Jean Monnet Professor, Universität Leiden, Juristische Fakultät (Leiden Law School)
3 Siehe, zum Beispiel, die Einrichtung einer High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence durch die
Europäische Kommission: ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-
intelligence, besucht am 1 Februar 2020.
4 Auf Englisch: „still […] a baby that is growing fast and is doing well. But we need to continue to nurture it
well.”; Rede von Kommissarin Jurova, 13 Juni 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/SPEECH_19_2999, besucht am 1 Februar 2020.
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Questionnaire Topic 2: The New EU Data
Protection Regime
General Introduction
The newEUdata protection package entered into force inMay 2018, following a protracted
legislative process. The package comprised a General Data Protection Regulation
(Regulation 2016/679, GDPR) and a lesser-known Law Enforcement Directive (Directive
2016/680, LED). The GDPR, in particular, seeks to “Europeanise” data protection law and
to render it more effective: by introducing a regulation rather than a directive, an attempt
is made to minimise national divergence while significant new avenues for private redress
and public enforcement are introduced. Although the responsibility for public enforcement
of the framework lies primarily with national supervisory authorities (NSAs), the creation
of a new European body with the power to issue authoritative opinions and, in specific
cases, binding decisions has a centralising effect on data protection enforcement. The hope
is that the changes brought about by the GDPR will ultimately enhance the effectiveness
of the EU Charter rights to data protection and privacy. Yet, despite this shift towards a
truly European legal framework for data protection, and unusually for a regulation, the
GPDR leaves much responsibility to the national legislature, NSAs and courts.
This new regulatory framework raises substantive, procedural and institutional issues
that will of interest and relevance to general EU lawyers and those specialising in other
fields of substantive EU law.
Those with an interest in procedural and institutional matters will note that the GDPR
sets out detailed provisions on remedies, liability and penalties. These provisions specify
high administrative fines and provide for the possibility of criminal sanctions, as well as
introducing provisions providing for representative actions by non-profit organisations.
These detailed remedies, avenues for redress and sanctions will need to be accommodated
within the national legal system in a way that is compatible with the general principle of
national procedural autonomy. Moreover, the similarities between the enforcement
possibilities afforded by the GDPR and those applicable to financial services in the EU (in
particular, the power of an EU body to issue decisions binding on national regulators) will
not go unnoticed.
From a substantive perspective, the application of the EU Charter rights to data
protection and privacy has had a transformative effect on the fundamental rights landscape
in Europe. How the EU Charter has impacted upon domestic legal systems in this area as
well as the impact of the GDPR on other rights, such as freedom of expression, is therefore
1
covered in this questionnaire. Furthermore, the CJEU has been pushing the boundaries
of the Charter right to respect for privacy in the context of law enforcement. The relevance
of this jurisprudence to domestic national security interests, and thus issues of sovereignty,
remains contested.
Beyond these broader EU law questions, this questionnaire addresses issues that are
specific to the EU data protection framework. Although necessarily drafted in a technical
and legalistic manner, these issues are of fundamental societal interest. For example,
following the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, there has been renewed public
interest and debate regarding the handling and harvesting of our data by technology giants
and the bargainwe have entered intowith these actors (access to ‘free’ services in exchange
for this personal data processing, addressed in question 5). Similarly, whether individuals
should have a right to delete their data from the de facto public record (for instance, a
search engine service like Google) when there is a countervailing public interest in this
information is hotly contested and addressed in question eight.
The ambition of this questionnaire is to gauge how this new legal framework for data
protection has been received by all relevant actors at national level (most notably, Courts;
national Parliaments; national supervisory authorities; and civil society). This national
datawill then be used to inform the discussion of both the specific data protection questions
and the general EU law issues that the new legal framework entails.
This being so, this questionnaire is structured around four key areas of inquiry:
A Setting the Scene
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National Legal Order
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
A Setting the Scene
The GDPR is unusual in so far as it is a Regulation that leaves significant scope for the
national legislature to avail of the flexibilities incorporated in many provisions.
1 Please identify and describe themain national legal instruments that have been introduced
to implement the GDPR. In particular, outline how these instruments avail of the most
notable flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR (in, for example, Article 6(1)(c); Article
23 and 86-90 GDPR) and what oversight role the national supervisory authority (NSA)
exercises in relation to these instruments.
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The EU Charter is unique amongst international human rights instruments in so far as it
incorporates distinct provisions to protect the right to respect for private life and the right
to data protection (Articles 7 and 8 EU Charter).
2 Does your national legal order differentiate between these rights? Has the EU Charter
right to data protection influenced the interpretation of national law?
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National Legal
Order
While EDPB guidelines should minimise divergence between Member States on the
interpretation of the GDPR’s substantive provisions, even in this situation the possibility
remains that the acceptance of the EDPB’s findings remain contested at national level (for
instance, by the judiciary; by other relevant regulators; by academics; or, by civil society
and the media). It is for this reason that the following questions are asked.
GDPR Responsibilities
Many of the safeguards, or ‘principles’, relating to data processing remain unchanged from
the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Yet, the meaning and practical impact of critical
principles remains underdeveloped with limited guidance, to date, from the Court of
Justice of the EU (CJEU).
3 How have data controllers interpreted and applied the principles of ‘fair’ processing;
purpose limitation and ‘data minimisation’? Has the NSA applied these principles and
have they been interpreted by domestic courts?
The Article 29 Working Party provided an Opinion on the use of ‘legitimate interests’ as
a legal basis for data processing and, more recently guidelines on the concept of consent
(endorsed by the EDPB).
4 How have these legal bases – ‘consent’ and ‘legitimate interests’ – arguably the most
significant yet opaque in the digital environment – been interpreted by national courts?
Most digital services and content offered to Internet users are offered for
free-at-the-point-of- access to end-users. This service or content is then subsidised through
the provision of online behavioural advertising tailored to the user based on a profile
generated through the processing of their personal data. In this way, personal data becomes
the indirect counter-performance or ‘payment’ for the provision of the ‘free’ digital content
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or service. Article 7(4) GDPR stipulates that, in situations where consent is used to justify
personal data processing, when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account
should be taken of whether the performance of a contract is made conditional on consent
to the processing of unnecessary data. Similarly, Article 6(1)(b) provides that processing
is lawful when ‘it is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject
is party’ (emphasis added).
5 Has there been debate or decision at national level regarding the validity of personal data
as ‘counter-performance’ for the provision of digital content?
GDPR Rights
The GDPR seeks to render existing rights (such as the right of access to data by the data
subjects) more effective by specifying their meaning while introducing one ‘brand new
right’, a right to data portability.
6 Article 22 provides for a right not to be subject to automated decision-making, including
profiling. Article 22(2)(b) allows Member States to introduce legislative measures to
ensure this right does not apply in certain situations. Have such legislative measures been
introduced and, if so, what measures to safeguard the rights, freedoms and legitimate
interests of data subjects do they incorporate?
7 How has the right to erasure (Article 17), or its Data Protection Directive predecessor
(Directive 95/46 EC, Article 12) been applied at national level by search engines, the NSA
or Courts?
8 The GDPR allows Member States to legislate to reconcile the right to data protection
with freedom of expression (Article 85). Has your state introduced a law pursuant to
Article 85(2) GDPR and, if so, how has this been interpreted and applied to date?
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
The GDPR revolutionises the enforcement of data protection in Europe. On the one hand,
it introduces a new EU body, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) with the power
to adopt authoritative opinions and, ultimately, even binding decisions on any matter of
general application or producing effects in more than one Member State.1 On the other
hand, it introduces an array of new remedies and penalties, including significant
administrative sanctions and the possibility for collective redress. The interaction between
1 This results from a combined reading of Article 64(2) and Article 65(1)(c) GDPR.
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these new provisions and existing national procedural rules is likely to be complicated. It
is against this backdrop that the following questions are asked.
NSAs are the guardians of the GDPR: they are tasked with the role of monitoring its
application and contributing to the consistency of such application.
9 Identify the relevant public authority (or authorities) in your Member State. Outline its
composition; the appointment process for members and staff; any additional power or
duties the NSA is entrusted with under national law; and, provide relevant details
regarding its ‘enforcement record’ under the GDPR.
The GDPR provides individuals with a right to lodge a complaint before a supervisory
authority and states that the supervisory authority shall inform the complainant on the
progress and outcome of that complaint. Some commentators have advocated that
supervisory authorities should adopt a ‘selective to be effective’ approach to complaints
by triaging them to focus resources on the most significant (for instance, in terms of scale
or legal precedent).
10 What strategy for complaint-handling is taken by your NSA andwhat, if any, constraints
does domestic law place on such a strategy?
The GDPR provides Member States with new mechanisms to sanction data protection
infringements, including the power to impose correctivemeasures (Article 58(2)), enhanced
administrative fines (Article 83) and the possibility to impose ‘other penalties’ (Article 84
GDPR).
11 How have these sanctions been applied by your NSA, and what additional sanctions
have been adopted at national level in addition to those explicitly provided for by the
GDPR?
The GDPR provides that data subjects should be compensated for damages suffered for
tangible and intangible harm (Article 82).
12 Has your legal system historically awarded damages for intangible harm (in this area or
others)? If so, how are such damages calculated?
Data processing operations in the online environment in particular can be characterised
by information and power asymmetries between data controllers and data subjects. The
GPDR seeks tomitigate these asymmetries by providing for the possibility of representative
actions pursuant to Article 80 GDPR.
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13 Has your Member State introduced legislative measures to facilitate such representative
actions?What role have NGO’s played in data protection enforcement in your State and
are there any alternative movements emerging at national level (such as personal data
cooperatives or unions) to combat such asymmetries?
As personal data has both an economic and a dignitary value there is an increasing trend
for regulators beyondNSAs to intervene in data processing related complaints (for instance,
competition authorities and consumer protection authorities). Moreover, in some states
new regulatory bodies for the Internet and/or Artificial Intelligence are proposed.
14 Have these trends been visible in your Member State? In particular, has the NSA
cooperated with other regulators or an ombudsperson formally or informally?
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Both theGDPR and the LawEnforcementDirective exclude from their scope of application
personal data processing for ‘national security’ purposes. The Law Enforcement Directive
seeks, for the first time, to regulate the domestic data processing operations of law
enforcement authorities. The dividing line between law enforcement activities, within the
Directive’s scope, and national security activities, outside its scope, may therefore give rise
to contestation at national level.
15 Is ‘national security’ defined in your domestic law or administrative practice? Have
national authorities accepted the application of the EU Charter to data retention for
national security purposes (following from the Tele 2 and Watson judgments)?
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Questionnaire Thème 2: Le Nouveau Régime de
Protection des Données de l’UE
Introduction générale
Le nouveau paquet de l’Union en matière de protection des données est entré en vigueur
en mai 2018 à la suite d’un long processus législatif. Le paquet comprend un règlement
général sur la protection des données (règlement 2016/679, ci-après le « RGPD ») et une
directive sur l’application de la législation (directive 2016/680, ci-après la « DAL »). Le
RGPD vise notamment à « européaniser » le droit en matière de protection des données,
ainsi que le rendre plus effectif. L’introduction d’un règlement, au lieu d’une directive,
envisage de réduire les divergences nationales en ce qui concerne les dispositions de fond.
Également, le RGPD introduit des instruments essentiellement nouveaux pour la mise en
vigueur, y compris des recours par des parties privées et des fonctions des autorités de
contrôle publics. Bien que la responsabilité pour le contrôle des instruments juridiques
fait surtout partie de la mission des autorités de contrôle nationales, la création d’un nouvel
organisme européen ayant le pouvoir de rendre des avis ayant de l’effet juridique et, dans
les circonstances spécifiques, des décisions contraignantes a la conséquence de centraliser
le respect de la protection des données. Il est à espérer que les changements apportés par
le RGPD augmenteront au final l’effectivité des droits à la protection des données et au
respect de la vie privée prévus par la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne
(ci-après « la Charte »). Pourtant, malgré cette évolution vers un cadre juridique vraiment
européen de la protection des données, et de façon inhabituelle pour un règlement, le
RGPD laisse une grande responsabilité au législateur national, aux autorités nationales
chargées de la protection des données (ci-après les « autorités nationales ») et aux tribunaux.
Ce nouveau cadre réglementaire soulève des questions procédurales, de fond et des
questions institutionnelles qui seront intéressantes tant pour les juristes généraux de droit
de l’Union que pour ceux spécialisés dans des domaines spécifiques substantiels du droit
de l’Union.
Les personnes ayant un intérêt pour les questions procédurales et institutionnelles
remarqueront que le RGPD contient des dispositions particulières concernant les voies
de recours, responsabilités et sanctions. Ces dispositions prévoient des amendes
administratives élevées et permettent que les états membres introduisent des sanctions
pénales. En plus, les états membres sont en mesure de prévoir des actions par des
organisations non gouvernementales représentatives. Ces voies de recours, responsabilités
et sanctions détaillés devront être adaptées au système juridique national de sorte qu’elles
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soient compatibles avec le principe général de l’autonomie procédurale. En outre, les
similarités existant entre les possibilités d’exécution forcée prévues par le RGPD et celles
applicables aux services financiers dans l’Union (notamment le pouvoir accordé à un
organe de l’Union de prendre des décisions contraignantes envers les autorités nationales
de régulation) ne passeront pas inaperçues.
Sur le fond, l’application de la Charte à la protection des données et de la vie privée a
transformé le paysage des droits fondamentaux en Europe. Le questionnaire couvre donc
la façon dont la Charte a modifié les systèmes juridiques internes dans ce domaine, ainsi
que l’incidence du RGPD sur d’autres droits tels que la liberté d’expression. En outre, le
juge de l’Union a repoussé les limites du droit au respect de la vie privée prévu par la Charte
dans le contexte de l’application de la loi. La pertinence de cette jurisprudence pour les
intérêts nationaux en matière de sécurité et donc pour les questions de souveraineté reste
contestée.
Au-delà de ces questions larges de droit de l’Union, le présent questionnaire traite
également de questions spécifiques au cadre de protection des données de l’Union. Bien
que ces questions soient rédigées d’une façon nécessairement technico-juridique, ses
questions présentent un intérêt sociétal certain. Par exemple, à la suite du scandale
Facebook-Cambridge Analytica l’intérêt et le débat publics ont été renouvelés quant à la
gestion et la récolte de nos données par des géants technologiques et quant au marché
conclu avec ces acteurs (à savoir l’accès à des services « gratuits » en échange du traitement
de ces données personnelles, point qui est traité par la question 5). De même, la question
de savoir si les particuliers doivent avoir le droit d’effacer leurs données du registre public
de fait (par exemple, un service de moteur de recherche comme Google) lorsqu’il existe
un intérêt public à accéder à cette information est vivement contestée et sera traitée dans
la question 8.
Le présent questionnaire ambitionne d’évaluer la manière dont ce nouveau cadre
juridique pour la protection des données a été reçu par les différents acteurs au niveau
national (en particulier, les juridictions, les parlements nationaux, les autorités nationales
de régulation et la société civile). Ces données nationales seront ensuite utilisées pour
éclairer tant la discussion relative aux questions spécifiques en matière de protection des
données que celle relative aux questions générales de droit de l’Union que le nouveau cadre
réglementaire suscite.
Cela étant, le présent questionnaire est structuré autour de quatre grands sujets:
A Présentation du contexte
B Réception des dispositions de fond du RGPD dans l’ordre juridique national
C Application interne de la législation en matière de protection des données
D Traitement de données pour des motifs de sécurité nationale
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A Présentation du contexte
Le RGPD est un règlement atypique en ce qu’il accorde au législateur national une marge
significative lui permettant de se prévaloir de la souplesse prévue dans de nombreuses
dispositions.
1 Merci d’identifier et de décrire les principaux instruments juridiques qui ont été introduits
pourmettre enœuvre le RGPD.Merci d’exposer notamment la façon dont ces instruments
utilisent les principalesmarges demanœuvre permises par le RGPD [notamment à l’article
6, paragraphe 1, sous c), l’article 23 et aux articles 86 à 90 du RGPD] et de préciser quel
rôle de surveillance joue l’autorité nationale de contrôle concernant ces instruments.
La Charte est un cas unique parmi les instruments internationaux de protection des
droits humains en ce qu’elle contient des dispositions distinctes pour protéger le droit
au respect de la vie privée et le droit à la protection des données (articles 7 et 8 de la
Charte).
2 Votre ordre juridique national établit-il une distinction entre ces deux droits? Le droit
à la protection des données prévu par la Charte a-t-il influencé l’interprétation de votre
droit national?
B Réception des dispositions de fond du RGPD dans l’ordre juridique
national
Même si les lignes directrices du Comité européen de la protection des données (ci-après
le « CEPD ») devraient minimiser les divergences entre États membres, la possibilité
demeure que les conclusions du CEPD soient contestées au niveau national (par le pouvoir
judiciaire, par d’autres autorités de régulation, par des universitaires ou encore par la
société civile ou les médias). C’est pourquoi les questions ci-dessous sont posées.
Obligations au titre du RGPD
Un grand nombre des garanties ou « principes » relatifs au traitement des données reste
inchangé par rapport à la directive de 1995 sur la protection des données. Pourtant, la
signification et l’incidence pratique de principes critiques demeurent insuffisantes et, les
indications fournies à ce jour, par le juge de l’Union, sont limitées.
3 De quelle façon les responsables du traitement des données ont-ils interprété et appliqué
les principes du « traitement loyal », de limitation des finalités et de minimisation des
données? L’autorité nationale de contrôle a-t-elle appliqué ces principes et ces derniers
ont-ils été interprétés par les juridictions internes?
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Le groupe de travail de l’article 29 a rendu un avis sur l’utilisation des « intérêts légitimes
» comme fondement juridique pour le traitement des données, ainsi que des lignes
directrices sur le consentement (approuvé par le Comité européen de la protection des
données)
4 De quelle façon ces fondements juridiques – le « consentement » et les « intérêts légitimes
» – qui sont sans doute les plus importants (malgré le flou qui les entoure dans un
environnement numérique) sont-ils interprétés par les juridictions nationales?
La grande partie des services et contenus numériques offerts aux utilisateurs d’Internet
sont accessibles gratuitement par l’utilisateur final. Ce service ou contenu est ensuite
subventionné au moyen d’une publicité comportementale en ligne personnalisée à
l’utilisateur sur la base d’un profil généré par le traitement de ses données personnelles.
Ainsi, les données personnelles deviennent la contrepartie ou la « rémunération » de la
fourniture du contenu ou service numérique « gratuit ». L’article 7, paragraphe 4, du RGPD
prévoit que lorsque le consentement est utilisé pour justifier un traitement de données
personnelles, au moment de déterminer si le consentement est donné librement, il y a lieu
de tenir le plus grand compte de la question de savoir si l’exécution d’un contrat est
subordonnée au consentement au traitement de données à caractère personnel qui n’est
pas nécessaire à l’exécution dudit contrat. De même, l’article 6, paragraphe 1, sous b),
dispose que le traitement est licite lorsqu’il « est nécessaire à l’exécution d’un contrat auquel
la personne concernée est partie » (mise en italique par nos soins).
5 Un débat a-t-il eu lieu ou une décision a-t-elle été prise, au niveau national, quant à la
validité du transfert de données personnelles comme « contrepartie » à la fourniture de
contenus numériques?
Droits au titre du RGPD
Le RGPD vise à rendre plus effectifs des droits existants (comme le droit d’accéder à ses
propres données personnelles) en précisant leur signification et en introduisant un nouveau
droit, à savoir le droit à la portabilité des données.
6 L’article 22 prévoit le droit de ne pas faire l’objet d’une décision fondée sur un traitement
automatisé, y compris le profilage. L’article 22, paragraphe 2, sous b), autorise les États
membres à légiférer pour écarter l’application de ce droit, dans certaines circonstances.
Une telle législation a-t-elle été mise en place et, dans l’affirmative, quelles mesures pour
la sauvegarde des droits, libertés et des intérêts légitimes de la personne concernée
contient-elle?
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7 Le droit à l’effacement (article 17), ou son prédécesseur issu de la directive de 1995 sur
la protection des données (article 12 de la directive 95/46/CE,), comment a-t-il été appliqué
au niveau national par les moteurs de recherche, les autorités nationales de contrôle ou
les tribunaux?
8 Le RGPD permet aux États membres de légiférer pour concilier le droit à la protection
des données et le droit à la liberté d’expression (article 85). Votre État a-t-il adopté une
loi au titre de l’article 85, paragraphe 2, du RGPD et, dans l’affirmative, comment a-t-elle
été interprétée et appliquée jusqu’à présent?
C Application interne de la législation en matière de protection des
données
Le RGPD révolutionne la mise en œuvre de la protection des données en Europe. D’une
part, il crée un nouvel organe de l’Union, à savoir le Comité Européen de la Protection
desDonnées qui est compétent pour adopter des avis avec effet juridique et, ultérieurement,
des décisions contraignantes concernant toute questiond’application générale ouproduisant
des effets dans plusieurs États membres1. D’autre part, il introduit un éventail de nouvelles
voies de recours et de nouvelles sanctions, notamment des sanctions administratives
significatives et la possibilité de recours collectifs. L’articulation entre ces nouvelles
dispositions et les règles procédurales nationales existantes risque de se révéler complexe.
C’est dans ce contexte que les questions suivantes sont posées.
Les autorités nationales de contrôle sont les gardiens du RGPD: elles sont chargées de
contrôler son application et de contribuer à la cohérence de cette application.
9 Veuillez, d’abord, identifier l’autorité (ou les autorités) publique pertinente dans votre
État membre. Merci, ensuite, d’exposer brièvement sa composition, la procédure
d’embauche du personnel et de préciser si, en application du droit national, des pouvoirs
ou obligations additionnels sont confiés à l’autorité nationale de contrôle. Veuillez, enfin,
donner les détails pertinents concernant son bilan en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre
du RGPD.
Le RGPD accorde aux particuliers le droit d’introduire une réclamation auprès d’une
autorité de contrôle et précise que cette autorité doit informer l’auteur de la réclamation
de l’état d’avancement et de l’issue de l’enquête. Certains commentateurs ont estimé que
1 Cela résulte d’une lecture combinée de l’article 64, paragraphe 2, et de l’article 65, paragraphe 1, sous c),
du RGPD.
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les autorités de contrôle devraient retenir, au nomd’une plus grande efficacité, une approche
sélective des réclamations. Selon eux, il conviendrait de trier les réclamations et de
concentrer les ressources des autorités sur les plus importantes (par exemple, en termes
de taille ou de précédent judiciaire qui sera fixé à cette occasion).
10 Quelle stratégie a retenu votre autorité nationale de contrôle, en termes de gestion des
réclamations, et quelles contraintes éventuelles le droit national a-t-il imposé à cette
stratégie?
Le RGPD prévoit au profit des États membres de nouveaux mécanismes permettant de
sanctionner les infractions aux règles sur la protection des données, y compris le pouvoir
d’imposer desmesures correctrices (article 58, paragraphe 2,), des amendes administratives
plus élevées (article 83) et la possibilité d’infliger d’ « autres sanctions » (article 84).
11 Comment ces sanctions ont-elles été appliquées par votre autorité nationale de contrôle
et quelles sanctions additionnelles ont été adoptées au niveau national en plus de celles
prévues expressément par le RGPD?
Le RGPD prévoit que les personnes concernées ayant subi un dommage matériel ou moral
ont le droit d’obtenir réparation du préjudice subi (article 82).
12 La réparation d’un dommage moral est-elle possible dans votre système juridique (dans
ce domaine ou dans un autre)? Si tel est le cas, comment les dommages et intérêts alloués
sont-ils calculés?
Les opérations de traitement de données en ligne se caractérisent par des asymétries, en
termes de pouvoirs et d’informations, entre les responsables du traitement des données et
les personnes concernées par ce traitement. Le RGPD cherche à atténuer ces asymétries
en prévoyant à son article 80 la possibilité d’actions représentatives.
13 Votre État membre a-t-il légiféré pour faciliter ces actions représentatives? Quel rôle ont
joué les ONG dans l’application des règles en matière de protection des données dans
votre État et existe-t-il desmouvements alternatifs nouveaux au niveau national (comme
par exemple des syndicats ou coopératives dédiés à la protection des données à caractère
personnel)?
Dans la mesure où les données personnelles ont à la fois une valeur économique et une
valeur en termes de dignité humaine, il existe une tendance grandissante chez certains
régulateurs autres que les autorités nationales de contrôle à intervenir dans les réclamations
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relatives à un traitement de données (par exemple, les autorités de concurrence ou les
autorités en charge de la protection des consommateurs).
14 Cette tendance existe-t-elle dans votre État membre? En particulier, votre autorité
nationale de contrôle a-t-elle collaboré, formellement ou informellement, avec d’autres
autorités de régulation ou avec le médiateur?
D Traitement de données pour des motifs de sécurité nationale
Le RGPD et la DAL excluent de leur champ d’application le traitement des données
personnelles pour des motifs de « sécurité nationale ». La DAL a pour objet de réglementer,
pour la première fois, les opérations internes de traitement des données par les services
répressifs. La ligne de partage entre, d’une part, les activités répressives relevant du champ
d’application de la directive et, d’autre part, les activités relatives à la sécurité nationale ne
relevant pas de son champ d’application, pourrait donner lieu à des contestations au niveau
national.
15 La notion de « sécurité nationale » est-elle définie dans votre droit national ou dans la
pratique administrative interne? Les autorités nationales ont-elles accepté d’appliquer
la Charte à la conservation des données pour des motifs de sécurité nationale [à la suite
de l’arrêt du 21 décembre 2016, Tele2 Sverige et Watson e.a. (C–203/15 et C–698/15,
EU:C:2016:970)]?
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Fragebogen Thema 2: Das Neue
EU-Datenschutzregime
Allgemeine Einführung
Nach einem langjährigen Gesetzgebungsprozess ist im Mai 2018 das neue
EU-Datenschutzpaket in Kraft getreten. Das Paket umfasst die
EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung (Verordnung 2016/679, nachfolgend: DSGVO) sowie
die weniger bekannte Umsetzungsrichtlinie für den Bereich Justiz und Inneres (Richtlinie
2016/680, nachfolgend: JI-Richtlinie). Ziel, insbesondere der DSGVO, ist sowohl eine
Europäisierung als auch ein effektiverer Datenschutz: Durch die Einführung einer
Verordnung anstelle einer Richtlinie wurde der Versuch unternommen nationale
Abweichungen zu minimieren, während gleichzeitig neue Möglichkeiten privater Abhilfe
sowie öffentlich-rechtlicher Rechtsdurchsetzung eingeführt werden. Obwohl die
Verantwortung für die öffentlich-rechtliche Durchsetzung des Rechtsrahmens in erster
Linie bei den nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden liegt, hat die Gründung einer neuen
EU-Datenschutzbehörde, mit der Befugnis maßgebliche Stellungnahmen zu verfassen
sowie in bestimmten Fällen sogar bindende Entscheidungen zu treffen, einen
zentralisierenden Effekt für die datenschutzrechtliche Rechtsdurchsetzung. Ferner besteht
dieHoffnung, dass durch diemit derDSGVOeingeführtenVeränderungen schlussendlich
das Recht auf Datenschutz und das Recht auf Privacy – niedergelegt in der
EU-Grundrechtecharter – effektiver geschützt werden können. Trotz dieser Entwicklung
hin zu einem einheitlichen EU-Rechtsrahmen im Datenschutz, überträgt die DSGVO,
anders als bei EU-Verordnungen eigentlich üblich, den nationalen Gesetzgebern,
Datenschutz-Aufsichtsbehörden und Gerichten weitreichende Verantwortung.
Dieser neue Regulierungsrahmen wirft materiell-rechtliche, verfahrensrechtliche und
institutionelle Fragen von Bedeutung für allgemeine EU-Juristen sowie Spezialisten in
speziellen materiellen EU-Rechtsfeldern auf.
Diejenigenmit einembesonderen Interesse an verfahrensrechtlichenund institutionellen
Fragen werden feststellen, dass die DSGVO detaillierte Vorschriften über allgemeine
Rechtmittel, Haftungsfragen sowie mögliche Strafen enthält. Diese Vorschriften listen
hohe Bußgelder und sehen strafrechtliche Sanktionen sowie Verbandsklagen von
gemeinnützigenOrganisationen vor. Diese detaillierten allgemeinenRechtsmittel, Abhilfe-
und Sanktionsmöglichkeiten müssen, unter Berücksichtigung mitgliedsstaatlicher
Verfahrensautonomie, in die nationale Rechtsordnung integriert werden. Außerdem fällt
auf, dass die Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten unter der DSGVO deutliche Ähnlichkeit mit
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den einschlägigen Vorschriften für Finanzdienstleistungen (insbesondere die Befugnisse
einer zentralen EU-Einrichtung einheitliche Entscheidungen zu treffen) aufweisen.
Materiell-rechtliche gesehen, hat die Anwendung des Rechts auf Datenschutz und des
Rechts auf Privacy, die jeweils in der EU-Grundrechtecharta niedergelegt sind, einen
umgestaltendenEffekt auf dieEuropäischeGrundrechtslandkarte gehabt.Deshalb behandelt
dieser Fragebogen auch den Einfluss, den die EU-Grundrechtecharta auf die nationale
Rechtsordnung in diesemBereich sowie den Einfluss derDSGVOauf andereGrundrechte,
einschließlich derMeinungsfreiheit, hat. Darüber hinaus hat der EuropäischeGerichtshof
(EuGH) die Grenzen des Privatsphäreschutzes im Sinne der EU- Grundrechtecharta im
Bereich der Rechtsdurchsetzung verschoben. Die Bedeutung dieser Rechtsprechung für
nationale Sicherheitsfragen, und somit auch für die nationale Souveränität, bleibt weiterhin
umstritten.
Neben diesen allgemeinen EU-rechtlichen Fragenwidmet sich dieser Fragebogen auch
bestimmten Problemen, die spezifisch für den EU-Datenschutzrahmen sind.Obwohl diese
notwendigerweise in einer technischen und legalistischen Weise gefasst sind, sind die
grundsätzlichen Fragen doch von erheblicher gesellschaftlicher Relevanz. Wie z.B. das
gesteigerte öffentliche Interesse und die anhaltende Debatte nach dem
Facebook-Cambridge-Analytica-Skandal über die Nutzung und das Sammeln unserer
Daten durchTechnologiegiganten – sowie dasGeschäft in daswirmit diesenUnternehmen
eingestiegen sind (Zugang zu „freien”Dienstleistungen imGegenzug für dieVerarbeitung
unserer personenbezogenen Daten – welches in Frage 5 thematisiert wird) – zeigt. Ferner
wird die Frage, ob Privatpersonen ein Recht auf das Löschen ihrer Daten aus dem de facto
öffentlichen Register (wie z.B. einer Suchmaschine wie Google) haben, wenn ein
entgegenstehendes öffentliches Interesse an diesen Informationen geltend gemacht wird,
hitzig debattiert und in diesem Fragebogen unter Frage 8 behandelt.
Die Bestrebung dieses Fragebogens ist es herauszuarbeiten, wie dieses neue
datenschutzrechtliche Regelwerk durch die maßgeblichen Vertreter auf nationaler Ebene
auf- und angenommenwird (vor allem vonGerichten, nationalen Parlamenten, nationalen
Aufsichtsbehörden, und der Zivilgesellschaft). Die gesammelten nationalen Informationen
werden dann verwendet, um eine Diskussion über sowohl die datenschutzspezifischen als
auch die allgemeinen EU-rechtlichen Fragen, die durch das neue Regelwerk aufgeworfen
werden, zu stimulieren.
Der Fragebogen ist entsprechend in vier Kernbereiche unterteilt:
A Setting the Scene – Weichenstellung
B Die Annahme von materiell-rechtlichen DSGVO-Vorschriften in der nationalen
Rechtsordnung
C Nationale Durchsetzung von Datenschutzrecht
D Datenverarbeitung für nationale Sicherheitsbelange
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A Setting the Scene – Weichenstellung
Die DSGVO eröffnet dem nationalen Gesetzgeber erhebliche Umsetzungs- und
Ermessensspielräume durch viele teils äußerst flexible Vorschriften, welches als
grundsätzlich eher untypisch bei EU-Verordnungen angesehen werden kann.
1 Frage 1:Bitte benennen und erläutern Sie die wichtigsten nationalen Rechtsinstrumente,
die eingeführt wurden, um die DSGVO umzusetzen. Gehen Sie insbesondere darauf ein,
wie diese Instrumente mit der Flexibilität umgehen, die durch die DSGVO eingeräumt
wird (z.B. in Artikel 6 (1) (c); Artikel 23 und 86-90 DSGVO), sowie die Aufsicht, die
durch die nationale Aufsichtsbehörde über diese Instrumente ausgeübt wird.
Die EU-Grundrechtecharta unterscheidet sich von anderen internationalen
Menschenrechtsinstrumenten dadurch, dass die Charta spezielle Vorschriften über den
Schutz des privaten Lebens und den Datenschutz beinhaltet (nämlich in Artikel 7 und 8
EU-Grundrechtecharta).
2 Frage 2: Unterscheidet Ihre Rechtsordnung zwischen diesen beiden Rechten? Hat das
Recht auf Datenschutz aus der EU-Grundrechtecharta die Interpretation des nationalen
Rechts beeinflusst?
B Die Annahme von materiell-rechtlichen DSGVO-Vorschriften in der
nationalen Rechtsordnung
Obwohl die LeitliniendesEDSA (EuropäischerDatenschutzausschuss) eine unterschiedliche
Interpretation der materiellen Vorschriften der DSGVO zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten
minimieren sollen, besteht die Möglichkeit, dass die Befunde des EDSA auf nationaler
Ebene infrage gestellt werden (beispielsweise durch die Judikative; durch andere
Regulierungsbehörden; durch Akademiker; oder, durch Zivilgesellschaft und Medien).
Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die nachfolgenden Fragen gestellt.
DSGVO Verantwortlichkeiten
Viele der Schutzmaßnahmen, oder besser der „Grundsätze”, des Datenschutzrechts sind
seit der Datenschutzrichtlinie von 1995 unverändert geblieben. Trotzdem bleiben die
genaue Bedeutung und die praktische Wirkung von wichtigen Grundsätzen in diesem
Bereich bis heute ungenau, auch aufgrund nur begrenzter Orientierungshilfe durch die
Rechtsprechung des EuGHs.
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3 Frage 3: Wie haben die für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen die Grundsätze der
„Verarbeitung nach Treu undGlauben”, der Zweckbindung und derDatenminimierung
interpretiert und angewendet? Wurden diese Grundsätze von den nationalen
Aufsichtsbehörden angewendet undwurden diese durch nationale Gerichte interpretiert?
Die Artikel-29-Datenschutzgruppe hat eine Stellungnahme bezüglich der Verwendung
von „berechtigten Interessen des für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen” als
Rechtsgrundlage für die Datenverarbeitung und schließlich Leitlinien zum Konzept der
Einwilligung (gebilligt durch den EDSA) veröffentlicht.
4 Frage 4:Wiewurden diese Rechtsgrundlagen – „Einwilligung”und „berechtigte Interessen”
– wohl die wichtigsten und gleichzeitig undurchsichtigsten Grundlagen in der
Digitalwirtschaft – durch nationale Gerichte interpretiert?
DiemeistenDienstleistungen und Inhalte, die im Internet angebotenwerden, werden dem
Endnutzer frei zugänglich angeboten („free-at-the-point-of-access-to-end-users). Diese
Dienstleistungen und Inhalte werden durch das Vorhalten von zielgerichteter Werbung,
die genau auf den Nutzer auf Basis seines Onlineverhaltens und der Verarbeitung seiner
personenbezogenen Daten abgestimmt ist, finanziert. Somit werden personenbezogene
Daten dieGegenleistung oder „Bezahlung” für das Bereitstellen von „kostenlosen” digitalen
Inhalten oder Dienstleistungen. Artikel 7 (4) DSGVO legt für Situationen, in denen die
Einwilligung genutzt wird um die Verarbeitung von personenbezogenen Daten zu
rechtfertigen, fest, dass bei der Bestimmung der Freiwilligkeit der Einwilligung ein
besonderes Augenmerk darauf gelegt werden muss, ob der Vertrag von der Verarbeitung
nicht relevanter Daten abhängt. Vergleichbar legt Artikel 6 (1) (b) DSGVO fest, dass die
Verarbeitung rechtmäßig ist, wenn sie „für die Erfüllung eines Vertrags, dessen
Vertragspartei die betroffene Person ist, oder zur Durchführung vorvertraglicher
Maßnahmen erforderlich [ist]” (eigene Hervorhebung).
5 Frage 5: Gab es auf nationaler Ebene eine Debatte oder eine Entscheidung über die
Rechtmäßigkeit der Verwendung von personenbezogenen Daten als „Gegenleistung” für
die Bereitstellung von digitalen Inhalten?
DSVGO Rechte
Die DSGVO versucht bereits bestehende Rechte (wie beispielsweise das Auskunftsrecht
betroffener Personen) durch eine genauere Bestimmung des Regelungsinhaltes effektiver
zu gestalten und führt zugleich ein „brandneues Recht” ein, nämlich das Recht auf
Datenübertragbarkeit.
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6 Frage 6: Artikel 22 DSGVO beinhaltet das Recht nicht „einer ausschließlich auf einer
automatisierten Verarbeitung – einschließlich Profiling – beruhenden Entscheidung
unterworfen zuwerden”. Artikel 22 (2) (b) DSGVO erlaubt esMitgliedstaaten gesetzliche
Vorschriften zu erlassen um zu bestimmen, dass dieses Recht in gewissen Situationen
keine Anwendung findet. Wurden solche gesetzlichen Vorschriften erlassen, und falls ja,
welche Vorkehrungen beinhalten diese Vorschriften um die Rechte, Freiheiten und
berechtigten Interessen der betroffenen Personen zu schützen?
7 Frage 7:Wie wurde das Recht auf Löschung (Artikel 17), oder dessen Vorgänger aus der
Datenschutzrichtlinie (Richtlinie 95/46/EG, Artikel 12), auf nationaler Ebene durch
Suchmaschinen, nationale Aufsichtsbehörden oder Gerichte angewendet?
8 Frage 8: Die DSGVO erlaubt es Mitgliedsstaaten gesetzliche Vorschriften zu erlassen,
um das Recht auf Datenschutz mit dem Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung in Einklang
zu bringen (Artikel 85 DSGVO). Hat Ihr Mitgliedsstaat ein Gesetz auf Basis von Artikel
85 (2)DSGVOerlassen, und falls ja, wie wurde dieses bisher interpretiert und angewendet?
C Nationale Durchsetzung von Datenschutzrecht
DieDSGVO revolutioniert die Durchsetzung desDatenschutzrechts in Europa. Einerseits
wird durch die DSGVO eine neue EU-Behörde gegründet, nämlich der Europäische
Datenschutzausschuss (EDSA)mit der Befugnismaßgebliche Stellungnahmen zu verfassen
und, schlussendlich, in bestimmten Fällen sogar bindende Entscheidungen über
Angelegenheiten allgemeiner Bedeutung sowie Angelegenheiten die mehr als nur einen
Mitgliedsstaat betreffen zu treffen.1 Andererseits führt die DSGVO eine große Anzahl
neuer Rechtsmittel und Strafen, insbesondere hohe Bußgelder sowie die Möglichkeit
kollektiven Rechtsschutzes, ein. Das Zusammenspiel dieser neuen Vorschriften mit den
bestehenden nationalen Verfahrensregeln wird sich höchstwahrscheinlich kompliziert
gestalten. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die folgenden Fragen gestellt.
Nationale Aufsichtsbehörden sind die Hüter der DSGVO: sie sind mit der Aufgabe
betraut die Anwendung der DSGVO zu überwachen und ihrerseits zur einheitlichen
Anwendung ebendieser beizutragen.
9 Frage 9: Identifizieren Sie die einschlägige öffentliche Behörde (oder die einschlägigen
öffentlichen Behörden) in Ihrem Mitgliedsstaat. Skizzieren Sie ihre Zusammensetzung;
die Verfahrensregeln für die Benennung von Mitgliedern und Mitarbeitern; jegliche
weitere Befugnisse oder Pflichten, die der Aufsichtsbehörde durch nationales Recht
1 Dieses resultiert aus Artikel 64 (2) in Kombination mit Artikel 65 (1) (c) DSGVO.
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auferlegt werden; und, stellen Sie, soweit möglich, die relevanten Details zur
„Rechtsdurchsetzungsbilanz” unter der DSGVO zur Verfügung.
Die DSGVO sichert Privatpersonen ein Beschwerderecht bei den Aufsichtsbehörden zu
und führt aus, dass die Aufsichtsbehörden den Beschwerdeführer über den Stand und den
Ausgang der Beschwerde informierenmüssen. Einige Kommentatoren haben befürwortet,
dass die Aufsichtsbehörden eine „selective to be effective”-Vorgehensweise (sprich eine
selektive Vorgehensweise um größtmögliche Effizienz zu erzielen) bei Beschwerden
anwenden sollten, sodass durch diese Priorisierung (z.B. auf Grund von Ausmaß oder
rechtlicher Präzedenz) vorhandene Resources gezielt eingesetzt werden können.
10 Frage 10: Welche Strategie wird von der Aufsichtsbehörde in Ihrer Rechtsordnung mit
Blick auf die Behandlung von Beschwerden verfolgt und, falls einschlägig, welche
Einschränkungen werden diesen Strategien durch nationales Recht auferlegt?
Die DSGVO bietet Mitgliedsstaaten neue Mechanismen um Datenschutzverstöße zu
ahnden, welches insbesondere Abhilfebefugnisse (Artikel 58 (2) DSGVO), erweiterte
Geldbußen (Artikel 83DSGVO) und andere Sanktionsmöglichkeiten (Artikel 84DSGVO)
umfasst.
11 Frage 11:Wiewurden diese Sanktionsmöglichkeiten durch die Aufsichtsbehörde in Ihrer
Rechtsordnung angewendet, undwelche weiteren Sanktionen, die über die in der DSGVO
explizit vorgesehenenMöglichkeiten hinausgehen, wurden auf nationaler Ebene erlassen?
Die DSGVO bestimmt, dass betroffene Personen für erlittene materielle und immaterielle
Schäden entschädigt werden müssen (Artikel 82 DSGVO).
12 Frage 12:Werden in Ihrer Rechtsordnung traditionell immaterielle Schäden kompensiert
(in diesem oder in anderen Bereichen)? Falls ja, wie wird ein solcher Schaden genau
bestimmt?
Datenverarbeitungstätigkeiten, besonders im digitalen Bereich, sind durch eine
Informations- undMachtasymmetrie zwischen denDatenverarbeitern undden betroffenen
Personen gekennzeichnet. Die DSGVO versucht diese Asymmetrie durch das Vorsehen
von kollektivem Rechtsschutz in Artikel 80 DSGVO abzumindern.
13 Frage 13: Hat Ihr Mitgliedsstaat gesetzliche Regelungen getroffen um diesen kollektiven
Rechtsschutz zu vereinfachen? Welche Rolle haben Nichtregierungsorganisationen bei
der Datenschutzrechtsdurchsetzung in Ihrem Land gespielt und bilden sich alternative
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Bewegungen auf nationaler Ebene (wie beispielsweise Vereine oder Vereinigungen für
personenbezogene Daten) um gegen diese Asymmetrie vorzugehen?
Durch sowohl denwirtschaftlichenWert als auchdenWürdegehalt vonpersonenbezogenen
Daten ergibt sich die zunehmende Tendenz, dass andere Regulierungsbehörden, neben
den speziellen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden, ebenfalls einschreiten (beispielsweise
Wettbewerbsbehörden oder Verbraucherschutzbehörden). Außerdem wird in manchen
Ländern angedacht neue Regulierungsbehörden für das Internet und für künstliche
Intelligenz zu schaffen.
14 Frage 14: Sind diese Tendenzen auch in Ihrem Mitgliedsstaat sichtbar? Haben
insbesondere die nationalenAufsichtsbehördenmit anderen Regulierungsbehörden oder
Ombudspersonen formell oder informell zusammengearbeitet?
D Datenverarbeitung für nationale Sicherheitsbelange
Sowohl die DSGVO als auch die JI-Richtlinie schließen die Verarbeitung von
personenbezogenen Daten aus Gründen der „nationalen Sicherheit” explizit von ihrem
Anwendungsbereich aus. Zum ersten Mal versucht die JI-Richtlinie nunmehr die
Datenverarbeitungstätigkeiten von Rechtsdurchsetzungsbehörden zu regulieren. Die
genaue Trennlinie zwischen Rechtsdurchsetzungshandlungen, welche vom
Anwendungsbereich der Richtlinie umfasst sind, und nationalen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen,
die außerhalb dieses Bereichs liegen, kann zu Streit auf nationaler Ebene führen.
15 Frage 15: Wird der Begriff „nationale Sicherheit” im nationalen Recht oder in der
Verwaltungspraxis Ihrer Rechtsordnung definiert? Haben nationale Behörden die
Anwendung der EU-Grundrechtecharta auf die Vorratsdatenspeicherung aus nationalen
Sicherheitsgründen akzeptiert (welches sich aus denUrteilenTele 2 undWatson ergibt)?
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The EU first enacted data protection rules in 1995. These rules attracted little attention
from EU lawyers for almost two decades. The inclusion of a right to data protection in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”) was an
early indicator that change was afoot. By the time the EU Commission published its
proposals for legislative reform in 2012, data protection was well on its way to a more
prominent position amongst EU policy areas. In the intervening period, “data protection”
has been catapulted into the spotlight as a result of factors such as technological changes
bringing about further datafication, and data-related scandals involving household names
such as Facebook.
Thus, the EU’s legislative package, comprised of aGeneralData ProtectionRegulation1
(hereinafter “GDPR”) and a lesser-discussed Law Enforcement Directive (hereinafter
“LED”),2 which entered into force in May 2018, has generated much debate in scholarly
and practitioner communities and, unusually for EU law instruments, amongst the general
population.
The design of this questionnaire provided an early opportunity to gauge how the
primary and secondary law framework that constitutes “EU data protection law” has been
received in domestic legal orders. While there are many aspects of the GDPR that merit
critical analysis, the questionnaire focused on those aspects where developments were
most likely to occur at national level.
Informing these questions were two background considerations.
* Associate Professor of Law, LSE; Visiting Professor, College of Europe (Bruges). With sincere thanks to
Katie Nolan, LSE PhD candidate, for her research assistance with questions 2, 3, 4 and 6.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L 119/89.
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The first relates to the ostensibly “technical” nature of data protection law. The creation
of a new EU body, the EDPB, with the power to issue binding decisions, may give the
impression that data protection is a technocratic area of law where clear standards are
applied in a manner that is objectively verifiable. However, in reality, the opposite is true.
Personal data, and its protection, raises fundamental issues of an economic, social and
political nature that cannot be clearly dissociated from the application of the law.
A second consideration relates to the perceived gap between the high level of substantive
protection provided for by the data protection framework, in particular the jurisprudence
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”), and the reality on the
groundwhere data abuses remainprevalent and enforcement action byNational Supervisory
Authorities (hereinafter “NSAs”) appears to be limited.
In order to shed light on these issues, the report sought to assess how Member States
had availed of the flexibilities offered by the GDPR (Questionnaire Section A and B) and
how they reconciled data protection with other rights and interests (Questionnaire Section
B and D). It also probed the changes to the public and private domestic enforcement
apparatus brought about by the GDPR (Questionnaire Section C).
The detailed national reports and Institutional Report proved to be treasure troves of
qualitative data in drafting this report and merit further reading. In particular, the
Institutional Report provides a clear and informative complement to this General Report.
Insights from these reports are integrated throughout this report. As they have not yet
been paginated, quotes and content are not cited. Where references are made to content
contained in national reports, the relevant national report is indicated and the content
relates to the question being discussed (unless otherwise specified). Similarly, where
references are made to legal provisions (for instance article 23) they refer to the GDPR
unless otherwise specified. This report has not sought to complement these reports by
conducting additional research into domestic legal systems but rather has attempted to
put the domestic developments documented into their broader European context.
1 Please identify and describe themain national legal instruments that have been introduced
to implement the GDPR. In particular, outline how these instruments avail of the most
notable flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR (in, for example, article 6(1)(c); article 23
and 86-90 GDPR) and what oversight role the national supervisory authority (NSA)
exercises in relation to these instruments.
Introduction
The GDPR offers considerable routes to flexibility for Member States containing over 50
direct or indirect references to national law. One key theme that emerges from the reports
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is that there is significant variation in the extent to which Member States chose to avail of
this margin of appreciation, In France, the use of such discretion is “moderate” whereas
in Germany the GDPR’s opening clauses are used “extensively”. In Finland, the aim of the
government was to use opening clauses and exemptions to preserve the current legal
situation, in particular in the insurance sector and with regard to freedom of speech.
Similarly, in theNetherlands an attempt has beenmade to retain existing national standards
and the status quo in order “to enable a smooth transition from the old to the new regime”.
In Austria and the Czech Republic there was an explicit attempt to prevent “gold-plating”
of theGDPR rules by takingmaximumadvantage of the flexibilities afforded by the regime.
As theCzech report notes, the goal was to ensure that the “regulatory burden” on companies
was not increased.
While it is not possible to outline exhaustively the ways in which this flexibility has
been used, some commonalities across reports are identified.
Article 23 and data protection “restrictions”
Article 23(1) provides that Union or Member State law applying to a data controller may
restrict the scope of obligations and rights in article 34, articles 12 to 22 and the
corresponding principles in article 5. This restriction should occur “by way of legislative
measure”, it should respect the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms and it should
be a “necessary and proportionate” measure in a democratic society to safeguard one of
ten enumerated objectives. These objectives include “public security” and “the protection
of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others”. Article 23(2) requires that the
legislative measure should contain specific provisions, where relevant, at least as to matters
such as the purposes of the processing, the safeguards to prevent abuse and the risks to
the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
Implicit in this provision, as the Dutch report notes, is the idea that the right to data
protection is not absolute and must be balanced with other rights and interests. Indeed,
article 23(1) mirrors the wording – and conditions – of article 52 of the Charter.
The way in which this provision has been received into national law reflects broad
differences in approaches between Member States. In some, limitations on specific rights
for particular purposes are foreseen in the domestic legislation. For instance, in France
there is no right to information if personal data have not been collected directly from the
data subject for certain processing relating to the oversight and collection of taxes.
Alternatively, some Member States reproduce the text of article 23 with minor tweaks.
This is the case in theNetherlands, where the domestic law is almost identical to theGDPR
with one deviation: it does not allow for a restriction of article 5 (the principles relating to
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personal data processing) or article 22 (the prohibition on automated decision making,
including profiling). Similarly, in the Czech Republic the domestic act allows for the
restriction of all the obligations and rights in articles 12-22 and article 5 with regard to all
kinds of processing provided the exceptions are necessary and proportionate measures to
safeguard the interests listed in article 23(1).
In both the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, the Explanatory Memorandum and
AccompanyingAct (respectively) indicate that this general provisionmay be supplemented
by sector-specific legislation ormore precise rules providing guidance on how the exception
applies in concrete cases. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch Act highlights that
the provision does not provide a basis for “structural and categorical restrictions of the
rights of data subjects” whereas the only safeguard provided for by the Czech Act is that
the controller must report every such restriction to the Czech NSA.
The former approach – specifying restrictions to particular rights in specific contexts,
as in France – is in line with article 23 and the broader vision of EU fundamental rights it
reflects: fundamental rights should be restricted only when necessary and proportionate
and respecting their essence. The Dutch approach appears to achieve this same objective
through a different means, assuming that “structural and categorical” rights restrictions
are not tolerated in practice and that specific legislative measures will provide for required
safeguards. However, the Czech approach appears incompatible with the wording of the
GDPR, which explicitly requires Member States to introduce restrictions by way of a
legislative measure and through article 23(2) to specify further information regarding the
restriction. The Czech report notes this tension but justifies the catch-all approach taken
as follows:
It seems practically impossible to explicitly and specifically cover all the necessary
exceptions for all the possible types of processing in the national law.Moreover,
the obligation to report these restrictions to the NSA should pave the way to
settled administrative practice and case law with regards to the more common
types of processing.
In some Member States it is apparent that the NSA plays a role in scrutinising the way in
which the legislature makes use of this discretion. In Ireland, for instance, where ministers
make regulations pursuant to article 23, these regulations must undergo a consultation
with the NSA. If the minister proceeds with the legislation despite observations to the
contrary from the NSA, a written explanation must be provided. Similarly, in Malta the
minister responsible for data protection can provide for restrictions pursuant to article 23
provided that the minster for Justice is in agreement and following a consultation with the
domesticNSA. It is notable in both these instances that the “legislativemeasure” introduced
is a regulation and that the NSA is consulted but its opinion is not binding.
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Flexibility dispersed within the text
Beyond article 23, many other GDPR provisions allow some flexibility for Member States.
Two of the most frequently cited examples are set out.
First, a novelty of the GDPR was that it introduced specific legislative provisions
applicable to the processing of children’s personal data. Article 8 sets out specific rules
for the consent of a child to the offer of “information society services”, providing that:
Where the child is below the age of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to
the extent that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over
the child.
However, article 8(1) also allows Member States to provide for a lower age limit provided
that it is not below 13 years. This provision prompted a necessary discussion on the
appropriate balance between the autonomy and privacy of children and their protection.3
The UK’s NSA has, for instance, introduced an age appropriate code of practice for
information society services pursuant to a statutory obligation.
There is wide divergence amongst Member States when it comes to the age chosen. It
is likely that reports that have not commented on this issue have adhered to the default
age of 16. In many of the reports, the minimum age of 13 is noted.4 The Finnish report,
for instance, cites the government proposal claiming that 13 year olds are generally already
accustomed to using information society services and that these services are an important
platform for self-expression and are also used for schoolwork.
In France an interesting hybrid approach has been adopted. If the child is under the
age of 13, consent can only be provided by the personwith parental authority (as is required
by the GDPR); between 13 and 15 consent must be jointly given by the minor and the
person with parental authority; and over 15 the minor can give sole consent. The French
government as well as the French Conseil Constitutionnel have justified “double consent”
based on the wording of article 8(2) which makes a distinction between consent “given”
and “authorised” by the holder of parental responsibility. This interpretation could be
queried, as the French report notes.
Second, recital 27 states that the GDPR does not apply to the processing of deceased
persons’ personal data. However, it leaves the possibility open for Member States to
provide for rules for the processing of deceased persons’ personal data. Several Member
States have availed of this possibility. In Estonia and Hungary, the national reports indicate
3 M. Stoilova et al, ‘Children’s data and privacy online: growing up in a digital age’ (2019, London: LSE):
http://www.lse.ac.uk/my-privacy-uk/Assets/Documents/Childrens-data-and-privacy-online-report-for-
web.pdf, all webpages referred to where last visited on 1 February 2020.
4 Belgium; Estonia; Finland; Portugal; Norway. In Greece, 15 is the relevant age.
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that specific rules apply or rules apply to a limited extent following the death of a data
subject. In Bulgaria, the domestic rules require a legal basis for the processing of personal
data of deceased persons. Moreover, controllers are obliged to take appropriate measures
to ensure that the rights and freedoms of others or a public interest are not adversely
affected. It also provides that the heirs of the deceased person, or other persons with a
“legitimate interest” are entitled to get access to the personal data of a deceased person.5
Pre-existing provisions also exist in Portugal and in France.
Observations
This small insight into how Member States have availed themselves of the flexibilities
offered by theGDPR lays bare one of the challenges of data protection regulation in Europe.
Although the decisionwasmade to replace a directive with a regulation, this is no ordinary
regulation. As we will see below (questions 7 and 8), the reception of these opening clauses
into domestic legal orders – their implementation we might say – will lead to significant
substantive divergences between the laws of the Member States.
Not only does this challenge the Regulation’s ambition for a uniform regulatory
environment in Europe, it also makes the domestic legal framework incredibly complex.
Manydomestic laws combineGDPRprovisionswith the “implementation”of these opening
clauses and the LED. Some, such as Hungary, also include provisions on matters outside
the scope of EU law within the same legislation. This convoluted legal landscape challenges
the accessibility of the law: the Czech report notes that “the Act itself is somewhat difficult
to understand for the common citizen”, the Italian law involves “difficulties of
interpretation” while the French law is described as “difficult to read bordering on
unintelligible”.
2 Does your national legal order differentiate between these rights? Has the EU Charter
right to data protection influenced the interpretation of national law?
Introduction
The Charter is distinct amongst international instruments being the first to incorporate
distinct provisions relating to the right to respect for private life and the right to data
protection (articles 7 and 8Charter).Moreover, as the Institutional Report notes, the CJEU
5 E.Harbinja, ‘Post-mortem privacy 2.0: theory, law and technology’, International Review of Law, Computers
and Technology, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2017, p. 26.
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has invoked these provisions to dramatic effect to declare several Union instruments invalid
and provide a negative opinion on a draft international agreement.
Distinct rights: in search of a common constitutional tradition?
Despite the separation of data protection from the right to respect for private life in the
Charter, a significant number of Member States either do not acknowledge data protection
as a right at all (for instance, Bulgaria and Slovakia) or, if they do, they treat is as a subset
of the right to privacy.6 Yet a similar number of States have in their constitutional
frameworks a distinct right to the protection of personal data alongside protection of the
right to privacy.7 These Member States can be distinguished in the following ways.
Contrasting specific and general approaches
Some countries prescribe very specific protections, while others express the right in more
general terms. In Poland the right is framed in quite specific terms. The Polish Constitution
explicitly establishes the right to data protection. Thus, article 51(1) provides that “No one
may be obliged, except on the basis of statute, to disclose information concerning his
person”. Article 51(2) controls the use of information by public authorities, prohibiting
them to “acquire, collect normake accessible information on citizens other than that which
is necessary in a democratic state ruled by law”.
In Germany, by contrast, there is a constitutionally protected general personality right
“which ensures for the individual a right to a protected space for free development”.
Alongside this right, there is also a judicially created right to data protection.
The Czech Republic protects a free-standing right in its domestic Charter. Article 10(3)
of the domestic Charter explicitly provides for protection against unauthorised collection,
publication or othermisuse of personal data. This appears to be a halfway house approach:
it ismore specific than article 8 of the EuropeanConvention onHumanRights (hereinafter
“ECHR”) but less detailed than the Charter. Yet, as the report notes in domestic
jurisprudence, it is this right that is referenced rather than international alternatives, and
it is viewed as a sort of semi-independent right to informational self-determination.
Established versus modern rights
Portugal has the distinction of being the first written constitution in theworld to recognise
the protection of personal data as a fundamental right, including this right amongst its
6 In particular, such an approach is seen in Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Malta, the Netherlands and
Switzerland.
7 Namely, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and
Spain.
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provisions since its approval in 1976. The original article was entitled “Use of computerised
data”. It provided for a set of fundamental rights related to data processing through
automated means that was intended to ensure informational self-determination.
Interestingly, this constitutional provision was amended in 1997 to adjust to European
secondary legislation, the Data Protection Directive (hereinafter “DPD”), by extending its
material scope to the processing of personal data other than by automated means.
Spain andAustria have both recognised the right to personal data since 1978. InAustria,
a fundamental right to data protection was introduced in 1978 and exists alongside article
8 ECHR,which has constitutional status inAustria. TheAustrianConstitution also protects
othermore specific communications privacy rights such as the Secrecy of Correspondence
(article 10) and Telecommunications secrecy (article 11).
In Spain, the Constitution of 1978 explicitly acknowledged the protection of personal
data within the privacy right. However, the Spanish Constitutional Court clarified the
distinct nature of the right to data protection in a landmark ruling of 2000 that confirmed
its autonomous character. Hungary is also amongst the Member States that was an “early
adopter” of the right to data protection, enshrining this right in its Constitution for the
first time in 1989.
These long-standing rights can be contrasted with more recent additions to national
constitutional landscapes. In Croatia, a distinct constitutional right to data protection was
introduced by amendment in 1997. Article 37, guaranteeing the “safety and secrecy of
personal data”, provides that, in the absence of consent, processing may only be done
under conditions specific for law. Article 37 also provides for a strict form of purpose
limitation, requiring: “The use of personal data contrary to the express purpose of their
collection shall be prohibited”.
In Greece, explicit protection for personal data was introduced in 2001 under article
9A of the Constitution. Article 9 protects the right to private and family life, while the
article 9A specifically protects the right to protection of personal data. Separate,
constitutionally independent administrative authorities are responsible for the protection
of the differentiated legal rights conferred by articles 9 and 9A. Article 9A, which belongs
to the new generation of “e-rights”, focuses on electronic data processing, but also covers
non-automated, conventional processing by traditional means.
Reliance on the Charter
The Spanish report notes that, even prior to the Charter acquiring binding status in 2009,
the Spanish Constitutional Court had relied on it, and other international texts, when
confirming the autonomous character of the right to data protection. It is therefore
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interesting to consider what, if any, impact the Charter rights have had at national level
over the following two decades later.
A number of Member States have not yet seen any explicit reliance on the Charter.8
Some insights into why this is the case can be gleaned from the reports. In Bulgaria the
Charter continues to be viewed as an “exotic instrument” compared to the ECHR while
in Austria the Charter is perceived as having no additional value on top of existing
constitutional protection. Norway’s particular status as a European Free TradeAssociation
(hereinafter “EFTA”) state to which the Charter does not apply has meant these rights
have not yet had any influence, however an indirect interpretative effect based on the
incorporation of CJEU Charter case law by Norwegian courts and authorities is not ruled
out.
However, in themajority ofMember States, the Charter and the judgments of the CJEU
interpreting articles 7 and 8 have had some, often considerable, impact.9 Even in Member
States where there was a pre-existing right to data protection, such as the Czech Republic
and Portugal, the Charter has been regularly invoked. In particular, the Charter rights
have been used as a benchmark to assess the legality of domestic legislative provisions. For
instance, in Slovenia the Charter has been invoked alongside domestic constitutional
provisions to declare a provision of the Protection of Documents and Archives Act
unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court decided that submission and retention of
materials of psychiatric institutions containing sensitive personal data on psychiatric
treatment to a public archive to make this material available to the public implies an
interference with the patients’ constitutional rights to the protection of personal data,
privacy and the inviolability of personal dignity. In so finding, the Constitutional Court
referred to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and the CJEU’s Schecke and Eifert decision.10
Interestingly,NSAs have also referred to theCharter in their decisions and deliberations.
In Poland, the “independence” ofNSAs referred to in article 8(3) Charter, as well as relevant
CJEU jurisprudence (such as Commission v Hungary11), was the subject of discussions
during the work on provisions to regulate aspects of the NSA’s functioning. Even more
notable is a decision of the Luxembourg NSA that considered the “essence” of the right to
data protection. The decision concerned a legislative bill that proposed introducing
restrictions to certain GDPR rights in the fiscal field on the basis of article 23(2). The aim
of this legislative bill was to restrict the scope of these rights in a proportionate way so as
not to hinder tax collection by the administration through direct contributions. The NSA
noted in its opinion that the limitations adopted must respect the essence of the right to
8 Austria; Bulgaria; Denmark; Germany; Hungary.
9 Finland; France; Ireland; Poland; Portugal; Slovenia.
10 Judgment of 9 November 2010 in Joined Cases C-92/09 and 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and
Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662.
11 Judgement of 8 April 2004 in Case C-288/12, European Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
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data protection. However, according to the NSA, the legislative bill nullified the essence
of the right to data protection by limiting the rights guaranteed by the GDPR in their
entirety.
Elucidating the meaning of these rights
It is clear that theCharter rights to privacy and data protection, and theCJEU jurisprudence
interpreting them, have been playing an important role at national level. Some Member
States nevertheless continue to treat data protection and privacy as synonymous despite
their separate enumeration in the Charter. The Belgian Constitutional Court, for instance,
considers that the Charter rights are “analogous in scope to article 8 ECHR”. Indeed, the
distinction between the two rights has not yet been clearly elucidated by the CJEU in its
jurisprudence, as hinted at by the German report, which suggests that the interpretation
of article 8 “raises questions of its own”.
There has beenmuch doctrinal debate about this question, withmany important issues
remaining unresolved.12 Some of this is reflected in the national reports. The Spanish
Constitutional Court considers the rights to be distinct in their scope, with the right to
data protection being wider than the right to respect for private life as it protects data in
the public domain. Moreover, it considers that data protection gives individuals “a group
of positive powers to control personal information”. The ultimate objective of this broad
reach and enhanced control is hinted at in the Luxembourg report, which notes that the
Charter right to data protection has inspired a proposal to include a right to informational
self-determination anddata protection in theConstitution.As the report notes, the principle
of informational self-determination based on the values of human dignity and autonomy
is recognised in the academic literature to have an inextricable link with data protection.
However, as it also notes, the consequences of anchoring this right at constitutional level
remain unclear. The same can be said, for the moment, about the anchoring of a right to
data protection at primary law level in the EU.
3 How have data controllers interpreted and applied the principles of “fair” processing,
purpose limitation and “data minimisation”? Has the NSA applied these principles and
have they been interpreted by domestic courts?
12 G. González Fuster & H. Hijmans, ‘The EU right to privacy and personal data protection: 20 years in 10





The principles of “fair” processing, purpose limitation and data minimisation constitute
core data protection principles that are common to many data protection frameworks
worldwide13 and formed a key pillar of EU data protection law in the 1995 Directive.
Nevertheless, despite their centrality to the data protection regime, there has been little
jurisprudence to inform the application of these principles. Moreover, the (former) Article
29 Working Party, an advisory body comprised of representatives of domestic NSAs,
provided guidance only on the concept of purpose limitation. The principle of fairness, in
particular, is enigmatic from a legal perspective and has only in recent years attracted the
attention of academics, primarily, yet not exclusively, in the context of automated decision
making where there is a growing “fair, transparent and accountable” machine-learning
community.14
It is therefore surprising, yet reassuring, to note from the national reports that while
judicial findings regarding these principles remain rare, a rich decisional practice from
NSAs applying these principles exists, some aspects of which will be highlighted.
Before doing so, it is worth noting that in transposing the 1995Directive someMember
States failed to directly incorporate some principles at national level. In Slovenia, we are
told that the former data protection law did not directly include a data minimisation
principle, albeit that the report suggests that domestic courts tried to plug this gap. In
Germany, a principle of “data economy” was in place rather than data minimisation.
Similarly, as discussed below, in many Member States the principle of fairness was not
directly incorporated into national law. In Poland, the controller’s obligation is expressed
to be one of “due diligence” (although the Polish translation of the Directive referred to
fairness). The Polish report suggests however that in practice this duty of “due diligence”
in processing data served as a synonym for “fairness”. What will be interesting to consider
is how in the future these pre-existing – and distinct – domestic concepts will affect the
interpretation of the GDPR principles at national level.
Data minimisation
The principle of data minimisation provides that personal data shall be “adequate, relevant
and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are to be
13 L.A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014,
chapter 5.
14 See, for instance, J. Ausloos & D. Clifford: ‘Data Protection and the Role of Fairness’, Yearbook of European
Law, Vol. 37, 2018, p. 130.
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processed”.15 What emerges from the reports about this principle are examples of
assessments arising in the context of complaints or queries regarding the extent of data
collection necessary for certain purposes. The reports reflect a fact-based assessment of
compliance with data minimisation, taking into consideration the purpose for which the
data is being processed.
Several examples arise in the context of employee data processing by employers. In
Italy, the NSA used its power to ban data processing in the context of employee-related
data through the use of vehicle tracking systems. In Croatia, the NSA was asked to consider
whether it is lawful for employers to send employee biographies to potential clients in
Croatia and abroad. The NSA concluded that the data that can be included in such a
transfer must be limited to information relating strictly to the professional experience and
knowledge of employees.
The processing of employee personal data (including gender, sexual orientation and
ethnicity) to prevent workplace discrimination for promotions, salaries and other was
deemed by the NSA to be incompatible with data protection law in Sweden. This was
upheld on appeal with the court finding that the information gatheredwould not constitute
a large enough dataset to serve its stated purposes. As a result, this led to the unnecessary
storage of highly personal information. Further, the court considered the information
collected to be too wide relative to the stated purpose and that the need to store the data
in the long term clashed with storage minimisation.
The processing of national identification data in inappropriate circumstances has also
led to a number of notable decisions. For example, in Hungary a recent, post-GDPR
decision of theNSA reviewed the check-in requirements for a festival. The festival collected
the personal data of festival-goers during mandatory security screenings by making copies
of IDs and taking photos at the entry gate. The NSA found that the scope of data processed
(including citizenship, number and ID expiration dates, date of birth and gender) was
excessive in relation to the purpose of the processing. The retention period of one year
was also deemed excessive.
The Czech Constitutional Court also recently annulled part of the law that required
the tax identification number (corresponding with the national identification number) of
the seller or service provider to be stated on every receipt.
It is interesting to note that dataminimisation does not entitle the data subject to specify
specific data security or dataminimisationmeasures, according to theAustrianNSA. Thus,
there is no right to have data pseudonymised for instance.




Purpose limitation means that data is be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not processed further in a manner incompatible with those purposes.16
Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, for scientific or historical research
purposes or for statistical purposes is deemed to be compatible.17 Guidance on how the
“compatibility” element of this principle is to be interpreted when the processing is not
based on consent or compliance with a legal requirement is found in article 6(4).
Sometimes a breach of this principle is evident. For instance, the Eastern High Court
of Denmark held that the purpose limitation principle was violatedwhen a real estate agent
used his access to a credit information system to obtain and pass on information about a
local politician’s unpaid debt. Equally, in Belgium the use of personal data obtained from
a neighbourhood watch WhatsApp group to send personal election materials was deemed
to infringe purpose limitation.
In the majority of cases however a more context-specific assessment is required. The
Danish NSA considered a case concerning an insurance company that sought access to
recordings and observations from inside the policyholder’s home when the policyholder
made a claim. The NSA held that the use of such recordings may be justified in order to
fulfil the stated purposes however in this situation there was no information on whether
the policyholder’s activities within the home were relevant to the case. In the Czech
Republic, a complaint was raised about companies using publicly available registers, such
as the land register, for advertising purposes. The NSA decided that not all the data from
such registers can be fully used formarketing and commercial purposeswithout the consent
of the data subject.
The Norwegian Supreme Court has arrived at the obvious yet important finding that
the existence of a legal basis, in situ legitimate interests, does not relieve the controller of
the obligation to comply with all data processing principles, including purpose limitation.
In the case before it, a driver who had been dismissed because of discrepancies between
his time sheets and the electronic (GPS) log of his vehicle requested damages for
non-economic loss pursuant to data protection law. The Supreme Court’s majority
concluded that reusing information collected for a purpose other than the original one
cannot be justified on the basis of legitimate interests of the controller alone. Rather, the
principle of purpose limitation must also be satisfied. In that case, the employer’s
comparison of the log and the time sheets represented a reuse that was incompatible with
the original purpose of data collection. The Court held that the data processing was
unlawful, even though the legitimate interest test was apparently satisfied.
16 Art. 5(1)(b) GDPR.
17 Ibid.
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The various visions of fairness
The principle of fairness can be difficult to articulate. While “fairness” is a well-established
benchmark in consumer protection law,18 resort to this concept in other areas of law has
been more controversial.19 A primary point of contention is whether the concept is so
nebulous or subjective as to impede legal certainty. Nevertheless, the reports provide ample
evidence of the application of this concept at national level. The Slovenian report, for
instance, notes that the most frequent infringement investigated in recent years has been
the violation of this principle.
Looking at the examples provided, it is clear however that what is considered unfair
differs across jurisdictions and regulators.
An early judgment handed downby theHungarianConstitutional Court linked fairness
to the purposes of data processing, finding that personal data may only be processed for
a definite and legally-justified purpose and that every stage of the processingmust conform
to this.
The Swiss andAustrian reports link the principle of good faith to the notion of fairness.
In Austria the principle of fairness is violated if a controller has a policy that entailed the
deletion of all personal data, even in situations in which the data subject requested partial
deletion.
Discriminatory practices in Finland were held to be unfair by the Finnish NSA. It held
that theway a credit information companywas establishing credit scoreswas discriminatory
as a very low or high age would cause an application for credit to be automatically
inadmissible.
According to theHungarian courts, the principle of fairness isbroader than lawfulness.
The courts were asked to adjudicate on an appeal against an NSA decision finding that a
liquidation company had violated principles of purpose limitation and dataminimisation.
The liquidation company had processed the data of third parties beyond the debtor,
including the data of neighbours and family members of the debtor, and a wider set of
data than necessary, including data on the medical condition, family life, work status and
tax identification numbers of data subjects. The court considered that the principle of fair
processing is a broader requirement for data processing than the principle of lawfulness.
The court also deemed the processing of third-party data to be unfair as it created an
18 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive
84/450/EEC,Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
[2005] OJ L149/22 and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer
protection laws (“Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”) [2006] OJ L364/1.
19 See, for example, A. Jones et al, EU Competition law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2019, p. 31.
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asymmetry between the data controller and the data subject whereby the data subject was
not in a position to be aware of what the data controller knew about them. The Hungarian
Supreme Court upheld these findings.
In the UK, fairness has been linked to the reasonable expectation of the data subject
in NSA guidance:
In general, fairness means that you should only handle personal data in ways that people
would reasonably expect and not use it in ways that have unjustified adverse effects on
them.
A decision of the NSA provides an insight into how this might be applied in practice.
The NSA investigated data processing by a pregnancy and parenting club, which collected
personal information for the purpose of membership registration through its website and
mobile app, merchandise pack claim cards and directly from new mothers at hospital
bedsides. The company also operated as a data broker service, supplying data to almost
40 third parties including credit reference and marketing agencies. In its decision, the NSA
indicated that the controller failed to use the personal data of the 14 million affected data
subjects fairly. In particular, data subjects “registering with a pregnancy and parenting
club would not reasonably have expected their personal data to be disclosed to the likes
of credit reference,marketing and profiling agencies”. TheAustrianNSA similarly reasoned
that the filming of people in traffic using a dash cam breached the principle of fairness as
it was not reasonable to expect that they would be filmed, in particular in situations not
involving accidents.
However, the dominant application of the fairness principle connects fairness to the
transparency principle. This is perhaps unsurprising given that article 5(1)(a) provides
that personal data shall be processed “lawfully, fairly and in a transparentmanner”. Indeed,
both the Czech and Greek reports indicate that the NSAs consider these three principles
together as an inseparable combination. The reports provide good examples of the ways
in which this link between transparency and fairness is made. In Ireland, for example, the
correct use of CCTV has arisen in many previous NSA case studies. In one case study, a
bus operator discovered one of its drivers using a mobile phone when driving while
reviewing CCTV footage in the context of a customer complaint. The driver later
complained about the use of this footage against him in a disciplinary procedure. The
operator was found to have contravened the fairness principle by failing to properly or
fully inform staff that CCTV footage may be used in disciplinary proceedings. A Belgian
court has held that the lack of sufficient information about Facebook’s systematic tracking
of internet users on third-party websites (irrespective of whether theywere Facebook users)
violated the principle of fair processing.
Which of these visions of fairness will be endorsed by the CJEU remains to be seen.
The Irish report also hints at another development thatmay be of significance in the coming
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years: “There remains a concern that while an organisation could be compliant with the
principles of GDPR, they must also ensure that they process personal data ‘fairly’”. This
suggests that fairness could be an over-arching responsibility beyond legal compliance
and could be linked to current debates about the role of ethics in technology regulation.
Equally however it could be understood as indicating that, within the GDPR, fairness
operates as a stand-alone principle with its interpretation being independent of other
principles (for instance, transparency). This, it is suggested, is the preferred approach yet
it is clear that more elucidation of “fairness” is required to promote legal certainty.
4 How have these legal bases – “consent” and “legitimate interests” – arguably the most
significant yet opaque in the digital environment – been interpreted by national courts?
Introduction
The CJEU’s Planet49 judgment affirmed how valid “consent” should be interpreted, in
particular the requirements that consent should be “specific”, “unambiguous” and
“informed”.20 According to the Institutional Report, the ruling “suggests that informing
users that, by continuing their activity on a website (‘continuous browsing’) they consent
to the placing of cookies on their devices is not sufficient for consent to be valid”. Yet, such
commercial practices remain commonplace, indicating that there is widespread disregard
for the law. Moreover, from the perspective of individuals, “consent” might be viewed as
a legal fiction, “partly overloaded in light of the realities of the digital economy” as the
German report notes.
The primary alternative legal basis to consent available to private parties is “legitimate
interests”. The Article 29 Working Party provided guidance on how this legal basis, now
found in article 6(1)(f), should be interpreted. Given the potential significance of this legal
basis should consent be applied as required by the CJEU, it is useful to also consider its
application domestically.
Legitimate interests
Many Member States reported that their local NSAs and courts had provided guidance
on the nature of the legitimate interests legal basis. We consider these below according to
two themes: findings which turned on whether a given interest could correctly be deemed
“legitimate”, and those which focused on the balancing of competing interests and rights
that this provision entails.
20 Judgment of 1 October 2019 in Case C-673/17 Planet49 GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2019:801.
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A Interrogating the meaning of “legitimate interest”
The reports provide some informative examples of interests that have not met the
“legitimate” threshold, including the following:
– The checking of bank account activity to exercise disciplinary control on employees
(Greece) or the use of personal data tomeasure performance in theworkplace (Sweden).
– The interest of local authorities to register detailed statistics of the contents of the
garbage of individuals (Sweden).
– The compilation of statistics on how the healthcare system operates (Sweden).
The reports also provide examples of interests deemed to be legitimate by NSAs and
domestic courts. For example, in Ireland the Supreme Court considered the provision of
fingerprints to UK authorities by the Irish Refugee Appeals Commissioner to comprise a
legitimate interest as it served the purpose of obtaining information relevant to the task
of determining the Member State responsible for dealing with the relevant refugees’
applications under the Dublin regime.
An interesting approach is taken in Spain where the national law specifying elements
of the GDPR includes a number of rebuttable presumptions that a certain interest should
be deemed legitimate if the regulation’s requirements aremet. These include the processing
or use of an individual’s contact details when they are acting as entrepreneurs or
professionals (article 19), processing for credit information systems (article 20) and some
commercial operations (article 21).
B Balancing exercise
We see many examples of NSAs and courts grappling with the balancing of legitimate
interests against competing interests of the data subjects. The CJEU has provided guidance
on how this balance should be struck inRigas Satiksme21 inwhich it set out three cumulative
conditions that must be taken into consideration. First, the interest pursued must be
legitimate. Second, the personal data processed must be necessary. Third, there must be
an overall balancing of rights and interests. The Czech Supreme Administrative Court has
emphasised this final balancing of rights and interests in one of its judgments. It considered
the necessity and proportionality of the use of CCTV in order to achieve its stated aim
before stating that the importance and gravity of the two fundamental rights opposing
each other must be assessed in the light of the factual circumstances of the case at hand
21 Judgment of the Court of 4 May 2017 in Case C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības
policijas pārvalde v Rīgas pašvaldības SIA “Rīgas satiksme”, ECLI:EU:C:2017:336.
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(balancing stricto sensu). This approach can be contrastedwith Sloveniawhere the legitimate
interest must be evident and not require a detailed or in-depth balancing exercise.
In Estonia, the Supreme Court has indicated that it is not relevant when assessing
legitimate interests whether the data processing, in fact, helped to achieve the interest
pursued. That case concerned the wrongful dismissal of a public official who had
experienced workplace bullying. To prove that she was being bullied, she recorded a
conversation without asking the permission of the official whom she was recording. The
Court held that it was irrelevant whether the recording had helped to achieve the legitimate
interest when striking this balance, as it was not possible to know this at the time the
recording was undertaken. What was important was that the personal data processing had
been to achieve the legitimate interest and that the plaintiff only disclosed the recordings
to the relevant authority. The Court also held that the controller’s interest must be a lawful
one and that the need for processing should be real and not just hypothetical. It ultimately
concluded that the plaintiff had the overriding legitimate interest to get evidence of the
alleged bullying in the workplace in order to demand that it cease.
Consent
Unsurprisingly, many Member States reported that their NSAs or courts had considered
complaints or questions in relation to consent. Four notable themes emerge: the prevalence
of consent as the default legal basis for processing; the practice of obtaining consent online
or in relation to digital services; consent in theworkplace; and the attention paid towhether
consent was freely given (considered in the next question).
A Consent as the primary norm
Consent is viewed as the primary norm, or default legal basis, for personal data processing
in a number of Member States, most notably in those Member States where there is a
strong tradition of informational self-determination.
In the Czech Republic, the Supreme Administrative Court has held that the right not
to have personal data processed without consent is part of the right to informational
self-determination protected by the Czech constitution, article 8 ECHR and,more broadly,
a part of one’s integrity as a fundamental precondition to a dignified existence. The domestic
legislation implementing the DPD treated consent as the “principal legal basis” for any
processing of personal data; other legal bases were merely an exception. According to the
Czech report, despite the changes introduced in response to the GDPR “the aim and
purpose of the consent of the data subject remains” and the SupremeAdministrative Court
itself noted in one particular case that the GDPR “would not change its conclusions”.
40
Orla Lynskey
Similarly, in Germany, consent and contract are examined as a priority as legal bases
for data processingwith legitimate interests construed narrowly by supervisory authorities.
Consent is said to put the power in the hands of the data subject while legitimate interests
shifts this power to the data controller. For instance, in March 2019 the German Data
Protection Conference (the Conference of Commissioners) stated in an opinion that, in
principle, consent for tracking measures is required and legitimate interests can only be
relied upon in exceptional cases.
B Obtaining consent online or digitally
Some reports drew attention to NSA decisions regarding how consent was sought or
obtained for digital services.
In Spain, for example, the NSA determined that the app offered by the Professional
Football League failed to comply with the GDPR consent requirements, specifically in
relation to the system for the activation of the microphone and the location of the device.
The UK NSA considered a complaint regarding 289,790 unsolicited e-mail
communications sent to existing contacts to clarify their marketing preferences. The
controller was unable to show that the recipients had consented to receiving the messages.
The NSA determined that the verification messages themselves constituted marketing
based on the UK legislation which implements the e-Privacy Directive.
Actions have also been taken against prominent technology companies for consent
violations.
For instance, in 2018, a Belgian court ordered Facebook to stop tracking Belgian internet
users, whether generated through Facebook or third-party domains via certain types of
cookies and similar technologies such as pixels, without their consent. A cookie banner
warning internet users that Facebook places cookies on the basis of further browsing was
not considered sufficient in this regard because, amongst other things, (i) users were not
sufficiently informed about the systematic placement of cookies without further use or
about the essential elements of such processing (such as the nature of the data collected
through cookies); (ii) users without a Facebook account could only express their lack of
consent by leaving the Facebook homepage, which entails negative consequences for the
user; and (iii) a user could only consent to all cookies and could notmake a granular choice.
C Consent in the workplace
A number of Member States noted that enforcement actions had considered the capacity
for consent to be obtained from existing or potential employees.
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The Austrian NSA held that, although consent is possible in the employment context,
it has to deliver a clearly recognisable advantage to the employee. In 2011, the Danish
Supreme Court stated that unspecified consent from a potential new employer to collect
references from a former employer could not cover the collection of highly sensitive
personal data, for instance regarding potential alcohol abuse. More recently, in 2016, the
Hungarian NSA issued guidelines on the basic requirements of data processing in the
context of employment, where it noted that consent can only be valid in the employment
context in exceptional situations given the relationship of subordination between employer
and employee.
As shall be discussed presently, the question of whether consent can be considered
freely given when services are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, has been hotly debated
in the context of services that are free at the point of access where data may be considered
as the quid pro quo for the service.
5 Has there been debate or a decision at national level regarding the validity of personal
data as counter-performance for the provision of digital content?
Data protection law is not applied in a vacuum. As Zuboff documented in Surveillance
Capitalism, current businessmodels embed and shape economic incentives that encourage
ever-more personal data processing.22 This dynamic is implicitly referenced in some reports.
The Finnish report, for instance, notes that Finnish media companies do not collect the
same amount of personal data for personalisation as international socialmedia companies.
However, the Swiss report notes that the major Swiss media houses and the public media
company announced in 2019 that they would collectively introduce registration for all
online content from September 2020 onwards. This was justified on the basis that “the
media houses will receive additional data from their users, which will enable more targeted
advertising”. The report suggests that publishers want to strengthen their competitive
position vis-à-vis the big US technology companies.
However, this business model raises questions about the fairness of the exchange for
individuals. As the Luxembourg report notes, it is questionable whether in the context of
digital services there is a real freedom of choice when access to digital content is made
conditional on data processing. Moreover, even if consent is deemed to be freely given,
should we question whether “too much” data are extracted in such circumstances, or
should the law impose any limitations on this market transaction?
We see from the national reports that in some jurisdictions such issues have been given
almost no consideration at all, or consideration only within academia. This is the case in
Denmark, Poland and Portugal. Yet, in other Member States this issue has been given
22 S. Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, London, Profile, 2019.
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considerable attention. In Italy, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM), the
Communications Regulatory Authority (AGCom) and the Data Protection Authority
jointly launched a “Big Data fact-finding survey”, which considered this issue amongst
others.
A matter of contract law
The Maltese report acknowledges the lack of jurisprudence on this issue in Malta. The
report opines that personal data could be viewed as “lawful consideration” for the purposes
of the Maltese Civil Code and that the validity of a contract based on personal data
processing would be upheld by a court of law. The UK report suggests that the lack of
debate on this topic in the UK may be attributable to the “common law’s traditional
laissez-faire attitude to the freedom to contract”.
Thus, this issue can be looked at as an issue of domestic contract law. From this
perspective, both the Hungarian report and the Norwegian report suggest that local legal
experts criticised theDraft Guidelines of the EuropeanData Protection Board (hereinafter
“EDPB”) on data processing under article 6(1)(b) in the context of the provision of online
services (the draft guidelines).23 The essence of this critique is that the EDPB overextends
its authority by straying beyond questions of GDPR into issues of contract law which is
“clearly and firmly within the domain of national courts”. Novovic, co-author of the
Norwegian report, asserts that by “making sweeping statements on the ‘general purpose
of the contract’ for the entire categories of online services, and consequently engaging in
contract interpretation, EDPB is seriously overstepping its authority and the scope of tasks
conferred on it by the virtue of article 70 of the GDPR.” In Hungary, the claim is made
that the underlying conceptions of theGDPR are being applied to “fundamentally different”
processing activities from those the GDPR was meant to regulate, and that data protection
is being treated as “some kind of super law, the principles/regulations of which should be
given more weight than the regulation of other areas of law”.
In Italy, in contrast, such transactions are not looked at as a matter of contract law.
The joint report (alluded to above) considers that the business relationship is “implicit”
not contractual as there is no “economic compensation, since the market, missing a
regulatory framework on the trade of data, does not assign any price to the transaction”.
Counter-performance through the lens of consumer protection law
In Luxembourg the consumer code provides that describing a product as “free”, “without
cost”, “free of charge” or in a similar way is considered to be an abusive commercial practice
if the consumer must pay other costs related to the commercial practice. The Luxembourg
23 European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data under art. 6(1)(b)
GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects, 8 October 2019.
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report notes that it could take inspiration from France where the “Unfair Terms
Commission” held that “free” clauses led the consumer or non-professional to believe that
the service does not require any other counter-performance on its behalf although the
data, information and content provided when using social networks constitutes a kind of
counter-performance that may have a value to professionals.
As the UK report notes, the most serious debate on this subject was conducted within
theCivil Liberties, Justice andHomeAffairs (LIBE)Committee of the European Parliament
before the adoption of EUDirective 2019/770 on contracts for the supply of digital content
and digital services in May 2019.24 This Directive must be transposed by July 2021 and will
apply from January 2022. The Greek report indicates that the discussions concerning this
directive since 2015 and the broader discussions regarding a “New Deal for Consumers”
proposed by the European Commission in April 2018 have spurred this debate at national
level. The latter, as the Irish report notes, seeks to extend consumer protection rights to
“free” digital services in which personal data is processed in lieu of payment.
In the Netherlands both Chambers of the Dutch parliament addressed questions to
the government in 2018 regarding the lack of clear coordination between the Digital
Content Directive and the GDPR. However, the negotiation of this legislative instrument
culminated in explicit references to the GDPR. Therefore, the final text of the Digital
ContentDirective provides that it applies where a trader provides digital content or services
to consumers in exchange for personal data, except where such personal data are exclusively
processed for the purpose of supplying the content or services or for compliance with a
legal obligation and the trader does not process the personal data for any other purpose.25
Article 3(8) of the Directive specifies that EU data protection law applies to the processing
of such data and that, in the event of any conflict between the Directive and data protection
law, the latter should prevail.26
A matter of data protection law
What then does data protection law have to say about this issue? In its Guidelines, the
EDPB indicates in the online behavioural advertising context that the article 6(1)(b) legal
basis – where the processing is necessary to enter into or perform a contract – cannot be
relied upon simply because advertising indirectly funds the provision of the service. It
notes that:
24 Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services [2019] OJ L136/1.
25 Ibid, art. 3(1) Digital Content Directive.
26 Ibid, recital 37.
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“Although such processing may support the delivery of a service, it is separate
from the objective purpose of the contract between the user and the service
provider, and therefore not necessary for the performance of the contract at
issue.”
If such processing cannot be justified on the basis that it is necessary for contractual
purposes, attention then turns to a likely alternative legal basis: consent. In order for
consent to be valid it must be freely given, specific and informed. Article 7(4) states that
when considering whether consent is freely given:
“[U]tmost account shall be taken of whether […] the performance of a contract,
including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing
of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.”
There are two elements of this provision that are of particular interest: first, the performance
of the contract is conditional on consent (conditionality, or bundling) and, second, the
processing must be necessary for the performance of the contract (necessity).
Necessity
Article 7(4) is an inherently circular provision as it requires analysis to revert to the question
of whether the processing is indeed necessary for the performance of the contract. There
has been somenational divergence of how “necessary” should be interpreted in this context.
In Slovenia, the Information Commissioner, in the context of its opinion on the Digital
ContentDirective, noted that there was a risk that such contract would be used to legitimise
situations where an individual actively provided more personal data than would be
reasonably necessary to perform the contract. Similarly inAustria there has been discussion
about the impact on consent if the benefit granted in return for consent is of little value.
The report predicts that the NSA and courts will make strict demands on the “free” nature
of consent in this respect.
In Italy, the SupremeCourt has determined that awebsite that provides fungible services
can legitimately subject the provision of the service to the condition that the processing
of data for advertising purposes, provided that the consent is individually given and linked
to the specific purpose. Implicitly this judgment would therefore seem to accept that
advertising was “necessary” for the performance of the contract.
This can be contrasted with a finding of the Austrian Supreme Court that held, in the
context of a collective action against a TV service provider regarding clauses in its general
terms and conditions that, if the conclusion of the contract ismade conditional on consent
to processing of personal data that is independent of the contract, it cannot be assumed
that the consent is freely given. The Supreme Court considered that such a strict
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interpretation of when consent is freely given can be derived from articles 4(11), 7(4) and
recital 43 GDPR.
Further facts regarding these judgments are not provided. However, what seemingly
differentiates the two is that, in the first, the data processing itself indirectly subsidised the
content through advertising revenue and was thus deemed necessary, whereas in the latter
it is possible that the TV service provider imposed a fee on customers and yet made its
service contingent on unnecessary data processing.
Conditionality or bundling
Equally controversial is the question of whether, or towhat extent, the provision of a service
or content can be made conditional on providing consent to data processing. The answer
to this questionwill hinge on how article 7(4) is interpreted by theCJEU.As the Institutional
Report notes, in Planet49 the Advocate General referred to the “selling” of personal data
in his Opinion, in the sense of “agreeing to be contacted by so-called [online lottery]
sponsors for promotional offers”,27 however this issue was avoided by the Court.
TheGerman report indicates that a strict ban on so-called consent bundling “maymost
likely not be derived” from article 7(4). One factor that seems to be playing an important
role is whether there are alternatives available to the data subject.
In a much-discussed decision, the Austrian NSA has considered the withholding of a
service in the absence of consent to be lawful if persons affected had a choice and could
receive the same service through a paid option that did not entail personal data processing.
In that case, an online newspaper presented affected individuals with the option of either
purchasing a paid subscription for €6 per month or accessing the content free of charge
but granting consent to the use of cookies for advertising purposes. The NSA concluded
that such consent could be given freely, since the absence of consent would not cause any
major disadvantage given that, amongst other things, the online subscription was not
excessively expensive, and other newspapers provided news and the content could be
accessed in print form.
A further differentiating feature is whether “conditionality” relates only to the provision
of a primary service (for instance retail services) or also related secondary services (such
as loyalty programmes and discount opportunities).
The Czech NSA issued a decision regarding the loyalty programme of the national
railway company that offered customers a loyalty programme with discounts if they
consented to data processing for marketing purposes. In its decision, the NSA stated that
membership of the loyalty programme was entirely voluntary and that the services of the
controller (primarily train travel) can be accessed without being a programme member.




The NSA indicated that the special prices and offers provided to loyalty programme
members are entirely within the controller’s discretion, which can therefore decide under
which conditions it will offer benefits to customers.
The latter can be contrasted with a decision of the Belgian NSA, which considered that
consent to the processing of the data subject’s national e-Identification in exchange for
the use of a loyalty card was not free. In particular, the NSA held that consent “cannot be
regarded as freely given if there are no alternatives available to the customer to benefit
from discounts.” Thus, while in the Czech case the NSA considered conditionality in
relation only to the primary service – which could still be accessed in the absence of data
processing – the Belgian decision considers that conditionality also applies to “optional”
services where the primary service remains available irrespective of the data processing.
When considering these decisions, it is difficult to separate the assessment of the “free”
nature of the consent from economic considerations, in particular whether the processing
subsidises the service and whether there are economically viable alternatives available. Yet,
whether such interpretations are compatible with the fundamental rights underpinnings
of data protection law remains contested. In France, the influential civil society organisation
LaQuadrature duNet advocated for the exclusion of personal data from theDigital Content
Directive on the basis that it could not be viewed as a commodity. Critics of the Austrian
decision claim that the presence of a paid alternative does not necessarily result in “free”
consent and that the impact of this “pay or okay” approach needs to be considered
cumulatively. The risk, according to such critics, is that data protection becomes a luxury
item, available only to those who can afford to pay for content that is not subsidised via
personal data processing rather than an inalienable right.
On the other hand, there are those who suggest that viewing data as
counter-performance for the provision of a contract simply acknowledges the current
economic reality. TheNorwegian report, in particular, identifies some of the key arguments
against the EDPB’s recommendation that “personal data cannot be a tradable commodity”.
It suggests that the GDPR does not address personal data commodification directly and
that it is for the legislature or the judiciary to resolve any disputes. It also notes that the
Charter protects “freedomof contract”, a fact which should have been given a central place
in the Guidelines.
What is certain is that the EDPB is correct in stating that while data subjects can agree
to the processing of their personal data, they cannot trade away their fundamental rights.
Short of such a waiver of rights, the precise terms of the exchange between data controllers
and data subjects is likely to receive considerable attention – and likely varying appraisals
– across EU States in the coming years.
6 Article 22 provides for a right not to be subject to automated decision making, including
profiling. Article 22(2)(b) allows Member States to introduce legislative measures to
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ensure this right does not apply in certain situations. Have such legislative measures been
introduced and, if so, what measures to safeguard the rights, freedoms and legitimate
interests of data subjects do they incorporate?
Contextual background
Article 22, and its predecessor article 15 DPD, reflect one of the first attempts globally to
regulate the use of automated decisionmaking (hereinafter “ADM”) and to introduce “due
process” protections for such decisions.28 According to the EDPB, article 22 should be read
as a prohibition rather than a right that must be invoked by data subjects.29 It provides
that:
“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely
on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”30
This prohibition does not however apply if the data subject explicitly consents, if the
processing is necessary to enter into or perform a contract or if authorised by Union or
Member State law. Thus, article 22(2)(b) affords Member States the possibility of allowing
for this ADM, even if it affects individuals. However, it also specifies that this law must
lay down “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests”. Article 22(3) sets out a similar requirementwhere the decisionmaking
is based on consent or contract but stipulates that it should include “at least the right to
obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view
and to contest the decision”. It remains to be determinedwhether these particularminimum
safeguards also apply when ADM is made permissible by law.
The GDPR thus embeds the perspective that ADM requires additional legal safeguards
for individuals when compared to non-automated decision making. Some of the key
concerns voiced in the vast literature on this concern the transparency, contestability and
accountability of such decision making.31
The reports reflect some distinct attitudes to the risks of such processing. The Dutch
government has, for instance, held firm in the face of industry calls (from the Dutch Trade
28 D.Keats Citron&F.A. Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process forAutomated Predictions’,Washington
Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2014, p. 1-34.
29 EDPB, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation
2016/679, WP251rev.01, 6 February 2018.
30 Art. 22(1) GDPR.
31 For a systematic overview of concerns see, Mittelstadt et al, ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’,
Big Data & Society, Vol. 3, 2016, p. 1-21.
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Association) to create more generous exemptions to article 22 in order to facilitate more
“options for innovation regarding new profiling-based techniques”. In a letter to theHouse
of Representatives in April 2019, the government noted, in particular, the risk that group
characteristics are attributed to an individual while it is not 100% certain that this individual,
although belonging to the group, shares these characteristics. This cautious approach is
also reflected in its initiative to establish a working group to create guidelines for, amongst
other things, the transparency of algorithms used by the government.
A less cautious approach is visible in other reports. Most notably, the Bulgarian report
indicates that the national legislator has permitted the automated processing of special
categories of personal data (such as data on ethnicity, racial origin, religious or political
affiliations) provided suitable safeguards are in place. Article 22(4) maintains that special
categories of data should only be used for ADM when based on consent or in the public
interest and accompanied by suitable safeguards. The Bulgarian provision appears to be
incompatible with this requirement as the claim could not be made that all ADM serves
the public interest.
A No Implementation
There are several States where no legislative measures have been introduced to apply the
option of “no implementation” offered by article 22(2)(b). These include Croatia, Estonia,
Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Norway and Switzerland.
In Norway a legislative initiative applicable to public administration is currently being
debated that would facilitate further digitalisation of administrative activities. According
to the Law Commission, it envisages the full automation of administrative proceedings,
subject to a requirement “that the legal content of the systemmust be publicly documented”.
Similarly, in Switzerland the precise circumstances of and conditions for the use of ADM
are still being debated at this point.
B Implementation on a broad or general basis
In the UK and in Sweden, we see a broad approach to the application of article 22(2)(b),
allowing for the possibility of a wide range of permitted ADM. For example, in the UK,
the domestic data protection act provides that where a controller takes a “qualifying
significant decision” in relation to a data subject based solely on automated processing:
a. the controllermust, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify the data subject inwriting
that a decision has been taken based solely on automated processing; and
b. the data subject may, before the end of the period of 1 month beginning with receipt
of the notification, request the controller to:
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reconsider the decision; ori.
ii. take a new decision that is not based solely on automated processing.
The NSA has provided further guidance on this section, taking the view that:
If you have a statutory or common law power to do something, and automated decision
making/profiling is the most appropriate way to achieve your purpose, then you may be
able to justify this type of processing as authorised by law. However, you must be able to
show that it’s reasonable to do so in all the circumstances.
C Implementation by specific or limited exception
Many Member States have exercised their discretion by introducing specific or limited
exceptions to the prohibition on ADM in article 22(2)(b).
For example, in Poland, a series of amendments were made to specific sectoral laws to
ensure that the prohibition on ADM does not apply in certain situations. These include
the Banking Law; Road Transport Law; the Insurance and Reinsurance Activities Law and
the National Tax Administration Law, to name but a few. The legal measures enacted
specify exhaustive categories of personal data which can be used in ADM. Similar style
provisions exist in Denmark and in Germany for insurance purposes.
Some references to the specific safeguards introduced by States are evident. In the
Netherlands, exemptions to the prohibition are available if ADM does not pose a high risk
of having a discriminatory effect. Therefore, ADM for “closed” decisions that are “based
on the fulfilment of objective requirements”, are thought not to be high risk. Some examples
include processing income data for tax purposes or basing traffic fines on photographs in
combination with licence plates.
In Hungary, a provision of the Hungarian Code of General Administrative Procedure,
pre-dating the GDPR, allows automated decision making if:
a. it is permitted by an Act or government decree;
b. all data are available to the authority at the time of the submission of the application;
c. decision making does not require deliberation; and
d. there is no party with opposing interests.
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D Recognition of prohibition in domestic law
Some laws affirm the prohibition in article 22 explicitly via law. For instance, in the Czech
Republic it is generally forbidden to issue “true administrative decisions” based purely on
automatic decision making.
Although not explicitly banned, it follows from the French implementing law that
machine learning algorithms (which develop a model based on training data and make
predictions and inferences without being programmed to do so) cannot be used as an
exclusive basis for administrative decisions. There has also been a long-standing rule in
French law (dating from 1978) that no judicial decision involving an assessment of the
behaviour of a person can be made algorithmically.
Observations
Inmany domestic legal systems, theGDPR is the only legal framework applicable toADM.
Yet, as these examples illustrate, the protection offered by article 22 is quite precarious.
Even if the conditions of article 22(1) apply in principle, Member States can introduce
legislative provisions circumventing this prohibition. ADM may be desirable if specific
safeguards are in place to protect individuals. However, some scepticism is required if this
circumvention occurs by relying on broadly framed exceptions. Moreover, the safeguards
offered by the GDPR in this context appear to be highly individualised – the right for an
individual to express their point of view and to contest the decision – raising the question
of whether these safeguards can be harnessed by groups who are systemically affected by
ADM.32
7 How has the right to erasure (article 17), or its Data Protection Directive predecessor
(Directive 95/46 EC, article 12) been applied at national level by search engines, the NSA
or Courts?
Context
Article 17 sets out a right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”). Pursuant to article 17(1) data
subjects have the right to have the controller erase personal data concerning them without
undue delay if one of a number of grounds enumerated in the provision applies. These
include situations where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the
32 See, L. Taylor et al (Eds), Group Privacy: the Challenges of New Data Technologies, Dordrecht, Springer,
2017.
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purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed33 and where the personal
data have been unlawfully processed.34 However, this right is not absolute as it may be
limited pursuant to article 17(3), amongst other things, for the protection of freedom of
expression and information.
The previous formulation of the right of erasure in article 12(b)DPD arguably achieved
the same objective yet in simpler terms. It provided that Member States must guarantee
the data subject the right to obtain from the controller, as appropriate:
the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not
comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data. (Emphasis added)
This provision is perhaps most known for its application by the CJEU in the 2014 Google
Spain judgment.35 Since then, there have been almost 895,000 requests to delete data relating
to over 3.5 million URLs, 53.8% of which have been declined.36 Some Member States, for
instance Austria, report that the right to erasure was one of the key topics in complaint
procedures following the entry into force of the GDPR.
In the Netherlands, the percentage of URLs that were delisted jumped from 47.8% to
56.3% following the entry into force of theGDPR. The national report suggests this change
may be attributed to the strong awareness campaign run by the NSA and the government
in the run up to this date. Similarly, in Spain – where the NSA acted as a pioneer for the
“right to be forgotten” – adopting its first Resolution on the right in 2007 – a considerable
volume of jurisprudence around the right has been developed.
This can however be contrasted with many other Member States where the right is
ostensibly yet to be embedded in domestic legal orders. There has been no case law or
decisional practice on this right inDenmark, and very limited activity in other jurisdictions
such as Luxembourg, Estonia, Norway and even Germany (where the national report
suggests the right to erasure has been relied on much less frequently than the right to
information).
Interest in this right and its application has therefore varied across Member States.
However, as this right requires a reconciliation of data protection and privacy interests
with freedom of expression and information interests, even where it is applied there will
be substantive variation across Member States. Indeed, the Irish report notes that although
33 Art. 17(1)(a) GDPR.
34 Art. 17(1)(d) GDPR.
35 Judgment of 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
36 Google Transparency Report, requests to delete relating to 3, 515, 080 URLs, https://
transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (data accurate as of 24 February 2020).
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approximately 25% of all cross-border processing complaints received by the NSA in 2018
related to erasure, a large proportion of these cases were dealt with locally by the “home”
NSA. As the report notes, erasure requests generally “involve an assessment of a single
data subject request in the context of local, on-the-ground conditions” and this transfer
of competence is facilitated by article 56(2).
The CJEU has since acknowledged this national divergence inGoogle LCC, cited in the
Institutional Report. The Court has suggested that the GDPR consistency mechanism will
be sufficient to enable NSAs to find a common solution to eventual discrepancies.37
In terms of terminology, it is clear the term “right to be forgotten” is often used to
describe the de-indexing of content from search engines with the right to erasure being a
broader term.However, neither the text of theDPDnor theGDPRmakes such a distinction.
Moreover, the article 17(2) obligation on controllers to whom an erasure request has been
addressed to take reasonable steps to inform subsequent controllers of this request to
discourage further dissemination is sometimes also referred to as a “right to be forgotten”.
Normative foundations for the right
The Spanish report provides some insights into the normative foundations of this right.
The jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court treats it as a “defence mechanism
that an individual has to protect her honour vis-à-vis informational initiatives or mistakes
thatmay endanger themoral integrity or reputation of the interested person”. As the Italian
report notes, requests to delete or update information processed lawfully arise due to the
passage of time or changes to the source of the information. As such, the right is intended
to be a “dynamic projection of the right of the person not to remain indefinitely exposed
to further damages their reputation may suffer due to the repeated publication of news
legitimately disclosed in the past”.
Furthermore, the Spanish report notes that rectification (as opposed to erasure) may
help to guarantee free public opinion by establishing the veracity of information in the
public sphere. For instance, the Spanish Act provides that when addressing requests for
rectification, digital media should publish an explanatory notice in their digital archives
indicating that the original notice does not reflect the current situation of the individual.
This notice must be in a visible place alongside the original information.
Factors influencing erasure requests
A number of elements relevant to establishing a deletion claim emerge from the national
reports.
37 Judgment of 24 September 2019 inCase C-507/17,Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc. v Commission
nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para. 67-69.
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First, it may be relevant to consider whether the controller has a countervailing right
or obligation not to delete the data. This issue has been addressed in several Swedish court
cases. For instance, the Supreme Administrative Court has found that where publicly
accessible documents containing personal datamust be archived, the data cannot be erased.
This may also be the case in relation to court records. For instance, the Maltese report
notes that there has been considerable controversy surrounding the decision to allow the
request for erasure of certain online criminal court judgments from the public record.
Such requests are made directly to the court registrar who is the data controller for the
court. It seems that, in the majority of such cases, the judgments were being anonymised
rather than removed from the record (112 of 176 requests for removal of judgments from
the public domain culminated in anonymisation, while 41 of these were rejected outright).
A second relevant factor is data accuracy.38 The principle of data accuracy requires that
personal data must be up to date. Moreover, the GDPR states that “every reasonable step
must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes
for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.”39 The more time that
passes, the greater the likelihood that information may become out of date. Conversely,
in Italy, the Court of Lucca has held that the right to be forgotten should be excluded if a
short interval has elapsed between the facts on which a case is based and the case itself.
Such a short interval is “undeniably insufficient to weaken the collective interest in
knowledge and dissemination” of the information.
In Ireland, the High Court considered the application of the data accuracy principle
in a case involving a request from a local politician to have a Reddit chat forum criticising
his campaign and labelling him as homophobic delisted from Google’s search results. The
High Court considered that a lower court had erred by considering the accuracy only of
the heading of the text and held that in assessing accuracy it should have considered the
entirety of the text of the discussion.
A third factor is the viability of alternative rights, such as rectification. In France a
court has upheld a finding that an individual whose personal data were erroneously
processed under the American Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (hereinafter
“FACTA”) had the right to the total erasure of these data. In particular, the Court held
that the relevant bank could not limit itself to a rectification of the error. The data subject
had the fundamental right, according to the court, to have all their data definitively erased
from the file held pursuant to FACTA.




Rights of primary publishers
In Google Spain, the CJEU distinguished between distinct data controllers in the context
of the provision of internet search engine (ISE) results. In particular, it noted that the
primary publishers of content indexed on ISE could be distinguished from the ISEs. In the
UK, in NT1 and NT2 the Court took account of this distinction and acknowledged that
the original news source (newspaper articles) could benefit from the exemption for
journalistic purposes (discussed further in Q8) while ISE could not. As a result, the rights
of the data subject will apply differently to distinct data controllers.
This is recognised in Polish jurisprudence, which incorporates the ECHR and indicates
that it is not a violation of an individual’s article 8 ECHR right when a court refuses to
order a newspaper to remove articles from an internet archive that damage an individual’s
reputation. Domestic courts consider that the internet constitutes a form of press and the
task of the press is to describe events that are currently taking place, even if circumstances
subsequently change. As such, there are no grounds for published articles to be monitored
by the publisher or journalist for their accuracy.
In Belgium, the Court of Cassation has taken a more nuanced approach. While the
Court recognised the right of publishers to put digital archives online and for the public
to access these archives, it held that such rights are not absolute. In this case, an individual
who was criminally convicted for involvement in a traffic accident in 1994 had a
contemporaneous news report republished in a digital archive in 2008. The Court held
that the online archive was a new disclosure of the claimant’s criminal history, which
violates his right to be forgotten. The Court confirmed the decision of the lower court to
award compensation for moral damage (of €1) and to anonymise the article. The Court
of Cassation issued a similar judgment in November 2018.
In Hungary, a domestic court refused to allow an individual – a lawyer whose father
had been accused of serious criminal offences andwhose name and professionwere referred
to indirectly in newspaper articles – to exercise his right of erasure vis-à-vis the newspaper.
The Court considered that the Google Spain reasoning was only of relevance in relation
to search engines and not a newspaper, even if it operated a search function within its
website.
Google Search has a practice of informing primary publishers when their content is
de-indexed in certain circumstances in response to a deletion request. Google Spain had
not taken into account the “interest of the newspaper itself in having wider accessibility
of its website”, as the Institutional Report highlights. Implicit in this practice is recognition
of this fact. Nevertheless, the Spanish NSA imposed a fine of 150,000 euro on Google for
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this practice in 2016. A Spanish court later declared this fine void in April 2019, despite
serious reservations that this practice is incompatible with EU data protection law.40
Observations and future developments
From the outset, the dereferencing facilitated by the right to erasure has led to questions
about whether and how the rights to data protection and privacy can be reconciled with
freedom of expression. The CJEU has begun to unpick this balancing exercise in its
jurisprudence. In Google LLC it has held that NSAs and judicial authorities remain
competent to balance the data subject’s rights with freedomof expression in light of national
fundamental rights standards and, where appropriate, to order the dereferencing of content
on all global domain names. However, this approach raisesmore questions than it answers,
as astutely observed by the Institutional rapporteurs:
“The precise implications of this consideration are unclear. How the national
balancing exercise can be separated from the European one, keeping in mind
that both will relate to the same request for delisting is unclear. It is equally
unclear what value should be given to the considerations of the Court that
numerous third States do not recognise the right to deferencing or have a
different approach to it and that the outcome of the balancing exercise is likely
to vary significantly around the world.”
8 The GDPR allows Member States to legislate to reconcile the right to data protection
with freedom of expression (article 85). Has your state introduced a law pursuant to
article 85(2) GDPR and, if so, how has this been interpreted and applied to date?
Introduction
Article 85 provides for a general reconciliation of freedomof expression and data protection.
Article 85(1) GDPR requires Member States to reconcile by law, “the right to freedom
of expression and information, including ‘processing for journalistic purposes and the
purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression’”. Article 85(2) indicates the specific
chapters of the data protection framework from which derogations may be permitted for
these purposes, in essence all but the provisions on judicial remedies, liability and sanctions.
40 D. Erdos, ‘Communicating Responsibilities: The Spanish DPA targets Google’s notification practices when





This provision is interesting as it is broader in its framing than its predecessor (article
9, DPD). The latter enabled Member States to introduce exemptions or derogations to
specific chapters to the extent necessary to reconcile data protection and privacy if
processing is carried out solely for journalistic purposes or for the purpose of artistic and
literary expression. Article 85 GDPR is broader in a number of senses: it enables a general
reconciliation of freedom of expression and data protection, including but not limited to
processing for journalistic, academic, artistic and literary purposes; processing no longer
needs to be solely for journalistic purposes; and it now explicitly incorporates processing
for academic purposes. It is thus instructive to consider whether Member States have
adapted their approach to this reconciliation in order to avail themselves of this increased
latitude.
The need for reconciliation by law
The GDPR requires that the reconciliation of data protection and freedom of expression
is by law. Despite this requirement, in Norway and Estonia no such laws exist to date while
in Portugal the provision referring to the balance between these rights does not provide
for limits or specific guarantees beyond those in the Constitution.
Several Member States have sought to reconcile the two rights within the text of the
domestic data protection legislation. This is the case in Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, the
Netherlands and the UK, for instance. Some of these provisions are very broadly framed.
The Irish legislation, for instance, exempts personal data processing for freedom of
expression purposes where “compliance with the provision would be incompatible with
such purposes”. As a safeguard, the domestic legislation enables the NSA to refer the case
to the High Court to seek a determination on any question of law relating to whether a
specific processing operation is exempt from compliance with a GDPR provision on
freedom of expression grounds. The Austrian report raises the prospect that such vague
provisions are incompatible with EU law as it delegates the required balancing to the
instance applying the provision instead of providing for this balancing in law.
“Journalistic activity” and the public interest
The notion of processing for “journalistic” purposes has been carried over from the 1995
Directive. As documented in the Institutional Report, the CJEU has had the opportunity
to expand upon its meaning on a number of occasions. Most recently, in Buivids the Court
built on its previous finding that activities are “journalistic” when they disclose to the
public information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium in which they are
transmitted. In particular, the Court held that uploading a video to YouTube could be
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considered processing for solely journalistic purposes only if its sole objective was to
disclose information, opinions or ideas in this way.41 It clearly follows, for instance, that
not all personal data published on the internet benefits from this exception. In Sweden,
there is extensive court practice on the interpretation and limits of “journalistic purposes”.
Consistent with the jurisprudence of the CJEU, it has been held that, if information aims
to inform, criticise and create debate on current issues of interest to the public, such
publications pursue journalistic purposes.
Such an approach differs starkly from the wording of the Austrian legislation, which
indicates that processing is for journalistic purposes only if it is done for the purposes of
“the media company or media service”. The Austrian NSA has however interpreted this
provision in line with relevant CJEU case law to incorporate “citizen journalism”.
Several reports suggest that whether the personal data processing is in the public interest
is a significant factor in balancing data protection and freedom of expression. For instance,
in Bulgaria a significant recent NSA opinion regarding the publication by the Prosecutor’s
Office of press releases and information for journalists relating to accused persons in the
pre-trial context, the NSA considered such processing lawful if there is an “overriding
public interest”. As a general rule the personal data of others should not be published in
the pre-trial context unless, again, there is an overriding public interest. The NSA notes
an exception to this, namely data relating to persons holding high public positions (as
defined by statute) which “by its nature has an effect on the public”.
Yet,Member States differ inwhat they consider to be in the public interest. InDenmark
the NSA held in its “Black Register” decision that a webpage run by “Black Register”
featuring the name, job title and work phone number of public servants under headings
such as “abuse of power” and “neglect of duty” was lawful. This webpage also sometimes
included the date of birth and political affiliations of civil servants. The NSA reasoned that
the webpage was part of a public debate and enabled opinions to be voiced.
In Slovenia, media rights are limited when it comes to processing personal data and
case law distinguishes between “ordinary citizens’” and “public figures”, and within the
latter category between “absolute” and “relative” public figures. The degree to which the
individual enters into public life leads to a proportionate reduction in the privacy they
enjoy. Absolute public figures are those who are constantly under the scrutiny of the public
due to their role and function in society (for instance, politicians, entertainers and other
artists, top athletes, officials, etc.). Relative public figures are those persons who are of
interest to the public only temporarily because of their connection with a particular event
(for instance, winners of various competitions or events, perpetrators of serious crimes
and others). Publishing information on relative public figures is only permitted if it is of
41 Judgment of 14 February 2019 in Case C-345/17, Sergejs Buivids, ECLI:EU:C:2019:122, para. 69.
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interest to the public due to the event and not later. Therefore, whether the “Black Register”
case would have been decided in the same way in Slovenia is doubtful.
Contested ground: evidence of contestation at national level
Striking the appropriate balance between data protection and freedom of expression is
one of the most contentious aspects of data protection legislation. That contestation over
the appropriate balance between these rights is occurring at national level is evident from
the reports.
This disagreement is, for instance, arguably reflected in the limited (arguably unlawful)
reception of article 85 in some Member States. The French legal framework focuses on
processing for journalistic purposes to the exclusion of the other forms of processing
(artistic, academic and literary) mentioned in article 85(1) GDPR. In Austria, processing
for journalistic purposes is treated in a separate provision to processing for these alternative
purposes, and it benefits from a blanket exemption from the GDPR requirements. In this
sense, it does not incorporate the required “necessity” element of article 85(1). Nor does
the Danish implementation, where journalistic purposes and journalistic databases are
exempted in their entirety from the scope of the domestic act. In the Czech Republic, the
Czech parliament introduced general exceptions for processing for the purposes specified
in article 85(1) indicating its scepticism regarding the more nuanced approach – with
specific exceptions – proposed by the government.
More explicitly, in the Netherlands the government stated openly in a letter to the
House of Representatives that it would not be following the recommendation of the news
companies’ trade organisation to exempt news companies from more GDPR provisions.
In Bulgaria, a request signed by fifty members of parliament is pending before the
Constitutional Court asking it to find that the domestic reconciliation of right is contrary
to the national constitution and the ECHR. The European Law Association contests this
claim.
Future developments
The CJEU has been cautious in giving substantive guidance on how these rights should
be reconciled. Moreover, as the national reports reflect, the scope for divergence in this
area is significant and, it could be added, the EU lacks the competence to harmonise
freedom of expression directly. The GDPR foresees that Member States must notify the
Commission of the provisions adopted to reconcile these rights and of any subsequent
amendments without delay. In this regard, the conclusion reached by the Institutional
Report is justified:
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“Even more than under the previous Directive, the Commission will feel
compelled to search for a certain coherence in this area in order not to
undermine the harmonising effect of the present Regulation.”
9 Identify the relevant public authority (or authorities) in your Member State. Outline its
composition; the appointment process for members and staff; any additional power or
duties the NSA is entrusted with under national law; and, provide relevant details
regarding its ‘enforcement record’ under the GDPR.
Introduction
One of the significant innovations of the GDPR was its attempt to strengthen and
Europeanise the enforcement mechanisms for data protection.42 Nevertheless, Member
States are left with significant latitude in designing the bodies tasked with enforcing the
rules, NSAs, subject to the proviso that these NSAs are independent as required by article
8(3) Charter and article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(hereinafter “TFEU”). It is evident from the national reports that States have taken
advantage of this discretion as there is a wide range of NSA profiles and procedures on
display.
Composition
Article 51(1) requires each Member State to provide for one or more independent public
authorities to be responsible for monitoring the application of the GDPR, to protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and to facilitate the free flow of data within
the Union. The domestic legal status of these supervisory authorities is very varied, for
instance the UK NSA is a “corporation sole” while the Dutch NSA is an autonomous
administrative authority endowed with legal personality. In Germany data protection
authorities are present at Federal and at Länder level and work together in the “data
protection conference”.
Most of the NSAs are comprised of a president or commissioner and some deputies
alongwith their staff. The FrenchNSA – the CNIL – is themost unusual in its composition.
The CNIL is composed of a multidisciplinary college of 18 members of which 9 are
appointed by political organs (parliament or government).
42 O. Lynskey, ‘The “Europeanisation” of EU data protection Law’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal
Studies, Vol. 19, 2017, pp. 252-268.
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Acommon, and perhaps surprising, feature that emerges from the reports is the creation
of various forms of advisory boards and expert groups at national level, which provide the
NSAs with non-binding guidance. In Finland, the NSA is supported by an Expert Board
comprised of five members. The role of the Expert Board is to give non-binding opinions
upon a request by the Ombudsman on high-profile issues relating to the application of
data protection legislation. In Belgium, theNSA is supported by an independent Reflection
Council, consisting of representatives of the business world, professional federations,
consumer organisations and the academic world. There is a similar body – a Council – in
Spain and it is provided for by Polish law.
The staffing levels across NSAs also vary drastically. The Estonian NSA, for instance,
currently employs 17 staff and has seen no major increase since the introduction of the
GDPR. Many of the other NSAs employ somewhere between 30 and 80 people with some
significant outliers. Cases in point are the Hungarian NSA which employs 114 people and
the CNIL which employs 215 people. The UK NSA is however by far the most significantly
staffed as it currently employs just under 700 people. This number was increased from
just over 500 following the entry into force of the GDPR “with particular increases in the
parts of the organisation handling data protection complaints and customer contact”.
Some NSAs have also engaged in internal restructuring to arrange their workload. The
Danish NSA consists, for instance, of a council and a secretariat: the former decides in
leading cases, while the Secretariat handles day-to-day cases and matters.
The independence of NSAs
Article 52 GDPR is dedicated to ensuring the independence of NSAs. This provision
incorporates the findings of the CJEU’s jurisprudence relating to the concept of
independence. For instance, the NSAs must be free from external influence, whether direct
or indirect, and must neither seek nor take instructions from anybody.43 It also specifies
various conditions for independence including budgetary independence, for instance.
Somenational reports raise the issue of independence. According to theGerman report,
German constitutional law generally requires that authorities engaged in administrative
actions should be subject to supervision in order to guarantee their democratic legitimacy.
Indeed, theGerman Federal Government had raised this constitutional issue in its defence
during infringement proceedings brought by theCommission, which (successfully) claimed
that this supervision of the NSA was incompatible with its independence under EU law.44
Moreover, this report notes that there are other practical possibilities for influence over
43 Art. 52(1) GDPR.
44 Judgment of the Court of 9 March 2010, Case C-518/07, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2010:125,
para. 25.
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the domestic supervisory authorities as is evident in Germany. For instance, the report
queries whether the supervision from supervisory authorities provided for by some state
constitutions is compatible with independence.
In other reports, independence is not explicitly mentioned but some of the conditions
regulating the NSA may give rise to concerns. In Bulgaria, for instance, although the NSA
has its own income, it also obtains part of its income from the fines it imposes if they are
upheld by the court. This possibility again may give the impression that the NSAs fines
could be motivated by financial considerations.
Enforcement record
Comparing the NSAs’ enforcement records thus far is a difficult task given that there is
no uniform metric for recording systems deployed across NSAs (or evident from these
reports). Therefore, some of the NSAs record their activity in terms of the number of
complaints received while others document the number of procedures commenced or
completed. Nevertheless, despite this difficulty in comparing data, it is notable that several
reports provide evidence that the relevant domestic NSA has seen a significant increase
in demand for its services since the GDPR’s entry into force. The UK NSA’s annual report
for 2018-19 refers to the year as “unprecedented”. Its helpline, live chat and written advice
services, for instance, experienced a 66% increase in contacts compared to the previous
year. There was also a significant increase in the number of complaints received: this shifted
from 21,019 in the 2017-18 period to 41,661 in the 2018-19 period.
The UK NSA was not alone in experiencing such a surge in demand. In Luxembourg
the NSA received double the number of written requests for information in 2018 than in
2017, with the number of complaints received also doubling from 200 in 2017 to 450 in
2018. In Croatia the number of complaints lodged with the NSA rose by 260%. Similar
dynamics were indicated in France and Denmark (where the NSA expects three to four
timesmore cases under theGDPR than previously). In theUK and Luxembourg it is noted
that the majority of these complaints relate to the right of access to personal data (38%
and 24% of complaints respectively).
The Portuguese report sensibly highlights that, in addition to this increased domestic
activity, the consistency mechanism brings a further line of work to the NSAs, one that is
having a real impact on the enforcement activity at national level.
One question this surge in demand raises is how NSAs are coping with it. We shall
consider this now.
10 What strategy for complaint handling is taken by your NSA andwhat, if any, constraints




Article 77 provides data subjects with the right to lodge a complaint with an NSA and
states that the NSA must inform the complainant of the progress and outcome of the
complaint including the possibility of judicial review. In particular, article 78(2) provides
that the data subject will have the right to an effective judicial remedy if the NSA does not
“handle the complaint or does not inform the data subject within three months on the
progress or outcome of the complaint lodged”.
In dealing with the significant increase in workload post-GDPR, Member States have
approached this task in different ways. In Spain, theNSAhas sought to enhance prevention
of data protection violations, as part of its Strategic Plan 2015-19, in order to ensure more
effective data protection. It has therefore engaged in various targeted information and
media campaigns, paying special attention to minors and education. Luxembourg has
managed this shift primarily by increasing the workforce of the department dealing with
complaints to allow all to be addressed. According to theNorwegian report, theNorwegian
NSA is ostensibly dealing with this issue in part by discouraging data subjects from
submitting complaints. The NSA website instructs data subjects to submit written rather
than electronic complaints and urges data subjects to resolve their issues directly with data
controllers. The Swedish NSA similarly emphasises the importance for individuals to try
to resolve potential problems themselves while in Greece the individual must appeal to
the controller, or Data Protection Officer if one has been appointed, before submitting a
complaint to the NSA. The Czech Republic inverts the process: the NSA is required by
legislation to have a yearly inspection schedule. With its remaining resources, the NSA
responds to individual complaints and queries.
One issue that this increase in regulatory activity raises is whether the NSA can adopt
a “selective” approach to the complaints it receives. Article 58(1)(f) provides that NSAs
must handle complaints lodged by a data subject or a relevant body “and investigate, to
the extent appropriate, the subject matter of the complaint”. The meaning of the “to the
extent appropriate” in this context is ambiguous.
Indeed, what is surprising is how few Member States require all complaints to be
investigated to a certain extent. This is the case in Austria, Finland, Malta and Portugal.
The Austrian report states that a selective strategy would be inconsistent with Austrian
administrative procedural law, which bars the NSA from making a selection amongst the
initiated proceedings before it. The Portuguese report also explicitly states that the NSA
has no margin of discretion on this issue and that it cannot “ignore complaints based on
an assessment of minor pertinence”.
The reports indicate that implicitly or explicitly a selective approach to complaint
handling or enforcement is being taken at domestic level.
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In Norway, an implicit enforcement prioritisation seems to be at play. The Norwegian
report notes that almost all enforcement action thus far has stemmed from breaches of
article 32 and that there is a “clear focus on data security as an enforcement mechanism
trigger”. As the report also suggests however, this strategy may be flawed in the long term
if it encourages data controllers to envisage their data protection obligations in an unduly
narrow manner. In Denmark, there is no published strategy for dealing with complaints;
however the report notes that the volume of cases is forcing the regulator to “be very
selective when deciding what cases to pursue or not”.
Many of the reports highlight the conditions for admissibility of complaints. These
include whether the subject matter of a complaint has already been reviewed by a court
or administrative authority (Slovakia); whether the complaint is submitted abusively (such
as if the complaint is a repeated one; Greece); or if there are court proceedings pending
(Hungary). Anonymous complaints are also rejected in some Member States (Greece and
Hungary, for example).
Strategic selectivity
These admissibility conditions may also directly or indirectly consider the strategic
significance of a complaint. The Hungarian NSA rejects complaints relating to minor
infringementswhile, in Sweden,whether an alleged infringement is a systematic or recurrent
breach is taken into considerationwhen assessing admissibility. Indeed, there is considerable
evidence of “strategic selectivity” in the reports. In Belgium, for example, the NSA can
decide at every stage of the complaint procedure whether to dismiss the case with a view
to an effective and efficient enforcement policy.
The UK’s enforcement responsibilities are said to be “intelligence led” according to
the NSA. This means that information received from various sources is used “to inform a
strategic threat assessment, which will support all of our work, including investigations,
enforcement, guidance, codes of practice and more”.
Similarly, the Italian Code differentiates between complaints and “reports”. The latter
may be anonymous and are directed to solicit oversight of an area rather than concrete
individual violations. TheNSAdoes not need to adopt ameasure based on a report however
if it deems it necessary, it can start a control if it “sees the risk of serious prejudice or
retaliation to the detriment of subjects concerned by the treatment, or for cases of particular
gravity”.
In Ireland, given the status of the NSA as “lead authority” in many disputes, a formal
complaint-handling process is set out. Unlike under the previous legislative framework,
the NSA is not under an obligation to reach a statutory decision on every complaint it
receives. Moreover, even if a complaint has been resolved informally to the satisfaction of
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a complainant, theNSAmay use its audit and investigatory powers if the complaint brought
wider or systemic compliance issues to the attention of the NSA.
One of the more elaborate complaint-handling mechanisms is in place in the
Netherlands where the NSA has published policy guidelines on how it will prioritise the
handling of complaints. According to these guidelines, as a first step the NSA determines
whether the complaint concerns the processing of personal data relating to the complainant,
and whether basic desk research indicates that there is a clear violation of the GDPR. As
a second step, if the desk research indicates that there may be a violation of the GDPR, the
NSA assesses whether further investigation is necessary. Inmaking this assessment, it takes
account of several criteria cited in the Dutch report, including how harmful the alleged
violation is for individuals; what the broader social significance of the case is; and the
extent to which the NSA will be able to act effectively.
Thus, what emerges from the reports is a picture that is generally in favour of the
strategic enforcement of the data protection framework. Concerns could be raised regarding
the compatibility of such an approach with the right to an effective judicial remedy, since
the strategic approach overrides the rights of individuals in some circumstances to ensure
more effective protection for a greater number of individuals.45 This concernwas dismissed
in the Netherlands in 2016 where the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council
of State, ruled that the pre-GDPR guidelines on complaint handling did not violate the
Data Protection Directive nor the obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law.
11 How have these sanctions been applied by your NSA, and what additional sanctions
have been adopted at national level in addition to those explicitly provided for by the
GDPR?
Introduction
TheGDPR, unlike its predecessor, sets out detailed provisions relating to remedies, liabilities
and penalties applicable pursuant to the regime. Of these penalties, the administrative
sanctions set out in article 83 have received the most attention. This is because of the
significant administrative fines they provide for: a maximum of €20 million or 4% of the
annual global turnover of an undertaking, whichever is greater. The reports indicate that
Member States have taken measures to limit the ability of NSAs to impose such
administrative sanctions.
45 See, for instance, Centre for Information Policy Leadership, ‘Regulating for results: strategic priorities for
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Limitation on the ability of the NSA to impose administrative sanctions
In bothDenmark and Switzerland theNSA is unable to impose administrative fines. These
administrative sanctions are criminal in nature for the purposes of human rights law and
therefore attract all of the procedural safeguards attached to criminal procedures. In
Switzerland, such criminal procedural guarantees are not regulated in the applicable Swiss
administrative procedure, while in Denmark, only the courts can impose administrative
fines. The NSA may also refer cases to the police for criminal prosecution, with two such
referrals having been made under the GDPR.
Limitations on the discretion of the NSA when imposing fines are evident in other
jurisdictions, in particular the amount of the fine is regulated in some Member States. In
Portugal, the domestic law lowers the maximum amount of the administrative sanction
foreseen by article 83 (4) and (5), taking into account the nature of the controller or
processor (in particular, if the entity is an individual or an SME). It also provides that
negligent infringements can only be sanctioned after the NSA has “advised” the controller
to remedy the situation. Moreover, breaches of the data protection principles can only be
sanctioned if they are intentional rather than negligent. The Portuguese report considers
these limitations to constitute a breach of the GDPR. The Bulgarian legislature also
differentiates between these upper limits and infringements that will lead to a sanction of
no more than 2,500 euro.
Although not limited by law, the Czech NSA has made a concerted effort to inform
the public throughmedia and other public channels that the highest sanctions in theGDPR
(article 83(4) and (5)) are envisaged for large multinational companies. It has indicated
that it will continue to impose much lower fines in line with the upper limit under the
previous data protection regime (386,000 euro). In Slovenia, domestic law does not place
a quantitative limit on fines but provides, in line with article 83(1), that the fine imposed
should not be a disproportionate or unprecedented burden on controllers or processors.
The benchmark chosen for these purposes by Slovenian law, absent from the GDPR, is
the sanction imposed for “comparable violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms”.
Moreover, the requirement of a “warning in place of punishment” is common across
Member States. TheGerman report notes the very burdensome administrative procedures
required to impose administrative fines and suggests that the reprimand provided for by
article 58(2)(b)may act as a substitute in some circumstances. InHungary, the law explicitly
requires the NSA to issue such a warning before imposing an administrative fine to ensure
the NSA exercises these powers in accordance with the principle of proportionality. A
similar obligation is present in the Czech Act where it is “standard practice” for the NSA
to impose a corrective measure before a fine and to impose such a fine only if the violation
cannot be corrected, is grave or repeated.
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While the Austrian act also requires such a “warning first” approach, the Austrian
report suggests this requirement is not being followed by the NSA, which has imposed
fines in several cases for first violations of the law.
A further potential limit on the ability of the NSA to impose administrative fines stems
from article 83(7), which allows each State to “lay down the rules on whether and to what
extent administrative fines may be imposed on public authorities and bodies”. The
possibility of imposing an administrative fine on a public body is precluded entirely in
severalMember States, includingCroatia, Finland andBelgium. In Belgium, the Federation
of Enterprises currently has a case pending before the Constitutional Court challenging
this exclusion. The amount of the administrative fine is capped for public actors in other
Member States, including Greece, Hungary, Malta and Sweden. In Romania fines can be
applied to public actors provided priority is given to the “prevention mechanism”, before
resorting to them.
Additional sanctions at national level
The GDPR enables Member States to introduce “other penalties” for infringement of its
provisions, subject to the proviso that they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.46
Many States have introduced – or retained – criminal sanctions.47 This is the case in
Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Switzerland and the UK, for instance. In
Germany, both Federal and Länder data protection laws provide for criminal sanctions.
The Austrian and Finnish laws specifically state that such sanctions can only apply where
the illegal processing of personal data is not captured by article 83 GDPR.
Beyond criminal sanctions, additional regulatory powers and sanctions have been
introduced. For instance, in Slovakia theNSA is empowered to impose a fine of up to 2,000
euro on persons who are not the controller or processor for failure to cooperate with the
NSA. In the UK, the NSA now has the power to issue “assessment notices” which enable
the ICO to access a company’s premises and assess data protection practices much quicker
than was previously the case. As the UK report notes, a 17-day delay occurred when the
NSA requested a searchwarrant for its investigation into the use of personal data in political
campaigns and to inspect the premises of Cambridge Analytica.
12 Has your legal system historically awarded damages for intangible harm (in this area or
others)? If so, how are such damages calculated?
46 Art. 84(1) GDPR.
47 See, for instance, P. DeHert &G. Boulet, ‘TheCo-existence of Administrative andCriminal LawApproaches
to Data Protection Wrongs’ in D. Wright & P. De Hert (Eds), Enforcing Privacy: Regulatory, Legal and
Technological Approaches, Cham, Springer, 2016, pp. 357-394.
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The GDPR provides individuals with the right to receive compensation from a controller
or processor for “material or non-material damage” suffered as a result of an infringement
of the Regulation. The reports reflect on whether such a requirement is congruous with
the domestic legal system andwhetherMember States had developed a practice for claiming
such damages under the previous regime, which similarly provided for damages for
intangible harm.
The acceptance of non-material harm within domestic legal orders
Historically, such damages have not been awarded in Slovakia, the UK and Ireland. In the
UK and Ireland this issue has arisen in litigation before domestic courts, culminating in
conflicting findings. In Ireland, the Irish High Court expressly held that, pursuant to
domestic data protection legislation, a plaintiff would need to establish material loss in
order to recover damages.
This can be contrasted with the findings of the English Court of Appeal in Vidal Hall.
The Court considered the compatibility of a provision in domestic data protection law
expressly limiting the right to claim damages for non-tangible harm under article 23 DPD.
The latter provided more generally that any person who suffered damage as a result of
unlawful processing was entitled to compensation for the damage suffered from the
controller. The Court gave article 23 DPD its natural and wide meaning to include both
material and non-material damage. As the national provision was not in conformity with
this approach, the Court resorted to harmonious interpretation. Consistent with previous
domestic case law, it held that:
“In so far as a provision of national law conflicts with the requirement for an
effective remedy in article 47, the domestic courts can and must disapply the
conflicting provision”.
This historic resistance to damages for non-material harm can be contrasted with other
jurisdictions where compensation for such harm is well established. These jurisdictions
are numerous and includeCroatia, Denmark, Finland,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Malta,
Norway, Luxembourg and Portugal. Such compensation goes by different names (for
instance, “compensation for pain suffered” inGermany or “grievance awards” inHungary).
The particular fields of law where such compensation may be awarded may be specified,
for instance in Malta the most notable cases deal with human rights, defamation and
intellectual property law.
One theme that emerges from these reports is that the compensation awarded is often
very low, often symbolic, monetary sums (as noted by Finland and Norway). In Belgium,
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compensation for moral damage can also be granted in kind. The publication of the
judgment inwhich the harmwas recognisedmay constitute compensation and the national
report notes that, “legal costs will often outweigh the benefit that can be gained from a
claim for compensation, resulting in little caselaw on the matter”.
Damages for data protection violations
Given that the former data protection framework also provided, albeit implicitly, for such
damages, it is interesting to consider how these actions for such damages have developed
at national level.
There have been a number of cases in Sweden. For instance, in a case where a person
used their website to accuse five people of rape, damages of approximately 500 euro each
were awarded to the data subjects. In Belgium, a court awarded 750 euro to an employee
whose employer had installed a track-and-trace system in his company car allowing the
employer to follow his every movement (including outside working hours) without
informing him adequately.
Proving that such harm has occurred can be challenging for data subjects. The Italian
report contends that a mere violation of the data protection code does not suffice for a
compensation claim: the seriousness of the injury and the damage sufferedmust be assessed.
This issue is not addressed by theGDPR and there is no consistent practice acrossMember
States, falling as this does to national law. The Spanish report notes that under previous
law, damagewas presumed and awardedwhenever therewas a breach, however, the current
law indicates that the data subject must prove the damage. In Luxembourg however the
court’s jurisprudence suggests that harm in the context of infringements of personality
rights is not rigorously controlled once fault is established. Whether or not Member States
adopt this approach more generally in the data protection context remains to be seen.
Finally, establishing a quantum of damages is challenging in this context. In Austria it
is possible that this will be “determined by free judicial conviction” and in such cases, the
circumstances of the case will be equally important as the harm to the victim. In Greece,
the former law set a minimum amount of compensation for intangible harm at 5,869.40
euro. However, this minimum amount was deemed to be unconstitutional by the Greek
courts that considered it to be incompatible with the principle of proportionality.
Given the reluctance of States to award significant damages for intangible harm under
the DPD, it would seem that the award of greater damages for such harm under the GDPR
is unlikely. Moreover, with limited prospects for such damages, individuals may decide
that the game is simply not worth the candle and refrain from legal proceedings. One
potential alternative, now considered, is for representative actions to litigate on behalf of
individuals.
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13 Has your Member State introduced legislative measures to facilitate such representative
actions? What role have NGOs played in data protection enforcement in your State and
are there any alternative movements emerging at national level (such as personal data
cooperatives or unions) to combat such asymmetries?
Article 80 GDPR provides for the “representation of data subjects”. Article 80(1) GDPR
awards data subjects a right to mandate a properly constituted non-profit entity to lodge
a complaint on their behalf with an NSA or to seek an effective judicial remedy against a
data controller, processor or an NSA. This is the compulsory part of article 80.
However, article 80 also leaves two choices to Member States. First, article 80(1) states
that where provided for by national law the data subjectmaymandate the non-profit entity
to seek compensation on their behalf. Second, also where provided for by law, article 80(2)
allows for such representationwithout themandate of the data subject. Before considering
how these provisions have been received in Member States, it is useful to consider the
background context.
Representative mechanisms existed pre-GDPR
Mechanisms involving representation by others were already in place under domestic law
in some countries, such as Croatia andDenmark, prior to the entry into force of theGDPR,
and therefore no new legislative actions have been taken pursuant to article 80.
However, in other States while some mechanisms for representative actions exist, they
do not necessarily apply in the data protection context. For instance, in both Malta and
Poland, such actions are possible in situations specifically enumerated in domestic law.
While the authors of both reports indicate that there is support to extend the scope of
application of such actions to avail of the possibility afforded by the GDPR, domestic law
has not yet been extended to do so. Similarly, in Spain and particularly in Germany the
possibility exists to pursue data protection claims under the auspices of the civil enforcement
of consumer protection law. However, the German report notes that this collective action
right of consumer organisations (Verbraucherzentralen) is not to be understood as an
implementation of article 80. This failure to extend existing mechanism to incorporate
data protection actions, or to introduce new mechanisms, seems to fall foul of the article
80(1) requirement to introduce this possibility for data subjects.
Availing of the flexibilities in article 80 GDPR
It appears that the majority of Member States have not opted to enable non-profit actors
to seek compensation on behalf of the data subject following a mandate. This possibility
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has been availed of in France. TheAustrian report notes that while it was originally intended
to extend domestic law to cover such actions, this was ultimately not included in the Act.
This exclusion has been viewed critically by activist organisations such as Austrian noyb
(none of your business).
Similarly, it seems that the possibility of enabling representation without a mandate
has not been widely availed of. Again, a notable exception here is France, which not only
incorporates the possibility envisaged by article 80(2) into national law but also extends
this to matters of compensation. Therefore a non-profit organisation may seek
compensation on behalf of a data subject even without their mandate pursuant to French
law.
Properly constituted organisations
The GDPR specifies that the not-for-profit body, organisation or association (hereinafter
“NGO”) be “properly constituted in accordance with the law of the Member State, has
statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and is active in the field of the
protection of data subjects’ rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their
personal data”.
It is clear that Member States have sought to add further conditions to these three
criteria, in amanner that is probably incompatible with EU law. For instance, under Czech
law the person acting on behalf of an NGO in civil or administrative proceedings must
have a “full legal education”. It seems that there is no such requirement if the data subject
decides to be represented by a natural person.
In France, relevant associations must have been established for at least five years. As
the French report notes, no such temporal limitation exists in the GDPR and this
requirement stems from a previous French law.
As the Romanian report indicates, the form in which the NGO receives the mandate
may also influence the feasibility and legality of such representative actions. It would seem
that in Romania such mandates must be issued under law by a lawyer or a notary.
Representative activity at domestic level
Representative actions in the field of data protection still remain relatively uncommon at
national level. There has however been notable litigation in the consumer protection
context. In Belgium, seven of the eight collective actions instigated since the relevant law
entered into force in 2014 were initiated by Test-Achats, a consumer protection
organisation. One of these actions was pending before the Brussels commercial court in
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the wake of Facebook’s data breach of September 2018 and the Cambridge Analytica
scandal, according to the national report.
In the UK there has also been more activity in recent years. For instance, in WM
Morrisons Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants the Court of Appeal considered the
vicarious liability of a supermarket for the deliberate disclosure by one of its employees of
the payroll data of 100,000 employees on a file sharing website. The judgment confirming
the vicarious liability is currently under appeal before the Supreme Court. Some claimants
in this case were part of a group legal order, which is recognised when a number of claims
give rise to common or related issues of fact or law. The national report also indicates that
a similar order may be prepared in respect of the British Airways data breach referred to
earlier.
Where such initiatives are absent, this may be explained in part by the lack of domestic
civil society actors active in this field. This absence has been noted in relation to several
countries, including Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece and Slovenia. Indeed, the Slovenian report
notes that at present there is no registered organisation that would meet the requirements
of article 80.
More positively, where such civil society organisations are well established, they have
made a significant impact. For instance, in the Netherlands civil society campaigned for
the organisation of a consultative referendum on the Dutch Intelligence and Security
Services Act. Some 6.7 million Dutch inhabitants voted in this referendum, with a majority
voting against the Act. Although the referendum was not binding, the government did
adjust the law to address some of the public concerns. In Belgium, twoNGOs are currently
appealing an Act before the Constitutional Court that embeds a fingerprint in new identity
cards.
As the Czech report indicates, the role of civil society is not limited to assisting in and
lodging formal complaints and judicial proceedings. It includes public information
campaigns, submissions of comments on draft legislation and the granting of awards and
“anti-awards”. Moreover, the variety of actors engaging in data protection advocacy is
expanding. InAustria, theChamber of Labour acts as an advocate for higher data protection
standards and has published various reports on related issues. In France, there is now a
trade union to represent data protection officers who are multiplying in number across
organisations.
14 Have these trends been visible in your Member State? In particular, has the NSA
cooperated with other regulators or an ombudsperson formally or informally?
Personal data is the object ofmultiple legal and regulatory frameworks leading to potentially
competing claims regarding how its processing should be regulated and by whom.
Moreover, just as digital data does not respect territorial boundaries, it also challenges
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traditional boundaries between regulatory authorities. States have therefore been
considering whether existing institutional arrangements are up to the task of effective
regulation in the digital context.
What emerges from the national reports is that cooperation between regulatory agencies
is the norm rather than the exception. Such cooperation is reported as being entirely absent
only in Slovakia and Austria. Indeed, NSAs actively seek such cooperation. For instance,
in its Regulatory Action Plan approved by parliament in November 2018, the UK NSA set
out the objective to “work with other regulators and interested parties constructively,
recognising the [… interconnected] nature of data flows in the expanding digital economy”.
Nevertheless, while such cooperation is occurring more frequently, there is little
consistency with regard to which regulatory agencies cooperate and the basis for their
cooperation.
Formal cooperation
Many reports note that while such cooperation exists, it is “informal and ad hoc” as in
Malta or “entirely based on personal relationships” like in the Czech Republic. In recent
years, one of the more visible avenues for more formal cooperation between regulatory
authorities has been the “Digital Clearinghouse” launched by the EuropeanData Protection
Supervisor with a view to facilitating dialogue and cooperation on data protection and
consumer protection, and between competition authorities and, more recently as noted
in the Institutional Report, electoral regulators. The reports from Ireland and Luxembourg
note the participation of the NSA in this forum.
Indeed, cooperation between these particular authorities is increasingly visible. The
German report refers to the legislative amendment that brought data protection lawwithin
the scope of application of competition law, allowing the German Competition Authority
to initiate proceedings against Facebook for an abuse of dominance through its failure to
respect data protection law.
In Ireland the updated Consumer Protection Regulations entered into force in January
2020. They enable competent authorities to request the exercise of enforcement powers
by other competent authorities. Moreover, the domestic data protection legislation
specifically recognises the importance of collaboration between regulators and other
statutory bodies at both domestic and international level. It creates an exemption to the
general prohibition on the disclosure of confidential information by staff of the NSA if
such disclosure is made “to a public authority, whether in the State or otherwise, for the
purposes of facilitating cooperation between the Commission and such authority in the
performance of their respective functions”.
What is perhaps less expected is the reference to agencies with ostensibly similar
missions to NSAs in the German and Greek reports. The German report notes that data
protection is tightly linked to data security and, as such, the Federal Office for Information
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Security plays a role in the wider context of data protection. Similarly, in Greece an
Authority for Communication Security and Privacy exists alongside the NSA and their
relationship is governed by law.
Filling the gaps?
While the idea of creating designated regulators for the internet is garnering public
attention, there is little evidence of such institutional change in the reports. Malta has
created a new authority – theMalta Digital InnovationAuthority – to “regulate innovative
technologies”. However, other reports note the adequacy of the status quo: for instance,
the German report notes that strong authorities already exist at federal and Länder level
with corresponding far-reaching competences.
Rather, what we see is cooperation between authorities to fill gaps in their competences
in some circumstances. In Poland, the NSA cooperates with the national ombudsman as
the latter has additional useful competences, such as the ability to lodge complaints to the
Constitutional Court. Similarly, in Finland, consumer authorities have the competence to
commence group complaints and class actions of their own initiative, competences the
NSA does not possess. In France, regulatory authorities have worked together on different
themes such as knowledge management, human resources and using data to inform
regulation. A report was published on the latter in July 2019.
15 Is “national security” defined in your domestic law or administrative practice? Have
national authorities accepted the application of the EU Charter to data retention for
national security purposes (following from the Tele2 and Watson judgments)?
Introduction
InDigital Rights Ireland the CJEU annulled the EU Data Retention Directive in its entirety
on the basis of its incompatibility with the Charter rights to privacy and to data protection.48
The CJEU considered that the Directive went further than was necessary to achieve its
objective of combatting serious crime by not setting out clear and precise rules regarding
the extent of the interference with these rights.
The compatibility of data retention requirements with fundamental rights had
concurrently been the subject of legal challenges across several EU Member States, with
national jurisdictions struggling to gauge the implications of Digital Rights Ireland for




their domestic data retention legislation. It was against this background thatTele2/Watson49
was delivered. This judgment marked a significant shift in approach as the CJEU held that
the objective of fighting serious crime cannot “in itself justify the finding that general and
indiscriminate data retention legislation is necessary for the fight against crime”.50 Thus,
general and indiscriminate data retention was deemed to be incompatible with the Charter
rights, irrespective of the safeguards put in place around access and use amongst other
things. This judgment has proven to be divisive, as the reports reflect. Moreover, as the
reports also reflect, the current legal landscape is a dynamic one, with references pending
relating to its application in the criminal context from the Estonian Supreme Court51 and,
most recently, the Irish Supreme Court.52
The reception of Tele2/Watson into domestic legal orders
Austria has set the gold standard for the reception of Tele2/Watson into domestic legal.
In 2018, Austria introduced amendments to relevant legislation in order to implement a
“quick freeze model”, which means that in the event of an initial suspicion of certain
criminal offences, telecommunications providers should be required by public prosecution
to retain telecommunications data stored. Furthermore, the Austrian law provides that
access to these data is only permissible on the condition of a specific suspicion regarding
an offence and judicial authorisation. The explanatory notes for these amendments refer
toTele2/Watson several times, reflecting the willingness of the legislature to adjust national
law accordingly. In Sweden legislative changes have been introduced in response to the
judgments, while such amendments are in the pipeline in Luxembourg.
In Germany, doubts were raised regarding the compatibility with EU law of domestic
data retention provisions enacted to reflectDigital Rights Ireland. These ruleswere supposed
to enter into force in July 2017. However, a regional court shared these concerns and
discharged a single operator from its storage obligations. This in turn led the Federal
Network Agency to suspend the implementation of these obligations.
These efforts can be contrasted with the situation in Italy where, despite a request from
the NSA to the legislature to amend the legislative text, an Italian law contains an exception
for data retention in order to ensure the effectiveness of investigative tools for
counter-terrorism purposes and the repression of specified criminal offences.
49 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for theHomeDepartment v TomWatson andOthers, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
50 Ibid, para. 103.
51 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 29 November 2018, Case C-
746/18, H.K. v Prokuratuur.
52 Dwyer v The Commissioner of An Garda Siochana and Others (2019/18, Irish Supreme Court).
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The extension of Tele2/Watson to national security
The prohibition of general and indiscriminate data retention set out in Tele2/Watson was
provided for in the context of data processing for the purposes of fighting serious crime.
However, the question has arisen of whether this prohibition on indiscriminate data
retention also applies in the context of national security.
One could argue that the dividing line between policing serious crime, protecting public
order and security, and protecting national security is becoming increasingly blurred. The
Charter also applies to Member States when availing of exceptions set out in EU legislative
instruments, arguably including national security.Nevertheless, article 4(2) TFEUostensibly
excludes national security from the scope of application of EU law, although – as the
Institutional Report clearly indicates – the meaning of article 4(2) remains contested. It is
therefore little wonder that a number of preliminary references are now pending before
the CJEU querying the outer limits of the Tele2/Watson judgment.
The questions referred from France and the UK, and the accompanying text, reflect
what the French report considers to be a great reluctance to apply the Tele2/Watson
conditions. In particular, the FrenchConseil d’Etat considers that data retention is necessary
to tackle threats. It asked the Court to consider whether the data retention obligations
must be considered in the context of the serious and persistent threats to national security,
and in particular terrorist threats, and therefore be viewed as a justifiable interference to
ensure the right to liberty and security provided for in the Charter, and the demands of
national security that Member States are responsible for.53 Similar questions were
concurrently posed by the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal in the Privacy International
referral54 and subsequently from the Belgian Constitutional Court.55
The Dutch Courts have refused to consider the possibility that the Tele2/Watson
reasoning applies to national security on several occasions, indicating that when personal
data are processed by a private party, but are destined for use by one of the intelligence
services, this does not fall within the scope of EU law. Similarly, the Czech national
authorities have actively argued against the view that Tele2/Watson could be extended to
data retention for national security purposes. However, even if EU law does apply to such
processing, it claims that conditions for proportionality would need to be vastly different
from Tele 2/Watson, due to the different nature of threats against national security and
53 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 3 August 2018, Case C-511/18,
La Quadrature du Net and Others.
54 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, London (UnitedKingdom) lodged
on 31October 2017, CaseC-623/17,Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign andCommonwealth
Affairs and Others.
55 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium) lodged on 2 August 2018, Case
C-520/18, Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone and Others.
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the different nature of the instruments needed to prevent these threats. The government’s
position has found support from theCzechConstitutional Court, which has recently ruled
that the general data retention obligation is in accordance with the Czech constitution,
even for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offences.
Future perspectives
It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to draw firm conclusions based on this
General Report. Yet, a number of important themes can be gleaned from the excellent
reports, both national and Institutional, that merit further discussion.
First, in this area as in many others of EU law, the tension between regulatory
convergence and harmonisation, on the one hand, and respect for the constitutional and
legal plurality of EU Member States is ever present. The GDPR is an unusual legal
instrument, as an EU regulation it leaves considerable margin for manoeuvre to Member
States in a way that detracts from its harmonising ambitions. The need for its “reception”
in domestic legal orders is more akin to the implementation of a directive than the direct
applicability of a regulation and makes for a complicated legal landscape at domestic level.
The use of this discretion in areas touching upon national constitutional rights, such
as freedom of expression, and sovereign prerogatives, such as national security, may be
viewed as essential to avoid clashes between domestic constitutional courts and the CJEU,
where possible. This may explain the CJEU’s cautious approach when providing guidance
on how data protection should be reconciled with freedom of expression, leaving this
balancing to a large extent to national courts and authorities. Whether such a restrained
approach is taken in the national security context remains to be seen.
A second theme that emerges relates to the enforcement of the European data protection
framework.While EU legislation has always provided for robust substantive data protection,
these provisions have not been enforced, leading to a visible gap, perhaps more accurately
a chasm, between the law “on the books” and in practice. Enhancing enforcement was one
of the key EU data protection reform priorities and led to the introduction of mechanisms
such as the one stop shop and the creation of a new EU body, the EDPB. Since the GDPR’s
entry into force, domestic authorities have seen a significant increase in demand for their
regulatory assistance at domestic level, on top of their increased “European” duties. While
many have strategic plans in place to prioritise their workloads, it remains critical that
these authorities remain adequately resourced. It is still too early to assess whether the
new regime will lead to improved enforcement.
Manyof the complementarymechanisms introduced to support this public enforcement,
including the possibility for representative actions on the part of the data subject and the
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continued availability of damages for intangible harm, do not appear to be having a
significant impact across Member States as of yet. Indeed, it is in neighbouring areas, such
as consumer protection, that representative actions are having the most bite.
A third theme to highlight is the ongoing tussle between dual visions of personal data,
namely as a commodity, and as an extension of the personality and dignity rights of
individuals. It is clear that at EU level there is little desire to renege on the commercial
benefits of personal data processing. Yet a commitment to data protection is required
under the Charter. This explains the prevarication regarding how personal data should be
treated in the Digital Content Directive, for instance. This is also evident at national level
where there is no uniform approach to key questions such as whether consent can be “free”
when the provision of a service or content is made conditional on such consent. This
validates Cohen’s approach to the information economy: it is not possible to disaggregate
data processing practices from the businessmodels they sustain.56 This is an issue thatmay
test the EU’s commitment to the right to data protection in the future.
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1 Introduction
It will not have gone unnoticed that new data protection rules became applicable in the
EU in May 2018. As data subjects, people were flooded with information and consent
notices. As persons in charge of data processing activities, there was great compliance
stress, at all levels from schools and sports clubs to public administration to small, medium
and big enterprises. One thing can safely be concluded: the General Data Protection
Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) has been a huge success in creating awareness of the
existence of data protection rules. Data protection rules to a large extent were not really
new. The ‘game changer’ was the introduction of the power for data protection authorities
to issues fines up to 4% of the annual worldwide turnover.
The FIDE 2020 conference, after two years of GDPR, is an excellent opportunity to
take stock and look at where the Union stands with regard to its data protection regime.
It should be noted that the data protection regime covers more than the GDPR only. In
May 2018, EUMember States also had to transposeDirective (EU) 2018/680which contains
data protection rules for law enforcement authorities (hereinafter “Law Enforcement
Directive”). Moreover, there are specific data protection rules for the telecoms sector and
for EU institutions and bodies. In addition, several EU instruments in the area of freedom,
security and justice have specific data protection provisions.
In order to keep the exercise within reasonable limits, the questionnaire for the present
topic highlighted more specific themes, and focuses on several topical legal issues. The
present report follows the main structure of the questionnaire and looks at the different
issues from a purely EUperspective through focus on relevant activities of the EU legislator;
on the supervision of EU data protection rules at EU level; and on topics which were the
subject of recent rulings of theCourt of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “CJEU”).
* Respectively Head of Unit Policy and Consultation, European Data Protection Supervisor; Member of the
Legal Service, European Commission, Professor of European Data Protection and Privacy Law, Maastricht
University, and affiliated member of the Institute of European Law, KU Leuven. The opinions expressed
in the report reflect the authors’ personal opinions and cannot be attributed to the EDPS or the European
Commission.
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2 Setting the scene
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the right to protection
of personal data is firmly grounded in primary Union law. The right is laid down in article
16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of Europe (hereinafter “TFEU”) as well as in article 8
of theCharter of Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “Charter”), next
to the right to privacy in article 7. Article 16 TFEU also provides a self-standing legal basis
for data protection rules in all areas of Union law.1 The provision lies at the basis of the
GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive, as well as Regulation 2018/1725 for the Union
institutions and bodies. The development of the Union acquis on data protection is
continuing, inter alia,with the pending legislative procedure on a new ePrivacy Regulation.
Recent years have also shown the CJEU as a driving force behind upholding strong,
harmonised data protection standards in the Union. Following an analysis in the light of
articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the Court has declared several Union instruments invalid
and has given a negative opinion on a draft agreement between Canada and the Union on
transfer of PassengerNameRecords.Also national supervisory authorities and the European
Data Protection Supervisor, including through their participation in the former article 29
Working Party (now the European Data Protection Board), have contributed to the
understanding and consistent application of the EU data protection rules.
The European Commission has taken stock of the implementation of the GDPR in
two communications inwhich it concluded that while the overall picture is positive, further
progress remains necessary in a number of areas, amongst which are the allocation of
sufficient resources to national supervisory authorities and the cooperation between them.2
At the time of writing the Commissionwas preparing a report on the evaluation and review
of the GDPR.3
The European Commission also used the occasion of the new data protection rules to
expand more actively the international dimension of Union data protection, relying on
the growing trend at global level to raise the protection of individual data in the digital
era.4 In 2019, for example, the Commission adopted a new adequacy decision concerning
Japan, and negotiations or exploratory talks are taking place with South Korea and several
Latin American countries.5 The Commission also developed specific provisions on data
1 Art. 39 TEU contains a specific procedure for the adoption of data protection rules for the common foreign
and security policy.
2 Communication COM(2018)43 of 24 January 2018, Stronger protection, new opportunities, and Commu-
nication COM(2019)374 of 24 July 2019, Data protection rules as a trust-enabler in the EU and beyond –
taking stock, p. 18.
3 As required by art. 97 GDPR.
4 Communication COM(2017)7 of 10 January 2017, Exchanging and protecting personal data in a globalised
world.
5 Communication COM(2019)374, part VI.
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flows and data protection for trade agreements, which it systematically tables in its bilateral
and multilateral negotiations. These horizontal rules are intended to rule out purely
protectionist measures, such as forced data localisation requirements, while preserving
the regulatory autonomy of the parties to protect the fundamental right to data protection.6
3 GDPR responsibilities: Consent and controllership
3.1 Consent
Pursuant to article 8(2) of the Charter, personal data may only be processed ‘on the basis
of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’.
Article 6 GDPR exhaustively lists the grounds for lawful processing, the first being where
the data subject has given consent for one or more specific purposes.7 Consent must be
freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.8
Although no ground in article 6(1) has normative priority over the others, in practice
consent may play a salient role in the private sector whenever no other legal basis seems
appropriate.9
The conditions for “specific”, “unambiguous” and “informed” consent were clarified
by the CJEU in Planet49.10 The case concerned the consent of participants in a promotional
online lottery to the sharing of their data with the company’s sponsors and partners, as
well as to the storage and reading of cookies.
The Court confirmed that only active behaviour on the part of the data subject with a
view to giving their consent (and not, for example, a pre-ticked box) fulfils the requirement
of “unambiguous” consent.11 Consent must also relate specifically to the processing of the
data in question and cannot be inferred from an indication of the data subject’s wishes for
other purposes.12 The ruling suggests that informing users that through continuing their
activity on a website (“continuous browsing”) they consent to the placing of cookies on
their devices is not sufficient for the consent to be valid.
In Planet49, the question also arose whether consent to the processing of personal data
for advertising purposes could be considered as “freely given” when it was a prerequisite
6 Ibid, p. 12.
7 Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR.
8 Art. 4(11) GDPR.
9 See W. Kotschy, commentary on Article 6 GDPR in C. Kuner et al. (Eds),The EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
10 Judgment of 1 October 2019 in Case C-673/17 Planet49 GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2019:801.
11 Ibid, para. 54.
12 Ibid, para. 58.
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for the user’s participation in a lottery. An answer to this question would have affected the
majority of online publishers and service providers that condition access to their services
on allowing online behaviour tracking through cookies or reliance on “cookie walls” as a
source of income. AG Szpunar did not rule it out and even referred in his Opinion to
“selling” of personal data in the sense of “agreeing to be contacted by so-called sponsors
[of an on-line lottery] for promotional offers”.13 However, the Court chose not to engage
with this issue in its ruling14 and so the validity of “cookie walls” and similar business
models remains unresolved as a matter of EU law.
The monetisation of personal data is a recurring subject of debate. It is widely accepted
today that personal data may have monetary value and in many cases they are traded as a
commodity, often as part of large data sets.15 An analysis of this economic dimension of
the data economy was provided by the European Data Protection Supervisor (hereinafter
“EDPS”) back in 2014.16 Since then, monetary value of personal data has been recognised
explicitly in certain Union instruments.17 Also the proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation
acknowledged that “[i]n the digital economy, services are often supplied against
counter-performance other than money, for instance by end-users being exposed to
advertisements”.18
In the context of the legislative process leading to Directive (EU) 2019/770 on digital
content, the EDPS sharply criticised the introduction of the notion of “personal data as
counter-performance” in the proposal,19 considering that since personal data are related
to a fundamental right, they “cannot be considered as a commodity” or “conceived as a
mere economic asset”.20 The EDPS also demonstrated how the very literal conception of
“data as currency” was bound to raise difficult questions about the relationship of the
proposed Directive and the relevant provisions of the GDPR (in particular with respect to
lawful bases for processing). The final text of Directive (EU) 2019/770 sends mixed
messages. It recognises that “the protection of personal data is a fundamental right and
13 Opinion of AG Szpunar of 21 March 2019 in Case C-673/17 Planet49 GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2019:246, para.
99.
14 C-673/17 Planet49, para. 64.
15 Report of J. Crémer, Y-AdeMontjoye andH. Schweitzer of 2019 for the EuropeanCommission,Competition
policy for the digital era, www.ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf, p. 2. This
webpage and those following were visited on 1 February 2020.
16 EDPS preliminary Opinion of March 2014, www.edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_
competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf.
17 See for example recital 16 ofDirective (EU) 2018/1972 establishing the EuropeanElectronicCommunications
Code (recast) [2018] OJ L321/36.
18 COM(2017)10 final, rec. 18.
19 EDPS Opinion 4/2017 of 15 March 2017, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-03-14_
opinion_digital_content_en_1.pdf.
20 Ibid, p. 7.
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that therefore personal data cannot be considered as a commodity”,21 but, at the same time,
the scope of the Directive does include situations where “the consumer provides or
undertakes to provide personal data to the trader”.22
It seems indeed that the notion of “personal data as counter-performance”oversimplifies
complex realities and fails to account for the various business models that exist. Equating
“paying a price” with money is often misleading, if only because the average consumer
would typically not be in a position to fully understand how exactly the information related
to him is processed and howmuch value is actually extracted from it.23 Moreover, adopting
such concepts in legislation (or case law) may inadvertently serve to legitimise business
practices which are questionable, if not illegal, under the GDPR.
Also the European Data Protection Board (hereinafter “EDPB”) appears to confirm
that it is necessary to make a distinction between certain business practices and their
compatibility with data protection rules.24 As technological progress has increased the
possibilities to process growing amounts of personal data, online service providers have
been incentivised tomaximise their data collection and use, including through contractual
terms – which, according to the EDPB, constitutes an “acute risk”.25 Furthermore, article
6(1)(b) GDPR (processing necessary for a contract with the data subject) cannot provide
a lawful basis for online behavioural advertising simply because such advertising funds
the provision of the service. Additional elements would need to be considered to establish
the necessity of such processing. Relevant factorsmay include themutual perspectives and
expectations of the parties, including whether an ordinary user of the service would
reasonably expect that, considering the nature of the service, the envisaged processing will
take place in order to perform the contract.
It is difficult to dispute the fact that data – including personal data –are necessary for
the development and functioning of many services and products that are indispensable in
a modern society. Attempts to assign monetary value to data are therefore understandable
from the point of view of economics. A broader reflection is still needed about the
compatibility of “data monetisation” approaches with the fundamental right nature of
personal data protection.
21 Recital 14 Directive (EU) 2019/770 [2019] OJ L136/1.
22 Ibid, art. 3(1), second paragraph.
23 This is partly due to the fact that standard contractual terms and privacy policies typically contain vague
terms like “improving consumers’ experience” and are practically never explicit about the actual ways of
monetising information.
24 See EDPB Guidelines 2/2019 of 9 April 2019, www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/
guidelines/guidelines-22019-processing-personal-data-under-article-61b_en.
25 Ibid, p. 6.
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3.2 Controllership
The concept of “controller” is key to determining who is responsible for compliance with
the data protection rules, including against whom data subjects can exercise their rights
and, in many cases, which supervisory authority is competent. Controller is “the natural
or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others,
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”.26
Today, the roles of controllers and processors (who process data on behalf of the
controller) are becoming more fluid, with controllers losing some of their traditional
dominance over data and processors being more likely to influence decisions over it (as,
for example, in the field of cloud computing). Thismight explainwhy the concept of “joint
controllers” is gaining importance.
Article 26 GDPR clarifies that two or more controllers who jointly determine the
purposes andmeans of processing, are to be considered joint controllers. Further, it imposes
on such joint controllers an obligation to enter into an arrangement setting out their
respective responsibilities, in particular in relation to the modalities for the exercise of data
subject rights and transparency obligations. The designation of a contact point for data
subjects may be covered by such an arrangement. Still, data subjects are able to exercise
their rights in respect of each of the joint controllers.27
Joint controllership was also considered by the CJEU. In Wirtschaftsakademie a
private-law company operating in the field of education was ordered to deactivate its fan
page on Facebook, since the personal data of the visitors of the fan page were collected via
cookieswithout informing them.28 Wirtschaftsakademie argued that it was not the controller
in relation to this processing, but that Facebook was.
The Court applied a broad interpretation of the concept of “controller”. By setting up
the fan pages on Facebook’s terms, setting the parameters and allowing Facebook and
others to place cookies, the administrator of such pages contributed to the visitors’ personal
data processing and therefore became controller, jointly with Facebook Ireland.29 The fact
that the fan page administrator did not have access to the personal data but only received
anonymised statistics did not prevent joint controllership.30 The Court underlined that
“the existence of joint responsibility does not necessarily imply equal responsibility of the
26 Art. 4(7) GDPR.
27 Art. 26(3)GDPR.TheEDPS issued guidelines on the concepts of controller, processor and joint controllership
as regards Union institutions and bodies. See EDPS Guidelines of 7 November 2019, www.edps.europa.eu/
sites/edp/files/publication/19-11-07_edps_guidelines_on_controller_processor_and_jc_reg_2018_1725_
en.pdf.
28 Judgment of 5 June 2018 in Case C–210/16, Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:388.
29 Ibid, para. 36.
30 Ibid, para. 38.
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various operators involved in the processing of personal data” but that the “level of
responsibility of each of themmust be assessedwith regard to all the relevant circumstances
of the particular case”.31
The Court’s ruling may have far reaching consequences for users of any service or
platform which technically permits the collection and processing of personal data, e.g. by
placing cookies or similar tracking devices, or by allowing the collection of IP addresses.
In such cases, by agreeing with terms and conditions for use of the tool, the users may be
taking part in the determination of the purposes and the means of data processing, thus
becoming joint controllers for such data processing activities. Regarding in particular the
arrangements between joint controllers required under article 26 GDPR, it remains to be
seen to what extent an individual administrator of a Facebook fan page (or any user of
another tool or platform offered by a large company) has any leverage in shaping the
respective obligations in such an un-balanced relationship.
TheCourt confirmed its broad understanding of “controllership”’ in Jehovan todistajat
in relation to the collection of personal data by the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the course of
their door-to-door activities.32 The Court clarified that in order to qualify as a controller
there is no need for providing guidelines or instructions.33 Nor must the data controller
necessarily have access to the data processed. It must be determined in practice whether
the actor exerts sufficient influence over the processing of data so as to qualify as a data
controller.34
In Fashion ID, the CJEU further clarified the concept of (joint) controllership.35 The
case concerned the responsibility of the operator of a website embedding on its website
the “Like” social plug-in (button) from Facebook. Through the “Like” button, personal
data of people accessing the website, such as IP addresses and website history, were sent
to Facebook, regardless of whether the user clicked on it or was himself a member of
Facebook. TheCourt found that Fashion IDwas joint controller with Facebookwith respect
to two stages of the processing: the collection of personal data and disclosure by
transmission of those data.36 The website operator was found to exert decisive influence
over the processing, since the collection and transfer would not occur if the plug-in had
not been embedded.37 At the same time, the website operator’s responsibility as controller
is limited to the operation or set of operations for which it actually determines the purposes
31 Ibid, para. 43.
32 Judgment of 10 July 2018 in Case C-25/17, Jehovan todistajat, ECLI:EU:C:2018:551.
33 Ibid, para. 67.
34 Ibid, para. 68. See on the ruling R. Gellert, ‘Door-to-Door Preaching by Jehovah’s Witnesses Community
falls under Data Protection Law’, EDPL, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2018, pp. 391-395.
35 Judgment of 29 July 2019 in Case C–40/17, Fashion ID GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629.
36 Ibid, para. 84. On this point, the Court followed the Opinion of AG Bobek of 19 December 2018,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1039.
37 Ibid, para. 78.
85
Institutional Report Topic 2: The New EU Data Protection Regime
and means, that is to say, the collection and disclosure by transmission of the personal
data at issue.38
Fashion ID is the first case in which the Court assigned specific responsibilities in a
situation of joint controllership based on the data processing stages in which a controller
is involved. This “phase-oriented” approach to the division of responsibilities between
joint controllers has been criticised for lacking clear underpinnings inUnion data protection
law (e.g. the list of examples of processing operations in article 4(2) of the GDPR, to which
the Court referred, was never intended as a systemic classification of the different phases
of data processing) and for possibly exacerbating legal uncertainty. In addition, limiting
responsibilities to individual phases of data processing might result in losing sight of the
bigger picture, when it comes to the societal risks posed by complex, networked, personal
data processing systems such as in the case of a service provider like Facebook.39
4 GDPR rights: Data protection, freedom of expression and the
right to be forgotten
40
4.1 Data protection and freedom of expression
The right to data protection has a dual relationship with the freedom of expression which,
according to article 11 of the Charter, includes the freedom to receive and impart
information. On the one hand, data protection rules aim to reach a harmonised level of
data protection ensuring the free flow of information. On the other hand, data protection
rules might require a restriction of the public disclosure of personal data. The development
of the information society made the friction between the two rights increasingly apparent.
The potential conflict between both rights is recognised in article 85 GDPR which
requires Member States to provide, by law, for exemptions or derogations from the GDPR
for processing carried out for “journalistic purposes” or the purpose of academic, artistic
or literary expression, if they are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of
personal data with the freedom of expression and information. Exemptions or derogations
are possible from almost all provisions of the GDPR, but not with regard to judicial
38 Ibid, para. 85.
39 R. Mahieu and J. van Hoboken, ‘Fashion-ID: Introducing a phase-oriented approach to data protection?’,
European Law Blog, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/09/30/fashion-id-introducing-a-phase-oriented-
approach-to-data-protection/.
40 See also the commentary of H. Kranenborg on articles 17 and 85 of the GDPR in C. Kuner et al. (Eds), The
EUGeneral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press, 2019 and the commentary
of H. Kranenborg on article 8 of the Charter in the upcoming second edition of S. Peers et al. (Eds), Com-
mentary on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Oxoford, Hart Publishing.
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remedies, liability and sanctions.41 A similar provision existed in the former Directive
95/46/EC.42
Whether the EU data protection rules as such brought about an unjustified restriction
of the freedom of expression was addressed in the Lindqvist ruling of 2003.43 It concerned
the publication on a Swedish internet site of certain personal information byMrs Lindqvist
about fellow parishioners in her church. The Court did not consider that the former
Directive 95/46/EC in itself restricted the freedom of expression and that it was for the
national authorities and courts responsible to apply the transposing national law in such
a way as to ensure a fair balance between the rights and interests in question, including
respect for fundamental rights.44
In later rulings, the CJEU gave a very broad interpretation to the notion of ‘journalistic
activities’, thereby allowing Member States a large margin of manoeuvre. In Satamedia,
the Court considered that activities could be classified as journalistic if their object was
the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium
which is used to transmit them.45 In Buivids, the Court considered that not all information
published on the internet, involving personal data, comes under the concept of “journalistic
activities”.46 Uploading a film on YouTube can be done solely for journalistic purposes,
provided its sole objective is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas.47
According to article 85 GDPR, exemptions or derogations from the GDPR should be
made if “necessary to reconcile” the right to the protection of personal data with the
freedom of expression and information which requires a balancing of the two rights. The
CJEUhas been cautious in giving substantive guidance. InBuivids, theCJEUmade reference
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”) on
reconciling the rights to privacy and freedom of expression and the relevant criteria
developed by that Court for the balancing exercise.48
In its case law, the ECtHR paid particular attention to the public status of the persons
involved. Persons who have entered the public arena, such as politicians, are required to
41 See Chapter VIII of the GDPR. Chapters I, X and XI are also excluded.
42 Article 9 Directive 95/46/EC.
43 Judgment of 6 November 2003 in Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, para.72.
44 Ibid, para. 90.
45 Judgment of 16 December 2008 in Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy
and Satamedia Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727, para. 61. Despite the broad interpretation, the CJEU did not
consider the activities of an internet search engine as a journalistic activity. See judgment of 13 May 2014
in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para. 85. See on that ruling further par. 4.2 below.
46 Judgment of 14 February 2019 in Case C-345/17, Buivids, ECLI:EU:C:2019:122, para. 58.
47 Ibid, para. 69.
48 Ibid, para. 68. The CJEU referred the Satamedia ruling of the ECtHR which was indeed a further ruling on
the same issue as the Satamedia ruling of the CJEU. Judgment of the ECtHR of 21 July 2015, Satakunnan
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, App. No. 931/13.
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accept a greater degree of tolerance regarding the publication of information about them.49
However, public figures, especially if they did not deliberately choose to be in the public
arena, are not without protection.50 In order to strike a fair balance between privacy and
the freedom of expression, the ECtHR also took into account whether the publication
contributed to a debate of general interest.51 This could concern political issues or crimes,
but also sporting issues or performing artists.52 The rumoured marital difficulties of a
president, or the financial problems of a famous singer, were not deemed to be matters of
general interest.53 Other elements for the balancing exercise were the subject of the news
report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; themethod of obtaining the information
and the content, form and consequences of the publication.54 In Buivids, the CJEU
considered that the possibility for the controller to adopt measures to mitigate the extent
of the interference with the right to privacy also had to be taken into account.55
4.2 The right to be forgotten
A data subject has the right to require the controller to erase her of his personal data on
the basis of one of the grounds listed in article 17(1) GDPR. If the controller made the
personal data public, hemust take reasonable steps to informother controllers withwhom
the data were shared. The right to erasure, also referred to as the right to be forgotten, is
not absolute, as follows from article 17(3) GDPR. The right may be limited, inter alia, for
the protection of freedom of expression and information.56
The right to be forgotten has triggered significant debate. An important driver behind
the debate was the Google Spain ruling of the CJEU in 2014.57 The case concerned the
deletion of a link to a website from the list of results when searching the Internet via
Google’s search engine on an individual’s name. By removing the link from the search
results, the information about the person is not really “forgotten”, but rather removed
49 See for example judgment of the ECtHR of 8 July 1986, Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, A-103, para.
42.
50 Judgment of the ECtHR of 24 June 2004, Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, para. 69.
51 Ibid, paras 60-65.
52 Judgment of the ECtHR of 7 February 2012, Von Hannover v. Germany (No 2), App. No. 40660/08, para.
109.
53 Ibid.
54 Judgment of the ECtHR of 10 November 2015, Couderc and Hackette Filipacchi Associés v. France, App.
No. 40454/07, para. 93. This case gives a elaborate overview of the different criteria.
55 Ibid, para. 66.
56 Art. 17(3)(a) GDPR.
57 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL.
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from the “active memory” of the Internet since the website itself remains accessible.58 Still,
such ‘dereferencing’ also affects the freedom of expression.
In Google Spain the Court did not expend many words on the freedom of expression
as such.59 The competing interests referred to by the Court as requiring balancing were:
the economic interest of Google; the legitimate interests of internet users potentially
interested in having access to the information and the interests of the data subject.60
However, the interest of the newspaper itself in having wider accessibility of its website
was not taken into account. The role of Google as an instrument of freedom of expression
in that respect was not directly acknowledged by the Court.61
When giving guidance on how to strike the balance, the Court used elements seemingly
taken from the case law of the ECtHR discussed above. The point of departure, according
to the CJEU, is that the rights of the data subject “as a rule” override the other interests.
However, in some circumstances the right of the general public might prevail, which
depends on the nature of the information in question; its sensitivity for the data subject’s
private life and on the interest of the public in having that information which may vary,
in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.62
TheCourtwas criticised for not giving enough prominence to the freedomof expression
in theGoogle Spain ruling. In a second case concerningGoogle,GCand others, AG Szpunar
invited the Court to also take into account the freedom of expression of the publisher of
the website.63 The Court eventually gave more prominence to the right to freedom of
expression; however, it was still limited to the user of the search engine and not the owner
of the webpage, let alone Google itself.64 Instead of the “legitimate interests” of internet
58 See in relation to the source website, ECtHR 16 July 2013, Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, Appl.
No. 33846/07. See also S. Wechsler, ‘The Right to Remember: The European Convention on Human Rights
and the Right to be Forgotten’,Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs,Vol. 49, No. 1, 2015, p. 135. Regarding online press
archives: ECtHR 28 June 2018, M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, App. No. 60798/10 and 65599/10.
59 See for criticism of this point: E. Frantziou, ‘Further Developments in the Right to be Forgotten: The
European Court of Justice’s Judgment in Case C-131/12’, HRLR, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014, p. 761; S. Kulk and
F. Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘“Freedom of expression” and “right to be forgotten” cases in the Netherlands
after Google Spain’,EDPL,Vol. 1, No. 2, 2015, p. 113 andC. Kuner, ‘TheCourt of Justice of the EU Judgment
on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges’, in B. Hess and C.
Mariottini (Eds), Protecting Privacy in Private International and Procedural Law and by Data Protection,
Farnham/Baden-Baden, Ashgate/Nomos, 2015.
60 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, para. 81.
61 The Court points at the “important role” played by search engines, but only to underline that its activities
constitute a more significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to privacy than the
publication on the website, see paras 80 and 87. See for criticism H. Hijmans, ‘Right to have links removed:
Evidence of effective data protection’, Maastricht Journal, Vol., No. 3, 2014, p. 555.
62 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, at paras 81 and 97. See also on this H. Kranenborg, ‘Google and the Right
to be Forgotten’, EDPL Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, pp. 77-79.
63 Opinion of AG Szpunar of 10 January 2019 in Case C-136/17, GC and others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:14, para.
89.
64 Judgment of 24 September 2019 in Case C-136/17 GC and others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:773.
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users potentially interested in having access to the information, the Court referred to “the
right of freedom of information” of internet users potentially interested in accessing the
webpage as protected by article 11 of the Charter.65
GC and others concerned a request to delist a reference to “sensitive data” (e.g. data
concerning health or data revealing sexual orientation).66 TheCourt concluded that, having
regard to the responsibilities, powers and capabilities of the operator of a search engine,
the prohibition to process sensitive data applies to the operator, but via verification on the
basis of a request by the data subject.67 This means that the prohibition would not generally
obstruct the activity of Google as a search engine operator. The Court considered that the
operator of a search engine, when asked to remove a link, must always ascertain whether
the inclusion of the link would still be necessary for exercising the right of freedom of
information of the internet users potentially interested in accessing that website by means
of a search.68
In a third Google case, Google LCC, the Court recognised that Member States might
attach different weight to the freedom of information of internet users when balancing
this freedom against the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.69 According
to the Court this is also reflected in article 85 of the GDPR.70 In that respect, the Court
pointed at the consistency mechanism introduced by the GDPR, which should allow the
supervisory authorities to find a common solution.71
Google LCC concerned the territorial scope of the obligation to dereference. The Court
concluded that a search engine operator is not required to carry out a dereferencing on all
the versions of its search engine.72 The dereferencing is, in principle, supposed to be carried
out in respect of all the Member States, whereby sufficiently effective measures must be
taken to ensure the effective protection of the data subject’s fundamental rights.73
The Google LCC ruling contains an interesting twist at the end. The Court considered
that a national supervisory or judicial authority remains competent to weigh up, in the
light of national fundamental rights standards, the data subject’s rights, on the one hand,
and the right to freedom of information, on the other, and to order, where appropriate,
the operator of that search engine to carry out a dereferencing concerning all versions of
that search engine.74 The precise implications of this consideration are unclear. How the
65 Ibid, para. 66.
66 See art. 9(1) GDPR for a definition.
67 C-136/17, GC and others, para. 47.
68 Ibid, para. 66.
69 Judgment of 24 September 2019 in Case C-507/17, Google LCC, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para. 67.
70 Ibid, para. 67.
71 Ibid, paras 67-69.
72 Ibid, para. 65.
73 Ibid, paras 66 and 70.
74 Ibid, para. 72.
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national balancing exercise can be separated from the European one, keeping in mind that
both will relate to the same request for delisting, is unclear. It is equally unclear what value
should be given to the considerations of the Court that numerous third states do not
recognise the right to dereferencing or have a different approach to it and that the outcome
of the balancing exercise is likely to vary significantly around the world.75 In any event, it
seems that the uniform application of Union law (i.e. the GDPR) might be compromised
if some Member States were to require global delisting, and others did not.76
4.3 Data protection and freedom of expression: what level of
harmonisation?
According to article 85 GDPR Member States must, by law, reconcile the right to the
protection of personal data pursuant to the GDPR with the right to freedom of expression
and information.
Arguably, the right to be forgotten and how it relates to the freedom of expression is
covered by article 17 GDPR, while the general reconciliation of data protection and the
freedom of expression is left to the Member States under article 85 GDPR.77
Article 85(3) GDPR states that Member States shall notify the provisions of their laws
adopted on the basis of that provision to the European Commission. Member States also
have to notify, without delay, any subsequent amendment law or amendment affecting
them. A study from 2010 showed that there were wide divergences between the Member
States.78 Evenmore than under the previousDirective, the Commissionwill feel compelled
to search for certain coherence in this area in order not to undermine the harmonising
effects of the present Regulation. The existence of national law also raises questions about
the national law applicable in cross-border situations, which can be “particularly sensitive”.79
The issue was recognised by the legislator, which stated in recital 153 of the GDPR that
where such exemptions or derogations differ from one Member State to another, the law
of the Member State to which the controller is subject should apply.
75 Ibid, paras 59-60.
76 See in this respect judgments of 26 February 2013 inCaseC-617/10,Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105,
para. 29, and of 26 February 2013 in Case C-399/11, Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para. 60 partially cited
by the CJEU in para. 72 of the Google LCC ruling.
77 See in this respect the two orders of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 6 November 2019, at:
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2019/bvg19-083.html and
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2019/bvg19-084.html.
78 Report by D. Korff of 20 January 2010 for the European Commission, Comparative Study on Different
Approaches to New Privacy Challenges in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments.
79 Ibid, pp. 12-13.
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5 Enforcement of data protection law in the Union institutions
5.1 Data protection and the Union institutions: Regulation (EU) 2018/1725
The data protection rules for Union institutions and bodies were initially laid down in
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 which also established the EDPS.80 Since Union institutions
and bodies fell outside the scope of the GDPR, Regulation 45/2001 had to be adapted to
the GDPR.81 The new Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 entered into force on 11 December
2018.82
While generally aligned with the GDPR, Regulation 2018/1725 displays certain
differences, justified by the specific context inwhichUnion institutions and bodies operate.
The sections below set out some of those specificities and focus on issues raised in section
C of the questionnaire for the present topic.
5.2 The European Data Protection Supervisor
The EDPS is responsible for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of national
persons and, in particular, their right to data protection, are respected byUnion institutions
and bodies. The EDPS performs vis-à-vis the Union institutions and bodies the role of the
independent supervisory authority within the meaning of article 8(3) of the Charter and
article 16(2) TFEU.
The tasks and powers of the EDPS are generally aligned with those of national
supervisory authorities. The rules concerning appointment, performance of duties, and
independence have not changed much. This is not surprising: in three cases related to the
independence of national data protection authorities, the CJEU considered the EDPS as
a benchmark for the independence of supervisory authorities.83 The EDPS is appointed
for a term of five years by common accord of the European Parliament and of the Council,
80 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and
bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] OJ L8/1. The appointment of the first EDPS (Peter
Hustinx) and Assistant EDPS (JoaquínBayo Delgado) took effect only in January 2004.
81 See art. 2(3) GDPR.
82 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No
45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC [2018] OJ L295/39.
83 See C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2010:125, C-614/10, Commission v. Austria,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:631, and C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
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on the basis of a shortlist of at least three candidates drawn up by theCommission following
a public call for candidates.
5.3 Consultative role of the EDPS (legislative consultation)
Under Regulation 45/2001, the EDPS was tasked already with advising the Commission
and other institutions on new legislative proposals and other measures relating to the
protection of personal data.84 The first formal legislative opinion was issued on 22 October
2004.85 Since then, the awareness of the Commission services grew and with it the number
of EDPS opinions, reaching an average of 10-12 opinions and 20-30 formal comments per
year.86
In linewith theGDPR, Regulation 2018/1725 boosted the consultative role of the EDPS,
consolidating the practices developed over longer than the past decade.87 Article 42(1)
explicitly requires theCommission to consult the EDPS following the adoption of proposals
for a legislative act; of recommendations and of proposals to the Council pursuant to article
218 TFEU (i.e. international agreements) or when preparing delegated or implementing
acts with ‘an impact on the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to
the processing of personal data’.
Article 42(2) provides for the possibility in certain cases for the Commission to consult
also the EDPB (of which the EDPS is a member). In such cases, the EDPS and the EDPB
should coordinate their work with a view to issuing a joint opinion. The EDPS still
maintains its role as a privileged advisor to all EU institutions and bodies on data protection
issues, while the EDPB’s advisory powers are limited to the Commission.88
5.4 The EDPS’ approach to complaints
The right to lodge a complaint with the EDPS is enshrined in article 63 of Regulation
2018/1725. The EDPS must handle the complaint or inform the data subject about the
progress or outcome in three months (in line with article 78(2) GDPR).
84 Arts 28, 41 and 46(d) Regulation 45/2001.
85 [2004] OJ C301/4, also available at http://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/04-10-22_financial_
interests_en.pdf.
86 See EDPS Annual Reports, http://edps.europa.eu/annual-reports_en.
87 See EDPS Policy Paper of 4 June 2014, http://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-06-04_pp_
edpsadvisor_en.pdf.
88 See rec. 60, art. 42, 57(1)(g) and 58(3)(c) Regulation 2018/1725, and art. 70 GDPR.
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Since the entry into force of Regulation 2018/1725, the EDPS has not yet published an
updated general enforcement strategy.89 However, the main elements of the approach to
complaints have been made available on the EDPS website.
Anyonewhose personal data are processed by aUnion institution or body can complain
about that processing.90 In addition, anyone who is employed by a Union institution or
body can complain about breaches of the data protection rules by a Union institution or
body, even if they are not personally affected.91 Anonymous complaints are not handled.
Moreover, the EDPS does not deal with complaints which are before a court or that have
already been settled by a court, nor with matters that are being examined by the European
Ombudsman. At the same time, the admissibility of a complaint is not affected by the fact
that another Union institution is examining it, but the EDPS can decide to await the
outcome of that body’s procedures before starting its own investigation.92
In 2018, the EDPS received 298 complaints, an increase of 111% compared to 2017.
Of these, 240 complaints were inadmissible (the majority did not concern processing by
aUnion institution or body) and 23 complaints were closedwith a decision. The remaining
58 complaints required in-depth inquiry, an increase of 132% compared to 2017. 38 cases
submitted in previous years were still in the inquiry, review or follow-up phase on
31 December 2018.93
5.5 Administrative fines
Regulation 2018/1725 granted the EDPS the power to impose administrative fines on
Union institutions and bodies.94 During the legislative process the Member States were
divided over this issue, which can be explained by the fact that only a minority of them
made use of the possibility under article 83(7) GDPR to allow for administrative fines for
data protection infringements to be imposed on public authorities. The EDPS supported
the introduction of this power mainly because of its deterrent effect.
The sanctions regime for Union institutions and bodies differs in several important
aspects from the rules set out in the GDPR. While administrative fines under the GDPR
can, as a general rule, be imposed in addition to, or instead of, other corrective measures,95
89 For the approach under the old Regulation 45/2001, see EDPS Policy Paper of 13 December 2010, http://
edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/10-12-13_pp_compliance_en_0.pdf.
90 In addition, the EDPS specifies that a complaint will be investigated only if it concerns a real or potential
and not a hypothetical breach of personal data protection rules, and only if it is lodged within two years
from the date the data subject became aware of the facts on which the complaint is based.
91 Art. 67 Regulation 2018/1725.
92 See https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-role-supervisor/complaints_en.
93 www.op.europa.eu/webpub/edps/2018-edps-annual-report/en/, p. 37.
94 Art. 66 Regulation 2018/1725.
95 Art. 83(2) GDPR.
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fines under Regulation 2018/1725 are clearlymeant as sanctions of last resort, to be imposed
only in case of non-compliance with one of the other corrective measures under article
58(2)(d) to (h) and (j).96
Moreover, maximum limits for administrative fines under article 66 are significantly
lower than those provided for under article 83 GDPR and may not exceed 25,000 euro per
infringement in most cases, and up to a total of 250,000 euro per year. Higher fines (up to
50,000 euro per infringement and up to 500,000 euro per year) may only be imposed for
infringements of the basic principles for processing, including consent, data subjects’
rights, and rules related to international transfers. The total amount of fines imposed for
several infringements related to linked or continuing processing operations cannot exceed
the amount specified for the gravest infringement. This approach appears justified given
that, unlike theGDPR, Regulation 2018/1725 does not apply to operators pursuing gainful
activities. Moreover, fines of this order of magnitude, while undoubtedly having deterrent
effect, would not risk jeopardising the day-to-day functioning of the Union institution in
question. It should be emphasised that the funds collected by imposition of administrative
fines will not be linked in any way to the budget of the EDPS, but would form part of the
general budget of the Union.97
5.6 The data protection officer in Union institutions and bodies: A model
for the GDPR
Almost twenty years ago, Regulation (EC) 45/2001 introduced an interesting, if not unique
feature, of the data protection framework applicable to Union institutions and bodies: the
obligation for all Union institutions and bodies to appoint a data protection officer
(hereinafter “DPO”).98
DPOs were tasked with ensuring the internal application of the Regulation in an
independent manner.99 The first Annual Report of the EDPS presented the DPOs as a key
figure for the achievement of effective personal data protection and acknowledged that
the DPOs (some of whom were appointed even before the first EDPS and Assistant EDPS
were effectively appointed in January 2004) had done “very useful work”.100
96 Rec. 81 Regulation 2018/1725.
97 Art. 66(7) Regulation 2018/1725.
98 Member States could provide for the appointment of a “data protection officer” already under Directive
95/46/EC, see art. 18(2). However, this possibility was not widely used.
99 The independence of the DPO is understood as preventing them from receiving instructions regarding the
exercise of their tasks.
100 EDPS, Annual Report 2004, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/annual_report_2004_en.pdf,
p. 11.
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Over the years, the EDPS provided guidance on the role of the DPO; the type of profile
required for a DPO and the resources that should be allocated to the DPO to ensure the
good performance of their duties. The latest “position paper” took into account some
novelties introduced by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, e.g. the possibility to appoint a single
DPO for more than one Union institution or body. The EDPS considered, in particular,
that in order to be able to carry out the assigned tasks and responsibilities, DPOs should
be provided with adequate support at material, staff and managerial levels. Performing
the role of a DPO on a part-time basis is not excluded (and in fact it is quite common),
but in any event the DPO should have sufficient time to fulfil their duties.101
The obligation to appoint a DPO was introduced in the GDPR as one of the elements
strengthening controllers’ and processors’ responsibility and accountability, moving away
from the rather bureaucratic approach based on notification to or prior-checking by a
supervisory authority.102 Already before the adoption of theGDPR, the Article 29Working
Party argued that the DPO “is a cornerstone of accountability” and that it will continue
to be at the heart of the new accountability-based framework as intermediary between
relevant stakeholders (e.g. supervisory authorities, data subjects, and business units within
an organisation).103
The designation of a DPO under the GDPR is mandatory for controllers (and
processors) in the public sector (except for courts acting in their judicial capacity) and for
those whose activities require regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large
scale, or consist of processing on a large scale of “sensitive data” or data related to criminal
convictions.104 The GDPR requires DPOs to be provided with necessary resources and
support to maintain their expert knowledge, and to report to top management of the
controller or processor.105
Beyond supporting the controller or processor internally, thus facilitating compliance
with data protection rules, theDPO also act as a contact point for the supervisory authority,
and is tasked with cooperating with the authority more generally.106
101 EDPS, Position Paper of 30 September 2018, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-09-30_
dpo_position_paper_en.pdf.
102 See the Commission Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation, SEC(2012)72/2, p. 51. Designation of a DPO is also mandatory for police and judicial authorities
subject to the Law Enforcement Directive (see art. 32). Also in this case, Member States may exempt courts
and other independent judicial authorities when acting in their judicial capacities from that obligation. For
a discussion of the principle of accountability, C. Docksey, ‘Commentary on article 24 GDPR’ in: C. Kuner
et al, (Eds), The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.
103 Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (DPOs), WP 243 rev. 01, https://
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612048, p. 4.
104 Art. 37 GDPR.
105 Art. 38(2) and (3) GDPR.
106 Art. 39(1)(d) and (e) GDPR.
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5.7 Data protection rules for EU law enforcement agencies
Chapter IX of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 lays down the rules applicable to the processing
of operational personal data by Union bodies, offices and agencies when carrying out
activities which fall under the provisions on judicial cooperation in criminal matters or
police cooperation.107 Operational personal data is the personal data processed when
carrying out such activities to meet the objectives and tasks laid down in the legal acts
establishing those bodies, offices or agencies. Other processing activities are covered by
the “normal” rules of the Regulation. Chapter IX was not included in the Commission
proposal, but was added during the legislative process at the insistence of the European
Parliament. The provisions are based on those of the Law Enforcement Directive, in a way
“transposing” it for the EU agencies, providing for one single instrument at Union level.
Since 12 December 2019, the provisions also apply to the processing of operational
personal data by the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
(“Eurojust”).108 In the future, the Commission will have to review the relevant legal acts
governing the processing of operational personal data andmaymake legislative proposals,
in particular with a view to applying Chapter IX to the European Police Office (Europol)
and the European Public Prosecutors Office (EPPO).109
5.8 Remedies for non-compliance
Non-contractual liability of the Union requires the following elements to be present: actual
damage; a causal link between the damage claimed and conduct alleged against the
institution; and the illegality of such conduct.110 Claims for compensation may be brought
before the General Court pursuant to article 268 TFEU and article 340(2) TFEU, or
concerning relations between the Union and its servants under article 270 TFEU.111
The CJEU has accepted liability of Union institutions for breaches of the former
Regulation (EC) 45/2001. In Nanopoulos v. Commission, confidential information about
the applicant was leaked to the press and subsequently included in press articles.112 It is
for the applicant in an action for damages to establish that the conditions for
non-contractual liability are satisfied. However, the burden of proof shifts to the institution
107 Art. 2(2) Regulation 2018/1725.
108 Art. 26(1) Regulation 2018/1727 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on
the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and replacing and repealing
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA [2018] OJ L295/138.
109 Art. 98 Regulation 2018/1725.
110 K. Lenaerts et al, EU Procedural Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, at 11.01.
111 Previously these cases fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal (CST).
112 Judgment of 11May 2010 inCase F–30/08, Fotios Nanopoulos v. EuropeanCommission, ECLI:EU:F:2010:43.
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when a fact giving rise to damages could have resulted from various causes, and the
institution has not introduced any element of proof as to what was the true cause, even
though it was best placed to do so.113 As the publication of the applicant’s name could only
have resulted from an unauthorised disclosure by one of its departments, it was for the
Commission to prove that it was not the source of the leak.
In V v. European Parliament the applicant challenged the Parliament’s decision not to
recruit her on grounds of unfitness to be hired. That conclusion was reached based on a
medical dossier collected by the European Commission when the same applicant applied
for a job there almost two years earlier, and which had been subsequently transmitted to
the Parliament.114 The former Civil Service Tribunal concluded that the transmission was
in breach of several provisions of Regulation (EC) 45/2001. The applicant was awarded
5,000 euro for material damages (lost potential earnings). The Court recalled that the
annulment of the administration’s unlawful act could not constitute full reparation for the
non-material damage if that act contains an assessment of the abilities and conduct of the
person concernedwhich is capable of offending them, aswas the case here. This particularly
serious infringement of Regulation (EC) 45/2001 justified a compensation of 20,000 euro
for the non-material damage. More recently, the General Court held in XI v. Commission
that unnecessary disclosure of sensitive medical data in an administrative decision was
sufficient for the Court to find that the applicant had indeed suffered moral damage.115
The applicant was awarded 2,500 euro in compensation.116
In CN v. Parliament, a document stating that the applicant was suffering from a
life-threatening illness and that his son had a severe disability was published on the
Parliament’s website in the context of the procedure for handling a petition that the
applicant had submitted.117 Despite the applicant’s claims to the contrary, the General
Court considered that he had given his express consent to the processing of his personal
data, even sensitive data, by the Parliament, including their publication on the internet.
The applicant’s claims with regard to non-material damage were rejected on the ground
that he ‘merely claimed’ that the Parliament’s dismissive and dilatory attitude hurt him
deeply and caused him considerable stress, without providing any evidence.118
In Oikonomopoulos v. Commission the applicant claimed 2 million euro in damages
suffered as a result of infringements of the Regulation by the Commission and OLAF,
including reputational damage and loss of income due to the fact that he had to cease his
113 Judgment of 8 July 2008 in Case T-48/05, Franchet and Byk v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:257,
para. 183 and Case F–30/08, FotiosNanopoulos v. Commission, para. 161.
114 Judgment of 5 July 2011 in Case F-46/09, V and EDPS v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:F:2011:101.
115 Judgment of 12 September 2019 in Case T-528/18, XI v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2019:594.
116 Ibid, paras 75-77. The Commission’s appeal against the General Court’s ruling is currently pending.
117 Judgment of 3 December 2015 in Case T-343/13, CN v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2015:926.
118 Ibid, para. 121.
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professional activity. Even though the Court found an infringement of Regulation (EC)
45/2001, it held that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of any causal link
between that infringement and the damage complained of, and therefore his claim for
damages was dismissed as unfounded.119
5.9 Cooperation of supervisory authorities with other regulators
The EDPS has long drawn attention to synergies between data protection, consumer
protection and competition policy.120 Increased cooperation between competent authorities
could help to deal with challenges posed by the digital economy more effectively.
In 2016, the EDPS launched theDigital Clearinghouse in order to facilitate cooperation
and information exchange between regulators and enforcement agencies from across the
three areas. The scope of the meetings was later expanded to include electoral regulators,
in order to discuss the impact of online manipulation on free and fair elections and the
democratic process. From 2019, theDigital Clearinghouse is jointly hosted by the Research
Centre in Information, Law and Society (CRIDS) at the University of Namur, the Tilburg
Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) at TilburgUniversity, and the European
Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels.121 The emphasis was on the challenges of regulating
non-monetary price services and enforcement vis-à-vis big tech companies.122
6 Data protection and national security
6.1 ‘…national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State’
Article 4 TEU combines several elements fundamental to the Union legal order. The first
paragraph lays down the principle of conferral: competences not conferred upon theUnion
remain with the Member States. The second paragraph determines that the Union shall
119 Judgment of 20 July 2016 in Case T-483/13, Athanassios Oikonomopoulos v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:421, para. 247.
120 See EDPS Preliminary Opinion of March 2014, ‘Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The
interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy’,
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf and EDPS
Opinion of September 2016 on coherent enforcement of fundamental rights in the age of Big Data, https://
edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-09-23_bigdata_opinion_en.pdf.
121 See https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/subjects/big-data-digital-clearinghouse_en.
122 See EDPS Report of 2019, ‘Leading by Example EDPS 2015-2019’, www.edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/
publication/edps_2015-2019_en.pdf, p. 23.
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respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities.
The second paragraph continues by stating that the Union shall respect the essential State
functions of the Member States, which includes ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. Finally, it is added:
“[i]n particular national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”.
The third paragraph of article 4 lays down the principle of sincere cooperation: the Union
and the Member States shall assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the
Treaties.
Squeezed between the principles of conferral and sincere cooperation, the precise
meaning of the part listing the different elements concerning national identities and
essential State functions in article 4(2) is not self-evident.123 Directly following the principle
of conferral, these references could be seen as indicating certain areas that remain the
competence of the Member States and are therefore excluded from Union competence.
However, given that they are directly followed by the principle of sincere cooperation,
paragraph two could also be considered as listing national particularities that have to be
respected by the Union when exercising its competences.
Adopting the latter interpretation, matters relating to national identities and essential
State functions are not as such excluded from the scope of Union law but must be taken
into account in the application of Union law. The wording used in article 4(2) (“shall
respect”) seems to support this latter interpretation. However, the last sentence on (in
particular) national security rather supports the first interpretation.124
Member States have relied on article 4(2) TEU to argue that certain situations were
indeed as such excluded from the scope of Union law. In ZZ the Court stated that the mere
fact that a decision concerns State security cannot result in Union law being inapplicable.125
In her Opinion in the Achbita case, Advocate General Kokott stated that the European
Union’s obligation under article 4(2) TEU requires that the application of Union law must
not adversely affect the national identities of the Member States.126
If not considered as excluded as such from the scope of Union law, the question rises
as to how far the Court can go in assessing the lawfulness of national measures in these
areas. Should it limit itself to verifyingwhether the situation relied upon genuinely qualifies
as a national matter mentioned in article 4(2) TEU and leave it at that? Arguably, this
123 See art. 4(2) TEU; also G. Di Federico, ‘The Potential of Article 4(2) TEU in the Solution of Constitutional
Clashes Based on Alleged Violations of National Identity and the Quest for Adequate (Judicial) Standards’,
EPL, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2019, pp. 347-380 and S. Sule, ‘National Security and EU law restraints on Intelligence
Activities’, in J. H. Dietrich and S. Sule (Eds), Intelligence Law and Policies in Europe, Munich, Beck, 2019,
pp. 335-387.
124 To be noted that reference is made to the sole responsibility and not to the sole competence of the Member
States.
125 Judgment of 4 June 2013 in Case C-300/11, ZZ, ECLI:EU:C:2013:363, para. 38.
126 Opinion of 31 May 2016 in Case C-157/15, Achbita, ECLI:EU:C:2016:382, para. 32 (emphasis in original).
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would then still amount to an exclusion assessment. Or should the Court treat article 4(2)
TEU rather as derogation from Union law, which should be interpreted strictly, and also
includes an assessment of the proportionality of the national measure?
So far, the Court treated article 4(2) TEU mostly as a possible ground for derogation
from Union law, so applying a strict interpretation and assessing the proportionality of
the national measure. Admittedly, this might also be due to the fact that article 4(2) TEU
was almost always invoked in conjunction with grounds for derogations which were
explicitly provided for elsewhere in Union law (e.g. in the Treaty provisions on free
movement, or in secondary legislation). In these cases, considerations relating to article
4(2) TEU fed into the assessment of whether the derogation provided for elsewhere could
be relied upon.Article 4(2) TEUhelped to qualify the objective pursued by the derogation.127
The cases concerning specifically national security were indeed all based on other
Union law provisions as well, such as article 346(1) TFEU which itself includes a necessity
requirement.128 This justified a review by the Court also going into the proportionality of
the measure at issue.129
It has not yet been establishedwhether in relation to national security, article 4(2) TEU
could be invoked independently from any other provision inUnion law and, if so, whether
it will be treated as a ground for derogation; or, with a view to the explicit language in the
last sentence of article 4(2) TEU,whether the assessmentwould rather be limited to verifying
whether the situation relied upon genuinely qualifies as a matter of national security.
InCorreiaMoreira, which did not concern national security, the Court seemed to imply
that once a matter is harmonised by Union law, and no exclusion or derogation is foreseen
for national specificities, article 4(2) TEU cannot be relied upon in order not to apply those
rules.130
127 E.g. the Court has qualified as belonging to the national identity: the protection of the official language or
languages of the Member States, the status of a Member State as a Republic and the division of competences
within a Member States, including internal reorganisations of powers. See resp. judgment of 12 May 2011
in Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291, para. 86; judgment of 16 April 2013 in Case C-
202/11, Anton Las, ECLI:EU:C:2013:239, para. 26/27; judgment of 22 December 2010 in Case C-208/09,
Sayn-Wittgenstein, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, para. 92 and judgment of 21 December 2016 in Case C-51/15,
Remondis, ECLI:EU:C:2016:985, para. 40. See also judgment of 2 June 2016 in Case C-438/14, Bogendorff
von Wolffersdorff, ECLI:EU:C:2016:401, para. 64.
128 See for example judgment of 20March 2018 inCase C-187/16,Commission v. Austria, ECLI:EU:C:2018:194,
para. 78.
129 See art. 346(1)(a) and (b) TFEU. Only art. 346(1)(b) contains a reference to the necessity of the measure,
but the Court considered the same requirement to apply to art. 346(1)(a) TFEU. SeeCommission v. Austria,
ibid, para. 78. See for example Sayn-Wittgenstein, ibid, paras 91-93. See also the Opinion of AG Kokott in
Case C-157/15, Achbita, para. 125.
130 See judgment of 13 June 2019 in Case C-317/18, Correia Moreira, ECLI:EU:C:2019:499, para. 61 and 62.
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6.2 National security in secondary EU data protection legislation: Exclusion
and/or derogation?
In Union data protection legislation, national security can be found in exclusionary clauses
as well as in derogation clauses.131 The former Directive (EC) 95/46 did not apply to the
processing of personal data ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of
Community law […] and in any case to processing operations concerning public security,
defence, State security […] and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law’.132 On
the other hand, article 13 ofDirective (EC) 95/46 allowedMember States to adopt legislative
measures to restrict the scope of rights and obligations in the Directive when it constituted
a necessary measure to safeguard, inter alia, national security, defence, public security or
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.133 Similar
provisions can be found in article 2(2)(a) and article 23 GDPR and in articles 1(3) and
15(1) of the ePrivacy Directive.134
The CJEU was asked about the interplay of these provisions in several cases in which
commercially collected datawere used by public authorities for law enforcement purposes.135
After the invalidation of the notorious Data Retention Directive inDigital Rights Ireland,136
several Member States kept in place national data retention legislation requiring telecoms
providers to retain the metadata of customers for a certain period in order for the data to
be available for access by law enforcement authorities. The Court was asked whether the
national legislation at issue actually fell within the scope of Union law. The Court had to
clarify the relationship between the exclusion clause of article 1(3), and the derogation
clause of article 15(1) of the ePrivacy Directive. This led to the seminal Tele2/Watson
ruling.137
Regarding article 1(3), the Court considered that that provision excluded from the
scope of the ePrivacy Directive ‘activities of the State’ in specified fields, including in areas
131 For the sake of simplicity national security, State security and public security are used interchangeably,
although the notions do not necessarily have the exact same meaning.
132 Art. 3(2) Directive 95/46/EC.
133 Art. 13(1)(a)-(d) Directive 95/46/EC.
134 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the pro-
cessing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive
on privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L201/37.
135 See for the first time, judgment of 30 May 2006 in Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v.
Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:346.
136 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238,
para. 54 onwards, in particular paras 60-62 regarding Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] L105/54.
137 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson et al,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
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of criminal law and in the areas of public security, defence and State security.138 The Court
underlined that the ePrivacy Directive regulated the activities of telecom providers.139
When considering article 15(1) the Court admitted that the legislative measures referred
to therein also concerned activities characteristic of States or State authorities, which are
unrelated to fields in which individuals are active and that the provision listed the same
objectives as article 1(3).140 However, according to the Court, excluding the national
measures referred to in article 15(1) from the scope of the ePrivacyDirective would deprive
article 15(1) of any purpose.141 According to the Court, article 15(1) actually presupposed
that such measures fell within the scope of the Directive. The Court added that the national
measures referred to in article 15(1) in fact governed the activity of telecom providers.142
The retention obligation necessarily invoked the processing, by the telecom providers, of
personal data.143
The Court went even further by including in the scope of the Directive also national
legislative measures that regulated access of the national authorities to the data retained
by telecom providers (which arguably qualifies as a State activity).144 This was due to article
5 of the ePrivacy Directive which requires that the confidentiality of communications and
related traffic data has to be ensured, which, as the Court considered, had to be respected
by any person other than the user, whether private persons or bodies or State bodies.145 In
a later case, Ministerio Fiscal, the Court considered that national rules on access for law
enforcement purposes fell within the scope of the ePrivacy Directive, regardless of whether
the data at issue was stored by the company on the basis of a national data retention law,
or simply retained for the normal commercial purposes of the operator.146
As a consequence of the above interpretation the Court considered itself competent
to formulate conditions for national data retention measures, including for access to such
retained data. These conditions were the reason why the Tele2/Watson ruling triggered
extensive debates. The Court rejected the idea of generalised data retention (i.e. retention
of all metadata of all users) as opposed to targeted retention and formulated several strict
138 Ibid, para. 69. Arguably, the Court went beyond the wording of the provision, which only referred to state
activities in relation to criminal law. In the case Puškar, the Court considered that the exclusion clause must
be interpreted strictly, judgment of 27 September 2017 inCaseC-73/16,Peter Puškar, ECLI:EU:C:2017:725,
para. 38.
139 With reference to art. 3 of Directive 2002/58, see Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2/Watson, para. 70.
140 Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2/Watson, para. 72.
141 Ibid, para. 73. See to that effect already the Opinion of AG Bot of 14 October 2008 in Case C-301/06, Ireland
v. European Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:558, para. 129.
142 Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2/Watson, para. 74.
143 Ibid, para. 75.
144 Ibid, para. 76.
145 Ibid, para. 77.
146 Judgment of 2 October 2018 in Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2018:788, para. 37.
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conditions to which access should be subject, including prior authorisation by a court or
an independent authority.147
In subsequent French, Belgian and British cases, the question was raised whether the
reasoning in Tele2/Watson on the scope of the ePrivacy Directive would be the same if the
nationalmeasure at issue did not concern law enforcement but national security. According
to the Member States involved, article 4(2) TEU supported a reasoning that would exclude
from the scope of the Directive activities of the State for the purpose of national security
as well as the related activities of the telecom providers. As a subsidiary point, it was argued
that if these national measures were considered to fall within the scope of the ePrivacy
Directive, generalised retention should be possible for the purpose of national security
and the conditions for access by security authorities to data held by telecom operators
should not be as strict as in Tele2/Watson. AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona proposed that
the Court decide that when the cooperation of private parties, onwhom certain obligations
are imposed, is required, the activities of public authorities aimed at safeguarding national
security come within the scope of Union law.148 He furthermore suggested upholding the
criteria as developed inTele2/Watson, albeit with a nuance regarding the requirement that
the retention of data should be targeted.149
The outcome of these cases, which were still pending at the time of writing, will be of
great importance for the Member States who fear Union interference with their national
security measures which, as they argue, fall within the sole competence of the Member
States. It remains to be seen what meaning the Court will give to the last sentence of article
4(2) TEUwhen interpreting the exclusion and derogation clauses of the ePrivacyDirective
and also what effect it might have on the possible proportionality assessment it makes.
6.3 And the national security of third countries?
National security also plays an important role in the transfer of personal data to third
countries. When assessing whether a third country ensures an adequate level of protection,
the Commission must not only look at any relevant data protection law in that third state,
it has to assess the legal situation of that country as a whole. Article 45(2)(a) GDPR requires
the Commission to take into account, inter alia, the rule of law, respect for human rights
and relevant legislation concerning public security, defence and national security.
147 See Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2/Watson, resp. paras 104-112 and paras 117-123.
148 Opinions of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona of 15 January 2020 in Cases C-623/17 Privacy International,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:5, para. 34 and C-511/18 and C-512/18 La Quadrature du Net, ECLI:EU:C:2020:6, para.
85.
149 Opinions of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona of 15 January 2020 in Case C-520/18, Ordre des barreaux
francophones et germanophone, ECLI:EU:C:2020:7, paras 72-107.
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The content of article 45(2)GDPR is largely inspired by the Schrems ruling of theCJEU
of 2015. In Schrems the Court made clear that the Commission cannot decide positively
on the adequacy of the level of data protection in a third country if the law on national
security permits security authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content
of electronic communications data transferred to that country and if it does not provide
for any possibility to pursue legal remedies to invoke rights in relation to the transferred
data once acquired by those authorities.150 This would not respect the essence of the rights
contained in articles 7 and 47 of the Charter.
In the negotiations on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, the pending annulment action before
the General Court and in the second Schrems case before the CJEU, the U.S. government
argued that since national security falls outside the scope of Union law, the national
legislation of third countries in that area should also be left out of the assessment of whether
the third country ensures an adequate level of protection.151 Given the first Schrems ruling
it is clear that this argument cannot hold.152
It should be noted that article 4(2) TEU refers to the national security of the Member
States and not that of third countries. Moreover, when adopting an adequacy decision, the
Commission takes responsibility for the fact that the data may be transferred to the third
country (provided all other conditions of theGDPR aremet). Since the personal datamust
remain subject to a high level of protection if it is transferred to a third country,153 the
assessment necessarily includes an analysis of the general legal situation in the third country,
including national security.
As follows from article 2 TEU the Union is founded on the values of respect for the
rule of law and for human rights. As the CJEU has stated in the Opinion on the accession
of the EU to the ECHR, the Union is based on the fundamental premise that each Member
State shares with all the other Member States a set of common values which implies and
justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be
recognised.154 Against this background it is justified to leave certain matters to the Member
State without further assessment, while for third countries a further assessment as regards
those values still remains necessary.
150 Judgment of 6 October 2015 in Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 94 and 95.
151 Case T-738/16, La Quadrature du Net/Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2018:520 and Case C-311/18, Facebook
Ireland and Schrems. Case T-738/16 was suspended awaiting the outcome of Case C-311/18.
152 See also the Opinion of AG Saugmandsgard Øe of 19 December 2019 in Case C-311/18, Facebook Ireland
and Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, paras 100-110.
153 See Case C-362/14, Schrems, para. 72 and Opinion A-1/15 of 26 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2016:656, para. 134.
See on this opinion C. Kuner ‘International agreements, data protection, and EU fundamental rights on
the international stage: Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR’, CMLR, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2018, p. 857-882.
154 Opinion A-2/13 of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 168.
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A Setting the Scene – Weichenstellung
Frage 1
1.1 Auswahl nationaler Rechtsinstrumente zur Umsetzung der DSGVO
Die zur Ergänzung und Durchführung der DSGVO und zur Umsetzung der RL (EU)
2016/680 erforderlichen legistischen Schritte wurden in Österreich im
Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetz 20181 gesetzt. Durch dieses wurde das österreichische
Datenschutzgesetz („DSG”) grundlegend umgestaltet. So wurden im DSG sämtliche
aufgrund der DSGVO auf nationaler Ebene erforderlich gewordenen Regelungen etwa im
Bereich der Organisation der Aufsichtsbehörde, des Verfahrensrechts, der Verhängung
von Strafen sowie ausgewählte weitere Regelungenwie etwa in Bezug auf Bildverarbeitung
getroffen; im 3. Hauptstück des DSG erfolgte die Umsetzung der RL 2016/680.
DieDSGVOmachte darüber hinaus aber auchÄnderungen zahlreicherweitererGesetze
erforderlich. Dies erfolgte in erster Linie im Rahmen des
1. Materien-Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetzes 20182 und des
2. Materien-Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetzes 20183, durch welche über 100 sonstige
Gesetze angepasst wurden.
Kurz vor Inkrafttreten derDSGVOwurde vomösterreichischenGesetzgeber schließlich
mit demDatenschutz-Deregulierungsgesetz 20184 der (umstrittene)Versuchunternommen,
in Bezug auf die Strafbestimmungen (vgl. dazu noch Frage 11), die Befugnisse von
Datenschutzorganisationen (siehe Frage 13) und das Medienprivileg (siehe Frage 8) einige
als zu streng empfundene Bestimmungen der DSGVO zu relativieren bzw. der nationalen
Aufsichtsbehörde interpretatorische Leitlinien an die Hand zu geben.
* CerhaHempel Attorneys at law, Vienna, Partner. Der Autor dankt Agnes Balthasar-Wach für ihre wertvolle
Unterstützung bei den Arbeiten zu diesem Beitrag.
1 BGBl. I Nr. 120/2017.
2 BGBl. I Nr. 32/2018.
3 BGBl. I Nr. 37/2018.
4 BGBl. I Nr. 24/2018.
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1.2 Öffnungsklauseln – Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. c, Art. 23, Art. 86-90 DSGVO
Zentrale Maxime des österreichischen Gesetzgebers bei der Ausgestaltung der in den
Öffnungsklauseln der DSGVO enthaltenen Flexibilität war es, ein „gold plating” zu
verhindern, also keine strengeren Regelungen vorzusehen als unionsrechtlich vorgegeben.
DerUmgangdes nationalenGesetzgebersmit denÖffnungsklauseln kann imFolgenden
nur anhand einiger ausgewählter Beispiele illustriert werden:
1.2.1 Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. c iVm. Abs. 2 DSGVO:
Vom österreichischen Gesetzgeber wurden gestützt auf die Öffnungsklausel in Art. 6 Abs.
1 lit c iVm Abs. 2 DSGVO die zuvor im DSG 2000 geregelten besonderen
Verwendungszwecke von Daten (zB. §§ 47 bis 48a DSG 20005) und Regelungen zur
Videoüberwachung (§§ 50a bis 50eDSG2000) ins neueDSGübernommen; ebensowurden
die Regelungen zur Verarbeitung für im öffentlichen Interesse liegende Archivzwecke,
wissenschaftliche oder historische Forschungszwecke oder statistische Zwecke (§ 7 DSG)
auf Art. 6 Abs. 2 DSGVO gestützt; gleiches gilt für die Verarbeitung personenbezogener
Daten imKatastrophenfall (§ 10DSG) sowie die Regelungen in Bezug auf Bildverarbeitung
(§ 12, § 13 DSG).6
Die Mehrzahl der auf Art. 6 Abs. 2 DSGVO gestützten gesetzlichen Regelungen findet
sich allerdings nicht imDSG, sondern in den erwähnten, aufgrundderDSGVOangepassten
Materiengesetzen (vgl. als eines von zahlreichen möglichen Beispielen § 31a
Bauarbeiter-Urlaubs- und Abfertigungsgesetz).7
1.2.2 Art. 23 DSGVO:
Das Datenschutz-Deregulierungsgesetz führte auf Grundlage von Art. 23 DSGVO „im
Sinne eines Interessensausgleichs” in § 4Abs. 5DSG eine Beschränkung desAuskunftsrechts
ein. Demnach besteht das Recht auf Auskunft gegenüber hoheitlich tätigen
Verantwortlichen dann nicht, wenn die Erteilung der Auskunft die Erfüllung von dem
Verantwortlichen gesetzlich übertragenen Aufgaben gefährden würde. Begründet wurde
dies damit, dass sich für „zuständige Behörden” Beschränkungen schon aus dem 3.
Hauptstück des DSG sowie aus einschlägigen Materiengesetzen (zB. SPG) ergeben, für
5 Zurverfügungstellung von Adressen zur Benachrichtigung und Befragung von Betroffenen, Publizistische
Tätigkeit, Verwendung von Daten im Katastrophenfall.
6 Im Zusammenhang mit § 12 DSG war allerdings schon im Vorfeld (ähnlich wie in Deutschland) fraglich,
ob durch dieDSGVO insoweit überhaupt einGestaltungsspielraum für den nationalenGesetzgeber eröffnet
wurde. Vgl. dazu zB. Müllner/Wieser, §§ 12 f DSG – Kein Spielraum für Beharrlichkeit, jusIT 2018, 72.
Hierzu hat das Bundesverwaltungsgericht nun mittlerweile in zwei (nicht rechtskräftigen) Entscheidungen
die Gültigkeit von § 12 und § 13 DSG im Lichte der DSGVO in Zweifel gezogen. Es hat entschieden, dass
für § 13 DSG und § 12 Abs. 4 Z 1 DSG keine Öffnungsklausel besteht und diese Bestimmungen daher nicht
anzuwenden sind (BVwG 20.11.2019, W256 2214855-1; BVwG 25.11.2019, W211 2210458-1).
7 ERlRV, 65 Blg XXVI. GP (Materien-Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetz 2018), 33.
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den Bereich der allgemeinen Verwaltung im Anwendungsbereich der DSGVO jedoch
keine derartigen Beschränkungen vorgesehen waren.
In den Materien-Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetzen finden sich zahlreiche weitere
gestützt auf Art. 23 DSGVO erlassene Regelungen. Dies bspw. im Zusammenhang mit
– der Beschränkung der Informationspflichten (zB. § 2b Abs. 3 Gesundheits- und
Krankenpflegegesetz, § 2b Abs. 3 Sanitätergesetz, § 2a Abs. 3 Zahnärztegesetz, § 19
Abs. 3 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, § 3b Abs. 2 Ärztegesetz, § 8 Abs. 6
Suchtmittelgesetz, § 48e Bundesabgabenordnung);
– der Beschränkung desAuskunftsrechts (zB. § 21Abs. 6 Finanzmarkt-Geldwäschegesetz,
§ 104c Bundeshaushaltsgesetz, § 7 Abs. 11 IVF-Fonds-Gesetz, § 11 Abs. 4
Wettbewerbsgesetz, § 48f Bundesabgabenordnung);
– der Beschränkung des Rechts auf Berichtigung (zB. § 104d Bundeshaushaltsgesetz, § 7
Abs. 11 IVF-Fonds-Gesetz, § 280b Abs. 5-8 Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz, § 48g
Bundesabgabenordnung);
– der Beschränkung des Rechts auf Löschung (zB. § 104e Bundeshaushaltsgesetz, § 280b
Abs. 6 Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz);
– der Beschränkung des Rechts auf Einschränkung der Verarbeitung (zB. § 2b Abs. 3
Gesundheits- und Krankenpflegegesetz, § 2b Abs. 3 Kardiotechnikergesetz, § 19 Abs.
3 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, § 3b Abs. 2 Ärztegesetz, § 8 Abs. 6 Suchtmittelgesetz);
– der Beschränkung des Widerspruchsrechts (zB. § 22f
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehördengesetz, § 2b Abs. 3 Gesundheits- und
Krankenpflegegesetz, § 2a Abs. 3 Zahnärztegesetz, § 9 Abs. 4
Gesundheitsberuferegister-Gesetz, § 11 Abs. 5 Wettbewerbsgesetz).
1.2.3 Art. 86 bis 90 DSGVO:
Der österreichische Gesetzgeber hat von diesen Öffnungsklauseln nur begrenzt Gebrauch
gemacht:
– Hinsichtlich derÖffnungsklausel desArt. 86DSGVOwurde (anders als inDeutschland)
bislang kein Gesetz erlassen, welches den Zugang zu amtlichen Informationen und
den Schutz personenbezogenerDaten ausbalanciert.8 DieVerabschiedung eines solchen
Informationsfreiheitsgesetztes („IFG”) wird inÖsterreich allerdings schon längere Zeit
diskutiert; zuletzt wurde die Behandlung eines Anfang 2019 eingebrachten
Initiativantrags am 1.7.2019 vertagt.
– Von der Öffnungsklausel des Art. 87 DSGVO wurde ua. im Bereich Wissenschaft und
ForschungGebrauch gemacht (vgl. Datenschutzanpassungsgesetz 2018 –Wissenschaft
und Forschung9 hinsichtlich der Zulässigkeit der Verarbeitung nationaler Kennziffern,
8 Öhlböck in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 86 DSGVO Rz. 8.
9 BGBl. I Nr. 31/2018.
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wie ua. Stammzahl gemäß § 2 Z 8 des E-Government-Gesetz, § 2d Abs. 2 und 9, § 2e,
§ 2k Abs.3 und § 21 Abs. 2 Forschungsorganisationsgesetz; § 43 Abs. 5
Hochschülerinnen- und Hochschülerschaftsgesetz.10
– Nach dem Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetz war zunächst vorgesehen, das
Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz (ArbVG), soweit es die Verarbeitung personenbezogener
Daten regelt, als Vorschrift iSd. Art. 88 DSGVO zu definieren. Dieser Verweis, durch
welchen die im ArbVG enthaltenen Bestimmungen des kollektiven Arbeitsrechts (ua.
Erfordernis einer Betriebsvereinbarung für bestimmte Datenverarbeitungstätigkeiten)
als Regelungen zurVerarbeitung personenbezogenerDaten imBeschäftigungskontext
iSd. Art. 88 DSGVO positiviert worden wären, wurde jedoch im Zuge des
Datenschutz-Deregulierungsgesetzes wieder gestrichen. Von der Öffnungsklausel des
Art. 88 DSGVO wurde daher im österreichischen Recht nur sehr punktuell Gebrauch
gemacht (vgl zB. § 280a Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz).
– Hingegen wurde die Öffnungsklausel des Art. 89 DSGVO im Rahmen der
Materien-Datenschutz-Anpassungsgesetze sehr häufig genützt (dies bspw. in
Zusammenhang mit § 2b Abs. 4 Gesundheits- und Krankenpflegegesetz, § 61d Abs. 5
Hebammengesetz, §3a Abs. 4 Medizinische Assistenzberufe-Gesetz, § 16b Abs. 5
Meldegesetz, § 13a Abs. 2 Strafregistergesetz).
– Von der Öffnungsklausel des Art. 90 DSGVO wurde kein Gebrauch gemacht und
wurde daher auch keine Mitteilung an die Europäische Kommission erstattet.11
1.3 Aufsichtsbehörde
Die österreichische Datenschutzbehörde („DSB”) ist nationale Aufsichtsbehörde iSd. Art.
51 DSGVO (siehe im Detail Frage 9) und daher zur Aufsicht über die zur Umsetzung der
DSGVO in Österreich ergangenen Bestimmungen zuständig, soweit sich diese im DSG
finden; das von der DSB anzuwendende Verfahrensrecht ist das Allgemeine
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz („AVG”)12 sowie dasVerwaltungsstrafgesetz („VStG”)13. Für
die Vollziehung der in sonstigen Materiengesetzen enthaltenen Bestimmungen sind die
jeweils sachlich und örtlich zuständigen Behörden zuständig.
10 Öhlböck in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 87 DSGVO Rz. 2.
11 Pollirer in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 90 DSGVO Rz. 27; ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/
data-protection-eu/eu-countries-gdpr-specific-notifications_en. Hinweis: Die Fundstellen der Online-
Quellen wurden zuletzt am 1.2.2020 besucht.
12 StF: BGBl. Nr. 51/1991 (BGBl. I Nr. 58/2018).




Schon vor Inkrafttreten derGRCunterschied die österreichische Rechtsordnung zwischen
dem Grundrecht auf Datenschutz und dem Grundrecht auf Achtung des Privat- und
Familienlebens. Letzteres wird ausdrücklich durch die in Österreich im Verfassungsrang
stehende Bestimmung des Art. 8 EMRK sowie verschiedene Bestimmungen des
Staatsgrundgesetzes 1867 (Art. 9 – Hausrecht, Art. 10 – Briefgeheimnis, Art. 11 –
Fernmeldegeheimnis) gewährleistet. Das ebenso in Österreich verfassungsrechtlich
verankerte Grundrecht auf Datenschutz ist demgegenüber wesentlich jünger (das als
„Jedermannsrecht” ausgestaltete Grundrecht auf Datenschutz in § 1 DSG14 wurde 1978
eingeführt; der Schutzbereich umfasst dabei auch juristische Personen).
Vor diesem innerstaatlichen Hintergrund ergibt sich, dass auch in der
Entscheidungspraxis der Behörden und Gerichte zwischen diesen unterschiedlichen
Grundrechten differenziert wurde und daher bei einer Bezugnahme auf Art. 8 GRC oder
§ 1 DSG nicht automatisch auch Art. 7 GRC oder Art. 8 EMRK mitangeführt wird.15
Zumal in bislang zuArt. 8 GRC ergangenen Entscheidungen österreichischerGerichte
häufig festgehalten wurde, dass Art. 8 GRC keinen über die Verfassungsbestimmung des
§ 1DSGhinausgehenden Schutzgehalt habe,16 hatArt. 8GRCbislang keinenmaßgeblichen
Einfluss auf die Interpretation des nationalen Rechts entfaltet. Aufgrund des schon zuvor
in Bezug auf das Grundrecht auf Datenschutz in Österreich gegebenen hohen
Schutzstandards führte dieGRCnicht zurÄnderung bestehender Rechtsprechungslinien.17




Soweit ersichtlich bestehen inÖsterreich keine Besonderheiten, was die Interpretation der
in Art. 5 DSGVO geregelten Grundsätze der Datenverarbeitung durch Verantwortliche
betrifft. Hingegen hat sich die DSB bereits in einer Reihe von Entscheidungen mit diesen
Grundsätzen befasst. Nachstehend werden beispielhaft einige dieser Entscheidungen
14 StF: BGBl. Nr. 565/1978.
15 ZB.DSB7.3.2019,DSB-D130.033/0003-DSB/2019 (rechtskräftig);DSB18.1.2013,K121.876/0003-DSK/2013;
DSB 13.9.2018, DSB-D123.070/0005-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
16 VfGH 29.9.2012, B 54/12 ua. und nachfolgend zB. VwGH 27.9.2013, 2012/05/0213.
17 Vgl zB. OGH 14.9.2011, 6Ob63/11z; OGH 24.11.2011, 6Ob64/11x.
113
Austria
wiedergegeben (thematisch nach Bildverarbeitung sowie Pflichten des Verantwortlichen
gegliedert):
Bildverarbeitung:
Eine wesentliche Rolle spielten die Grundsätze der Verarbeitungstätigkeit in den
Entscheidungen der DSB zu Dash-Cams. Die DSB stellte dabei einen Verstoß gegen Art.
5 Abs. 1 lit. a und c iVm. Art. 6 Abs. 1 DSGVO fest, da die vom Aufnahmebereich der
Dash-Cams erfasstenVerkehrsteilnehmer insbesondere dann, wenn keinUnfallgeschehen
vorliegt, vernünftigerweise nicht damit rechnen müssen, aufgenommen zu werden und
verhängte eine Verwaltungsstrafe iHv. EUR 220,-.18
Im Rahmen eines Konsultationsverfahrens gemäß Art. 36 DSGVO sprach die DSB in
einer Empfehlung aus, dass eine beabsichtigte Aufnahme und kurzzeitige Speicherung
von Videos mittels an der Frontscheibe eines Kfz angebrachter Videokamera nicht
durchgeführt werden möge. Dadurch, dass auch das Drücken eines Notfall-Knopfes eine
Speicherung der Bilddaten auslöst, sei keine Beschränkung auf das notwendige Maß iSv.
Art. 5Abs. 1 lit. cDSGVOgegeben, zumal derNotfall-Knopf zu jedembeliebigenZeitpunkt
gedrückt werden könne und somit eine dauerhafte Speicherung von Bilddaten auch ohne
Unfallgeschehen möglich wäre.19
In einer anderen Entscheidung hielt dieDSB fest, dass der Betrieb vonKameras, welche
die vor einerWohnanlage gelegenen, zur allgemeinenNutzung bestimmtenFlächen erfasste,
gegen die in Art. 5 DSGVO normierten Grundsätze der Zweckbindung und
Datenminimierung verstieß und verhängte eine Geldbuße in Höhe von EUR 1,000.20
Ebenso einen Verstoß gegen Art. 5 DSGVO stellte die DSB in einer Entscheidung fest,
die Kameras eines Vereines betraf, welche im Eingangsbereich auf den öffentlichen Raum
ausgerichtet waren. Dies insbesondere, da der Verantwortliche die Kameras durch eine
Anpassung des Blickwinkels auf eine Weise betreiben hätte können, durch die ein
Miterfassen der umliegenden öffentlichen Verkehrsflächen vermieden worden wäre.21
Pflichten des Verantwortlichen
Die DSB gab einer Beschwerde statt, die auf Löschung von Einträgen über ein nicht
eröffnetes bzw. erledigtes Insolvenzverfahren in der Konsumenten- und
Warenkreditevidenz gerichtet war. Die Beschwerdegegnerin hatte den Beschwerdeführer
über diese Einträge nicht informiert; darüber hinaus war die Gläubigerforderung bereits
zur Gänze beglichen worden. Die DSB hielt fest, dass aufgrund des in Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. a
18 DSB 27.9.2018, DSB-D550.084/0002-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
19 DSB 9.7.2018, DSB-D485.000/0001-DSB/2018-II, DSB-D485.000/0001-DSB/2018 (Empfehlung).
20 DSB 20.12.2018, DSB-D550.037/0003-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
21 DSB 18.12.2018, DSB-D550.015/0003-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
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DSGVO verankerten Grundsatzes von Treu und Glauben eine entsprechende
Benachrichtigung des Beschwerdeführers gemäß Art. 14 DSGVO erforderlich gewesen
wäre.22
In einem Verfahren, in welchem die Beschwerdeführerin mit Blick auf potentielle
Hacker-Angriffe und Datenlecks die Verletzung des Grundrechts auf Geheimhaltung
durch eine „unterlassene Pseudonymisierung” ihrer Daten imELAK (Elektronischer Akt)
vorbrachte, hielt die DSB fest, dass aus der DSGVO kein Recht des Betroffenen auf
spezifische Datensicherheitsmaßnahmen oder spezifische Maßnahmen zur
Datenminimierung iSv. Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. c DSGVO abzuleiten sei.23
In einer weiteren Entscheidung hielt die DSB schließlich fest, dass dem Betroffenen
bei einem Löschbegehren freistehe, auch die Löschung bloß eines Teiles seiner Daten zu
begehren. Die Vorgehensweise der Verantwortlichen, ungeachtet eines bloß partiellen
Löschbegehrens sämtliche personenbezogenen Daten des Beschwerdeführers zu löschen,
verletze den Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben.24
3.2 Bundesverwaltungsgericht
Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht befasste sich bislang nur am Rande mit den Grundsätzen
des Art. 5 DSGVO: So führte das Bundesverwaltungsgericht aus, dass eine an den
Beschwerdeführer gerichtete E-Mail, welche in Kopie (“CC”) an weitere Personen
weitergeleitet wurde, eine Verletzung des Rechts auf Geheimhaltung darstelle.25 In einem
weiteren Verfahren verneinte das Bundesverwaltungsgericht einen Verstoß gegen den
Zweckbindungsgrundsatz durch die mitbeteiligte Partei, die ihren Verwaltungsdirektor
mit der Führung von datenschutzrechtlichen Verfahren betraut und ihm daher
Korrespondenzen und Verfahrensinhalte weitergeleitet hatte.26
22 DSB 30.11.2018, DSB-D122.954/0010-DSB/2018 (nicht rechtskräftig).
23 DSB 13.9.2018, DSB-D123.070/0005-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
24 DSB 5.12.2018, DSB-D123.211/0004-DSB/2018 (nicht rechtskräftig).
25 BVwG1.10.2018,W253 2140428-1; ebenso ohne vertieftere Befassung vgl. BVwG27.9.2018,W214 2196873-
1 und BVwG 10.12.2018, W211 2188383-1.






Sowohl zur Rechtsgrundlage der Einwilligung als auch des berechtigten Interesses sind in
Österreich bereits eine Reihe vonEntscheidungen ergangen.Nachstehendwerden zunächst
einige ausgewählte EntscheidungenderDSBwiedergegeben (gegliedert nachVerfahrensart):
Amtswegige Prüfverfahren – Anforderungen an Einwilligungen
In einem bereits auf Basis der DSGVO eingeleiteten Prüfverfahren befasste sich die DSB
mit einer Einwilligungserklärung im Beitrittsformular zu einem Automobilclub und
verneinte deren „Freiwilligkeit”. Die DSB sah das Kriterium der Verständlichkeit nicht
erfüllt.Erstens, da die vorformulierte Einwilligungserklärung den Betroffenen suggerierte,
lediglich entscheiden zu könnendurchwelchesMedium sieMarketing-Zusendungen erhalten
möchten (per Post, elektronisch oder per Telefon). Zweitens, da die Einwilligung direkt
vor der Unterschrift für den Abschluss der Mitgliedschaft platziert war, sodass die
Optionalität der Einwilligung missverstanden werden konnte. Drittens, da durch den im
unmittelbaren textlichenZusammenhang stehendenHinweis auf dieWiderrufsmöglichkeit
der Eindruck vermittelt wurde, einer Datenverarbeitung zu Marketingzwecken zunächst
zustimmen zu müssen und diese erst sodann mittels Widerrufs unterbinden zu können
(„opt-out”).28
In einem weiteren Prüfverfahren erklärte die DSB eine in einem Formular einer
Allergieklinik verlangte Einwilligung in mehrerlei Hinsicht für unzulässig. Erstens, da in
den bereitgestellten Informationen nach Art. 13 DSGVO neben der Einwilligung auch
andere Rechtsgrundlagen angeführt wurden und somit der Einwilligung nicht mit der
erforderlichenKlarheit zu entnehmenwar, fürwelcheDatenverarbeitungendie Einwilligung
die Rechtsgrundlage darstellte. Zweitens, da die Einwilligung zur Datenverarbeitung an
die Zustimmung zur unverschlüsselten Übermittlung von Daten gebunden war, die
Erforderlichkeit einer derartigen Datensicherheitsmaßnahme nach Art. 32 DSGVO
allerdings allein vomVerantwortlichen zu beurteilen ist.Drittens, da eine „unwiderrufliche”
Einwilligung der DSGVO widerspricht. Viertens führte die DSB aus, dass bei einem
Haftungsausschluss für die unkorrekte und unvollständige Übermittlung von Daten
27 Zum Kopplungsverbot und Anforderungen an die Freiwilligkeit hinsichtlich Setzung von Cookies beim
Besuch einer Webpage (Online-Zeitung) siehe Frage 5 (DSB 30.11.2018, DSB-D122.931/0003-DSB/2018).
28 DSB 31.7.2018, DSB-D213.642/0002-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
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Aspekte der Datensicherheit nach Art. 32 DSGVO betroffen sind, von denen mittels
Einwilligung nicht zum Nachteil von Betroffenen abgewichen werden kann.29
In einemweiteren Prüfverfahren, inwelchemdieDSBdieGültigkeit der Einwilligungen
von Arbeitnehmern zu einem GPS-Überwachungssystem in Dienstfahrzeugen überprüfte,
kam sie ebenfalls zum Ergebnis, dass diese mangels Freiwilligkeit unwirksam sei. Die DSB
hielt fest, dass eine Einwilligung im arbeitsrechtlichen Kontext zwar möglich sei, jedoch
einem klar erkennbaren Vorteil des Arbeitnehmers dienen müsse, was gegenständlich
nicht der Fall sei. Sie schloss allerdings nicht aus, dass ein derartiges System auf eine andere
Rechtsgrundlage (zB. Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f DSGVO) gestützt werden könnte.30
Sonstige Bescheide – Nichtvorliegen einer Einwilligung
Die DSB stellte in einer weiteren Entscheidung eine Verletzung des Rechts auf
Geheimhaltung fest, da der Beschwerdegegner eine auf einer Webseite veröffentlichte
Telefonnummer des Beschwerdeführers, die dazu diente, als „Beratungshotline” für
bedürftige Personen erreichbar zu sein, für einen Werbeanruf verwendet hatte. Die DSB
führt aus, dass die Veröffentlichung der Telefonnummer nicht als Einwilligung zu
Werbeanrufen anzusehen sei.31
In einem weiteren Bescheid untersagte die DSB mangels Einwilligung des
Beschwerdeführers die Datenverarbeitung durch einen digitalen Türspion, der feststellte,
wer sich im Aufnahmebereich befindet (Bildaufnahme iSd. § 12 Abs. 1 DSG).32
4.1.2 Bundesverwaltungsgericht
Im einem Bauverfahren, in welchem Beamte im Wohnbereich des Beschwerdeführers
Fotos von privaten Wohnungsbereichen aufnahmen und dies auf eine vermeintliche
Einwilligung stützen, stellte das Bundesverwaltungsgericht klar, dass sich behördliche
Datenverarbeitungen grundsätzlich auf geeignete gesetzliche Grundlagen stützen müssen
(eine behördliche Datenverarbeitung auf der Grundlage einer Einwilligung könne nur im
Ausnahmefall denkbar sein).33
In einem Verfahren über Zulässigkeit der Veröffentlichung eines
Disziplinarerkenntnisses unter Anführung des Namens und der Adresse des Betroffenen
in einem Mitteilungsblatt einer Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts hielt das
Bundesverwaltungsgericht fest, dass eine Satzungsbestimmung, wonach rechtskräftige
Erkenntnisse in Disziplinarverfahren in einem Mitteilungsblatt zu veröffentlichen sind,
29 DSB 16.11.2018, DSB-D213.692/0001-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
30 DSB 8.8.2018, DSB-D213.658/0002-DSB/2018 (nicht rechtskräftig).
31 DSB 31.10.2018, DSB-D123.076/0003-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
32 DSB 5.10.2018, DSB-D123.204/0005-DSB/2018 (nicht rechtskräftig).
33 BVwG 11.7.2018, W214 2183935-1.
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nicht als Einwilligung der betroffenen Person im Sinne des Art. 4 Z 11 DSGVO zu
qualifizieren ist.34
4.1.3 OGH
Auch der Oberste Gerichtshof (OGH) setzte sich bereits mit der Freiwilligkeit einer
Einwilligung auseinander. Gegenstand des Verfahrens war eine Verbandsklage wegen
Klauseln in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen eines TV-Anbieters. Der OGH gelangte
dabei zum Ergebnis, dass bei einer Kopplung der Einwilligung zur Verarbeitung
vertragsunabhängiger personenbezogener Daten mit einem Vertragsabschluss davon
auszugehen ist, dass die Erteilung der Einwilligung grundsätzlich nicht freiwillig erfolgt.
Der OGH leitete aus dem Spannungsverhältnis des Verordnungstextes (Art. 4 Z 11 und
Art. 7 Abs. 4 DSGVO) und EwGr. 43 strenge Anforderungen an die Beurteilung der
Freiwilligkeit einer Einwilligung ab.35
4.2 Berechtigte Interessen36
4.2.1 DSB
In ihren bereits zitierten Straferkenntnissen zum Betrieb privater Videoüberwachungs-
anlagen nahm die DSB nicht nur einen Verstoß gegen die Grundsätze gem. Art. 5 DSGVO
an, sondern hielt auch fest, dass auf Seiten der Verantwortlichen kein berechtigtes Interesse
am Betrieb der jeweiligen Bildaufnahme gegeben sei.37
In einem anderen Verfahren (gegenständlich war die Frage der Zulässigkeit der
Veröffentlichung von Kontaktdaten eines Mannschaftsführers auf der Website eines
Sportverbandes) hielt die DSB fest, dass das Geheimhaltungsinteresse des Betroffenen das
Interesse an der Verarbeitung überwiege.38 Weitere Verfahren befassten sich mit dem
(fehlenden) berechtigten Interesse des Arbeitgebers, aufgrund des Aufbewahrens eines
Aktenvermerks über Verfehlungen eines früherenArbeitnehmers, eineWiedereinstellung
zu verhindern39 oder mit der Abwägung zwischen den berechtigten Interessen von
34 BVwG 27.9.2018, W214 2196873-1.
35 OGH 31.8.2018, 6 Ob 140/18h.
36 Zum berechtigten Interesse des Arbeitgebers mittels eines Aktenvermerks bestimmen zu können, mit wem
ein Dienstverhältnis (nicht) eingegangen werden soll (DSB 15.11.2018, DSB-D122.944/0007-DSB/2018)
und zur Abwägung zwischen den berechtigten Interessen von Portalbenutzern und den berechtigten
Interessen des auf dem Portal bewerteten Arztes (DSB 15.1.2019, DSB-D123.527/0004-DSB/2018) siehe
Frage 7.
37 Siehe Frage 3 (Bildverarbeitung) und Datenschutzbericht 2018 (März 2019) 50.
38 DSB 12.11.2018, DSB-D123.032/0003-DSB/2018.
39 DSB 15.11.2018, DSB-D122.944/0007-DSB/2018; siehe auch Frage 7.
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Portalbenutzern (Patienten) gegenüber den berechtigten Interessen des auf dem Portal
bewerteten Arztes40.
4.2.2 Bundesverwaltungsgericht
Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht ging bislang nur vereinzelt substantiell auf Art. 6 UAbs. 1
lit. f DSGVO ein:
In einer schon erwähnten Entscheidung (3.2 – Verletzung des Rechts auf
Geheimhaltung, da eine an den Beschwerdeführer gerichtete E-Mail in Kopie [“CC”] an
weitere Personen weitergeleitet wurde), befasste sich das Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit
dessenAnwendungsbereich.Die E-Mail-Korrespondenz zwischen demBeschwerdeführer,
einem als Personalvertreter dienstfreigestellten Beamten, und seiner Abteilungsleiterin
fand zum Zwecke der “Weitergewährung von Kosten für Arbeitsmittel, also
Gehaltsansprüchen des Beschwerdeführers” statt. Die DSB führt aus, dass die
Bestimmungen betreffend die Verarbeitung zur Wahrung der berechtigten Interessen des
Verantwortlichen auf den vorliegenden Sachverhalt nicht anzuwenden sind, da dies gem.
Art. 6UAbs. 1 lit. f DSGVO für von Behörden in Erfüllung ihrer Aufgaben vorgenommene
Verarbeitungen ausgeschlossen ist und die Überprüfung der Geltendmachung von
Ansprüchen eines Beamten durch dessen Dienstbehörde eine Erfüllung derer Aufgaben
darstellt.
Aus demselben Grund verneinte das Bundesverwaltungsgericht in einer weiteren –
ebenfalls schon erwähnten –Entscheidung (4.1.2 –Zulässigkeit der Veröffentlichung eines
Disziplinarerkenntnisses durch eine Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts in ihrem
Mitteilungsblatt) die Anwendbarkeit von Art. 6 UAbs. 1 lit. f DSGVO.
Frage 5
Diese Fragestellungen wurden in Österreich in erster Linie in Zusammenhang mit Art. 7
DSGVO bzw. EwGr. 43 DSGVO diskutiert.
In der juristischen Literatur wurde dazu die Auffassung vertreten, dass das
Kopplungsverbot41 dem Konzept des „cash for consent” nicht entgegenstehe, da die
Datenverarbeitung als Gegenleistung zur Vertragserfüllung erforderlich sei.42 So möchten
Feiler/Forgó43 berücksichtigt wissen, dass bei „cash for consent” die datenschutzrechtliche
Einwilligung und die Erbringung des Dienstes zwar nicht notwendigerweise in einem
rechtlichen, aber jedenfalls in einem wirtschaftlichen Austauschverhältnis stehen; die
40 DSB 15.1.2019, DSB-D123.527/0004-DSB/2018; siehe auch Frage 7.
41 Kastelitz in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 7 DSGVO Rz. 33.
42 Kastelitz in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 7 DSGVO Rz. 34-38.
43 Feiler/Forgó, EU-DSGVO – EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, Art. 7 Rz. 9-11.
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Erteilung der Einwilligung schaffe erst die wirtschaftlichen Voraussetzungen für die
unentgeltliche Zurverfügungstellung der Waren oder Dienstleistungen, sodass insofern
die Einwilligung für die Vertragserfüllung (wirtschaftlich) erforderlich sei und daher eine
wirksame Einwilligung vorliege.
Da allerdings auch valideArgumente44 dafür bestehen, dass die Bereitstellung derDaten
als Gegenleistung für die Vertragserfüllung nicht erforderlich ist, ist nicht gesichert, dass
die DSB oder mit dieser Frage befasste Gerichte dieser Argumentation folgen würden.
Diskutiert wurde weiters, ob die Freiwilligkeit einer Einwilligung nicht beeinträchtigt
ist, wenn der als Gegenleistung für die Einwilligung gewährte Vorteil nur geringen Wert
hat. Allerdings ist zu vermuten, dass Behörden und Gerichte an die „Freiwilligkeit” der
Einwilligung auch insoweit strenge Anforderungen45 stellen werden.
Schließlich wurde diskutiert, ob unabhängig von der Frage, ob eine Verarbeitung für
die Vertragserfüllung „erforderlich” ist, eine Einwilligung trotz Kopplung wirksam sein
könne. Dies, da es auch darauf ankommt, ob ein „Abhängigmachen” (iSd Art. 7 Abs. 4
DSGVO) vorliege. In diesem Zusammenhang hat es die DSB in einer jüngeren und viel
diskutierten Entscheidung46 als zulässig angesehen, wenn der Betroffene dieWahl hat und
einen angebotenen Vorteil alternativ durch eine (auch kostenpflichtige) Variante erhalten
kann, die keine Einwilligung zur Verarbeitung von personenbezogenen Daten umfasst.
ImAusgangssachverhalt stellte eineOnline-Zeitung die Betroffenen vor dieWahl, entweder
ein kostenpflichtiges Abo um EUR 6,00 pro Monat zu erwerben oder kostenlos auf die
Inhalte zuzugreifen, dafür aber eine Einwilligung zum Werbetracking mittels Cookies zu
erteilen. Die Datenschutzbehörde gelangte zum Ergebnis, dass diese Einwilligung freiwillig
erteilt werden könne, da bei Nichtabgabe der Einwilligung bei weitem kein wesentlicher
Nachteil drohe (Online-Abo als keine unverhältnismäßig teurere Alternative; es kann auf
ein alternatives Informationsangebot anderer Zeitungen zurückgegriffen werden bzw.
erscheint die Zeitung auch in gedruckter Form).
Kritiker der Entscheidungwendeten ein, dass für dasVorliegen der Freiwilligkeit nicht
relevant sein sollte, ob auch andere Medien genutzt werden können. Auch führe die
Alternative der Zahlungspflicht nicht zu einer genuin freiwilligenZustimmung und bestehe
die Gefahr, dass Datenschutz zum Luxusgut werde, wenn dieses „Pay or Okay”-Konzept
von Unternehmen flächendeckend angewandt werde; denn jedenfalls im Fall ihrer
Kumulierung könnten derartige entgeltliche Alternativen für den Einzelnen Nachteile
44 ZB. die gebotene restriktive Auslegung des Begriffs der „Erforderlichkeit”; personenbezogene Daten als
nicht handelbares Gut; Fehlen einer direkten und objektivenVerbindung zwischen Zweck derVerarbeitung
und Zweck der Vertragserfüllung.
45 So wie der OGH anlässlich der Prüfung der Gültigkeit einer datenschutzrechtlichen Einwilligung in AGB.
OGH 31.8.2018, 6Ob140/18h.
46 DSB 30.11.2018, DSB-D122.931/0003-DSB/2018.
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entfalten.47 Befürworter sahen die Entscheidung demgegenüber als Anerkennung des
Umstandes, dass es Unternehmen wirtschaftlich unmöglich ist, einen Dienst oder Inhalte
anzubieten, ohne dadurch Umsätze – sei es direkt durch Entgelt der Nutzer oder indirekt
durch Werbeeinnahmen – erzielen zu können.48
Frage 6
Als Beispiele, in denen eine automatisierte Verarbeitung einschließlich Profiling gem.Art.
22 DSGVO erlaubt sein kann, nennt EwGr. 71 DSGVO die Überwachung und
Verhinderung von Betrug und Steuerhinterziehung. In diesem Sinne wurde in Österreich
diskutiert, ob der Erlassung eines Steuerbescheides ein behördliches Profiling vorausgehen
darf. Da ein solches nicht gesetzlich vorgesehen ist, wurde dies im Ergebnis verneint.49
Nach EwGr. 71 DSGVO fällt auch die automatische Ablehnung eines
Online-Kreditvertrags unter eine solche automatisierteVerarbeitung. Auch insoweit (und
soweit ersichtlich auch nicht in sonstigen Bereichen) hatÖsterreich keine auf Art. 22 (2) (b)
DSGVO gestützte gesetzliche Regelungen erlassen.50
Frage 7
Das Recht auf Löschung ist in Österreich (§ 1 Abs. 3 Z 2 DSG) auch verfassungsgesetzlich
gewährleistet.
7.1 Suchmaschinen
Aus dem Transparenzbericht von Google geht hervor, dass seit 29.5.2014 rund 13.800
Ersuchen um Entfernung aus Suchergebnissen aus Österreich einlangten, die rund 56,000
URLs betrafen.51 Im Schnitt wurden etwas weniger als die Hälfte der URLs aus den
Suchergebnissen entfernt. Ca 86% der Antragsteller waren Privatpersonen. Hinsichtlich
folgender drei Domains wurden die meisten URLs aus den Google-Suchergebnissen
entfernt: www.facebook.com; groups.google.com; www.youtube.com.
Hinsichtlich anderer Suchmaschinenbetreiber (zB. Bing, Yahoo, Baidu und Yandex)
sind zu Österreich keine Zahlen verfügbar.
47 Kastelitz/Tschohl, Die „derStandard.at”-E der Datenschutzbehörde kritisch betrachtet – DSGVO: Frei-
willigkeit der Einwilligung bei Cookies? VbR 2019, 39; Feiler/Schrems, Cookies oder Zahlen: Für undWider
zum Datenschutz-Spruch, 10.12.2018, derStandard.at.
48 Feiler/Schmitt, Die entkoppelte Einwilligungserklärung – DSGVO: Freiwilligkeit der Einwilligung bei
Cookies? VbR 2019, 38.
49 Ehrke-Rabel/Hödl, Steuerbescheid und behördliches Profiling, Dako 2017, 50.
50 Haidinger in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 22 DSGVO Rz. 35.




Laut DSB-Datenschutzbericht 2018 war das Recht auf Löschung eines der
Schwerpunktthemen in Beschwerdeverfahren.52 Nachstehend wird ein Überblick über
ausgewählte Entscheidungen gegeben:53
7.2.1 Entscheidungen in der Sache – Erfolgreiche Beschwerden:54
– In einem „Übergangsverfahren” befasste sich die DSB mit der Notwendigkeit der
Speicherung personenbezogener Daten. Der Beschwerdegegner hatte dem
Löschbegehren des Beschwerdeführers zwar entsprochen, im Zuge dessen allerdings
Name, Geburtsdatum und Adresse des Beschwerdeführers gespeichert, was ua. mit
einem Verweis auf „sicher amtsbekannte Gründe” nach Art. 17 Abs. 3 lit. e DSGVO
begründet wurde. Die DSB hielt fest, dass dies nicht genüge, um die Erforderlichkeit
der Verarbeitung gem. Art. 17 Abs. 3 DSGVO zu belegen.55
– In einem weiteren Fall entschied die DSB, dass die Speicherung der Daten des
Beschwerdeführers im Hinblick auf eine eventuelle zukünftige Kontaktaufnahme
gemäßArt. 17Abs. 1 lit. a DSGVOdann nicht notwendig sei, wenn dieser die Löschung
seiner gesamten Daten verlangt und daraus zu schließen sei, dass eine derartige
Kommunikation nicht mehr erfolgen werde (zudem Verletzung des Grundsatzes der
Speicherbegrenzung nach Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. e DSGVO).56
– Hinsichtlich eines auf Löschung von Bonitätsdaten durch einen Wirtschafts-
auskunftsdienst gerichteten Begehrens führte die DSB aus, eine generelle Löschung
bonitätsrelevanterDaten sieben Jahre nachTilgung der Schuld sei imHinblick auf Art.
6 Abs. 1 lit. f DSGVO unverhältnismäßig. Die Datenschutzbehörde trug dem
Wirtschaftsauskunftsdienst auf, Bonitätsdaten zu löschen, die eine Inkassoforderung
betrafen, die bereits vor Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens getilgt worden war. Die
Löschung von Daten zu einer erst im Insolvenzverfahren getilgten Forderung war
demgegenüber nicht geboten, da die gesetzliche Frist zur Löschung dieses Verfahrens
aus der Insolvenzdatei noch nicht abgelaufen war.57
7.2.2 Entscheidungen in der Sache – nicht erfolgreiche Beschwerden:
– Für zutreffend erachtete die DSB hingegen die gegen ein Löschbegehren von
Bewerberdaten vorgebrachte Argumentation eines Verantwortlichen, Daten von
52 Datenschutzbericht 2018, 18.
53 Vgl. auch Datenschutzbericht 2018, 18 ff.
54 Zu DSB 30.11.2018, DSB-D122.954/0010-DSB/2018 und DSB 5.12.2018 DSB-D123.211/0004-DSB/2018
(Treu und Glauben) siehe Frage 3.
55 DSB 28.5.2018, DSB-D216.580/0002-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
56 DSB 28.5.2018, DSB-D216.580/0002-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
57 DSB 7.12.2018, DSB-D123.193/0003-DSB/2018 (nicht rechtskräftig).
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Bewerbernmindestens sechsMonate zu speichern, um einen eventuellen binnen dieser
Frist geltend zu machenden Anspruch auf Entschädigung wegen Verletzung des
Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes abwehren zu können. Folglich kann einem Löschungs-
begehren gemäß Art. 17 Abs. 3 lit. e DSGVO die Notwendigkeit der Speicherung von
Daten zurAbwehr konkret bezeichneter Rechtsansprüche erfolgreich entgegengehalten
werden.58 (Als gegensätzlich zu dieser Entscheidung kann die zuvor ergangene
Entscheidung der DSB vom 28.5.2018, DSB-D216.471/0001-DSB/2018, angesehen
werden: Die DSB stellte darin fest, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin, ein
Telekommunikationsunternehmen, die Beschwerdeführerin dadurch in ihrem Recht
auf Geheimhaltung verletzte, indem sie Stammdaten, Verkehrsdaten und weitere
personenbezogeneDatennachBeendigung desVertragsverhältnisses über den zulässigen
Zeitraum hinaus verarbeitete. Nach der DSB normiert § 207 Abs. 2
Bundesabgabenordnung eine Verjährungsfrist und keine Verpflichtung zur
Aufbewahrung von Daten, weshalb Stammdaten gem. § 132 Abs. 1
Bundesabgabenordnung zulässigerweise nur für eine Dauer von sieben Jahren
aufbewahrt werden dürfen.Hinsichtlich der auf § 99Abs. 2 Telekommunikationsgesetz
gestützten Speicherung von Verkehrsdaten für einen Zeitraum von sechs Monaten
nach Durchführung des Bezahlvorganges erklärte die DSB, dass die gesetzliche Frist
des § 99 Abs. 2 Telekommunikationsgesetz von drei Monaten nicht mit der Berufung
auf interne Prozesse/den Postlauf auf sechs Monate ausgedehnt werde. Andere
personenbezogeneDaten seien nachBeendigung derVertragsverhältnisse entsprechend
dem Grundsatz der Speicherbegrenzung ungeachtet der abstrakt bestehenden
Möglichkeit von Schadenersatz- oder sonstigen Forderungen des Betroffenen zu
löschen).
– DieDSBwies eineweitere Beschwerde ab, inwelcher der Beschwerdeführer vorbrachte,
dass sein ehemaliger Dienstgeber sich weigerte, Krankenstandstage und einen
Aktenvermerk, dass einerWiedereinstellung des Beschwerdeführers nicht zugestimmt
werde, zu löschen. Hinsichtlich der Krankenstandstage hielt die DSB fest, dass sowohl
§ 132 BAO als auch § 42 Abs. 1 ASVG eine rechtliche Verpflichtung im Sinne des Art.
17 Abs. 3 lit. b DSGVO zur Aufbewahrung normieren und eine Löschung daher erst
nach sieben Jahren erfolgen müsse. Betreffend des Aktenvermerks liege keine
unrechtmäßige Verarbeitung nach Art. 17 Abs. 1 lit. d DSGVO vor, weil der
Beschwerdegegner ein berechtigtes (Dokumentations-)Interesse gemäß Art. 6 Abs. 1
lit. f DSGVOvorweisen könne, welches die Interessen des Beschwerdeführers überwiege
(der Aktenvermerkwerde zudemdrei Jahren nach Beendigung desDienstverhältnisses
gelöscht).59
58 DSB 27.08.2018, DSB-D123.085/0003-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
59 DSB 15.11.2018, DSB-D122.944/0007-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
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– In einem weiteren Fall hatte die DSB zu beurteilen, ob einem Löschbegehren auch
dann entsprochen wurde, wenn die Daten des Beschwerdeführers nur teils durch
vollständige Entfernung aus einem Kundenverwaltungs-System gelöscht wurden, teils
aber durch bloße Entfernung des Personenbezugs („Anonymisierung”). Laut DSB
komme dem Verantwortlichen hinsichtlich der Art und Weise, wie eine Löschung
durchgeführt wird, ein Ermessen zu. Da die DSGVO auf Daten ohne Personenbezug
keine Anwendung finde, könne die Entfernung des Personenbezugs
(„Anonymisierung”) grundsätzlich ein zulässiges Mittel zur Löschung iSv. Art. 4 Z 2
iVm. Art. 17 Abs. 1 DSGVO darstellen. Es müsse aber sichergestellt sein, dass weder
der Verantwortliche noch ein Dritter ohne unverhältnismäßigen Aufwand den
Personenbezugwiederherstellen könne. Eine völlige Irreversibilität sei für dasVorliegen
einer Anonymisierung iSd. DSGVO nicht notwendig.60
– Hinsichtlich einer Bewertungsplattform für Ärzte, welche einem Löschbegehren eines
Allgemeinmediziners nicht entsprach, kam die DSB (im Einklang mit der deutschen
Rechtsprechung) zum Ergebnis, dass Art. 17 Abs. 1 lit. d DSGVO nicht erfüllt sei, da
die berechtigten Interessen der Portalbenutzer (Patienten) gegenüber den Interessen
des Beschwerdeführers überwiegen (§ 1 Abs. 2 DSG). Insbesondere berücksichtigte
die DSB, dass das in Art. 11 GRC bzw. Art. 10 EMRK verankerte Recht auf Freiheit
der Meinungsäußerung auch die Abgabe und den Empfang von Bewertungen bzw.
Erfahrungsberichten umfasst.61
7.3 Bundesverwaltungsgericht
Bislang wurde zu Art. 17 DSGVO nur eine Entscheidung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts
veröffentlicht, die eine Verfahrensfrage zum Gegenstand hatte. Es überprüfte, ob die DSB
eine Beschwerde zuRecht zurückgewiesen hatte, weil sich diese auf das Recht auf Löschung
gemäß Art. 17 DSGVO und hilfsweise auf das Recht auf Berichtigung gemäß Art. 16
DSGVO stützte. Die DSB ging davon aus, dass ein solcher Antrag nicht § 24 Abs. 2 DSG
entsprochen habe, der zwingend die Bezeichnung des als verletzt erachtetenRechts verlangt.
Dem folgte das Bundesverwaltungsgericht nicht und führte aus, dassmangels gegenteiliger
Regelung auch inDatenschutzbeschwerdeverfahrenHaupt- undEventualanträge kumuliert
werden können.62
60 DSB 5.12.2018, DSB-D123.270/0009-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).
61 DSB 15.1.2019, DSB-D123.527/0004-DSB/2018 (rechtskräftig).




8.1 Gesetz und Interpretation
Gestützt auf die Öffnungsklausel des Art. 85 Abs. 2 DSGVO wurden in Österreich § 9 Abs.
1 und 2 DSG erlassen: § 9 Abs. 1 DSG befasst sich dabei mit der Datenverarbeitung zu
journalistischen Zwecken, § 9 Abs. 2 DSG mit der Datenverarbeitung zuwissenschaftlichen,
künstlerischen oder literarischen Zwecken. In der Literaturwurde § 9DSG teils stark kritisiert
und als unionsrechtswidrig bezeichnet:
So wurde bemängelt, dass Verarbeitungen nur dann privilegiert seien, wenn sie zu
journalistischen Zwecken „des Medienunternehmens oder Mediendienstes” erfolgen. Da
zB. selbständige Blogger und Pressestellen Daten nicht zu Zwecken eines
Medienunternehmens oderMediendienstes verarbeiten, liege insoweit eine Einschränkung
des Anwendungsbereichs auf „klassische” Medien vor. Zumal Art. 85 DSGVO eine solche
Einschränkung nicht vorsehe, umfasse § 9DSGdaher Tätigkeiten, die nach der EuGH-Rsp
als „journalistisch” einzustufen seien, nicht.63
Hinsichtlich des Umfangs der Privilegierung ist § 9 Abs. 1 DSG als gänzliche und
pauschale Ausnahmeregelung von den Vorgaben der DSGVO und des DSG konzipiert,
ohne den Erforderlichkeitsvorbehalt in Art. 85 Abs. 2 DSGVO aufzugreifen. Auch dies
wurde in der Literatur als unionsrechtswidrig gesehen, da leg cit die Mitgliedstaaten wohl
nicht dazu ermächtigen sollte, zB. Ausnahmen von der Anwendbarkeit der Regelungen
der DSGVO zu Rechtsschutz, Schadenersatz und Sanktionen vorzusehen.64
Hingegen sieht § 9 Abs. 2 DSG nur eine Ausnahme von DSGVO und DSG vor, „soweit
dies erforderlich ist”; die Regelung ist auch insoweit differenzierter, als sieGegenausnahmen
vorsieht und zB. dieAnwendbarkeit desArt. 5DSGVO(allgemeineDatenschutzgrundsätze)
ausdrücklich anordnet. In diesem Zusammenhang wird allerdings als unionsrechtswidrig
angesehen, dass § 9 Abs. 2 DSG die Abwägung an die Rechtsanwender delegiert, anstatt
die gebotene Abwägung zwischen den Grundrechten auf Datenschutz und
Meinungsäußerungs- bzw. Informationsfreiheit gesetzlich vorzunehmen und dann im
erforderlichen Umfang Ausnahmen vorzusehen.65
63 Jahnel/Krempelmeier, Medien und Datenschutz in Österreich in Lachmayer/Lewinski, Datenschutz im
Rechtsvergleich (2019), 179 (188); Krempelmeier, Sind die datenschutzrechtlichen Privilegien des § 9 DSG
unionsrechtswidrig? jusIT 2018, 188; Bresich/Dopplinger/Dörnhöfer/Kunnert/Riedl (2018) DSG § 9 Rz.
1-12.
64 Jahnel/Krempelmeier (2019), 179 (190); Krempelmeier (2018), Rz. 1-12.




Zur erwähnten Bestimmung des § 9 DSG existiert bislang soweit ersichtlich nur eine
DSB-Entscheidung.66
Im Ausgangssachverhalt behauptete der Beschwerdeführer eine Verletzung im Recht
auf Löschung, weil die Beschwerdegegnerin, die ein Online-Forum betreibt, die Löschung
seiner Userkommentare verweigert hatte.
Die DSB führte in ihrer Entscheidung aus, dass journalistische Tätigkeiten nicht nur
Medienunternehmen vorbehalten sind (EuGH 16.12.2008, C-73/07 Rz. 62) und für die
Anwendbarkeit des Privilegs nach § 9 Abs. 1 DSG daher allein der Verarbeitungszweck
entscheidend sei. Daher könne § 9 Abs. 1 DSG ungeachtet seines restriktiveren Wortlauts
auch „Bürgerjournalismus” (bspw. Internet-Diskussionsforen) umfassen, der den Zweck
der einseitigen oder wechselseitigen Kommunikation von Ideen, Meinungen und
Informationen verfolgt.
C Nationale Durchsetzung von Datenschutzrecht
Frage 9
9.1 Behörde und Zusammensetzung
Die DSB ist nationale Aufsichtsbehörde gemäß Art. 51 DSGVO (§ 18 DSG). Sie ist
unabhängig (§ 19, 31 DSG).67
An ihrer Spitze steht ein Leiter, welcher wie sein Stellvertreter vomBundespräsidenten
auf Vorschlag der Bundesregierung für eine Dauer von fünf Jahren bestellt wird; die
Wiederbestellung ist zulässig (§ 20 DSG). Als weiteres Personal waren der DSB im Jahr
2018 21 Juristen (davon zwei Praktikanten), 4 Mitarbeiter im gehobenen Dienst und 9
Mitarbeiter im Fachdienst zugeordnet.68
Durch dieDSGVOwurde eineUmstrukturierung derDSB vorgenommen, indemdiese
in sechs Büros69 unterteilt wurde (Präsidium; Verfahrensführung; Internationales und
grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit; Akkreditierung und Verhaltensregeln;
Verwaltungsstrafen; sowie bis 27.12.2018 Stammzahlenregister).
66 Datenschutzbehörde 13.8.2018, DSB-D123.077/0003-DSB/2018.
67 Die genannten Bestimmungen wurden auch im Hinblick auf das zur früheren Organisation der DSB
ergangeneEuGH-Urteil vom16.10.2012,C-614/10,EuropäischeKommission/Österreich, erlassen, inwelchem
der EuGH festhielt, dass die zuvor bestehende Behördenorganisation dem Kriterium der Unabhängigkeit
nicht ausreichend Rechnung trug.




9.2 Befugnisse oder Pflichten
Durch die DSGVO hat sich das Aufgabenspektrum der Datenschutzbehörde stark
verbreitert70 und sind insbesondere folgende Aufgaben hinzugekommen: Erlassung von
Standardvertragsklauseln (Art. 28 Abs. 8 DSGVO); Entgegennahme und Prüfung von
Meldungen über die Verletzung des Schutzes personenbezogener Daten nach Art. 33
DSGVO sowie Anordnung von Abhilfemaßnahmen; Erlassung von Verordnungen
betreffend die (Nicht-)Durchführung einer Datenschutz-Folgenabschätzung unter
Einbindung des EuropäischenDatenschutzausschusses nachArt. 35Abs. 4 und 5DSGVO;
Führung von Konsultationsverfahren nach Art. 36 DSGVO; Entgegennahme von
Meldungen über die Bestellung von Datenschutzbeauftragten (Art. 37 Abs. 7 DSGVO);
Prüfung und Genehmigung von Verhaltensregeln (Art. 40 DSGVO) sowie Erlassung der
korrespondierendenVerordnung über die Akkreditierung vonÜberwachungsstellen (Art.
41 DSGVO) unter Einbindung des Europäischen Datenschutzausschusses; Genehmigung
von Zertifizierungskriterien (Art. 42 DSGVO) sowie Erlassung der korrespondierenden
Verordnung über die Akkreditierung von Zertifizierungsstellen (Art. 43 DSGVO);
Genehmigung von verbindlichen internen Vorschriften sowie von Vertragsklauseln zur
Übermittlung vonDaten anEmpfänger inDrittstaaten oder internationalenOrganisationen
(Art. 46 f DSGVO); Führung von Verwaltungsstrafverfahren (Art. 83 DSGVO iVm. § 62
DSG); strukturierte Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Aufsichtsbehörden bei
grenzüberschreitenden Fällen (Art. 60 f DSGVO); Mitarbeit im Europäischen
Datenschutzausschuss (Art. 63 ff DSGVO).
Unverändert ist die DSB auch nach der neuen Rechtslage zuständig für
Beschwerdeverfahren (Art. 77 DSGVO iVm. § 24 DSG); Amtswegige Prüfverfahren (Art.
57 Abs. 1 lit. h DSGVO); Verfahren betreffend Datenverarbeitung für Zwecke der
wissenschaftlichen Forschung und Statistik (§ 7 DSG) sowie Datenverarbeitung von
Adressdaten zur Benachrichtigung und Befragung von betroffenen Personen (§ 8 DSG).
Die DSB berät schließlich die Ausschüsse des Nationalrates und des Bundesrates, die
Bundesregierung und die Landesregierungen auf deren Ersuchen über legislative und
administrative Maßnahmen (§ 21 DSB).
9.3 Rechtsdurchsetzungsbilanz
Obwohl die Anzahl der anhängig gemachten Verfahren im Vergleich zu 2017 signifikant
angestiegen ist, konnten fast alle Verfahren innerhalb der gesetzlich vorgesehenen Frist
von sechs Monaten beendet werden.71 Im Jahr 2018 erledigte die DSB knapp 6,000
Eingangsstücke (darunter 509 Individualbeschwerden, 253 grenzüberschreitende
Beschwerden (einlangend und ausgehend), 95 amtswegige Prüfverfahren, 119




Genehmigungen im internationalenDatenverkehr, 344 Sicherheitsverletzungen und 3.974
Rechtsauskünfte).72
Frage 10
In den letzten Jahren hat die von der DSB zu bewältigende Fallzahl kontinuierlich
zugenommen. Dies begründet durch den Zuwachs an Aufgaben und Befugnissen,
andererseits aufgrund des iZm. der DSGVO gestiegenen Bewusstseins für Datenschutz.
So stieg allein die Anzahl der eingelangten Individualbeschwerden von 180 im Jahr 2016
auf 1036 im Jahr 2018.73 Von den 509 Erledigungen im Jahr 2018 wurde das Verfahren in
169 Angelegenheiten eingestellt und erging in 340 Fällen ein Bescheid.74 Aus diesen Daten
ist keine „selective to be effective”-Vorgehensweise ableitbar. Eine derartige „Strategie”
stünde im Übrigen auch nicht im Einklang mit dem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht, welches
derDSB nicht erlaubt, eineAuswahl innerhalb der bei ihr anhängigenVerfahren zu treffen.
Die derDSBvomösterreichischenGesetzgeber in § 11DSGnahegelegteVorgehensweise
(„Ermahnen statt Strafen”) wurde soweit ersichtlich bislang von der DSB negiert (diese
hat in mehreren Fällen auch bei erstmaligen Verstößen Geldbußen verhängt – vgl.
nachfolgend Frage 11).
Frage 11
Die Sanktionsmöglichkeiten wurden bislang von der DSB mit Augenmaß angewendet.
Vor Inkrafttreten der DSGVO waren in Österreich die Bezirksverwaltungsbehörden für
Verwaltungsstrafverfahren zuständig. Mit 25.5.2018 ging diese Zuständigkeit auf die DSB
über. Die DSB übernahm alle bei den Bezirksverwaltungsbehörden anhängigen
Verwaltungsstrafverfahren (in Summe 75) und leitete 2018 59 neue Verwal-
tungsstrafverfahren ein.75 Ein Großteil dieser Fälle betraf Videoüberwachungen.76 In den
im Jahr 2018 (seit 25.5.2018) von der DSB geführten 134 Verwaltungsstrafverfahren
erfolgten 83 Einstellungen, vier Ermahnungen und fünf Straferkenntnisse.77 Die höchste
2018 verhängte Strafe belief sich auf EUR 4.800,-78 und betraf die Videoüberwachung eines
Geschäftslokals (Filmen des öffentlichen Raums, keine geeigneten Hinweisschilder, zu
72 Ibid, 10, 11.
73 Ibid, 10.
74 Ibid, 10.






lange Speicherdauer, keine Protokollierung der Verarbeitungsvorgänge). Im Jahr 2019
verhängte dieDSB imVergleich schonmerklich höhereGeldbußen: zB. EUR10,000 gegen
eine Privatperson wegen heimlichen Filmens anderer Personen; EUR 50,000 Euro gegen
ein Unternehmen aus dem medizinischen Bereich wegen Verletzung der
Informationspflichten und EUR 18 Mio gegen die österreichische Post, weil Daten zur
Hochrechnung von politischen Affinitäten genutzt wurden.
Neben den Sanktionen der DSGVO bestehen noch folgende weitere Bestimmungen
auf nationaler Ebene:
– Wie erwähntwurde zunächstmit demDatenschutz-Deregulierungsgesetz in § 11DSG
das Prinzip „Ermahnen statt Strafen” verankert („die Datenschutzbehörde wird den
Katalog des Art. 83 Abs. 2 bis 6 DSGVO so zur Anwendung bringen, dass die
Verhältnismäßigkeit gewahrt wird. Insbesondere bei erstmaligen Verstößen wird die
Datenschutzbehörde im Einklang mit Art. 58 DSGVO von ihren Abhilfebefugnissen
insbesondere durchVerwarnenGebrauchmachen”). Begründet wurde die Einführung
dieser Bestimmung damit, dass in Einklang mit Art. 58 DSGVO eine Beratung und
eine Verwarnung möglich sein soll und eine Bestrafung nur unter Abwägung der
Kriterien des Art. 83 DSGVO erfolgen soll.79
– In § 62 Abs. 1 DSG wurde (im Sinne des Art. 84 Abs. 1 DSGVO80) eine
Verwaltungsstrafbestimmung geschaffen, welche subsidiär zur Anwendung kommt,
sofern die Tat nicht einen Tatbestand nach Art. 83 DSGVO verwirklicht oder nach
anderen Verwaltungsstrafbestimmungen mit strengerer Strafe bedroht ist. So werden
ua. widerrechtliche Zugriffe auf Datenanwendungen, Verletzungen des
Datengeheimnisses, Verstöße gegen die im DSG geregelten Bestimmungen zur
Bildverarbeitung und die Verweigerung der Einschau durch die DSB mit Geldstrafen
bis zu EUR 50,000 sanktioniert.
– Schließlich sieht (wie bereits vor Inkrafttreten derDSGVO) § 63DSG eine gerichtliche
Strafbestimmung vor. Es handelt sich dabei umeinVorsatzdelikt, dasDatenverarbeitung
in Gewinn- oder Schädigungsabsicht mit Strafdrohung von Freiheitsstrafen bis zu
einem Jahr sanktioniert.
Frage 12
Die österreichische Rechtsordnung stand immateriellen Schadenersatzansprüchen lange
skeptisch gegenüber. Grundsätzlich werden immaterielle Schäden nach österreichischer
Rechtslage nur ersetzt, wenn deren Ersatzfähigkeit ausdrücklich gesetzlich angeordnet ist
79 21. Sitzung des Nationalrats, XXVI. GP, 20.4.2018, 31, zu Z 12 (§ 11), www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/
XXVI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00021/fname_721211.pdf.
80 Illibauer in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 84 DSGVO Rz. 18 (Stand 1.10.2018, rdb.at).
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(zB. Schmerzengeld bei Körperverletzung gem. § 1325 ABGB; Ersatz entgangener
Urlaubsfreude gem. § 12Abs. 2 PRG; ideelle Schäden bei Verletzung des Rechts am eigenen
Bild gem. § 78UrhG iVm. § 87Abs. 2UrhG; Ersatz ideeller Schäden gem. § 6 ff.MedienG).
Die jüngere österreichische Rsp. zeigt sich dem allgemeinen Ersatz ideeller Schäden
demgegenüber zugänglicher (vgl. Ersatz von Trauerschäden81, Ersatz bei Vertauschung
von Babys82, ideeller Schaden bei vorsätzlichem Freiheitsentzug83), wenngleich die Höhe
der zugesprochenen Beträge vergleichsweise gering ist.
Die Tendenz zu immateriellen Schadenersatzansprüchen ist auch im Datenschutz
bemerkbar: In Österreich existierte bereits vor Inkrafttreten der DSGVO die Möglichkeit,
immateriellen Schadenersatz für Datenschutzverletzungen geltend zu machen (§ 33 DSG
2000). Die diesbezüglichenVoraussetzungenwaren allerdings restriktiv, weshalb derartige
Ansprüche nur selten geltend gemacht wurden.84
Grundlage (DSG iVm. DSGVO)
Nach der nunmehr eingeführten Bestimmung des § 29 DSG hat jede Person, der wegen
eines Verstoßes gegen die DSGVO oder gegen § 1 oder Artikel 2 1. Hauptstück des DSG
ein materieller oder immaterieller Schaden entstanden ist, Anspruch auf Schadenersatz
gegen den Verantwortlichen oder den Auftragsverarbeiter nach Art. 82 DSGVO. Im
Einzelnen gelten für diesen Schadenersatzanspruch die allgemeinen Bestimmungen des
bürgerlichen Rechts und sind diese Ansprüche vor den ordentlichen Gerichten geltend
zu machen.
Nach demWortlaut des § 29DSG sind dieVoraussetzungen imVergleich zur früheren
Rechtslage deutlich gelockert. Den Kläger trifft die Beweislast hinsichtlich des Eintritts
eines (materiellen oder immateriellen) Schadens, hinsichtlich eines datenschutzrechtlichen
Normverstoßes des Verantwortlichen und hinsichtlich der kausalen Verursachung des
Schadens durch den Normverstoß des Verantwortlichen.
Bemessung
Die Bemessung derHöhe des immateriellen Schadenersatzes unterscheidet sich je nachdem
um welchen Bereich es sich handelt: Schmerzengeld wird in „Tagessätzen” berechnet und
es wird zwischen leichten,mittleren und schweren Schmerzen unterschieden.85 Der Ersatz
entgangener Urlaubsfreude wird in Pauschalbeträgen pro Tag abgegolten.86 Hinsichtlich
81 Reischauer in Rummel/Lukas, ABGB3 § 1325 Rz. 5a.
82 OGH 22.3.2018, 4 Ob 208/17t.
83 Hinteregger in Kletečka/Schauer, ABGB-ON1.04 § 1329 Rz. 5.
84 Bsp OGH 6Ob275/05t 15.12.2005 (zur Aufnahme in die „Warnliste” der Banken); OGH 17.12.2009
6Ob247/08d (zur unzulässigen Eintragung in eine Bonitätsliste eines Kreditschutzverbands).
85 Welser/Zöchling-Jud, Bürgerliches Recht Band II14 (2015) Rz. 1484.
86 ErläutRV 1513 BlgNR 25. GP 15.
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des Ersatzanspruchs nach § 78 UrhG sollte die Höhe des immateriellen Schadenersatzes
für den Verletzter fühlbar sein und der Allgemeinheit verdeutlichen, dass sich
Rechtsverletzungen dieser Art nicht lohnen, wobei der Grad des Verschuldens sowie die
Intensität und Dauer der Verletzung einfließen.87 Im Zusammenhang mit § 6 MedienG
muss die Zuerkennung von Schadenersatz für eine Ehrenkränkung nach der Rsp. des
EGMRzuArt. 10MRK in einem angemessenenVerhältnis zur erlittenen Beeinträchtigung
des Ansehens stehen.88
Bei der Bemessung des immateriellen Schadenersatzanspruches für
Datenschutzverletzungen nach § 33 DSG 2000 fielen bislang Faktoren wie die Intensität
der Persönlichkeitsverletzung, der Verschuldensgrad des Schädigers, die Breitenwirkung
derDatenveröffentlichung,Gewinnerzielungsabsichten des Schädigers und auch präventive
Gedanken ins Gewicht. Da die Feststellung der Höhe eines immateriellen Schadens
Schwierigkeiten bereiten wird, wird wohl häufig auf § 273 ZPO (Festsetzung durch freie
richterlicheÜberzeugung) zurückgegriffenwerden.DabeiwerdenUmstände des Einzelfalls
ebenso bedeutend seinwieBeeinträchtigungdesOpfers (Erfolgsunwert),Handlungsunwert,
präventive Aspekte, Verbreitungsgrad sowie der Adressatenkreis der Datenschutz-
verletzung.89
Auf Basis der neuen Bestimmungen hat das LG Feldkirch im August 2019 (nicht
rechtskräftig) einer PersonwegenunrechtmäßigerVerarbeitung vonbesonderenKategorien




Österreich hat keine Regelungen getroffen, um kollektiven Rechtsschutz im
datenschutzrechtlichen Kontext zu vereinfachen.
Dass die kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung bei Datenschutzverstößen in der
österreichischen Praxis Schwierigkeiten begegnet, zeigt sich nicht zuletzt an der
öffentlichkeitswirksamen Sammelklage gegen Facebook, die 2014 von Max Schrems beim
Landesgericht Wien wegen Verletzungen der Rechte auf Achtung der Privatsphäre und
auf Datenschutz anhängig gemacht wurde.91
87 Guggenbichler in Kucsko/Handig, urheber.recht2 § 87 UrhG Rz. 22-25.
88 Rami in Höpfel/Ratz, WK2 MedienG § 6 Rz. 7.
89 Vgl. Schweiger in Knyrim, DatKomm Art. 82 DSGVO Rz. 30ff.
90 LG Feldkirch 07.08.2019, 57 Cg 30/19b.
91 Schrems vertrat dabei zunächst auch Verbraucher aus anderen EU-Staaten und Indien (vgl. ua OGH
28.2.2018, 6 Ob 23/18b; EuGH 25.1.2018, C-498/16, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2018:37 (infolge Vorlage des
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13.2 Rolle von Nichtregierungsorganisationen
13.2.1 Art. 80 Abs. 1 DSGVO (Schadenersatz)
Die ursprünglich auch für Schadenersatzklagen vorgesehene Möglichkeit der Vertretung
durchNichtregierungsorganisationenwurde imDatenschutz-Deregulierungsgesetz 201892
wieder gestrichen. Betroffene haben daher auf Basis des § 28 DSG nur das Recht, eine
Nichtregierungsorganisation zubeauftragen, in ihremNameneineBeschwerde einzureichen
und die in den §§ 24 bis 27 DSB genannten Schritte (Beschwerde an die
Datenschutzbehörde, Begleitende Maßnahmen im Beschwerdeverfahren, Beschwerde an
das Bundesverwaltungsgericht) zu setzen. Hingegen sind Nichtregierungsorganisationen
nicht zur Geltendmachung von Schadenersatzansprüchen befugt, sondern gelten
diesbezüglich die allgemeinen Bestimmungen der Zivilprozessordnung, welche eine
Vertretung durch Rechtsanwälte vorsehen.
Kritisch gesehenwird dies naturgemäß vonDatenschutzorganisationenwie noyb (noyb
führt dazu aus, dass aufgrund der Möglichkeit, Ansprüche abzutreten, eine
Schadenersatzklage gegen ein österreichisches Unternehmen einer „Vertretung” nach §
28 DSG nicht bedarf).93
13.2.2 Art. 80 Abs. 2 DSGVO (Verbandsklage)
In Österreich wurde zwar diskutiert, von der Öffnungsklausel in Art. 80 Abs. 2 DSGVO
Gebrauch zumachenund soNichtregierungsorganisationenunabhängig von einemAntrag
der betroffenen Person die Befugnis einzuräumen, bei der Datenschutzbehörde
Beschwerden eizureichen.94 Letztlich wurde dies allerdings nicht umgesetzt.
13.2.3 Organisationen, Vereine, Anlaufstellen
Neben der schon angesprochenen Datenschutzorganisation „noyb” gibt es eine Reihe
weiterer Anlaufstellen für Einzelpersonen, um Informationen zu erlangen bzw.
Einrichtungen, die sich im Datenschutz engagieren; darunter:
– ARGE Daten, ein 1983 gegründeter österreichischer gemeinnütziger Verein,
veröffentlicht auchMusterbriefe und allgemeine Informationen zumDatenschutzrecht.95
EuGH); zur letztendlichen Abweisung der Klage: futurezone.at/netzpolitik/facebook-klage-von-max-
schrems-landesgericht-wien-nicht-zustaendig/400388459 (25.1.2019).
92 BGBl. I Nr. 24/2018; 21. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, XXVI. Gesetzgebungsperiode,
Freitag 20.4.2018, 31; AA-10 XXVI. GP – Abänderungsantrag.
93 Noyb, EU-Datenschutz: Regierungsparteien schwächen Rechtsdurchsetzung gegen globale Konzerne,
noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PA_DSGVO.pdf.




– Der Internet Ombudsmann, eine notifizierte Schlichtungsstelle iSd. § 4
Alternative-Streitbeilegung-Gesetz.96
– Der Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI), eine gemeinnützige
Verbraucherschutzorganisation, veröffentlicht ebenfalls Musterformulare für
Beschwerden bei der DSB sowie Musterauskunftsbegehren.97
– Die Arbeiterkammer tritt als Interessensvertretung für höhere Datenschutzstandards
auf und veröffentlicht diverse Studien/Untersuchungen zu Datenschutzthemen (zB.
Siri, Alexa, Cloud, Datenschutz von mobilen Apps).98
– DasEuropäischeVerbraucherzentrumÖsterreich unterstützt bei der außergerichtlichen
Durchsetzung von Ansprüchen gegenüber einem Unternehmen im europäischen
Ausland.99
Schließlich gibt es auf Datenschutz spezialisierte Forschungseinrichtungen wie zB. das
Research Institute – Digital Human Rights Center (RI), welches ua. technische und
rechtliche Aspekte des Datenschutzes und der Datensicherheit untersucht.100
Frage 14
14.1 Einschreiten anderer, bestehender Regulierungsbehörden
Es ist aktuell keine merkbare Tendenz in Österreich zu erkennen, dass neben der DSB
auch andere Regulierungsbehörden auf Bundesebene in datenschutzrechtlichen Fragen
einschreiten würden. Allerdings scheint durchaus möglich, dass datenschutzrechtliche
Wertungen in die Beurteilung anderer österreichischer Regulierungsbehörden einfließen
werden (wie etwa auch bereits das deutsche Bundeskartellamt).101 Ebenso wie das
Bundeskartellamt sind auch die österreichische Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (BWB) und
der österreichische Bundeskartellanwalt im Zuge der Kontrolle des Kartell- und
Marktmissbrauchsverbots bzw. der Zusammenschlusskontrolle aufgrund der durch die
Digitalisierung ermöglichten neuenGeschäftsmodelle/-methoden (etwaPreis-Algorithmen
bzw. „Dynamic Pricing”) immer häufigermit Datenschutzfragen konfrontiert. Es ist daher
denkbar, dass auch die BWB auf die DSGVO zurückgreifen würde, um







101 Beschluss des Bundeskartellamts vom 6.2.2019, B6-22/16.
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14.2 Schaffung neuer Regulierungsbehörden für das Internet und für die
künstliche Intelligenz
E-Government hat inÖsterreich einen hohen Stellenwert. Aktuell wird das „Digitale Amt”
realisiert (Digitalisierung von Behördenwegen). Hingegen ist soweit ersichtlich nicht
beabsichtigt, eine Internet- oder KI-Regulierungsbehörde zu schaffen.102
D Datenverarbeitung für nationale Sicherheitsbelange
Frage 15
Das DSG definiert den Begriff „nationale Sicherheit” nicht. In seinem 3. Hauptstück
(„Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten für Zwecke der Sicherheitspolizei einschließlich
des polizeilichen Staatsschutzes, des militärischen Eigenschutzes, der Aufklärung und
Verfolgung von Straftaten, der Strafvollstreckung und des Maßnahmenvollzugs”) nimmt
das DSG allerdings auf den Begriff Bezug (in § 36 DSG im Zusammenhang mit dem
Anwendungsbereich und in § 43 Abs. 4 Z. 2 DSG im Zusammenhang mit den
Informationsrechten der betroffenen Person).
Zur Umsetzung eines „Quick-Freeze-Modells” wurden 2018 ua. Änderungen der
Strafprozessordnung („StPO”)unddes Telekommunikationsgesetzes („TKG”) beschlossen.
Bei Vorliegen einesAnfangsverdachts bestimmter gerichtlich strafbarerHandlungen sollen
Telekommunikationsanbieter aufgrund staatsanwaltlicherAnordnung verpflichtet werden,
Telekommunikationsdaten weiter zu speichern. So wurde den Fällen des § 99 Abs. 2 TKG,
in denen von Betreibern eines öffentlichen Kommunikationsnetzes oder -dienstes
Verkehrsdaten nicht zu löschen sind, ein weiterer Anwendungsfall hinzugefügt (§ 135
Abs. 2b StPO und § 138 Abs. 2 StPO). Der Zugriff auf diese Daten soll allerdings nur unter
der Voraussetzung eines konkreten Tatverdachtes und einer gerichtlichen Bewilligung
möglich sein. In den Erläuterungen zum Strafprozessrechtsänderungsgesetz 2018 (17 Blg
XXVI. GP) wird durch mehrfache Bezugnahme auf das EuGH-Urteil Tele 2 und Watson
(zB. hinsichtlich der Kategorien von zu speichernden Daten, des Anfangsverdachts, der
gerichtlichen Bewilligung) deutlich, dass sich jedenfalls der österreichische Gesetzgeber
der Anwendung der GRC auf die Vorratsdatenspeicherung aus nationalen
Sicherheitsgründen in Folge des EuGH-Urteils bewusst ist und diese akzeptiert.
102 Vgl. auch „Broschüre – Die Zukunft der Künstlichen Intelligenz in Österreich gestalten”, ein Entwurf für





Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, Dries Van Briel and Justine De Meersman*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
New legislation
The most important legal instruments implementing the General Data Protection
Regulation in Belgian (federal) legislation are (i) theAct of 3December 2017 on the creation
of the Data Protection Authority and (ii) the Act of 30 July 2018 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.1
Contents of the Framework Act
The Framework Act is the most important piece of legislation when it comes to the
implementation of the GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive.2 The Framework Act
takes advantage of several of the flexibilities offered by the GDPR, such as:
– Article 8(1) GDPR on children’s consent: article 7 Framework Act lowers the age for
children to give valid consent for the processing of their personal data with regard to
a direct offer of information society services to 13 years.
– Article 35(10) GDPR on data protection impact assessments: article 23 Framework
Act obliges a controller to carry out its own data protection impact assessment
(hereinafter “DPIA”) prior to a processing activity based on a legal obligation or a task
* Attorneys-at-Law at Eubelius CV, Brussels (Belgium).
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (hereinafter
“GDPR”); Act of 30 July 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data (hereinafter “Framework Act”); Act of 3 December 2017 on the creation of the Data Protection
Authority (hereinafter “NSA Act”).
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
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carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority, even if a DPIA
was already carried out in the context of the adoption of the legal basis.
– Article 37(4)GDPRon the designation of aData ProtectionOfficer (hereinafter “DPO”):
article 21 Framework Act stipulates that private bodies that process personal data on
behalf of a federal authority or to which a federal authority transfers personal data are
obliged to designate a DPO if such processing of personal data entails a high risk to
the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
– Article 85 GDPR on freedom of expression and information: the Framework Act
includes exemptions in this regard, which are further discussed in Question 8.
– Article 87 GDPR on the national identification number: the Act of 25 November 2018
has fundamentally changed existing legislation regarding the use of the national registry
number.3 In principle public authorities and public or private institutions need
authorisation from the Minister of the Interior to access, receive and/or use the data
of the national registry number. Exemptions apply for e.g. police forces, judges of courts
and tribunals, etc.4
– Article 89 GDPR on processing for archiving purposes, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes: title 4 of the Framework Act is entirely devoted to this
matter and includes possibilities to deviate from data subjects’ rights, provided that
the exercise of these rights risks to render the processing for archiving in the public
interest, for scientific or historical research or for statistical purposes impossible or
provided that the exercise of these rights would seriously impair processing and hence
derogations are necessary to achieve the objectives.5
The Framework Act contains a chapter allowing restrictions on the rights of data subjects
in the application of article 23 GDPR.6 Restrictions exist for the processing of personal
data that are obtained from or communicated to authorities involved in intelligence and
security services, police and judicial services.7 In these cases, for obvious reasons of safety
and secrecy, a controller is not allowed to inform the data subject of the processing of his
personal data.8 Data subjects have alternative means to ask the National Supervisory
Authority (hereinafter "NSA") to perform verifications with the authorities involved.
3 Act of 25 November 2018 containing various provisions with regard to the National Registry and the pop-
ulation registers (hereinafter “Act of 25November 2018”); Act of 8August 1983 regulating a national registry
of natural persons (hereinafter “Act of 8 August 1983”).
4 Art. 8(3) Act of 8 August 1983.
5 Art. 186 Framework Act.
6 Arts 11-17 Framework Act.
7 Arts 11 ff. and 14 ff. Framework Act.
8 Exceptions apply when (i) the controller is obliged to provide the information in the context of legal pro-
ceedings or (ii) in case the authority from which the data were obtained allows the controller to provide
information.
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Oversight role of the NSA
The NSA issues opinions on draft legislation and in this way has an oversight role in
legislation that implies data processing.9 We further elaborate on the NSA and its
functioning in Question 9.
Question 2
The right to private life is enshrined in article 22 of the Belgian Constitution.10 During the
legislative process, the legislator’s intention was to bring the content of article 22 as closely
as possible in line with article 8 European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter
“ECHR”) in order to avoid substantive differences.11 Under article 22 Constitution every
individual has the right to private and family life, except in the cases and under the
conditions provided for by law. Any interference with this right has to be provided for by
an act in the formal sense of the word, which differs from article 8 ECHR that applies a
qualitative legality principle.
Separate legislation has been adopted to protect the processing of personal data as part
of the right to private life. The first legislative act in this regard was the Belgian Act of
8December 1992 regarding the protection of private life towards the processing of personal
data (which after a legislative change in 1998 also implemented Directive 95/46/EC).12
This act was withdrawn and replaced by the Framework Act following the entry into force
of the GDPR.
The Belgian Constitutional Court interprets the right to private life broadly and
considers the right to protection of personal data and information to be part of the right
to private life. It does not make a formal distinction between the right to private life and
the right to data protection.13
TheConstitutional Court examines article 22Constitution in combinationwith article
7 and 8 of theCharter of Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “Charter”)
9 Art. 23 NSA Act.
10 Coordinated Constitution of 17 February 1994 (hereinafter “Constitution”).
11 Preparatory works Constitution, Parl. St. Senaat BZ 1991-92, no. 100-4/5; Preparatory works Constitution,
Parl. St. Kamer 1992-93, no. 997/5, p. 2.
12 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31 (hereinafter “Directive 95/46/EC”).
13 CC 15 March 2018, No. 29/2018, Rec. B.11; CC 14 July 2016, No. 108/2016, Rec. B.9. The automatic identi-
fication of the right to data protection and the right to private life is however criticised in legal doctrine (P.
De Hert & D. De Bot, ‘Artikel 22 Grondwet en het onderscheid tussen privacyrecht en gegevensbescher-
mingsrecht. Een formele wet is niet altijd nodig wanneer de overheid persoonsgegevens verwerkt, maar
toch vaak’, VDB-CDPK, No. 4, 2013, pp. 358-373; R. Van Crombrugge et al, ‘Bescherming van persoons-
gegevens: is er ruimte voor een horizontale toepassing van het legaliteitsbeginsel in artikel 22 Gw.?’, RW,
No. 7, 2015, pp. 243-252.
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and considers these rights in relation to the right to data protection to have a scope that
is analogous to article 8 ECHR, article 22Constitution and article 17 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.14
Regarding the right to data protection, the Constitutional Court assumes that the
international obligations arising from Directive 95/46/EC are an integral part of the
guarantees laid down in article 22 Constitution. Recently, the Constitutional Court has
reconfirmed this reasoning by stating that Directive 95/46/EC and the GDPR must be
taken into account in the assessment of the validity of legislation in light of article 7 and
8 Charter.15
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Principle of fair processing
The principle of fair processing is one of the three principles of lawfulness, fairness and
transparency mentioned in article 5(1)(a) GDPR.
The NSA tends to interpret the principle of fair processing mostly in the light of
transparency (articles 12 – 14GDPR). TheNSA especially underlines that controllers have
the responsibility to ensure that data subjects are informed of (i) the purposes of processing,
(ii) the identity of the controller with whom they can exercise their data subject rights and
(iii) the risks of the processing as well as the data subject’s rights (in line with recital 39
GDPR).16
The principle of fair processingwas applied in the Facebook-case initiated by the former
NSA. The NSA accused Facebook of tracking browsing behaviour of internet users, with
and without a Facebook account, by using social plug-ins, cookies and pixels without user
consent. The Brussels Court of First Instance ruled that fair processing requires data to be
obtained transparently and to be kept no longer than necessary and that subsequent
processing does not conflict with reasonable expectations of data subjects. A lack of
sufficient information by Facebook about systematic tracking on third party websites not
14 CC 19 July 2018, No. 96/2018; CC 15 March 2018, No. 29/2018, Rec. B.15.1; CC 14 July 2016, No. 108/2016,
Rec. B.13.1; CC 6 December 2012, No. 145/2012; CC 14 December 2005, No. 189/2005.
15 CC 15 March 2018, No. 29/2018, Rec. B.15.2.
16 See for recent examples: NSA, Opinion No. 135/2018 of 28 November 2018, No. 47 and NSA, Opinion No.
132/2019 of 3 July 2019, No. 32; NSA, ‘Principe de traitement licite, loyal et transparent’,
www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/principe-de-traitement-licite-loyal-et-transparent. All webpages referred
to were visited 11 February 2020.
138
Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, Dries Van Briel and Justine De Meersman
only led to a lack of valid consent (see Question 4), but also entailed a violation of the
principle of fair processing.17
In a recent decision, the NSA determined that a controller must take appropriate
measures to ensure that data subjects receive the information required by article 13 GDPR
in a concise, transparent, comprehensible and easily accessible form and in ‘clear and
simple language’.18 Policies must contain accurate and complete information and the
controller must provide appropriate means (e.g. a link to the privacy policy) to make the
policies easily available to data subjects in all languages of the website.
Principle of data minimisation
TheNSA interprets the principle of dataminimisation in the same fashion as article 5(1)(c)
GDPR and recital 59 GDPR. On its website, the NSA recommends data controllers to only
process the strict minimum of data required. A review of whether all data is adequate,
relevant and limited towhat is necessarywith regard to the purposes is part of the standard
check of the NSA when assessing draft legislation.19
So far, there have been two decisions from the NSA relating to data minimisation.
In a first decision, the NSA decided that the mere fact of placing a surveillance camera
in a kitchen of a student dorm is a violation of the data minimisation principle because
the kitchen is a common space where residents have no other choice than to enter and
being filmed.20
In a second decision, the NSA decided a case where a company required a scan of the
customer’s eID in exchange for a loyalty card.21 By scanning the eID the company
automatically received the customer’s national registry number. As explained above (see
Question 1), use of this number is subject to strict rules. The NSA considered the use of
the number as a means to retrieve customer data in the company’s database
disproportionate. Furthermore, the NSA considered the processing of gender and birth
date disproportionate because the loyalty card was not used for verifying the minimum
age of the customer. The companywas imposed a fine of 10,000 euro (also because of other
infringements – see Question 4).
17 Court of first instance Brussels 16 February 2018, RABG, No. 9, 2019, p. 695. Facebook appealed against
this judgment. The Brussels Court of Appeal decided on 8 May 2019 to refer certain preliminary questions
to the EU Court of Justice. An excerpt of the decision of the Court of Appeal Brussels can be found here:
www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/Dispositief_arrest.pdf;
Request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal Brussels of 8 May 2019, C-645/19 Facebook
Ireland and Others. The questions relate to the international jurisdiction of the court.
18 NSA, Decision No. 11/2019 on the merits of 25 November 2019.
19 NSA, ‘Principe deminimisationdes données’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/principe-de-minimisation-
des-donn%C3%A9es. See for a recent example: NSA, Opinion No. 132/2019 of 3 July 2019, Rec. 24.
20 NSA, Decision No. 03/2019 on the merits of 2 April 2019.
21 NSA, Decision No. 06/2019 on the merits of 17 September 2019.
139
Belgium
Principle of purpose limitation
Finally, the NSA interprets the purpose limitation principle in the same way as and with
reference to the European sources (article 5(1)(b)GDPR and 6(4)GDPR).22 The (Litigation
Chamber of the) NSA had the opportunity to apply the principle of purpose limitation in
five recent decisions.
In a first decision, the NSA decided that the coordinator of a neighbourhood watch
who (re)used personal data obtained through a WhatsApp Group of the neighbourhood
watch to send emails with personal election propaganda infringed the purpose limitation
principle. The coordinator admitted his one-off mistake and got away with a reprimand.23
In a second decision, the NSA decided that a company that had sent a global email to
all its customers in order to sign a tax declaration, whereby all customers were visible
instead of using the bcc-field, infringed the purpose limitation principle. Interestingly, the
NSA also found an infringement of the principles of accountability and privacy by design
and by default (article 24-25 GDPR). The company did not contest the facts and received
a reprimand.24
In a third decision, the NSA decided that a mayor who (re)used email addresses of
citizens obtained during his office (i.e. a decision on allotment) for sending personal
election propaganda infringed the purpose limitation principle. The mayor received an
administrative fine of 2,000 euro.25
In two other similar cases, the NSA imposed an administrative fine of 5,000 euro each
on amayor and an alderman formisusing personal data for electoral purposes.26 Themayor
used personal data that he had obtained in his capacity as mayor. The alderman used a
client list that he had obtained in the context of his professional activities.
Question 4
In recent guidelines, the NSA paid specific attention to the legal bases for the processing
of personal data in the context of direct marketing.27 The NSA clarified that there is no
hierarchy between the legal grounds provided by the GDPR and that a controller must
22 NSA, ‘Principe de finalité déterminée’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/principe-de-finalit%C3%A9-d
%C3%A9termin%C3%A9e.
23 NSA, Decision No. 01/2019 on the merits of 2 April 2019.
24 NSA, Decision No. 02/2019 on the merits of 2 April 2019.
25 NSA, Decision No. 04/2019 on the merits of 28 May 2019.
26 NSA, Decision No. 10/2019 on the merits of 25 November 2019; NSA, Decision No. 11/2019 on the merits
of 25 November 2019.
27 NSA, Recommendation no. 01/2020 of 17 January 2020, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/
privacycommission/files/documents/Recommandation_01-2020_marketing_direct.pdf.
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demonstrate that the processing is validly based on the legal grounds laid down in article
6 GDPR (and article 9(2) GDPR, if applicable).28
Regarding the legal ground of legitimate interests, the interest of the controller to
process personal data should, according to the NSA, always prevail over the interest of the
data subject not to process the data.29 The NSA specifies that the NSA or a judge should
decide whose interest prevails in a given case. In the case regarding the use of the eID to
obtain a loyalty card (see Question 3), the NSA assessed the interests of both the company
and the data subject and found the interests of the data subjects to prevail. Therefore, the
company could not rely on the legal ground of legitimate interests.
In a recent case on the use of cookies, the NSA elaborated on consent as a legal basis
for placing cookies. The NSA first of all decided that consent is required for all types of
non-essential cookies. Furthermore, the NSA ruled that consent is only valid if the user
has received accurate and adequate information about the cookies in advance. Finally, the
NSA clarified that the user should be able to choose between all types of (non-essential)
cookies and should actively consent for each type of cookies separately. Pre-ticked boxes
are not allowed.30
One of themost notorious cases on consent brought before a national court was, again,
the Facebook-case (see Question 3), where the Brussels Court of First Instance ordered
Facebook to stop tracking internet traffic of Belgian internet users via cookies and other
technologies without their consent.31 Acookie bannerwarning internet users that Facebook
places cookies on the basis of further browsingwas not considered sufficient in this regard.
Facebook’s defence that it could also rely on a legitimate interest, was rejected.32
Question 5
The EU recently adopted Directive (EU) 2019/770 of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services.33 The Directive
Digital Content&Digital Services contains a framework for the payment of digital content
and digital services with (personal) data.
28 NSA, Recommendation no. 01/2020 of 17 January 2020, p. 46.
29 NSA, ‘Intérêt légitime’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/lexique/interet-legitime.
30 NSA, Decision No. 11/2019 on the merits of 25 November 2019.
31 Court of First Instance Brussels 16 February 2018, RABG, No. 9, 2019, p. 695.
32 Facebook referred to its interest in security in relation to the use of the datr-cookie and its interest in
advertising based on surf behaviour and optimisation in relation to the fr-cookie (Facebook pixel).
33 Directive (EU) 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services [2019] OJ L136/1 (hereinafter
“Directive Digital Content & Digital Services”).
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In the context of the draft proposal of the directive, the Belgian Council for
Consumption issued an opinion in 2016 and commented on the issue of data as a counter
performance for a service.34 In this opinion, representatives of businesses did not support
the application of the same set of rules to both agreements for the supply of digital content
in exchange for the payment of a price and agreements in exchange for data as a counter
performance. These representatives hence favoured amore restricted scope of the directive,
limited to the sale of digital content in exchange for a price. They argued that a broad
material scope would hamper innovation as it entails a lot of formalities for businesses.
Representatives of consumers, on the contrary, welcomed the proposal and suggested
enlarging the scope of the directive even more in order to also include agreements in
exchange for passively provided data.
Question 6
In 2019, theNSA advised on three occasions on draft legislative acts that introduce profiling
measures.35 The most interesting advice of the NSA relates to a draft act entrusting an
energy regulator with the power to grant authorisations for collective self-consumption
of energy based on a study of the energy consumption profile of the applicant.36 In this
case, the NSA advised the legislator to include the following safeguards in the legal basis:
(i) a description of the role of the regulator who carries out the processing
(controller/processor), (ii) legal remedies against the decision of the regulator, (iii) the
right for the data subject to express his or her point of view (e.g. in case the regulator
refuses an authorisation based on exceptional consumption figures) and (iv) the
methodology of the profiling.
More recently, the control organ for police information ordered the immediate
termination of a pilot project with facial recognition at the national airport because of a
lack of legal ground, the lack of carrying out a DPIA and problems with false positives and
negatives.37
34 Proposal for a European directive on certain aspects of contracts for the supply of digital content of 5 July
2016. The Council for Consumption is an advisory body for the department of economy (“Raad voor het
Verbruik”): Raad voor het Verbruik, ‘Advies betreffende het voorstel van Europese Richtlijn betreffende
bepaalde aspecten van overeenkomsten voor de levering van digitale inhoud’, RvV 494, Brussels, 5 July
2016,www.economie.fgov.be/sites/default/files/Files/About-SPF/avis-cc-rvv/Advies-494-Raad-Verbruik.pdf.
35 NSA, Opinion No. 116/2019 of 5 June 2019; NSA, Opinion Nos. 44/2019 and 32/2019 of 6 February 2019.
36 NSA, Opinion No. 44/2019 of 6 February 2019.
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Question 7
In one of its first decisions, the NSA ordered a company to delete the data of a data subject
after three previous requests had been ignored.38
Under the reign of the formerNSA, a case was brought by a person accused on different
websites of being involved in child abduction and paedophilia although he had never been
the subject of criminal investigations.39 The former NSA advised the search engine to
implement deletions of search results on all domains, except to the extent that it was
demonstrated for a given country that the right to be forgottenwould infringe uponnational
law.40 The former NSA furthermore urged the search engine to enhance the effectiveness
of its deletion mechanisms (e.g. deletion of “first name + name” is not enough).
The right to erasure (right to be forgotten) was also the subject of two landmark
decisions of the Court of Cassation.
The first case related to the publication of an online news archive by a newspaper in
2008. This archive contained reproductions of older articles, among which a feature on a
traffic accident in 1994 caused by the claimant whichmentioned the claimant by his name.
Because the newspaper ignored the claimant’s request to remove the article or at least to
anonymize it, he started legal proceedings invoking inter alia his right to be forgotten. The
Court of Cassation considered that the rights to freedom of expression and press freedom
include the right for publishers to put digital archives online, but that these rights must
be balanced against a person’s right to private life and right to be forgotten. The Court
concluded that the online archive is a new disclosure of the claimant’s criminal history
that interferes with, and in the case at hand violates, his right to be forgotten. As such, the
Court confirmed the lower court’s decision to award a compensation for moral damage
(1 euro) and to anonymise the article.41 A similar judgment was issued by the Court of
Cassation on 8 November 2018.42
38 NSA, Decision No. 02/2019 of 15 May 2019. In two other decisions of the NSA on complaints from data
subjects for non-compliance with their right to erasure, the NSA decided to dismiss the case (NSA, Decision
No. 09/2019 on themerits of 17 September 2019) or it found that therewas no infringement (NSA,Decision
No. 08/2019 on the merits of 17 September 2019).
39 Former NSA, advice 75/2017 of 13 December 2017 following a complaint against a search engine regarding
the modalities of the implementation and the geographic extent of deleting URLs from search results.
40 Compare with Judgment of 24 September 2019 in Case C-507/17, Google LLC, venant aux droits de Google
Inc. v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772; Judgment of
3October 2019 inCaseC-18/18 EvaGlawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited, ECLI:EU:C:2019:821.
41 Cass. 29 April 2016, C.15.0052.F.




The Framework Act contains a chapter on the processing for journalistic purposes and
for academic, artistic or literary expression.43 Processing for journalistic purposes is defined
as the preparation, collection, drafting, production, distribution or archiving for the purpose
of informing the public, regardless of the medium, whereby a controller is responsible for
compliance with journalistic deontological rules.44 The Framework Act does not contain
definitions of processing activities for academic, artistic or literary forms of expression.
Processing activities for journalistic purposes and for academic, artistic or literary
expression can benefit from four kinds of alleviations under Belgian law:
– The rules regarding consent and processing of special categories of data (article 7 – 10
GDPR) and certain rights of data subjects, e.g. the right to rectification, to restriction
of processing and to data portability (article 11(2), 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21(1) GDPR) are
not applicable.
– There are fewer obligations to cooperate with supervisory authorities (e.g. records of
processing activities do not need to be made available to supervisory authorities, data
breaches do not need to be notified) if these obligationswould compromise a publication
or would constitute a control measure prior to a publication (articles 30(4), 31, 33 and
36 GDPR).
– The rules on data transfers (articles 44 – 50 GDPR) do not apply if that is necessary to
reconcile the right to data protection with the right to freedom of speech and of
information.
– The powers of supervisory authorities (article 58 GDPR) cannot be used if they can
unveil sources or would constitute a control measure prior to a publication.
To our knowledge, these new articles have not yet been at stake before the Belgian courts
or the NSA.
The CJEU, in its judgement of 14 February 2019, interpreted the journalistic exception
broadly, by ruling that a video post onYouTube by a non-professional journalist constitutes
the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes provided that the purpose of the
recording and publication is solely to make information, opinions or ideas known to the
public.45 In the light of that judgment, the Belgian legislator might have to reconsider the
scope of article 24(1) Framework Act, which limits the journalistic exception from the
43 Title I, Chapter V Framework Act.
44 Art. 24 Framework Act. It remains to be seen how this definition can be upheld in the light of the CJEU’s
Judgment of 14 February 2019 in Case C-345/17, Sergejs Buivids v. Datu valsts inspekcija,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:122.
45 Case C-345/17, Buivids, para. 69.
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obligations under GDPR to “the controller responsible for compliance with journalistic
deontological rules”.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Themain supervisory authority in Belgium is theData ProtectionAuthority (seeQuestion
1). There are different sector-specific supervisory authorities for processing activities by
the police, the intelligence and security services.46
The NSA is composed of six bodies:
i. the Executive Committee (“Comité de direction”);
ii. the General Secretariat (“Secrétariat général”);
iii. the Front Office (“Service de première ligne”);
iv. the Knowledge Centre (“Centre de connaissance”);
v. the Inspection Service (“Service d’inspection”); and
vi. the Litigation Chamber (“Chambre contentieuse”).47
The members of the Executive Committee, the Knowledge Centre and the Litigation
Chamber are appointed by the Belgian Federal House of Representatives for a one-time
renewable term of six years.48
In addition, the NSA is supported by an independent Reflection Council (“Conseil de
réflexion”). The Belgian Federal House of Representatives decides on the composition of
the Reflection Council and appoints its members. The members of the Reflection Council
are, however, not part of the NSA.49
46 Arts 95, 128 and 161 and 184 Framework Act determine the power of the Control Organ of Police Informa-
tion, the Standing IntelligenceAgencies ReviewCommittee and the Standing PoliceMonitoringCommittee.
At regional level, the Flemish supervisory commission (“Commission de contrôle flamande pour le traitement
des données à caractère personnel”) is specifically competent for the data processing by the Flemish public
authorities. The counterparts of the Flemish supervisory commission at Brussels and Walloon level are
currently not yet fully-fledged supervisory authorities within the meaning of the GDPR.
47 Art. 7 NSA Act.
48 Art. 37 read together with art. 39 NSA Act.
49 Art. 35 NSA Act.
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The NSA has the powers and duties as foreseen by the GDPR. Although not specifically
provided for in the GDPR, the Front Office is specifically competent to initiate a mediation
procedure.50
In 2018, the NSA initiated 218 audit files and several administrative sanctions have
been imposed meanwhile.51
On 12 December 2019, the Executive Committee released its strategic plan with the
annual priorities of the NSA. In the coming years, the NSA will mainly focus on five key
sectors: (1) telecommunications and media, (2) government, (3) direct marketing, (4)
education and (5) small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”). In addition, the NSA
will also pay specific attention to the role of data protection officers, the legitimacy of the
processing activity and data subject rights. Finally, the NSA will respond proactively to
three particular issues that it considers to be high on the societal agenda: 1) the creation
and use of photos and cameras, 2) online privacy and 3) use of sensitive data (including
biometric data).52
50 Art. 22(2) NSA Act.
51 NSA, ‘Rapport Annuel 2018’, www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be/jaarverslag-rapport-annuel/fr/
politique-de-respect-des-dispositions-legales-information-et-assistance-dans-l-exercice-des-droits-et-des-
obligations.html.
52 NSA, ‘Plan Stratégique 2019-2025’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/privacycommission/files/
documents/APD_Plan_Strategique_2019-2025.pdf, pp. 22-27.
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Question 10
Any person can submit a complaint to the NSA.53 The NSA has established a template
form on its website.54 Filing a complaint is in principle free of charge.
The legislator has taken into account the NSA’s concern to be able to act selectively in
view of an effective and efficient enforcement policy at every stage of the complaint
procedure.55
– The FrontOffice first examines whether the complaint is admissible.56 The FrontOffice
has a margin of discretion considering the priorities set by the Executive Committee
and the seriousness of the complaint.57 The Front Office may also initiate a mediation
procedure between the parties.58
– The Front Office submits admissible complaints to the Litigation Chamber.59 The
Litigation Chamber can deal with the complaint in two ways: either it chooses a ‘light
procedure’ (i.e. without hearing the parties or presenting their defense) or it chooses
to deal with the merits of the case.60 The Litigation Chamber also has the power to
dismiss the case.61
– The Litigation Chamber can (but is not obliged to) ask the Inspection Service to carry
out an investigation before taking a decision.62 The Inspection Service then submits
an investigation report to the Litigation Chamber.63
An investigation by the NSA can also be triggered in other ways, i.e. without receiving a
complaint. For instance, the Inspection Service may start investigations at its own initiative
or at the request of the Executive Committee.64
53 Art. 58 NSA Act.
54 NSA, ‘Procédures’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/introduire-une-requete-une-plainte.
55 Preparatory works NSA Act, Parl. St. Kamer 2016-17, no. 54 2648/001 (hereinafter “Preparatory works
NSA Act”), p. 51.
56 Art. 60 NSA Act.
57 Preparatory works NSA Act, p. 41.
58 Art. 22(1)(2) NSA Act.
59 Art. 62(1) NSA Act.
60 Preparatory works NSA Act, pp. 51-52. This procedure is criticised in legal doctrine: see L. Kuyken et al,
‘Handleiding bij inspectie door de GBA’, TPP, No. 1, 2019, p. 11.
61 Art. 95(1)(3) and art. 100(1)NSAAct; see for exampleNSA,Decision 09/2019 on themerits of 17December
2019 and NSA, Decision 05/2019 of 23 July 2019.
62 Art. 94(2) NSA Act; Kuyken e.a., 2019, p. 7.
63 Art. 91(1) NSA Act; Preparatory works of the NSA Act, p. 49.
64 Art. 63(1) NSA Act.
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In its strategic plan, the NSA underlines that it does not intend to act only on the basis
of complaints. By contrast, it intends to strive for an open and innovative organisation
with proactivity as one of its core values.65
Question 11
The Litigation Chamber is the NSA’s administrative dispute body and has the power to
take all corrective measures and impose administrative fines as set out in articles 58(2)
and 83 GDPR. In addition, the Litigation Chamber has the power to impose periodic
penalty payments (“astreintes”) and it can decide to publish decisions on its website (which
happens frequently).66
Based on the published decisions of the Litigation Chamber, the Litigation Chamber
has so far imposed different sanctions:
– a warning (e.g. NSA, Decision 04/2019 of 28 May 2019);
– a reprimand (e.g. NSA, Decision 11/2019 on the merits of 25 November 2019);
– an order to prohibit the processing (e.g. NSA, Decision 03/2019 on the merits of 2 April
2019);
– an order to bring the processing operation into compliance with the GDPR (e.g. NSA,
Decision 07/2019 on the merits of 17 September 2019);
– an order to comply with the data subjects’ requests to exercise their rights, including
the right of access and the right to information (e.g. NSA, Decision 03/2019 of 28 May
2019), the right to be forgotten (e.g. NSA, Decision 06/2019 of 17 September 2019)
and the right to rectification (e.g. NSA, Decision No. 01/2019 of 15 May 2019); and
– administrative fines (e.g. NSA, Decision 12/2019 on the merits of 17 December 2019
(15,000 euro)).67
Article 221(2) Framework Act provides that no administrative fines can be imposed on
public authorities. However, a request for annulment of this article is currently pending
before the Constitutional Court in a case initiated by the Federation of Enterprises.68
In addition to the administrative sanctions provided for by the GDPR, the Belgian
legislator has introduced criminal sanctions in the form of inter alia fines ranging from
100 euro to 30,000 euro (to be increased with a multiplication factor of 8), which vary
65 NSA, ‘Plan Stratégique 2019-2025’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/privacycommission/files/
documents/APD_Plan_Strategique_2019-2025.pdf, pp. 20-21.
66 See arts 95 and 100 NSA Act.
67 In three cases, the NSA’s decision was challenged before the Market Court in Brussels. In one particular
case, theMarket Court decided to annul theNSA’s Decision 05/2019 on themerits of 9 July 2019 on grounds
of lack of reasoning and excess of power.
68 CC, No. 7135.
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depending on the nature of the infringement of the GDPR and/or the Framework Act.69
Contrary to administrative fines, these criminal sanctions can be imposed on public
authorities.
Question 12
If a data subject suffers damage as a result of unlawful processing of his personal data, he
can claim compensation.70 In many cases damage resulting from infringements of data
protection law will consist of moral damage.71 Compensation for moral damage can be
granted in kind (e.g. by the publication of the judgment), but a judge may also award a
pecuniary compensation.72
Moral damage is difficult to assess by its nature.73 There are no standard rates for
estimating the damage.74 Most judges estimate the moral damage ex aequo et bono, with
amounts ranging from a symbolic compensation of 1 euro to amounts varying from 500
to 1,250 euro.75 Legal costs will often outweigh the benefit that can be gained from a claim
for compensation, resulting in little case law on the matter.76 In a rare published case of
2015, the court awarded a compensation of 750 euro, estimated ex aequo et bono, to an
employee whose employer had installed a track-and-trace system in his company car
allowing the employer to follow every movement of the employee (even outside working
hours)without sufficiently informing the employee.77 Weare not aware of similar judgments
since the entry into force of the GDPR.
69 Art. 222-230 Framework Act.
70 Art. 216 Framework Act.
71 Y. S. VanDer Sype andA.Vedder, ‘Privacy, werk en internet of things’, Or, No. 5, 2016, p. 124; FRA, ‘Access
to data protection remedies in EU Member States’, Luxembourg, 2013, p. 28.
72 J. Van de Voorde, ‘L’excuse contrainte par justice (l’amende honorable) en droit de la responsabilité belge:
Recherches sur la réparation ou la satisfaction du dommagemoral’, RGAR,No. 2, 2019, p. 15545; E. Verjans,
‘Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid voor schending van persoonlijkheidsrechten’, RW, No. 14, 2013, p.
533.
73 E. Guldix and A. Wylleman, ‘De positie en de handhaving van persoonlijkheidsrechten in het Belgische
privaatrecht’, TPR, No. 4, 1999, p. 1652.
74 A.Hallemans andK.Vranckaert, ‘Aansprakelijkheid onder deAlgemeneVerordeningGegevensbescherming’,
TTP, No. 2, 2018, p. 11.
75 Verjans, 2013, p. 535.
76 Van Der Sype e.a., 2016, p. 124.




A data subject has a right to instruct a non-profit body to file a complaint and to introduce
administrative or judicial proceedings before the NSA and the judiciary on his behalf.78
Possibilities for collective redress for data protection infringements already existed under
Belgian law before the entry into force of the GDPR.79 Groups of consumers and SMEs
can be represented by non-profit organisations or public bodies to bring actions to seek
collective redress for alleged violations of data protection law.80
One recent class action is pending before the Brussels commercial court in the wake
of Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal.81
NGOs, such as the League forHumanRights (“Liga voorMensenrechten”), put pressure
on governments to increase respect for human rights by initiating proceedings before the
Constitutional Court and theCouncil of State. Togetherwith its French counterpart (“Ligue
des Droits Humains”), the League for Human Rights has lodged an appeal before the
Constitutional Court against an act that embeds fingerprint in new identity cards and
against an act holding data retention obligations (see Question 15 below).82 Also the “Ligue
des Droits Humains” has recently filed a complaint demanding the NSA to launch an
investigation into the alleged illegal techniques for mass collection of (sensitive) personal
data used by the behavioral advertising industry.83
Another foundation, ‘TheMinistry of Privacy’, is fighting against the use of fingerprints
on identity cards before the Constitutional Court.84 On 28 January 2020, the foundation
announced more actions against inter alia the use of ANPR cameras in public, smart
electricity meters and smart cities.85
Question 14
The NSA is obliged to carry out its tasks in a spirit of dialogue and consultation with all
public and private actors involved in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons with regard to processing of personal data and involved in consumer
78 Art. 220(1) Framework Act.
79 G. Renier, ‘L’action en réparation collective enmatière de données personnelles après une année d’application
du RGPD’, DCCR, No. 1, 2019, p. 156.
80 Art. XVII.37, 10°/1 Code of Economic Law.
81 Test-Achats, ‘Action collective Facebook’, www.test-achats.be/actions-collectives/facebook.
82 CC, No. 7203.
83 Ligue des Droits Humains, ‘La Ligue des Droits Humains et 13 ONG en Europe déposent plainte contre
les techniques illégales de publicité en ligne’, www.liguedh.be/la-ligue-des-droits-humains-et-13-ong-en-
europe-deposent-plainte-contre-les-techniques-illegales-de-publicite-en-ligne/.
84 CC, No. 7150.
85 See for more information: www.ministryofprivacy.eu/ (in Dutch).
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protection.86 The NSA may be assisted by, or act at the request of, other public authorities.87
In order to achieve cooperation, the NSA may establish committees.88 The NSA can carry
out public enquiries or consultations (such as the recent consultation regarding direct
marketing) in other sectors in order to formulate opinions and recommendations that
serve the interests of data protection.89
In the coming years, it is the NSA’s ambition to collaborate more effectively with other
national and regional players through cooperation agreements and thus to have a broader
view than just the strict privacy landscape.90
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The Belgian Constitutional Court has eagerly applied the EU Charter in its data retention
judgments preceding and following the Tele2/Watson-judgment of the CJEU.91
Quoting extensively the CJEU’s Digital rights-judgment,92 the Constitutional Court
considered in 2015 that the Belgian Act of 30 July 2013 on electronic communications that
transposed the Data Retention Directive (hereinafter “2013 Act”), contained the same
flaws and held that the 2013 Act violated articles 7 and 8 EU Charter.93
Following the annulment of the 2013 Act, the Belgian legislator introduced a new act
in 2016.94 This new act imposed more safeguards for retention and more limitations to
access to data, but nevertheless introduced again a general blanket data retention obligation
with no differentiation ratione personae, rationae materiae or ratione temporis. Seven
86 Art. 52(1, first section NSA Act.
87 Art. 52(1), second section NSA Act.
88 Art. 53(1) NSA Act; Preparatory works NSA Act, p. 37.
89 Art. 52(2) NSA Act. On 10 February 2020, the NSA published its new guidelines on direct marketing: NSA,
Recommendation no. 01/2020 of 17 January 2020, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/
privacycommission/files/documents/Recommandation_01-2020_marketing_direct.pdf.
90 NSA, ‘Plan Stratégique 2019-2025’, www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/sites/privacycommission/files/
documents/APD_Plan_Strategique_2019-2025.pdf, pp. 29-30.
91 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Joint Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson, Peter Brice, Geoffrey Lewi
(Tele2 and Watson), [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (hereinafter “the Tele2/Watson-judgment”).
92 Joint Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital rights, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (hereinafter “Digital Rights-
judgment”).
93 CC 11 June 2015, No. 84/2015, in particular Rec. B.11.




months after the adoption of this Act, the CJEU rendered its Tele2/Watson-judgment,
setting new criteria for data retention obligations.95
A new series of requests before the Constitutional Court seeking the annulment of the
2016 Act followed after said judgment.96 In its preliminary ruling of 19 July 2018, the
Constitutional Court decided to stay its decision and ask three preliminary questions to
the CJEU, summarized below:97
1. Must article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, read in conjunction with article 6 Charter
and articles 7, 8 and 52(1) Charter, be interpreted as precluding national legislation
such as that at issue, which lays down a blanket data retention obligation for national
legislation whose objective is not only the investigation, detection and prosecution of
serious criminal offences but also the safeguarding of national security, the defence of
the territory and of public security, the investigation, detection and prosecution of
offences other than serious crime or the prevention of the prohibited use of electronic
communication systems, or the attainment of another objective identified by article
23(1) GDPR and which, furthermore, is subject to specific guarantees in that legislation
in terms of data retention and access to those data?
2. Must article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, in conjunction with articles 4, 7, 8, 11 and
52(1) Charter be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue,
which lays down a general data retention obligation if the object of that legislation is,
in particular, to comply with the positive obligations borne by the authority under
articles 4 and 8 Charter, consisting in providing for a legal framework which allows
the effective criminal investigation and the effective punishment of sexual abuse of
minors and which permits the effective identification of the perpetrator of the offence,
even where electronic communications systems are used?
3. If, on the basis of the answers to the first or the second question, the Constitutional
Court should conclude that the contested law fails to fulfil one or more obligations
arising under the provisions referred to in these questions, might it maintain on a
temporary basis the effects of the 2016 Act in order to avoid legal uncertainty and to
enable the data previously collected and retained to continue to be used for the objectives
pursued by the law?98
95 Case 203/15 and 698/15, Tele2 and Watson, Rec. 106-111; G. Formici, ‘ECJ, the floor is yours! The never
ending story between Data Retention and Right to Privacy’, 28 March 2019, www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/
blog/ecj-the-floor-is-yours-the-never-ending-story-between-data-retention-and-right-to-privacy/.
96 CC, Nos. 6590, 6597, 6599 and 6601.
97 CC 19 July 2018, No. 96/2018, Rec. B.21 and B.24. F. Verbruggen, S. Royer and H. Severijns, ‘Reconsidering
the blanked-data-retention-taboo, for human rights’ sake? BelgianConstitutional Court offers CJEU chance
to explain its puzzling Tele2 Sverige AB-decision’, 1 October 2018, www.europeanlawblog.eu/2018/10/01/
reconsidering-the-blanket-data-retention-taboo-for-human-rights-sake/.
98 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Belgian Constitutional Court of 19 July 2018, Case C-520/18
Ordre des barreaux francophones and germanophone and Others.
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On 15 January 2020, the Advocate General delivered his opinion on the preliminary
questions and answered the first two questions affirmatively while leaving room under the
third question for the national courts to decide on the consequences of data retained under
annulled legislation.99 It is now up to the Court of Justice to decide.
99 Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in Case 520/18, Ordre des barreaux francophones





Bulgaria has had a Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) since 2002, even before Bulgaria
joined the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (The Convention No 108).
Our legislation has put serious requirements for lawfulness in data processing, protection
of the data and not using personal data information when the purpose of the processing
could be reached without it.
Both the PDPA and practice of the national supervising authority (Commission for
Personal Data Protection, hereinafter CPDP) and of the courts also follow the main
principles of personal data protection laid down inDirective (EC) 95/46 and in theGeneral
Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) nowadays. The national legislator has
chosen to consolidate in one act those of the items of the GDPR where a nation approach
is required and the text of Directive (EC) 2016/680.
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
1.1.
OurPDPAdoes not deviate from the EuropeanCommission guidance on direct application
of theGDPR and its reconciliationwith the issues which theGDPR leaves to the discretion
of and legal solution offered by each Member State.1 Following that the national legislator
adapts the existing law to the new requirements of the GDPR. First of all, the redundant
provisions as well as those which were not in compliance with the GDPR have been
removed.
The national legislator accepts the progressive approach to complying with EU data
protection legislation by including the GDPR concept and the rules of Directive (EC)
* Partner at Simeonov & Dermendjiev Law Firm with practice areas on arbitration, administrative and civil
litigation, regulatory matters in data protection, ecology, aviation, sports, public procurement, EU law.
1 PDPA in English: https://www.cpdp.bg/en/index.php?p=element&aid=1194. All webpages referred towere
visited 1 February 2020.
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2016/2802 in one common legal act. Despite the difference between the legal nature of both
EU law acts, Regulation andDirective, such approach is logical and successful in principle,
as well as referring to legislative technique philosophy. To gather in one single legal act
the common data protection rules and to underline the specific requirements because of
the nature of the processes referred to in Directive (EC) 2016/680 seems as codifying the




The first group of national legal instruments concerns the issues where the GDPR gives
the opportunity to or requires a Member State to create its national solutions. Such spheres
are:
1.2.1.1.
Rules on processing of national identification number:
Actually, the personal identification numberwhichwas created as a really uniquemark
to identify any person and includes in itself information about date of birth, area of origin
and gender, is one of the least secret personal data in our daily life. Especially if one is an
active person who is a partner in a company, possesses real estates, etc. So much so that
in 2018, a discussion about the personal identification number not to be the only means
of identifying the user started. Nowadays, the PDPA permits an information containing
personal identification number to be available only if a special law explicitly requires public
access to it. Otherwise, the controllers providing services by electronic means are required
to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal
identification number is not the only means of identifying the user (in this sense: article
25g § 2 PDPA).
1.2.1.2.
Data processing for journalistic purposes and for the purposes of academic, artistic or
literary expression: the PDPA requires the freedom of expression and the right to
information to respect the data subject privacy.
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal




In order to boost finding of “the golden mean”, the national legislator has put several
criteria on the basis of which the evaluation if the relevant data processing has a real value
for the society should be done, e.g. is it of public interest or it is just a piece of information
which is interesting for the members of the public, i.e. it has the characteristics of gossip.
The criteria will be further analysed when answering Question No 8.
1.2.1.3.
Certain aspects of data processing by employers/appointing authorities: the legal
instruments applied in this area intend to reach the balance between the legitimate interest
of employers or appointing authorities and the fundamental rights and freedom of
employees. The principle adopted by the legislator is that employees should be informed
about each of the measures/systems/organization which are applied by the employer or
appointing authority in favor of their legitimate interest which should not exceed the
nature of the activity, special needs and available resources of the enterprises.
There are special rules concerning collecting, storing and returning and/or erasing or
destroying the originals or notary certified copies of any documents candidates are requested
to submit in staff selection procedures. The storage period is limited to six months unless
the applicant has given consent for a longer period of storage.
When the period of time expires, the employer or appointing authority shall erase or
destroy the documents containing personal data unless otherwise provided for by a special
law.
1.2.1.4.
Despite the GDPR principle being inapplicable to the deceased persons’ data, the national
legislator has provided for rules regarding the processing of personal data of deceased
persons. PDPA requires a legal basis for the deceased persons’ data processing and the
controllers or processors are obliged to take the appropriate measures so that the rights
and freedoms of others or a public interest should not be adversely affected. The persons
authorized to get access to personal data of a deceased person, including by providing a
copy, are the heirs of the person or other persons with a legitimate interest.
1.2.1.5.
Data processing for National Archiving Fund purposes is found as processing in public
interest and articles 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 GDPR and shall not apply in such cases (that
exception is under article 25k of PDPA).
In the case where personal data is processed for statistical purposes, articles 15, 16, 18
and 21 GDPR shall not apply.3




The national legislator finds data processing for humanitarian purposes as lawful in case
it is operated by public bodies or humanitarian organisations, as well as when processing
concerns cases of disaster within the meaning of the Disaster Protection Act.4
In the case of such processing purposes articles 12-21 and article 34 of GDPR are not
applicable.
1.2.1.7.
Obligations in large-scale processing are seen in article 25e of PDPA:
The data controller or processor shall adopt and apply rules for large scale personal
data processing or for a large scale systematic monitoring of publicly accessible areas,
including video surveillance, if the controller or processor implements appropriate technical
and organisational measures for safeguarding the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
The rules on large scale systematic monitoring of publicly accessible areas shall state the
legal grounds for setting up a monitoring system, its scope and means, storage period of
the information records and their erasure, the individuals’ right of access, the provision
of information to the public about the monitoring, as well as restrictions with regard to
the access of third parties.
In paragraph 2 of the same article, the national legislator obliges the National
Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”) to issue guidelines to data controllers and
processors for the performance of the obligations detailed above and make them available
on the NSA internet site.
PDPA says that
“Large-scale (processing operations) shall be monitoring and/or processing of
personal data of a significant or unlimited number of data subjects or amount
of personal data, where the core activities of the controller or the processor,
including the means by which these activities are carried out, consist of such
operations”.
1.3.
The second group of specific national legal solutions concerns the restrictions permitted
under article 23 of the GDPR: the way and the terms to execute the rights under articles





The third group of legal instruments concerns the transition of Directive (EC) 2016/680.
There are certain differences in the principles adopted by the Directive. For example, the
principle of transparency is not the leading one in the case of data processing for the
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or
execution of criminal penalties. The storage period regarding those data differs also from
the period for storage of personal data in the case of regular processing.
Question 2
Actually, even now the Charter is a certain exotic instrument in comparison with the
European Convention on Human Right (hereinafter “ECHR”). As far as the Convention
is an international legal instrument it is easy to find the spot of its application. But the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter) supposes
to be of limited application (only within the scope of EU law), so our national legislator
does not make very deep differentiation between the “respect for private and family life”
(article 7 of the Charter) and “personal data protection” (article 8) as far as the
understanding of the national law is that the institute of “personal data” includes the
privacy of the personal and family relationships.
So, our national legislation and practice accept and rely on the common, GDPR’s,
principles and rules for personal data protection and our national law on the PDPA does
not include any special provision to respect private and family life. On the other hand,
private and family life privacy is stated to be one of the criteria in search for the balance
between the freedom of expression and the right to information and the right of personal
data protection in article 25h of Personal Data Protection Act. In article 25h, paragraph
2, item 2, the national legislator requires that “the impact that the disclosure of the personal
data or the publishing of the data would have on the data subject’s privacy and reputation”
has to be evaluated searching for the balance aforementioned.




The national jurisprudence and the practice of the NSA usually interpret those principles
in the most common way, as it is required by the EU law and the case law of the Court of
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Justice of the European Union. The understanding of the NSA and the courts for an
eventual difference or nuance in the interpretation, could by noticedwhen the requirements
of the basic principles of the PDPA should be applied together with the requirements of
other special laws as Anti-money Laundering Measures Act, etc. when even the purpose
of data processing is different, the controller has the obligation to collectmore data because
it fulfils its obligation under that law.
Other examples are Occupational Health Authorities, who maintain health records by
virtue of their own regulations and not because they have been assigned to do so by the
administrator.
The NSA follows the same philosophy in its Opinion on the Draft of the Protection
and Development of Culture Act where the NSA finds that collecting data of young people
beneficiaries of E-cards for cultural activities is a fair processing: after the law adoption
such collection will be based on the controller’s (Ministry of Culture) legitimate interest
or its legal obligation (it depends on the point of view).5
3.2.
The constant practice of the NSA calls for a minimalist approach to the use of personal
data, especially the data of those individuals who are not public persons and have no direct
relation on a debate of public interest. The exception to allowing deviations from such an
approach is when that approach would impede the exercise of the right to information.6
Question 4
4.1.
Obviously, the controllers find the “consent” of the data subject as one of the most easily
obtainable reasons for data processing. Many of them put themselves in the stalemate of
not obtaining the consent requested (by the subject) and thus unable to process the data
lawfully, although there are other grounds for processing for the same purpose for which
they requested consent. In order to avoid that Catch 22 the NSA has published Guidelines
where the situations when consent should not be required are pointed out and explained
in detail.7 Those Guidelines were published after 25 May 2018 and up to that moment
quite few controllers had already got in the positionwaiting for data subject consent, which
will probably never come.
5 That NSA Decision (unfortunately, all NSA documents are only in Bulgarian) is published on: https://
www.cpdp.bg/index.php?p=element_view&aid=2085.
6 NSA Decision: https://www.cpdp.bg/index.php?p=element_view&aid=2186.
7 The Guidelines: https://www.cpdp.bg/?p=element_view&aid=2117.
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So, from a formal point of view, any further processing of data for the purpose for
which consent was previously sought should be considered illegal, even if another ground
for processing the data for the same purpose exists. The same “dead end” situation is
encountered when the controller had started to process the data on the consent of the data
subject although other grounds had existed and then later, the data subject decided to
withdraw its consent.
It is evident that “the consent” is the most uncertain ground for data processing: the
lawfulness of controllers’ activities depends on the data subject’s position/mood/emotions.
However, the case is not this when data processing is based on the controller’s “legitimate
interest”.
4.2.
There is no legal definition of “legitimate interest” but the courts give the following
definition: in order to be recognized as “legitimate” the source and the purpose of the
interest should be to satisfy a particular human need, to be admissible by the law, i.e. legal
remedies are provided for its enforcement/satisfaction (subjective rights), and in case such
rights are not expressively provided for, they are admissible in the light of the general
principles of law.
Obviously there are cases where the legitimate interest is expressly defined by the law
and the controller should not hesitate to proceed with data. But if legitimate interest does
not exist by law but because of the concrete situation, then an additional evaluation is
required. The court is competent to make such an evaluation. The main criteria should be
whether the data processingwould be in favour of revealing the objective truth, respectively
to the benefit of either of the parties. A simple example of that is when at the time of court
proceedings one of the parties would like to present information about the counterparty
before the court, which means “personal data” and for its dissemination any consent is
required. Surely, the counterparty will not give her/his consent. So, the deciding court
should assess whether that information has its “added value” for the party within the frame
of the process. Then the court could permit or deny the information to be obtained by the
party concerned.
Specifically, in Bulgarian law, the order of receiving it officially, i.e. legally, is in article
186 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for the possibility, after a positive
assessment of admissibility and relevance, that the determining court issues a court
certificate whereby the institution having the requested data cooperates and provides them.
It should be underlined in this context that it is not enough for the controller to have the
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information she wishes to present before the court or any third party at her disposal, but
she needs a legal ground to disseminate that information.8
Question 5
Actually, there was no debate and the new PDPA does not pay any special attention to
personal data processing within digital content, particularly of eventual
“counter-performance”.
“Counter performance” is easily visible during the process of labour contract signing.
Usually, employers require a lot more personal data than they really need to hire the
candidate and to prepare and sign the labour contract. An example of such unreasonable
requirements whose fulfilment is a condition sine qua non for the employment relationship
to be established are the following requirements of the employers: (i) number of personal
identification card or passport although the law (Labour Code and Ordinance No 4/May
1993 for the documents necessary to sign a labour contract) requires only a personal
identification number; and/or (ii) “criminal record certificate” although there is not any
special law which requires such information for the position the candidate applies for;
and/or (iii) the employers keep the job history book of the employees in the
company’s/enterprise’s archive office: the job history book, being a private document of
each person where all his/her jobs salaries, eventual penalties and praises are enlisted, and
as such its storage should be with the holder. Neither the law nor the Ordinance require
its storage with the employer but it is a “common practice” to leave it with the employer
when signing the employment contract; and if the employee refuses, the employment
contract could be denied by the employer, at least that was the situation before 25 May
2018.
In most of the cases such unfounded document requests are placed by the employers
unwillingly, due to low levels of GDPR awareness.
Question 6
6.1.
In article 52, paragraph 1 of the national PDPA the Bulgarian legislator has accepted a
wording of the presumptive ban of article 22, paragraph 1 from the GDPR which allows
the data subject to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including
8 The Decision on that case is Resolution No 10776 from 10.07.2019 on administrative case No 595/2018 at




profiling, if such does not produce adverse legal effects concerning him or her. Admitting
this wording, the refinement “unless this is provided for in Union law or in the legislation
of the Republic of Bulgaria” sounds lik even if potential “adverse effects” could occur,
automatic data processing and profiling is acceptable if either law allows it. Surely, the
characteristic “adverse” could be interpreted quite widely and in a biased way.
6.2.
In article 52, paragraph 2 of the PDPA, the national legislator has permitted an automated
processing even on the special categories of personal data (article 9 GDPR) as long as
suitable measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms and legitimate interests of the data
subject are in place.
6.3.
In any case, an impact assessment is required as the minimum elements of the assessment
process are listed in article 64, paragraph 2 of the PDPA: (i) a general description of the
envisaged processing operations; (ii) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms
of data subjects; (iii) the measures envisaged to address the risks, safeguards, security
measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate
compliance with this Chapter taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of
data subjects and other persons concerned. Discrimination impact is prohibited in any
case.9
6.4.
The controller and the processor are required to keep logs for at least the following
processing operations: collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure including transfers,
combination and erasure, so that those logs could be used to establish the justification,
date and time of such operations and, as far as possible, the identification of the person
who consulted or disclosed personal data, and the identity of the recipients of such personal
data. The logs shall be used solely for the verification of the lawfulness of the processing,
self-monitoring, ensuring data integrity and data security and criminal proceedings. The
time limits for storage and archiving of the logs should be established by the controller or
processor.10
6.5.
There are certain stages of automated data processing where strict control is required by
the law to be applied by controller and/or processor as a measure to protect the rights and
9 Art. 52, para. 4 PDPA.
10 Art. 64 PDPA.
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freedoms of natural persons. Those areas are: (i) equipment and data access (no
unauthorised person access to processing equipment used for processing of personal data
and/or to data not covered by the personal access authorization); (ii) data media control
(authorised reading, copying, modification or removal of data media only); (iii) storage
control (prevent the unauthorised input of personal data and the unauthorised inspection,
modification or deletion of stored personal data); (iv) users control (authorised persons
using data communication equipment only); (v)communication control (ensure that it is
possible to verify and establish the bodies to which personal data have been or may be
transmitted or made available using data communication equipment); (vi) input control
(ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which personal data have
been input into automated processing systems and when and by whom the personal data
were input); (vii) transmit control (prevent the unauthorised reading, copying,modification
or deletion of personal data during transfers of personal data or during transportation of
data media).
6.6.
The national legislator provides that the rules of processing of personal data for the purposes
of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, execution of
criminal penalties, safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public order and
security (Charter VIII of the PDPA) must be applied in case of thoroughly or partly
automatic processing and profiling (article 43 of the PDPA). One might say that such




Actually, the right to erase is a source of dispute almost only within the context of
journalists’ activities where it is a great challenge to find the balance between right to
privacy of the personal life, freedomof expression and right to information. Unfortunately,
in this case the “balance” is not a physical category and it is not concentrated in one single
cross-point. Actually, it is the interest of the individuals not their rights that are the leading
criterion; and sometimes it is the one who is stronger who wins, not the rightful one.
Detailed considerations are given below, in item 8.
7.2.
The right of erasure is an obligation for the controller under the hypothesis of 25a of the
PDPA where the data controller or the processor have been provided by with personal
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data without legal basis pursuant to article 6(1) GDPR or contrary to the principles under
Article 5 of the same Regulation, they shall return such data within a period of one month
after having become aware of it or, if this is impossible or would involve disproportionate
efforts, shall erase or destroy the data. The erasure and destruction shall be documented.
7.3.
In case of incorrect data even if the processing is for the purposes of the prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, including the safeguarding against, and the prevention of, threats to public order
and security, the data should be rectified or erased by the controller or by the recipient in
cases of data transmission.
7.4.
In case the law says nothing, the controller is competent to determine the data storage
period. In case the controller decides the storage period to be extended, a special written
and motivated decision should be issued.
7.5.
Even though the understanding that “the right to erase” is not an absolute right, there are
enough strong sanctions in case the controller denies unreasonably to erase the data. The
data controller shallmaintain a record of the categories of personal data processing activities
which shall contain where possible, the envisaged time limits for erasure of the different
categories of data.
7.6.
The cases where the controller is obliged to erase the data are provided in article 56,
paragraph 2 of the PDPA: (i) where the data collected by competent authorities for the
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences
or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against, and the
prevention of, threats to public order and security are processing other than the purpose
for which that data have been originally collected; (ii) where the processing is not necessary
for the exercise of powers by a competent authority for the purposes referred to in previous
sentence and where such processing is not provided for in Union law or in a statutory
instrument which defines the purposes of the processing and the categories of personal
data which are processed.; (iii) where the processing concerns personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s
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sex life or sexual orientation without that being strictly necessary, if there are appropriate
safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject, and it is provided for in Union
law or in the legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria.11
7.7.
The controller is authorised to deny erasure of the data where this is necessary in order to
(i) avoid obstructing official or legal checks, investigations or procedures; (ii) avoid
prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences
or the execution of criminal penalties; (iii) protect public order and security; (iv) protect
national security; (v) protect the rights and freedoms of others.
7.8.
The “right to erase” is almost absolute in the relations between the data controller and the
data processor as the last one is obliged to erase the data if the controller requires that
without the option to refuse unless the conditions and procedure for the processing are
provided for in Union law or in the legislation of the Republic of Bulgaria.
7.9.
The right to erase could be executed by theNSA, respectively the Inspectorate, in exercising
supervision, the supervising authorities have power to order the controller or processor
to bring data processing operations into compliance with the applicable provisions,




This is one of the most controversial matters when it comes to personal data processing.
Both law and the practice are used to talk about the balance between the freedom of
expression and the right to information on the one hand and the privacy of personal and
family life on the other hand, as main criteria to find data processing lawful; however,
everyone is quiet when it comes to the characteristics of that mythical balance.
8.2.
When it comes to Bulgarian legislation concerning data processing for journalistic purposes
and for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, the GDPR does not
11 Art. 51 PDPA.
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influence much the main principle adopted by the Bulgarian legislator in 2002, when the
PDPA was first drafted. What is novel here, is that the amendment introduces criteria on
the basis of which it should be assessed if the above mentioned balance exists or not.
8.3.
The criteria under article 25h, paragraph 2 of the PDPA are as follows:
i. Nature of the personal data;
ii. The impact that the disclosure of the personal data or the publishing of the data would
have on the data subject’s privacy and reputation;
iii. The circumstances under which the personal data became known to the controller;
iv. The character and nature of the statement under which the rights of freedom of
expression are exercised;
v. The significance of the disclosure of personal data or the publishing of the data for the
clarification of a matter of public interest;
vi. Taking into consideration whether the data subject occupies a position under Article
6 of the Counter-Corruption and Unlawfully Acquired Assets Forfeiture Act or is a
person who, because of her/his activity and public status enjoys lesser protection of
her/his privacy, or whose actions impact the society;
vii. Taking into considerationwhether the data subject has contributedwith her/his actions
for the disclosure of her/his personal data and/or of information about her/his private
and family life;
viii. The purpose, content, form and consequence of the statementwhen the rights pursuant
paragraph (1) are exercised;
ix. The compliance of the statement for exercising the rights of freedom of the expression
and the right of information with the fundamental rights of citizens;
x. Other circumstances relevant to the case.
8.4.
At the moment of drafting the present report there is not any court jurisprudence on these
criteria application and/or evaluation. There is not any opinion of the NSA either. But
there is a Request signed by fifty members of the Parliament asking The Constitutional
Court to find those criteria in contradiction to the national Constitution and ECHR. BAEL
has been invited to present an opinion on this request and the position declared by our
Association was one in defense of the criteria. The mainline of our position is that the
information journalists make available should be really of great importance for society,
for its judgments and knowledge and not just a piece of information that is interesting for
the people, e.g. do not disseminate any information only because it makes the circulation
of the newspaper high. There are a lot of examples in our reality of unnecessary private
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details made available to the public despite those details being irrelevant to the activity
and/or position of the public person the society should be informed about.
8.5.
One of the latest principal NSA opinions on these matters concerns data processing by
the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria when publishing press releases and
providing information for journalistic purposes.
The position of the NSA is the following:
“The publication of personal data of accused persons in pre-trial proceedings on
the websites of the prosecutor’s offices, as well as their provision to the media for
journalistic purposes, is lawful when there is a legal obligation or there is an
overriding public interest”. In cases where for the public purpose it is impossible
or inappropriate to publish the information in an anonymous or pseudonymized
form, then the indication of the name, position or place of work of the accused
would be sufficient to achieve public awareness, and the publication of a personal
identification number and any relations with third parties who are out of the
process, etc. would be excessive. As a general rule, the personal data of other
participants in pre-trial proceedings, such as witnesses, experts or related to these
categories of third parties, etc., should not be published or otherwise disclosed,
as long as there is no legal obligation to do so or overriding public interest. An
exception could be made with respect to persons holding high public positions
within the meaning of Art. 6 of the Anti-Corruption Law and the Forfeiture of
Illegally Acquired Property or another Person, which by its nature has an effect
on the public, or where the publication of the information protects the vital
interests of the data subject. In all cases of publishing personal data of participants
in pre-trial proceedings or providing them to the media, the principles for
processing personal data in Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular
the principles of minimizing data in order to achieve the objective, accuracy of
data and limitation of storage time, should be applied.”12
Though this is one of the most specific and detailed opinions of the NSA referred to data
processing for journalistic purposes, it uses general expressions as “overriding public
interest” and “effect on the public” which leave the final evaluation in the hands and
conscious of the author of the press release.





The national legislator provides for the following exemptions under article 85, paragraph
2 GDPR: articles 6, 9, 10, 30, 34 and Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Another
exemption is that of article 25c the PDPA. Actually, this provision concerns the rights of
data subjects under the age of 14 and requires the administrator to make sure that consent
for data processing from the parent with parental rights or by a legal guardian is given. So,
by this provision even the privacy of a little child could be less important than the freedom
of expression and right of information. This report finds that exemption excessive and
unfair. Even though the place of the following comment ismisplaced, the national legislative
decision that only persons below 14 are to be considered “children” is at least strange
having in mind that according to our national law persons up to 14 years old are infants,
between 14 and 18 are minors (and their civil rights continue to be exercised with parental
consent) and only after 18 do they receive full rights. So, the legal decision not to require
parental consent for data processing concerning children of all ages for journalistic purposes
is not safe for children and for their future as a whole.
8.7.
Where data processing is for journalistic purposes and for the purposes of academic, artistic
or literary expression, the data controller or processor may deny the data subjects, fully
or partially the exercise of the rights pursuant articles 12-21 GDPR.13
8.8.
The autonomyof data processing for journalistic purposes and for the purposes of academic,
artistic or literary expression, is fully protected with the provision of paragraph 4 of article
25h the PDPA: “the exercise of the powers of NSA pursuant to Article 58 (1) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 shall not affect the secrecy of information sources”.
8.9.
Another group of exemptions are provided for by the national legislator where personal
data are processed for the purposes of creating a photographic or audio-visual work by
means of capturing the image of a person in the course of the public activity or in a public
place: in those cases article 6, articles 12-21, and articles 30-34 GDPR.
13 Art. 25h, para. 3, point 2 PDPA.
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Thenational supervisory authority is theCommission for PersonalData Protection (CPDP).
It is created as independent supervisory authority which protects the individuals with
regard to processing of their personal data and access to these data, as well as the supervision
on the compliance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and with national legislation. Surely,
the CPCP provides assistance with the implementation of the state policy in the personal
data protection field.
9.1.2.
There is an “alternative” supervising authority provided for in the PDPA - the Inspectorate
of the Supreme Judicial Council (The Inspectorate) – which exercises supervision and
ensures compliancewith Regulation (EU) 2016/679, with the PDPAandwith the statutory
instruments in the field of personal data protection upon the processing of personal data
by the courts when acting in their judicial capacity and by the prosecution and the
investigating authorities when acting in the judicial capacity for the purposes of prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal
penalties. Where the courts and the prosecutor’s office and the investigation’s office act
as employer the competent supervising authority is the CPDP.
9.2.
The CPDP consists of a Chairperson and four members who are elected by the National
Assembly after a nomination by the Council of Ministers for a five-year term and may be
elected for one more term. The Commission adopts decisions by a majority of the total
number of its members. The meetings of the Commission are open to the public. The
Commission may decide to hold closed meetings. The CPDP reports its activity to the
National Assembly by 31st March each year.
Eligible to bemembers of the Commission are Bulgarian citizens who hold a university
degree in information science or in law or hold amaster’s degree in information technology
and have not less than ten years working experience. Surely, the candidates should not
been sentenced and/or have conflict of interests working another job instead of scientific
research or teaching. A qualified lawyer who meets the requirements under Paragraphs




The Commission fulfils the tasks pursuant to Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Other duties of the CPDP are to analyse and exercise supervision and to ensure compliance
with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, with PDPA and with the statutory instruments in the
personal data protection field, except for the cases which concern issues within the
framework of Directive (EC) 2016/680 (in which the Inspectorate with Supreme Judicial
Council is the competent supervisory authority). TheCPDP is competent to issue secondary
legislation acts in the personal data protection field, including instructions, guidelines,
recommendations and best practices in connection with personal data protection. The
CPDP ensures the implementation of the decisions of the European Commission in the
personal data protection field and the implementation of the legally binding decisions of
the European Data Protection Board under article 65 GDPR also. The CPDP participates
in international cooperation with other personal data protection authorities and
international organisations on personal data protection issues and in the negotiations and
the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on matters within its competence.
The CPDP is competent to organise, coordinate and provide personal data protection
training.
Surely, the CPDP is the competent body to exercise the powers pursuant to Article 58
of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
9.4.
9.4.1.
The Chairperson and the members of the CPDP exercises control by means of prior
consultation, inspections and joint operations in compliance with Regulation 2016/679
and with PDPA, especially in cases where data are processed for the performance of a task
carried out in public interest, including processing in relation to social protection and
public health. In such a case, the CPCD may authorise the processing before the period
referred toArticle 36 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 expires. The prior consultation shall
take place pursuant Article 36 (2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Inspections will be conducted on the initiative of the CPDP, at the request of
stakeholders, or after an alert has been submitted.Where there is a need, any expert opinion
is allowed.
9.4.2.
The CPDP conducts accreditation of certification bodies in pursuant Regulation (EU)
2016/679 on the basis of the requirements laid down by the CPCD or by the European
Data Protection Board. The accreditation is issued in accordance with Article 43 (2) of
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 for a period of five years and may be renewed. The certification
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criteria, mechanisms and procedures, seals and marks are laid down in an Ordinance
adopted by the CPDP. The Ordinance shall be promulgated in the State Gazette. As of
September 2019 no such Ordinance has been issued.
9.4.3.
The CPDP approves codes of conduct by sector and field of action pursuant to Article 40
of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Bodies formonitoring the codes of conduct will be authorised
by the CPDP, with compliance of Article 41 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
9.5.
9.5.1.
The CPDP maintains the following public registers: (i) of data controllers and processors
which have designated data protection officers; (ii) of accredited certification bodies; (iii)
of codes of conduct pursuant Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
9.5.2.
The following registers maintained by the CPDP are not public: (i) of the infringements
of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and the PDPA, aswell as of themeasures taken in accordance
with the exercise of the powers referred to in Article 58 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679;
and the (ii) register of the notifications of personal data breaches under Article 33 of
Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
9.6.
The CPDP is a state budget financed legal person. Its Chairperson is a first level spender
which means that the President of the CPDP is authorised to spend the money at its own
discretion but within the frames laid down by the law. For example, there are special law
provisions on how the monthly remuneration of the Chairperson and the CPDP members
should be formed: the members of the Commission shall receive basic monthly
remuneration equivalent to 2.5 average monthly wages received under labour and civil
service contract in accordance with the information provided by the National Statistical
Institute as the basic monthly remuneration shall be recalculated every three months,
taking into consideration the average monthly wage for the previous three months. The
Chairperson of the Commission shall receive a monthly remuneration which is 30 per
cent higher than the basic monthly remuneration of the members of the CPDP. Up to
September 2019 the officially declared (by National Statistical Institute) average
remuneration is BGN 1253 or EUR 637.
The CPDP has its own income, different from the state budget funds. Such are the fees
charged for the training organized by the CPDP and certificates issued, the income of the
172
Ana Velkova
fines imposed by the CPDP and upheld by the court, European Union financing
programmes and projects, etc.
Question 10
10.1.
In cases of infringement of their rights pursuant the GDPR and the national PDPA, the
data subjects shall have the right to bring the infringement before the NSA (both the CPDP
or The Inspectorate) within six months after having become aware of the infringement
but no later than two years after.
The NSA shall inform the complainant of the progress of the complaint or of the result
within three months after the infringement has been brought to the attention of it. This
way there is not a dead line in which the NSA shall issue its decision. So, it supposes such
a term should be reasonable.
10.2.
The decision issued by NSA may apply the measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and
(j) of Article 58 (2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 or in Items 3, 4 and 5 of Article 80 (1)
and, in addition to or instead of them, the NSA may impose an administrative fine in
accordance with Article 83 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and under the PDPA.
Where the complaint is obviously unfounded or excessive, the NSA may adopt a
decision to dismiss the complaint.
The decision of the NSA is subject to appeal pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Code within 14 days of receipt.
10.3.
The complaint to the Commissionmay be submitted by a letter, fax or by electronicmeans
under the procedure of the Electronic Document and Electronic Trust Services Act. No
action shall be taken on anonymous complaints and on complaints which are not signed
by the complainant or by a legal or authorised representative.
It is not obligatory to bring the infringement before the NSA: the data subject may
appeal against any actions or acts of the data controller and processor directly before the
court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Code.
The court is the only competent body to decide on compensation for the damage
suffered as a result of an unlawful processing of personal data from the data controller or
processor. The NSA is not authorised to issue decisions on that matter. So, if the data




But once proceedings before theNSAhave been started, the data subjectmay not bring
a violation to the attention of the court.
10.4.
Where a decision to implement a binding decision of the European Data Protection Board
is required to be adopted, Articles 263 and 267 of the TFEU shall apply accordingly.
Question 11
11.1.
There are no special additional sanctions adopted by the Bulgarian PDPA than fines and
compulsory measures provided by the GDPR.
The measures referred to in article 58 items (a) to (g) and (j) of the GDPR and the
measures referred to in article 80 (1) items 3, 4 and 5 are applicable to any violation of
personal data protection. The specific measure, surely, depends on the background of the
case in question and on the Commission’s evaluation about the facts and their impact.
11.2.
The national legislator differentiates the infringements which are subject to administrative
fines or pecuniary sanction according to article 83, paragraphs 4 and 5 from certain other
infringements which will be subject to a much lower fine that those in the GDPR (article
86 the PDPA: the size of the fine or pecuniary sanction is no more than BGN 5000, e.g. a
bit more than EUR 2 500).
Even though the PDPA does not provide it explicitly, the practice of the NSA shows
that very often only a fine/pecuniary sanction or only a compulsory administrativemeasure
(those under article 58, paragraph 2) is imposed by the Commission.
11.3.
According to the Rules on the activity of the Commission, adopted in August 2019, the
compulsory administrative measures under article 58 paragraph 2, article 80, paragraph
1, point 3, 4 and 5 shall apply to: (i) consideration of a complaint against a personal data
controller under article 38 of the PDPA; (ii) carrying out the control activity of the
Commission under article 12 of the PDPA including and when a signal is received; (ii)
supervision of the commission under article 34, paragraph 4, article 42, paragraph 7, second




By the beginning of this century the national jurisprudence strictly followed the
understanding that intangible harm is inherent only to individuals. Only in the last five–six
years have the courts timidly started to recognize legal entities as entitled to bear intangible
harms. But in both cases, individuals and legal entities, the intangible harms are calculated
by the court only on the basis of “inner conviction” of the judge-rapporteur or of the panel.
“Inner conviction” is one of the basic principles in making the decision according to our
national law (art. 12 of Civil Procedure Code).
There is not any methodology whatsoever, neither in a public legal act nor in any
documentmeant for internal use of the judges to establish evaluation criteria. In a common
mode the witnesses are those who “decide” the case: the only source of information about
the emotions and negative consequences passed by the claimant are their (witnesses’)
statements. Usually, in such proceedings, only the claimant is allowed to summonwitnesses
about her/his emotions and non-material consequences resulting from thewrong harmful
activity of the respondent.
Surely, the first step is to assert that there is something illegal done by the respondent.
But once that fact is proved, the information of the possible harms comes from the
witnesses. The Respondent witnesses are not allowed because of the understanding (the
principle) that “the negative claims are not subject of proof”. This way the respondent is
deprived of the opportunity to rebut the testimonies of the claimant witnesses by other
witnesses’ testimony; the only step the respondent could rely on is the cross-examination.
Question 13
13.1.
Nowadays, there are no peculiar activities or role of NGO’s in the data protection process
and/or data subject representations.
Anyway, in article 83 of the PDPA the national legislator accepts the concept of article
80 of GDPR and provides the data subjects the right to mandate a not-for-profit legal
person, which has statutory objectives which are in the public interest and is active in the
field of protection of the rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard to the
protection of their personal data, to lodge a complaint on her/his behalf and to exercise
data subject rights. Such authorization does not concern the data subject right to receive
compensation.With regards to the exercise of that right, the data subjectmay notmandate




There are certain presumptions in the PDPA when the data subject may exercise one’s
rights through the NSA or, respectively, through the Inspectorate. In such cases, the
Commission or, respectively, the Inspectorate, shall verify the lawfulness of the refusal
(article 57, paragraph 1of the PDPA).
Such presumptions are the following:
i. if the controller delays or refuses, in whole or in part, the provision of the information
for processing grounds, storage period or criteria about it, which are the potential
recipients of the data and/or other additional information, with the excuse that its delay
or refusal is in order to avoid obstructing official or legal checks, investigations or
procedures, avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, protect public order and
national security and/or protect the rights and freedoms of others;
ii. if the controller restricts the access of the data subject to the data and information
which concerns her or him and those data are under process with that controller,
without any or with ungrounded explanation about such restriction;
iii. if the controller refuses to proceed with rectification, completion, erasure or restriction
of the processing of personal data because of any of the reasons in point (i) above or
fails to inform the data subject about the refusal grounded on the same reasons.
In those cases, the NSA or, respectively, the Inspectorate, shall inform the data subject that
at least all necessary verifications or consultations have taken place and of the right of the
data subject to seek a judicial remedy.14
Question 14
The NSA regulates its activity, the activity of its administration, as well as administrative
proceedingswith Rules of Procedure promulgated in the State Gazette. (article 9, paragraph
2 of the PDPA). In those Rules (article 14), in exercising its powers, the NSA is authorized
and obliged to cooperate with state bodies and non-governmental organizations by
participation inmeetings of working groups, holdingworkingmeetings, carrying out joint
activities, including inspections, implementation of joint projects and drafting regulatory
acts. In the course of relations with other bodies and organizations, theNSAmay conclude
cooperation and mutual assistance agreements. Nowadays, the NSA has a very active
cooperation with international structures such as Joint Supervisory Bodies and Working
14 Art. 57, para. 2 PDPA.
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Parties to the EU Council and Data Protection Groups to the European Data Protection
Supervisor.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
There is an explicit definition on “national security” in Bulgarian legislation. Article 2 of
the law for the management and operation of the national security system says:
“national security is a dynamic state of society and the state, while protecting
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and constitutionally established order of the
country, when the democratic functioning of the institutions and fundamental
rights and freedoms of the citizens are guaranteed, as a result of which the nation
preserves and increases its well-being and develops and when the country
successfully defends its national interests and realizes its national priorities”.
This definition is applied to all the national laws which concern the national security
though in different aspects: “National Security” Directorate Act, Classified Information
Act, Special Intelligence Law, etc.
Practically, as of March 2015 when the Constitutional Court has repealed in whole the
provisions of the Electronic Communication Act which had treated the obligation of the
enterprises providing electronic communication services to store the traffic for a period
of 12 months, our legislation provides for the unconditional application of article 7 and 8
of the Charter, at least as regards the information that can be obtained from the electronic
communications of any individual.
Where any information is required for the purposes of the prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, a
special permission should be issued by the court under the procedure of the Special






A Setting the Scene
Question 1
Following the enactment of theGeneral Data ProtectionRegulation (hereinafter “GDPR”),1
the main national legal instrument enacted for the enforcement is Zakon o provedbi Opće
uredbe o zaštiti podataka (the Act on the implementation of the General Data Protection
Regulation, hereinafter “GDPR Implementing Act”),2 which has set aside the previous
Personal Data Protection Act (Zakon o zaštiti osobnih podataka).3 However, it must be
noted that the Act, pursuant to its article 1(2), does not apply to personal data processing
for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences
or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention
of threats to public security. That processing has been regulated by the Act on protection
of physical personswith respect to processing and exchange of personal data for the purpose
of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution
of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to
public security (Zakon o zaštiti fizičkih osoba u vezi s obradom i razmjenom osobnih
podataka u svrhe sprječavanja, istraživanja, otkrivanja ili progona kaznenih djela ili
izvršavanja kaznenih sankcija)4 whichwas enacted to implementDirective (EU) 2016/680.5
* University of Zagreb, Department of EU Law.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Zakon o provedbiOpće uredbe o zaštiti podataka,Official Gazette 42/2018, enacted byCroatian Parliament
on 27 April 2018.
3 Zakon o zaštiti osobnih podataka, Official Gazette 103/03, 118/06, 41/08, 130/11, 106/12).
4 Zakon o zaštiti fizičkih osoba u vezi s obradom i razmjenom osobnih podataka u svrhe sprječavanja,
istraživanja, otkrivanja ili progona kaznenih djela ili izvršavanja kaznenih sankcija, Official Gazette 68/18.
5 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
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When it comes to flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR, the Act introduced several
flexibilities when it comes to genetic and biometric data, video surveillance and data
processing for statistical purposes. For instance, the Act specifies in its Article 20 that
processing of genetic data is prohibited for the purpose of risk assessment to determine
the possibility of illness or other health aspects with respect to concluding and fulfilling
life insurance contracts. Such a prohibition applies regardless whether the data subject
gave his or her consent to such processing. However, it must be noted that such a
prohibition is geographically limited to data subjects who conclude life insurance
agreements in Croatia and only if the data controller is established or is providing services
in Croatia.
Furthermore, with respect to biometric data, the Croatian legislator enacted the
possibility of its processing by the public authorities if two conditions are met. Firstly, it
must be prescribed by law, and, secondly, itmust be necessary for the protection of persons,
property, classified data or business secrets. However, itmust be balanced that data subject’s
interest contrary to processing purpose shall not prevail. For example, according to article
21(2) one of such purposes explicitly prescribed by the law is fulfilling one of the obligations
arising from international agreements regarding the border crossing personal identification.
On the other hand, when it comes to biometric data processing conducted in the private
sector, in addition to the abovementioned two conditions (for the public authorities), the
legal basis has to be the explicit consent given by the data subject in accordance with the
GDPR. Furthermore, the Croatian legislator explicitly allowed biometric data processing
by the employers for the purpose of recording working hours and the time of the entrance
and exit from the premises. However, the explicit consent of the data subject is necessary.
Furthermore, the Croatian legislator set out certain specifications (articles 25 – 32)
when it comes to data processing through video surveillance. It must be noted that the Act
regulates only video surveillance when such processing contains creating and storage of
video recording which forms or is intended to form a part of a filing system. However, it
envisions the subsidiary application of the Act only when no other more specific law is
applicable. Without going into specific conditions and requirements for each situation set
out by the Act, this report will as an example refer to the one prescribed by the article 30.
According to that provision, processing through video surveillance can entail recording
of the working space of the employees provided that employees have been informed about
it by the employer before the decision of introducing such a measure has been brought.
Spaces for personal hygiene, dressing rooms and leisure rooms are, however, excluded.
Finally, the Croatian legislator allowed that when the processing is conducted for the
purpose of official statistics, official bodies conducting such statistics are not obliged to
ensure the data subjects’ rights to access, rectification, restriction of processing and the
right to object in so far as those rights could probably disable or endanger the purpose of
processing andwhen such restrictions are absolutely necessary for those purposes. Similarly,
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data controllers, pursuant to article 33(3), are not obliged to inform the data subject of the
data transfer if such a transfer is done to official bodies for the purpose of official statistics.
With respect to the abovementioned flexibilities introduced by the Act, it does not
specify any specific powers of the Agency as the national supervisory authority besides the
ones it regularly conducts, which will be further elaborated below.
Question 2
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”)6
contains distinct provisions to protect the right to respect for private life and the right to
data protection. Similarly, the Croatian Constitution7 contains two separate provisions –
one concerning the right to personal and family life set out in article 35 while the right to
data protection is set out separately in article 37. The exact wording of the norms is the
following:
Article 35
Respect for and legal protection of each person’s private and family life, dignity,
and reputation shall be guaranteed.
Article 37
The safety and secrecy of personal data shall be guaranteed for everyone.Without
consent from the person concerned, personal data may be collected, processed,
and used only under the conditions specified by law.
Protection of data and monitoring of the operations of information systems in
the state shall be regulated by law.
The use of personal data contrary to the express purpose of their collection shall
be prohibited.
In that respect, the CroatianConstitutional Court in its case lawwhen determiningwhether
there was a breach of one’s constitutional right separately analyses the abovementioned
6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.




rights.8 However, this differentiation did not result from distinct provisions set out by the
Charter. It is present in Croatian Constitution since the amendment made in 1997.9 With
that in mind, it is hard to provide a comprehensive answer on the question whether the
Charter right to data protection influenced the interpretation of national law. Furthermore,
itmust also be borne inmind that Croatia is the newestmember state, which is still bearing
the legacy of the former socialist legal tradition where national courts are primarily seen
in the role of law appliers rather than lawmakers. In a system like that, it is hard to ascertain
precisely what interpretive tools the judges have used.10 According to the case law databases
available to the rapporteur, up to the time of this report, there are no judgments from
which can be inferred that national courts relied on the Charter. However, it is worth
mentioning that in some cases parties did rely on the provisions of the Charter.11
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
It is quite a difficult task to give a full and comprehensive answer on the question how
have data controllers interpreted and applied the principles of fair processing, purpose
limitation and data minimisation for two main reasons. Firstly, the term data controller
is extremely broad as it encompasses all legal and physical persons who are conducting
personal data processing regardless of the sector inwhich they provide its services. Namely,
not only do they collect various types of personal data that can be more or less sensitive,
they also use it differently, for different purposes. Secondly, the principles are inherently
vague and subject to interpretation, thusmaking it almost impossible to precisely determine
its content by the data controllers and processors. This report will, thus, in answering this
8 As one of the examples of analysis of both Article 37 (data protection right) and Article 35 (private and
family life) see S.B. v Županijski sud u Zagrebu, U-III-164/2013, Croatian Constitutional Court, 8 May
2014.
9 Official Gazette, 135/97, Article 5, 15 December 1997.
10 For a detailed discussion of interpretation of Croatian law in conformity with EU law, see Antonija Ivančan
and Davor Petrić, “Are Croatian Courts Prepared for the Interpretive Obligation?” (2019) 44 Review of
Central and East European Law 493–526.




question rely on the examples and principle analysis given by the Personal Data Protection
Agency (hereinafter “the Agency”) in its Annual Report12.
As one of these examples, the Agency was dealing with was whether the collection and
transfer of personal data by a non-governmental organisation to a company for the purposes
of organising a referendum was to be considered lawful even without specific consent of
data subjects.13 The Agency concluded that it was, observing the principle of lawfulness
and data minimisation. Namely, in order to be able to request a referendum, a petitioner
(here non-governmental organisation) must prove that a certain number of people signed
a petition. Since that is prescribed by the law, the Agency concluded that the legal basis
set out in article 6(1)(c) or (e) applies and that the collected data is necessary for identifying
people who signed the petition.
Secondly, regarding the principle of data minimisation and purpose limitation, the
Agency was requested to give an official opinion on the matter whether it is lawful for the
employers to send biographies to potential clients residing/established inCroatia or abroad.
When answeringwhat kind of data could lawfully be processed and transferred, theAgency
relied on the principles of proportionality and data minimisation. It, thus, concluded that
the data which can be included in such a transfer (without the consent of the data subject)
shall be limited to information strictly relating to professional experience and/or knowledge
of the employees.14 Similarly, in another case, theAgencywas requested to issue anOpinion
on the question whether it is lawful for an employer, a public authority body, to send the
photocopies of the ID cards of the employees to third persons. The Agency, relying on the
principle of proportionality and data minimisation, enumerated which conditions must
be satisfied and concluded that the sending of the photocopies would in principle be lawful.
However, it stressed that the principle of purpose limitation and data minimisation must
be ensured in a way that if the purpose can be achieved with a less restrictive measure,
such as e.g. “checking the ID cards without making copies”, such a measure shall be
applied.15
Thirdly, another example where the Agency was dealing with the principles of fair
processing, data minimisation and purpose limitation16 was one regarding the publication
of personal data pursuant to the Act on the right to access information (Zakon o pravu na
12 Godišnje izvješće o radu Agencije za zaštitu osobnih podataka za razdoblje od 1. siječnja 2018. do 31.
prosinca 2018, www.sabor.hr/sites/default/files/uploads/sabor/2019-04-02/154602/IZVJESCE_AZOP_
2018.pdf. All webpages referred to were visited 20 February 2020.
13 Annex to the Annual Report, Mišljenja, primjeri i preporuke Agencije za zaštitu osobnih podataka, Prilog
Godišnjem izvješću o radu Agencije za zaštitu osobnih podataka za razdoblje od 1. siječnja 2018. do 31.
prosinca 2018, p. 4, www.sabor.hr/sites/default/files/uploads/sabor/2019-04-02/154603/PRILOG_AZOP_
2018_MISLJENJA_PRIMJERI_PREPORUKE.pdf.
14 Ibid, p. 31-34.
15 Ibid, p. 10.
16 Ibid, p. 39.
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pristup informacijama).17 Namely, pursuant to the mentioned Act, some documents
concerning the financial activity of a health institution were made available online to the
public. Those documents contained the personal data of identified people such as their
pay check, travel expenses and education and some of the personal data subjects filed a
complaint with the Agency as a National State Authority. The Agency rejected such a
complaint arguing that the publication is lawful as it was made pursuant and in accordance
with the limitations set out by the Act on the right to access information. It further
acknowledged that the case in question deals with two constitutional rights – the right to
personal data protection and the right to access to information and that a balance shall be
made. It concluded that in the present case, the public interest must prevail. It concluded
in suchmanner because all the limitations envisioned by the principle of dataminimisation,
purpose limitation and proportionality were ensured.
There are also examples where the Agency determined that there had been a breach
of these principles. One of such examples is the one where a personal identity of the human
trafficking victim, together with photographs and health data, was published online and
in print.18 The publisher pointed out that the purpose was to raise awareness of the system
deficiencies and problems regarding human trafficking. The Agency concluded that
pursuant to the Media Act19 it is a valid purpose to raise public awareness. However, the
same purpose could be achievedwith a less invasivemethod, as it involves sensitive personal
data that was inexcusably excessively used contrary to the principles of data minimisation
and purpose limitation.
Finally, when it comes to principle analysis before the courts, according to the Agency
annual report there are several cases pending before administrative courts. However, after
the enactment of the GDPR there are currently no decisions issued by Croatian courts.
Question 4
According to accessible case law databases, it has not been any decision issued by the
Croatian courts regarding the “consent” and “legitimate interests” as legal bases. However,
there is an example present in the report by the Agency dealing with that issue when being
requested for the Opinion. Namely, the question was raised whether it was lawful for an
employer to send biographies of its employees to potential clients without their specific
consent. The Agency, following Opinion no. 249 of the Article 29 Working Party20,
concluded that such a transfer would be lawful if the employer had a legitimate interest to
17 Zakon o pravu na pristup informacijama, Official Gazette NN 25/13, 85/15.
18 Annex to the Annual Report (2018), p. 40.
19 Zakon o medijima, Official Gazette NN 59/04, 84/11, 81/13.
20 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work (WP 249, 8 June 2017).
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send the biographies to its potential clients. However, it pointed out that it should include
only personal data whichwere decisive for employing the subject such as formal education,
knowledge and expertise and those that are not relevant for performance of a task, such
as photography or an address, shall be excluded. It further determines that when making
such an assessment, a principle of proportionality must be observed in a sense that it does
not include data that is not strictly necessary for its purpose.21
Question 5
Since entering in the European Union, together with the technological advancement,
provision of information services such as Netflix and Deezer has increased. People are
more and more starting the subscriptions either for free or for certain compensation.
Regardless, in order to enjoy such services, when accepting terms and conditions of use,
they must give their personal data as “counter-performance”. So far in Croatia, there has
not been awide discussion on the validity of such a concept. However, it should be pointed
out that when it comes to the provision of information society service to children, the
Croatian legislator enacted a specific norm, pursuant to article 8 GDPR, which sets out 16
years old as age limit for being able to give consent.
Question 6
Even though article 22 of the GDPR (on the right not to be subject to automated
decision/making, including profiling) allows Member States to introduce legislative
measures to ensure this right does not apply in certain situations, the Croatian legislator
has not introduced such a measure.
Question 7
The right to erasure, even though it is quite popular, has so far scarcely been used by the
courts and the Personal Data Protection Agency. According to the case law databases
accessible to this rapporteur, there is only one decision issued by the Municipal Court in
Zagreb (first instance court) under no. Pn-3874/14.22 A citizen M.M., relying on the recent
Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”) judgment in Google Spain
initiated proceedings against Google Croatia d.o.o. (ltd.) asking for the removal from the
21 Annex to the Annual Report, 2018, p. 33.
22 M.M. v Google Hrvatska d.o.o., Municipal Court in Zagreb, Pn-3784/14, 30 November 2016.
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Google search engine of several URLs containing information about him.23 The Applicant
claimed the information to be false and damaging to his professional reputation. Namely,
he claims that the existence of such URLs in the Google search engine significantly impacts
his ability to find a job. The Applicant previously filed an online request to Google Inc.
However, the requestwas denied asGoogle Inc found the information thoseURLs contained
of high importance to the public and interests of freedom of expression. Google Croatia
d.o.o. contested its liability (passive legitimation) as it does not operate the search engine
and thus cannot be considered a data controller within the meaning of Directive 95/46
EC.24 TheCourt accepted thatGoogle Croatia d.o.o. cannot be considered as data controller
since it does not have any control over the use of the search engine and data and ruled in
favour of Google Croatia d.o.o. The applicant filed an appeal and the case is now pending
before the Regional Court in Dubrovnik (Gž – 32/2017).
Furthermore, regarding the search engines, according to data available to the rapporteur,
there have not been any cases with respect to Croatian search engines that have been
dealing with the right of erasure.
Finally, according to Croatian Personal Data Protection Agency’s annual report for
2018 there have been several requests made by the citizens for the interpretation of the
data subject’s rights including the right to erasure and most of the cases are currently
pending before Administrative courts.25
Question 8
According to the official communication between the Croatian Ministry of Public
Administration and the European Commission26, pursuant to Article 85(3) GDPR, the
Croatian Ministry informed that “in relation to processing for journalistic purposes or
and the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, the Act stipulates no
exemptions or derogations from the specific chapters of the GDPR (chapters II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII and IX), but instead leaves this matter to be regulated by special regulations
governing those areas”.27 However, in the abovementioned letter the Ministry pointed out
that “Article 14 of the Act stipulates a legal obligation of all central state administration
23 Judgment of 13May 2014 in caseC-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Google Spain), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
24 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995],
OJ L281/31.
25 Annual report of theCroatianData ProtectionAgency, 2018, p. 37, www.sabor.hr/sites/default/files/uploads/
sabor/2019-04-02/154602/IZVJESCE_AZOP_2018.pdf.
26 Letter of June 15th 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/hr_notification_art_51.4_84.2_85.3_88.3_
90.2_publish_0.pdf.
27 Zakon o provedbi Opće uredbe o zaštiti podataka, Official Gazette 42/2018.
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authorities and other state authorities to submit to the Agency all draft proposals of laws
and other regulatory proposals dealing with issues concerning the processing of personal
data, for the Agency to provide professional opinions with regard to the area of personal
data protection. This is to ensure a full and proper application of all the principles and
provisions of the GDPR in the course of adoption of the legislation”.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Article 4 of the GDPR Implementing Act sets out that the supervisory authority in the
sense of article 51 of theGDPR is the PersonalData ProtectionAgency (Agencija za zaštitu
osobnih podataka). It has been established as an independent state authority, autonomous
and independent in its work. TheAgency is the only and lead national supervisory authority
for personal data protection in Croatia. The Agency is headed by a director, who has a
deputy. The director and the deputy director of the Agency are appointed by the Croatian
Parliament at the proposal of the Government of Croatia, based on the public call for
candidates, launched by the central state administration authority competent for the state
administration system. The director and the deputy director of the Agency are appointed
for a term of four years and cannot be appointed to that office more than twice.
According to the abovementioned legislation, theAgency is entitled/obliged to perform
the following tasks which can be divided in four groups:
1. Supervisory tasks
The Agency monitors and supervises:
– compliance and application of the GDPR Implementing Act;
– compliance and application requests and provisions of the GDPR;
– compliance and application of theAct on protection of physical personswith respect
to processing and exchange of personal data for the purpose of prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats
to public security;
– personal data processing for the purpose of prevention, investigation, discovery
and prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal sanctions, on the
basis of relevant national law;
– lawfulness of the processing, in accordance with national law and the GDPR and
informs the data subject within a reasonable period of the investigation carried out
or reasons why the investigation was not carried out;
– represents Republic of Croatia before European Data Protection Board;
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– cooperates with other supervisory authorities to provide mutual assistance with a
view to ensure the consistency of application and enforcement of the law;
– cooperates with other guesting supervising authorities with power to conduct joint
operations, including investigations and joint enforcement measures;
– acts upon the request of public authorities, with respect to assessment of lawfulness
of the processing of personal data;
– acts upon the objection by the data subject;
– upon its request, it provides the data subject with the relevant information regarding
the exercise of its rights granted by the Personal Data Protection Act (where
appropriate it cooperates with other national supervisory authorities);
– verifies the accuracy of claims set out in the complaint lodged by the data subject
and informs the data subject within a reasonable period of the progress and the
outcome of the complaint, especially, if some further investigation needs to be
conducted;
– issues decisions and expert opinions regarding the personal data processing, which
can potentially create high risk of data subjects’ rights and freedoms violations;
– publishes its opinions and decision (when publishing on web sites, the opinions
and decision are anonymised and pseudonymised);
– publishes decisions (against which there is no legal remedy possible) without
anonymising personal data, provided that by that decision, the Agency has
determined the violation of provisions of theGDPRand/or PersonalData Protection
Act with respect to minor’s personal data, special categories of data, automated
decision-making, profiling etc.;
– issues decisions against pronounced measures; against those decisions it is possible
to start proceedings before the Administrative court (upravni spor);
– when the decision becomes enforceable, the Agency performs control supervision
of its enforcement;
– informs relevant judicial authorities about Personal Data Protection Act violations;
– initiates and conducts proceedings against relevant persons for GDPR or Personal
Data Protection Act violations;
– participates in legal proceedings conducted for enforcement of Personal Data
Protection Act provisions;
– in the course of misdemeanour proceedings conducts all the measures to which
the Agency is entitled to by the law. For such measures, it appoints a special
representative;
– suspends the proceedings before administrative courts and passes them to theHigh
Administrative Court of Croatia, if the Agency has reasons to doubt in the validity




– has the power to pronounce administrative monetary sanctions and measures;
– enables the setting up of efficient mechanism for encouragement of confidential
reporting on Personal Data Protection Act violations;
– follows and studies the problems regarding the processing of personal data and
their impact on its protection, especially with respect to the development of new
technology.
2. Advisory tasks:
Advises the Croatian Parliament, Government and other institutions and public
authority bodies on legislative and administrative measures dealing with the
processing of personal data;
–
– Conducts advisory procedures on personal data processing;
– Advises the data controller and gives opinions on every question dealing with
personal data protection at its own initiative or following the request;
– Issues opinions and approves drafts of codes of conduct;
– Issues standard contractual clauses;
– Authorises binding corporate rules;
– Enforces and monitors compliance with the code of conduct;
– Takes the necessary measures (together with appropriate safeguards) in the events
of controllers or processors violating code of conduct;
– Promotes and raises public awareness and understanding of risks, rules, and
safeguards concerned their rights in relation to the processing of personal data;
– Conducts activities of promoting awareness of individuals, controllers andprocessors
and other target groups;
– Continually promotes the awareness of controllers and processors, responsible for
personal data processing, of their obligations arising from the Personal Data
Protection Act and the GDPR;
– Issues criteria for determining the height of the administrative costs when data
subject’s complaints are manifestly unfounded or excessive or are of repetitive
character.
3. Corrective tasks:
Determines violations, issues warnings and reprimands–
issues warnings to a controller or processor that intended processing operations
are likely to infringe Personal Data Protection Act;
–
– issues official reprimands to a controller or a processor where processing
operations have infringed provisions of the GDPR.
– Has the power to order controller or processor:
to comply with the data subject’s requests to exercise his or her rights;–
– to bring processing operations into compliancewith the provisions of theGDPR
and the Personal Data Protection Act (in a specified manner and within a
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specified period), especially in a way to order rectification or erasure of personal
data or restriction of processing pursuant to article 17 of the GDPR;
– to communicate a personal data breach to the data subject;
– the rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing and the
notification of such actions to recipients to whom the personal data have been
disclosed.
– orders suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international
organisation;
– may suspend the controller or processor from the code;
– has the power to withdraw a certification or to order the certification body to
withdraw a certification issued, or to order the certification body not to issue
certification if the requirements for the certification are not or are no longer met;
– imposes an administrative fine, in addition to, or instead of measures depending
on the circumstances of each individual case.
4. Investigative tasks:
carries out investigations in the form of data protection audits;–
– imposes a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on processing;
– obtains access to:
all personal data and all information necessary for performance of its tasks;–
– any premises of the controller and the processor;
– any data processing equipment and means;
– where appropriate, it may:
make copies of available documents, record all the data and content contained
in the filling systems and assemble all other relevant information;
–
– seize necessary filling systems and equipment containing other relevant
information and withhold it for a period necessary for making such copies;
– confiscate filling systems or equipmentwhen performing data protection audits;
– if the Agency, upon performing investigative tasks, gains knowledge or finds objects
suggesting commitment of a crime, it is authorised to inform the competent police
station or district attorney.
5. EU and international tasks of the Agency:
Continually monitors data protection regulation in the country and abroad;–
– Cooperates with national supervisory authorities of the other EU Member States;
– Cooperates inworking groups and bodies, sub-groups, coordinations of theCouncil
of European Union and of the Council of Europe;
– Cooperates with other data protection authorities from neighbouring countries




Draws up an annual report on its activities and transmits such a report to the
Croatian Parliament. Such a report must contain all the relevant information
pursuant to special law;
–
– Upon the European Commission’s request it submits the annual report on the
GDPR Implementing Act requests through national law to the Commission and
the European Data Protection Office.
Question 10
Pursuant to Article 34 of the GDPR Implementing Act, the Personal Data Protection
Agency, as national supervisory authority, is given the task to conduct administrative
proceedings in which it must adopt a decision whether there was a breach of the personal
data protection regulation. When the Agency acts in such a capacity, there are two kinds
of proceedings – one is when proceedings are initiated upon request (by anyonewho claims
that his rights granted by the data protection provisions have been violated) while the
other is when proceedings are initiated by the Agency itself (ex officio). Regardless, the
Agency when conducting such proceedings acts in a manner pursuant to General
Administrative Procedure Act28 and personal data protection laws. It is worth mentioning
that after the enactment of the GDPR Implementing Act, the role of the Agency, as
supervisory authority over personal data protection, has been strengthened due to the
enactment of provisions on control of personal data (by an entitled person), on types of
control (announced or not announced), on concrete measures which can be undertaken
and on making an official report when performing the aforementioned control.
At the end of such administrative proceedings, after all the relevant facts have been
determined, the Agency issues a decision (rješenje). The decision is issued in the form of
administrative act against which no appeal can be lodged. However, the dissatisfied party
can initiate proceedings before the Administrative court (upravni spor) where it can
challenge the validity of such a decision. Those court proceedings are conducted pursuant
to Croatian Act on Administrative Court Proceedings.29
In such proceedings the Agency performs its investigative and corrective tasks which
are already mentioned above. Namely, investigative tasks are performed mainly through
exercising control and performing audits over personal data processing while corrective
tasks are performed when the Agency issues decisions (“rješenje”) by which it issues
warnings, official reprimands, orders or prohibitions to data controllers and processors.
28 Zakon o općem upravnom postupku, Official Gazette 47/09.
29 Zakon o upravnim sporovima, Official Gazette 20/10, 143/12, 152/14, 94/16, 29/17.
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When issuing ameasure TheAgency determines takes into account the level of seriousness
of personal data protection infringement. The issued measures may be of temporary or
permanent nature which is also determined on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, after the enactment of the GDPR Implementing Act, pursuant to article 44 of
that Act and article 83 of the GDPR, the Agency is also entitled to impose pecuniary
administrative fines. However, it must be mentioned that when it issues such fines, the
decision is brought in the form of “odluka” instead of “rješenje”. Against such a decision,
there is also no possibility to lodge an appeal, but the dissatisfied party may also initiate
administrative court proceedings before the competent Administrative court pursuant to
theAct onAdministrative Court Proceedings. Nevertheless, theAgency, pursuant to article
47 of theGDPR ImplementingAct, cannot issue administrative fines in proceedings against
public authority bodies. When it issues such administrative fines, the Agency publishes
the decision on its web page without anonymising personal data of the entity that made
an infringement.
Question 11
According to the annual report of the Agency, following the GDPR entering into force on
May 25th 2018, the number of received complaints has grown. Namely such a conclusion
is inferred from the fact that the number of complaints received by the Agency in 2018
(356) outreaches the number of complaints received in 2017 (139) by almost 260%percent.
The complaints have been received in various sectors (banking and finance, marketing,
health organisation etc.), which will be further elaborated in the text below.
One of the sectors inwhich theAgency received a large number of requests for opinions
as well as complaints was the public sector. Such a number was expected considering that
there is a vast number of personal data controllers and processors present within. In that
respect, the Agency, if it found that processing was contrary to data protection provisions,
for instance, ordered employers to cease processing personal data for which there was no
lawful basis. The practical examples are the following:
– the Agency prohibited video recording of working premises which shall not be subject
to such a recording;
– the Agency prohibited collecting and processing of personal data when it found that
it exceeded the amount necessary for the purposes for which they were processed;
– the Agency prohibited collecting and further processing of personal data when it was
determined that they were not collected for the precisely defined purpose.
Moreover, a large number of complaints was received in the finance sector, especially
considering the question whether making a copy of an ID card (pursuant to the Act on
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Anti-Money LaunderingTerrorismFinancing)30 was in accordancewith the data protection
laws. Other complaints were mostly received by the banking and other credit institutions
clients with respect to the due diligence procedure when entering into a business
relationship or making a transaction. In that respect, the Agency, not only was solving the
received complaints, but also conducted preventive measures in order to raise awareness
of the credit institutions and to draw attention to possible incompliances when collecting
and further processing personal data of their clients. To be precise, such measures were
primarily aimed at questionnaires the institutions were giving to their clients when
performing the due diligence procedure.
Further on, in the health organisation sector, the Agency was dealing mostly with the
complaints whether publication (in the public media) of their diagnosis and personal data
is compliant with the data protection regulation. Moreover, the Agency determined that
in this sector, some of the employers were unlawfully transferring medical data and
documentation to third parties. In such cases, the Agency prohibited further processing
and transferring and ordered the employers to conduct necessary safety measures.
Finally, in the telecommunications sector, individuals raised complaints claiming
identity theft. Many complaints concerned the conclusion of a contract without
authorisation, using the individual’s personal data. The Agency found most of the
complaints founded and as they also indicated that a crime had taken place, the Agency
properly notified the police and the district attorney. Identity theft complaints were also
present in the online environment. One of these examples involved the use of Facebook
pages in order to collect and further process personal data. The violators have been
organising a false prize contest where the person who applied gave his/her personal data.
Question 12
The Croatian legal system has historically awarded damages for intangible harm. Namely
pursuant toArticle 19 of theCroatianCivil ObligationsAct (Zakon o obveznim odnosima)31
any natural person or legal entity is entitled to the protection of its personality rights.
According to the second paragraph of the mentioned article, under personality rights,
among other rights, the right to privacy of personal and family life is also understood.
Furthermore, according to article 1100 of the mentioned Act in the event of violation of
personality rights, the court shall, where it finds that this is justified by the seriousness of
the violation and circumstances, award a just pecuniary compensation, irrespective of the
compensation for material damage and in the absence of the latter. In deciding on the
30 Zakon o sprječavanju pranja novca i financiranju terorizma, Official Gazette NN 108/17, 39/19.
31 Zakon o obveznim odnosima, Official Gazette 35/05, 41/08, 125/11, 78/15, 29/18.
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amount of just pecuniary compensation, the court shall take into account the degree and
duration of the physical and mental pain and fear caused by the violation, the objective of
this compensation, and the fact that it should not favour the aspirations that are not
compatible with its nature and social purpose.
Moreover, the practice of theCroatian courts, when dealingwith thematter of intangible
harm, created criteria for calculating the damages (“just pecuniary compensation”). The
Croatian Supreme Court in 2002 issued a document titled “Guidance criteria for
determining the amount of just pecuniary compensation”.32
Question 13
Pursuant to article 502a of the Civil Procedure Act,33 a mechanism of collective redress
was already introduced. In that respect the GDPR Implementing Act has not introduced
anything new. For the time being, there have been no such proceedings initiated before
Croatian courts.
Question 14
TheAgency has been cooperatingwith other public authorities, including the ombudsman.
Namely, such a cooperation is visible on the Agency’s webpage where it encourages data
subject’s to consult the ombudsman when they believe their rights have been violated.34
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The term ‘national security’ is not defined in the Croatian law nor by administrative
practice. However, there are certain acts and bylaws that have to be mentioned when it
comes to ‘national security’ especially in the context of data retention, as they are regulating
powers and authorities. Regarding the acts primarily relevant is the Act on security
32 Su-1331-VI/02 and 1372-11/02, Croatian Supreme Court, Zagreb, 29 November 2002.
33 Zakon o parničnom postupku, Official Gazette 4/77, 36/77, 6/80, 36/80, 43/82, 69/82, 58/84, 74/87, 57/89,
20/90, 27/90, 35/91, i NN 53/91, 91/92, 58/93, 112/99, 88/01, 117/03, 88/05, 02/07, 84/08, 96/08, 123/08,




intelligence systems35 and the Act on homeland security.36 Furthermore, with respect to
bylaws this report will point out the National Security Strategy37 adopted by the Parliament
and the Regulation on obligations arising from national security of physical and legal
persons in telecommunications sector.38 Those documents provide a legal framework for
the operations taken by the national authorities. However, for writing this report there
was no data on the actual practice.
Furthermore, when it comes to the question of recognising the Charter, as was briefly
mentioned above, Croatian courts, due to the traditionalist civil law culture, have a tendency
not to explicitly rely on the Charter when issuing a decision. Therefore, there is no evidence
(accessible for this report) that may indicate whether national authorities have accepted
the application of the Charter to data retention for national security purposes.
35 Zakon o sigurnosno-obavještajnom sustavu, Official Gazette 79/06, 105/06.
36 Zakon o sustavu domovinske sigurnosti, Official Gazette 108/17.
37 Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske, Official Gazette 73/17.
38 Uredba o obvezama iz područja nacionalne sigurnosti Republike Hrvatske za pravne i fizičke osobe u




Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Katerina Kalaitzaki*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The House of Representatives in Cyprus adopted the national law providing for the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and for the
free movement of such data (Law 125(I)/2018), on 31 July 2018. The law was adopted for
the effective implementation of certain provisions of theGeneralData ProtectionRegulation
(hereinafter “GDPR”), which applies as of 25 May 2018.1 Upon entry into force of the
provisions of law 125(I)/2018, the Processing of Personal Data (Protection of Individuals)
Lawof 2001 (Law 138(I)/2001)was repealedwhileActs issued by theCommissioner under
the provisions of the Processing of Personal Data (Protection of Individuals) Law, which
is repealed, will continue to be valid until their expiration or replacement.
Most of the notable flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR have been implemented in
law 125(I)/2018. For instance, article 6(1)(c)GDPRwhich states that ‘processing is necessary
for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject’ has been
implemented in particular in sections 5-7 of the relevant law under the title ‘Part II:
Lawfulness of Certain Processing Operations’. Section 5 permits the lawful processing of
personal data when it is carried out by the Courts acting in their judicial capacity and by
the House of Representatives within its powers. Moreover, section 6 permits the lawful
processing of special categories of data when ‘it is carried out for the purpose of publishing
or issuing a decision of any court or when it is necessary for the purpose of delivering
justice’. Lastly, within the framework of compliance with a legal obligation, section 7
permits the processing of personal data ‘on the basis of a Decision of the Council of
Ministers to a public authority or body for the performance of a task carried out in the
* Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou: Professor of European Law and Reform and Head, School of Law, University of
Central Lancashire, Cyprus. Katerina Kalaitzaki: Post-Doctoral Fellow (at the time of submission), School
of Law,University of Central Lancashire, Cyprus. This report is up to date as of 30August 2019. All webpages
referred to were visited on 30 August 2019.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1.
197
public interest or in the exercise of official authority’. Beyond the processing necessary for
the compliance with a legal obligation, further categories where processing of data is
allowed were added in the law including the offering of information society services to a
child, while the processing of genetic and biometric data for purposes of health and life
insurance is prohibited.
Part IX of law 125(I)/2018 entitled ‘Processing of personal data in specific situations’,
lays down a list of situations where the processing of personal data is allowed in exceptional
cases corresponding to articles 86-90 GDPR. Article 86 allowing the disclosure of personal
data in official documents held by a public authority or body for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest was implemented under section 30 of the law. Regarding
article 87 GDPR, the Cypriot legislator partly determined the specific conditions for the
processing of a national identification number under section 10(2) of the law stating that
in cases where the combination of filing systems by public authorities relates to special
categories of personal data or to personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences
or is to be carried out with the use of the identity card number or any other identifier of
general application, it is required to undertake a data protection impact assessment and a
prior consultation with the Commissioner.
Article 89 GDPR concerning the safeguards and derogations relating to processing for
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes was transposed under section 29 law 125(I)/2018. Section 29(1) states
that ‘the processing of personal data or special categories of personal data or personal data
relating to criminal convictions and offenses, which is carried out for journalistic or
academic purposes or for purposes of artistic or literary expression, is permitted, provided
that those purposes are proportionate to the aim pursued and respect the essence of the
rights as set out in the EU Charter and the ECHR’. Lastly, section 31 states that ‘the
processing which is carried out by a controller or a processor for archiving purposes in
the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall
not be used for taking a decision which produces legal effects concerning the data subject
or similarly significantly affects him or her’. Article 88 GDPR, concerning the processing
in the context of employment was not implemented in the law to provide for more specific
rules to ensure the protection for the rights and freedoms of employees’ personal data,
although according to the Regulation this can also be done by collective agreements.
Therefore, this omission of the House of Representatives does not seem to create a gap for
the protection of employees.
Beyond the GDPR, Member States had to transpose the Data Protection Law
Enforcement Directive (hereinafter “LED”) into their national law by 6 May 2018.2 The
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
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Directive protects citizens’ fundamental right to data protection whenever criminal law
enforcement authorities for law enforcement purposes use personal data. EU rules ensure
that the personal data of victims, witnesses, and suspects of crime are duly protected. The
introduction of similar data protection standards facilitates the exchange of personal data
for cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism.3 As Cyprus failed
to transpose EU rules into national legislation, the Commission sent a letter of formal
notice to the relevant authorities in July 2018. TheCommission had sent a reasoned opinion
to Cyprus for failing to implement the LED on 24 January 2019, which granted Cyprus
two months to respond and take the relevant action; otherwise, the case could be referred
to the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter “CJEU”).4 The Directive was transposed in
March 2019 under Law 44(I)/2019.5
Question 2
Article 7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”)
enshrines the right to respect for private and family life while article 8 the protection of
personal data. The Constitution of Cyprus includes a long list of fundamental rights and
liberties under Part 2, inspired by the EuropeanConvention onHumanRights (hereinafter
“ECHR”), and an express reference to the right of a person to have respect for his private
and family life is made under article 15 as well as to a further right to privacy of
correspondence in article 17. Subject to the analysis of articles 15 and 17 of the Constitution
provided in Part D below, no express reference to the protection of personal data is made
within the Constitution itself. Moreover, law 125(I)/2018 does not make any reference to
article 8 or to any other specific right of the Charter. The only express reference made to
theCharter is a very generic one under section 29(1) of the said law, of relevance toQuestion
8 below. Contrary to the main body of legislation, the Commissioner has made extensive
references to articles 7 and 8 Charter in her decisions when setting out the relevant legal
framework of a case, in conjunction with article 8 ECHR and article 15 of the Constitution
of Cyprus.6




5 Law of 2019 (44(I)/2019) on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data (in Greek).
6 Decision No. 135/2018, 9 January 2019, para. 2.8., www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/
dataprotection.nsf/all/2566119727D4B95CC22583A2003987DF/$file/complaint%20135-2018-efimerida
%20politis-apofasi.pdf?openelement; Decision No. 192/2018, 12 April 2019, para. 2.5.
w w w . d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . g o v . c y / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . n s f / a l l /
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B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
In the run-up to the entry into force of theGDPR, data controllers in Cyprus have benefited
from clear guidelines, information sessions and trainings, pertaining in particular to the
‘general obligations’ they ought to follow and apply as per article 5 GDPR. Such general
obligations are issued by the Data Protection Commissioner in Cyprus and pertain inter
alia to fair processing, purpose limitation and dataminimisation.7 Other general obligations
relate to articles 13 and 14 GDPR.8 General obligations have also been issued with respect
to the role of accountants, auditors and lawyers acting as data processors.9 Overall it can
be said that data controllers (as well as data processors) in Cyprus have interpreted and
applied such principles in line with requirements under the GDPR. It could be said that
data controllers in the private sector as well as some semi-governmental organisations
have perhaps been quicker and more efficient in applying GDPR requirements by putting
together adequate policies and implementing them, even if violations occur. A circular
was published by the State Service of Public Administration and Personnel on the
management of archives and documents containing personal data in public services, dated
24May 2018. Since the entry into force of theGDPRhowever, variousMinistries and State
services, including under the Ministry of Health, Education or the Ministries themselves,
public bodies such as a hospital or a university, as well as local authorities have been issued
a warning or fined for non-compliance with the GDPR, its principles, its safety measures
or for lack of consent.
TheData ProtectionCommissioner also has the power to issue opinions to the national
parliament, the government or to other institutions and bodies and/or the public, in
accordance with article 58(3)(b) GDPR, which she has already used to issue three such
opinions of much relevance to all economic sectors in Cyprus.10 Such opinions are based





8 w w w . d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . g o v . c y / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . n s f / A l l /
39B375E9A0126F47C22582F9002BFE2B?OpenDocument (in Greek).
9 w w w . d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . g o v . c y / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . n s f / A l l /
341ABF6C91574B17C225830B001F5543?OpenDocument (in Greek).
10 Opinion 1/2018 addressed to all trade unions on salaries; Opinion 2/2018 on video surveillance at the
workplace and the use of biometric systems; Opinion 3/2018 on access to email accounts of employees and
former employees (in Greek).
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and/or data minimisation, thereby reinforcing their importance.11 Such opinions also refer
to existing decisions of the Commissioner in the field, giving concrete examples and
precedents to addressees of the opinions. Such opinions are complemented by sectoral
circulars such as in the area of health or insurance. Reference is regularly made to EDPB
Guidelines and/or to Article 29 Working Party in such instruments.
Directives issued by theCommissioner in the pre-GDPR era are still valid until provided
otherwise. Recent decisions of the Commissioner are now based on the GDPR regime,
using the above principles, legal bases under the GDPR as well as the implementing law.
Notable post-GDPR decisions against data controllers were taken on the basis of the
principle of data minimisation,12 legitimate interest and/or lack of consent.13
However, the pre-GDPR regime still provides most of the ground for interpretation
by the domestic courts rather than the newly established GDPR regime. The few court
decisions of relevance, recently issued by the Administrative Court, relates to decisions of
the Data Protection Commissioner taken under the pre-GDPR regime, which were
challenged before the court. Recent appeal cases heard by the Supreme Court of Cyprus
also refer to pre-GDPR decisions which have been challenged and then appealed.14 The
first recourses of post-GDPR decisions appear to be currently pending.15
Question 4
In view of the above limitations, it cannot really be said that the legal bases of consent and
legitimate interests under the GDPR regime have yet been explored or interpreted by
national courts in Cyprus, even though the first such recourse is pending.16 Such concepts
have however been interpreted by the courts under the pre-GDPR regime and/or in other
contexts than data protection. With respect to legitimate interest, it should be noted that
this notion forms a cornerstone of constitutional rights in Cyprus.17
11 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/page3f_gr/page3f_gr?opendocument (in
Greek).
12 SeeDecisionNo. 192/2018, 12April 2019, against a company part of amedia group (NikodeaMedia group);
Decision No. 135/2018, 9 January 2019, against newspaper Politis (in Greek).
13 See Decision No. 232/2018, 12 April 2019, against Sigma Live Ltd, a media group, in violation of art. 6(1)(a)
GDPR; Decision No. 135/2018, 9 January 2019, against newspaper Politis partly based on art. 6(1)(f) GDPR
(in Greek).
14 Such as Appeal 32/2013, Republic of Cyprus through Commissioner on Data Protection v Dias Publishing
House Ltd, judgment issued on 1 March 2019 (in Greek) on the protection of sensitive data and the right
to family life.
15 Decision No. 135/2018, 9 January 2019, recourse before the Administrative Court pending.
16 Decision No. 135/2018, currently being challenged before the Administrative Court, was based on a breach
of the principle of data minimisation, of legitimate interest and for lack of consent, under arts 5 and 6
GDPR.




To date, there does not seem to have been a meaningful debate or a decision at national
level regarding the validity of personal data as ‘counter-performance’ for the provision of
digital content. The Data Protection Officer has however provided clear and precise
guidelines on direct marketing (pre-GDPR) as well as cookies, referencing Article 29 Data
ProtectionWorkingParty, updated in 2019 but referringmainly to pre-GDPR instruments.18
Question 6
Processing is defined in the main law as it is in the GDPR, referring to automated means
or not, but there is no reference to profiling. Law 44(I)/2019 which implements the LED
transposes almost verbatim article 11(1) LED on automated individual decision-making.
Section 13(1) of the law provides that ‘a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or
significantly affects him or her, is prohibited unless authorised by Union or national law
to which the controller is subject’. That is provided appropriate ‘safeguards for the rights
and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the
part of the controller, are provided in the law’. Article 11(2) and (3) LED is also reproduced,
with reference to safeguards for the ‘data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate
interests’ and discrimination.
General measures to safeguard the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of data
subjects, deriving from the GDPR, are incorporated into Part II of the main law. Section
5 nevertheless starts by providing that the processing of personal data by the Courts and
the House of Representatives is permitted and lawful ‘notwithstanding article 6(1)(e)
GDPR’, thereby suggesting that no proportionality test is needed to justify the processing
of personal data by these data controllers acting within their powers. With respect to the
publishing and issuing of decisions by the Courts, section 6 provides that the processing
of sensitive personal data covered by article 9 GDPR is permitted and lawful. It would
seem as though the Courts were exempted from the restrictive scope of the law.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as an independent organ of the State, issued a circular
containing directives on the publication of decisions in the post-GDPR regime.19 The
circular promotes the protection of the right to privacy and family life, as may be limited
through proportionality, and applies the principle of dataminimisation and anonymisation
18 w w w . d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . g o v . c y / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n / d a t a p r o t e c t i o n . n s f / A l l /
71B32C48C08B5AC1C22582780040F80E?OpenDocument (in Greek).
19 www.supremecourt.gov.cy/Judicial/sc.nsf/All/B450E5061E647886C225837C00309575?OpenDocument
published on 19 June 2018 (in Greek).
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to personal data as may be controlled or processed by the courts, including sensitive data
as listed in the circular. The circular also provides for the conditions of publication of
decisions through dedicated online platforms of Cypriot law, which prompted a public
debate around the way the Supreme Court applied the GDPR.
Section 7 law 125(I)/2018 provides that the processing on the basis of a decision of the
Council of Ministers must be ‘performed lawfully and fairly, in a clear, precise and
transparent manner in relation to the data subject, in accordance with the provisions of
article 5(1)(a) and article 6(1) GDPR’. Sections 8 and 9 include specific references to
consent, either of a child or ‘the holder of parental responsibility over the child’ for the
offering of information society services to a child, or the separate consent of the data subject
in case of further processing, without prejudice to the principle of purpose limitation.
Under section 10, the combination of filing systems by public authorities or bodies is only
permitted for reasons of public interest and subject to article 6(1)(c) or (e) or article 9(2)(g),
(h) or (i) GDPR.
Question 7
In its 2017 annual report, the Data Protection Commissioner notes that the number of
complaints regarding direct marketing messages or spam, leading to requests to erase
personal data, were down compared to 2016 (below 150). This was probably due to the
fact that the senders put in place consumer systems for erasure.20 With respect to violations
of the pre-GDPR legal regime however, the report observes that quite a few companies do
not take sufficiently seriously the right to object of their consumers and that they do not
have designated procedures for the efficient erasure of all numbers of consumers who do
not wish to receive such messages (including in case of change of marketing company by
the sender).21 On average there seems to be a growing number of administrative decisions
on the right to erasure in various economic sectors (insurance in particular), including
against search engines, websites or social media platforms in Cyprus.22 Since 2018, the
number of such complaints brought before the Data Protection Commissioner appears to
be on the rise. Court decisions in the field remain scarce, which could indicate that
administrative decisions ordering erasure of personal data are not necessarily appealed by
20 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/64DE4B83284311F7C225836700400096/
$file/Ετήσια%20Έκθεση%202017.pdf (in Greek), p. 30.
21 ibid, p. 53.
22 Decision No. 5/2016, 13 October 2016 against Facebook www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/
dataprotection.nsf/All/4D64324AD8260202C2258258004124F7?OpenDocument (in Greek). See also the





data controllers, perhaps in an effort of compliance. As administrative decisions however
grow more complex, judicial recourses against them are expected.
Question 8
As developed in Part A above, Part IX of law 125(I)/2018 entitled ‘Processing of personal
data in specific situations’, lays down a list of situations where the processing of personal
data is allowed in exceptional cases corresponding to articles 86-90 GDPR. The duty to
balance the right to the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression
and information enshrined in article 85GDPR is reflected in section 29(1) law 125(I)/2018.
Section 29(2) also provides that the provisions of articles 14 and 15 GDPR ‘shall apply to
the extent that they do not impair the right to freedom of expression and information and
journalistic secrecy’. As such it can be said that Cyprus has exercised its right to legislate
under article 85(2) GDPR.
This does not appear to have been interpreted or applied formally to date.With respect
to the pre-GDPR regime, it is worth mentioning a recent unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court on appeal of a Decision of the Data Protection Commissioner, initially
challenged at first instance, regarding the publication of an article in Simerini disclosing
sensitive data of a child, in violation of the principle of proportionality and of privacy and
family life.23 The SupremeCourt allowed the appeal on the ground that there is no automatic
right of journalistic retransmission of the subject-matter of a court case. This will depend
on the result of a balancing exercise to be conducted by the journalists. In the present case,
there was a violation of the principle of proportionality and of privacy and right to family
life.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The competentNational SupervisoryAuthority inCyprus is the Commissioner of Personal
Data Protection, which is an independent public authority responsible for monitoring the
implantation of the GDPR and other laws aiming at the protection of individuals with
regards to the processing of personal data. The Commissioner performs the duties and
exercises the powers assigned by the GDPR or any other relevant law in complete
23 Appeal 32/2013, Republic of Cyprus through Commissioner on Data Protection v Dias Publishing House Ltd,
judgment issued on 1 March 2019 (in Greek).
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independence and represents the Republic in the relevant bodies and committees of the
EU, the Council of Europe, and other International Organisations.24 The Commissioner
is appointed in accordance with section 19 of the national law, which implements the
provisions of article 51 GDPR, by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of
the Minister of Justice and Public Order.
The duties and powers of the Commissioner are enlisted under section 23 of the law,
including the power to authorise any officer of herOffice, who holds a position of authority,
to exercise on her behalf such duties and powers,25 while she has no competence to supervise
processing operations carried out by the courts of the Republic.26 More importantly, the
additional duties of the Commissioner are enshrined in section 24, which include the
transparency duties of the Office and the procedure of handling/examining a complaint
that is discussed in detail later in this Report. Section 25 sets out the additional powers of
the Commissioner including the investigative powers of the Commissioner in
accessing/collecting information and data,27 the corrective powers granted to the
Commissioner (discussed in more detail later in the Report),28 as well as the authorisation
and advisory powers.29 Lastly, the Commissioner participates in the European Data
Protection Board, which is composed of all Supervisory Authorities of EU Member States
and the European Data Protection Supervisor, as well as by the European Commission.30
Question 10
TheCypriot law states under section 24(b) that subject to the provisions of article 57GDPR,
the Commissioner shall examine the complaints lodged and ‘where possible depending
on the nature and type of the complaint, inform the complainant in writing of the progress
and outcome of the submission within 30 days’. The Commissioner shall therefore
investigate the subject of each complaint as appropriate and the degree to which each
complaint is dealt with is at her discretion in accordance with article 57(1)(f) GDPR. If
the complaint is deemed unfounded or does not fall within the competence of the
Commissioner, she shall inform the complainant in writing within 30 days of the filing of
the complaint. Consequently, complaints which are vague, unfounded or excessive,
particularly due to their recurring nature, or if they are anonymous and/or do not contain
24 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/home_el/home_el?opendocument.
25 s.23(2) law 125(I)/2018.
26 s.23(4).






the necessary details, may not be examined.31 In such case the complainant shall be duly
informed. Section 29(d) indicates that the Commissioner ‘may not investigate a complaint
or discontinue its investigation for reasons of public interest and shall notify to the data
subject, within a reasonable period, the reasons for not investigating or for terminating
the investigation of the complaint’. It thus seems that the Cypriot legislator followed the
approach of the GDPR for complaint-handing, although it is not yet clear whether the
public interest ground under paragraph (d) could be used to allow the Commissioner to
reject minor claims to pursue the legitimate aim of achieving more effective and efficient
use of resources, effective judicial protection or even sound budgetary policies.
Question 11
The national law has dedicated Part X to administrative fines, offences and sanctions.
Section 32 indicates that theCommissioner shall impose administrative fines in accordance
with article 83 GDPR. Where the administrative fine remains unpaid it shall be collected
as a civil debt due to the Republic.32 An administrative fine imposed to a public authority
which relates to non-profitable activities shall not exceed 200,000 euro. Regarding the
offences committed under Section 33(1) by the processors, controllers, certification bodies,
public authorities or third persons, the sanctions vary depending on the seriousness and/or
type of the offense. The most serious sanction for specific offences amounts to
imprisonment of maximum 5 years and/or to a fine not exceeding 50,000 euro and for the
least serious offences the convicted person shall be subject to imprisonment of a maximum
of 1 year and/or to a fine not exceeding 10,000 euro. There is also a category of offences
convicted with a maximum of 3 years and/or to a fine not exceeding 30,000 euro.33 The
imposition of administrative fines is the sanction mostly used by the NSA in Cyprus. For
instance, the Commissioner has recently imposed a financial penalty of 10,000 euro to a
newspaper for unlawful disclosure of names and pictures of two police investigators in a
publication which allegedly involved inconvenience, unnecessary and unlawful detention
of a citizen. The Commissioner considered that the aim could be achieved by referring
only to the initials of their name and/or their faces being blurred and/or publishing
photographs drawn from a distant distance so that it was impossible to identify the persons,
and these actions would not bring any change in the nature of the case.34
31 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/page1i_gr/page1i_gr?opendocument.
32 s.32(2) law 125(I)/2018.
33 s.33(2) law 125(I)/2018.




Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Katerina Kalaitzaki
In addition to the corrective powers provided for in article 58(2) GDPR, the Cypriot
law adopted further corrective powers under section 25(e). In particular, theCommissioner
has the power to require the Cyprus Organization for the Promotion of Quality to revoke
the accreditation of a certification body, when she ascertains that the requirements for the
certification are not met or where actions taken by the certification body violate the
provisions of theGDPRor the relevant national law. According to section 49 law 44(I)/2019
implementing LED, the decision issued by the Commissioner, including the decisions
imposing a sanction, can be challenged before the Administrative Courts in accordance
with article 146 of the Constitution, while an appeal of the Administrative Court’s decision
can be made before the Supreme Court.35
In particular, in the recent case of Dias Publishing House, the Commissioner had
imposed an administrative fine on a local newspaper for disclosing a child’s name and his
health problem. The fine was challenged before the civil courts in accordance with article
146 of the Constitution of Cyprus and the Supreme Court acting in its capacity as an
administrative Court (now Administrative Court) had annulled it. However, the Supreme
Court’s ruling on the 1st of March 2019, reversed the previous decision by rejecting the
newspaper’s claims and confirming the Commissioner’s fine.36
Question 12
As discussed above, the Commissioner may impose corrective measures (including fines)
to controllers or processors, when they are in breach of the data protection legislation but
cannot grant compensation to affected data subjects. Contrary to article 82 GDPR, no
reference ismade under national law that data subjects should be compensated for damages
suffered for tangible and intangible harm. Specifically, any personwho has sufferedmaterial
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of the GDPR, by the controller or
the processor, has the right to seek compensation before a Civil Court in accordance with
the Civil Offences Law Cap. 148. Under section 3 of the Civil Offences Law, any person
who suffered any damage by reason of a civil wrong (e.g. negligence, breach of statutory
duties and regulations) shall be entitled to seek from the person committing or liable for
such civil wrong the remedies which the Court has the power to grant.





Law 125(I)/2018 does not make any reference to the representation of data subjects. On
the contrary, a ‘representative’ is defined in the law as a natural or legal person established
in the Union who, designated by the controller or processor in writing pursuant to article
27GDPR, represents the controller or processor with regard to their respective obligations.
On the other hand, law 44(I)/2019 implementing LED, includes the representation of data
subjects under section 51, stating that ‘the data subject shall have the right to mandate a
not-for-profit body, organisation or association which has been duly constituted in
accordance with the relevant national legislation, has statutory objectives which are in the
public interest and is active in the field of protection of data subject’s rights and freedoms
with regard to the protection of their personal data, to lodge the complaint referred to in
section 48 and to exercise the rights referred to in sections 49 and 50 on his behalf’. It is
in fact the direct implementation of article 55 LED into national law. As a result, based on
section 51, the representative of the data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint
before theCommissioner, the right to an effective judicial remedy against theCommissioner
and against the controller or processor.37 The same rights that the representative of the
data subject would have been entitled to if the Regulation was implemented in law
125(I)/2018.
The omission of implementing article 80 GDPR into the relevant national law seems
to have slightly affected the data protection system in two aspects; (1) the fact that the right
to receive compensation referred to in article 82 cannot be exercised by the representative
of the data subject, which does not create any complexities since a claim for compensation
can only be raised before the Civil Courts and (2) that the representative cannot act
independently of a data subject’s mandate to lodge a complaint with the supervisory
authority as provided under article 80(2). As a result, the combination of laws 44(I)/2019
and 128(I)/2018 currently allow a complaint to be lodged firstly by the person whose data
are being processed (the data subject) and secondly by a non-profit body, organisation or
association as referred to in section 51 law 44(I)/2019. The information and power
asymmetries created between the data controllers/processors and data subjects are thus
mitigated by providing the possibility of representative actions in national law.
Question 14
During the recent years in Cyprus not many incidents have been recorded of regulators
intervening in data processing related complaints. In fact, the Cypriot Ombudsman
37 s.48-50 law 44(I)/2019.
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(Commissioner for Administration and Protection of Human Rights) seems to intervene
only when indispensable and only in cases which involve serious human rights
infringements beyond the protection of personal data. For instance, following a complaint
about an excessive number of cameras used in a medical institution where a person in
custody was hospitalised, the Commissioner asked the Prison Department to set criteria
for the number of cameras to be placed in areas declared as cells in accordance with the
Prison Law.38 A uniform practice had to be followed on the basis of the severity of each
case and the principles of proportionality, transparency and accountability. After the Prison
Department informed theCommissioner of the criteria it adopted, anOfficerwas authorised
to carry out an inspection in the site in order to determine whether the cameras in that
room fulfilled the criteria set by the Prison Department itself.39 The inspection found that
a limited number of cameras did not meet the pre-determined criteria and a letter was
sent to the PrisonsDepartment to remove them in order to complywith the data protection
guidelines. At that point, the Cypriot Ombudsman intervened with recommendations
addressed to the Prison Department to remove the cameras and comply with the letter of
the Commissioner for Personal Data.40
Another example is when the jurisdiction of the claims lodged is not clear and the
different authorities of the government need to cooperate to guide the applicants and refer
the claims to the competent office. For example, a wave of complaints was recently lodged
concerningmobile phone bills that did not fall within the jurisdiction of theCommissioner,
since the Commissioner is considering complaints about unsolicited advertising spam but
is not empowered to charge for complaints. As a result, the Office of the Commissioner
for the protection of personal data informed the applicants that they should refer thematter
to the Electronic Communications and Mail Regulatory Commissioner (ERIET).41 In
addition, the Commissioner indicated that if the applicants’ consent for activation of a
subscription service has been diverted through misleading advertising, they can refer the
matter to the Competition and Consumer Protection Office of the Ministry of Trade and
Tourism.42





40 Ibid, p. 121.
41 Ibid, p. 56.
42 Ibid, p. 56.
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D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
In Cyprus, there appears to be no express definition of the notion of national security
which would differ from the understanding at the European level of the area of national
security as activities carried out by the State itself or State authorities, traditionally
intertwined with the areas of public security, defence and the fighting of crime provided
a vital national interest security is at stake. TheCyprus Constitution43 provides that national
security can restrict some of the fundamental freedoms protected under the Constitution,
such as the right to privacy, through a proportionality test. Article 15 of the Constitution
in particular provides that ‘[e]very person has the right to respect for his private and family
life’ (paragraph 1) and that ‘[t]here shall be no interference with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary only in the interests of the
security of theRepublic or the constitutional order or the public safety or the public order
or the public health or the public morals or for the protection of the rights and liberties
guaranteed by this Constitution to any person’ (paragraph 2).44 The national courts
interpreted the scope of article 15 of the Constitution in landmark case law.45 There was
an amendment of article 15 of the Constitution through the Ninth Amendment of the
Constitution Law 69(I)/2016 which provides that the right may also be restricted for the
protection of transparency and for measures against corruption in public life.46 Article 15
of the Constitution, as amended, has been used as a legal basis to find national legislation
unconstitutional as far as transparency and corruption in public life are concerned.47
Also of relevance to privacy is article 17 of the Constitutionwhich provides that ‘[e]very
person has the right to respect for, and to the secrecy of, his correspondence and other
communication if such other communication is made through means not prohibited by
law’ (paragraph 1). This is followed by paragraph 2 which provides that ‘[t]here shall be
no interference with the exercise of this right, unless such interference is permitted in
accordance with the law, in the following cases: A. Of convicted or unconvicted prisoners;
B. Following a court order issued pursuant to the provisions of the law, upon an application
by theAttorney-General of the Republic, and interference shall constitute ameasure which
is necessary in a democratic society only in the interests of the security of the Republic
43 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, 1960. For an unofficial English translation, see:
www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013.pdf?lang=en.
44 Emphasis added.
45 President of the Republic v. House of Representatives [2000] 3 CLR 238 (in Greek).
46 See Emilianides, p. 181.
47 App. 11-12, 14-16/2016, President of the Republic v. House of Representatives, judgment of 16 March 2017
(in Greek).
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or for the prevention, investigation or prosecution of the following serious criminal offences:
[…].48 C. Following a court order issued in accordance with the provisions of the law, for
the investigation or prosecution of a serious criminal offence in respect of which, in case
of conviction, a sentence of imprisonment of five years or more is provided and the
interference concerns access to relevant electronic communication data of movement and
position and to relevant data which are necessary for the identification of the subscriber
or and the user’ (paragraph 2). Again national courts have interpreted this constitutional
provision in landmark case law,49 with respect in particular to the transposition of the EU
Data Retention Directive into national law.50 Law providing for the Retention of
Telecommunication Data with the intention of investigating serious criminal offences
183(I)/2007 provides in sections 4 and 5 for the access of police officers to
telecommunications data. These sections were declared unconstitutional on the basis of
article 17 of the Constitution. In a nutshell, the Court held that sections 4 and 5 law
183(I)/2007 were not enacted for the purposes of harmonisation with the Data Retention
Directive as they were going beyond its scope and objectives. The Court considered that
there was no provision in the Directive requiring Member States to enact legislation
enabling access of the police to such telecommunications data, hence sections 4 and 5 law
183(I)/2007were not covered by the provisions of theDirective andwere found inconsistent
with article 17 of the Constitution. Article 17 was subsequently amended with the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution Law 51(I)/10, to ensure the compatibility of sections 4
and 5 law 183(I)/2007 with the Constitution, by adding article 17 section 2 (C) as provided
above.51 Following the annulment of the Data Retention Directive by the CJEU in Digital
Rights Ireland,52 the SupremeCourt consideredwhether this had any effect upon the validity
of law 183(I)/2007.53 The Supreme Court held by majority that law 183(I)/07 had been
promulgated as domestic legislation and accordingly could not be affected by the annulment
of the Data Retention Directive.54
National security issues do not appear to feature directly in data protection case law
as far as the interpretation of constitutional provisions is concerned. The focus is more on
48 Emphasis added.
49 Matsias and Others [2011] 1 CLR 152, full bench of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, following Alexandrou
[2010] 1 CLR 17 (in Greek).
50 For a detailed legal appraisal, see C. Kombos and S. Laulhé Shaelou, ‘The Cypriot Constitution under the
Impact of EU law: An Asymmetrical Formation’ in A. Albi and S. Bardutzky (eds), National constitutions
in European and global governance: democracy, rights and the rule of law, Asser Press, 2019, pp. 1373-1432,
pp. 1412-15.
51 See Emilianides, pp. 182-4.
52 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and
Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
53 Attorney-General v. Isaia, Civil App. 402/2012, Judgment of 7 July 2014 (in Greek). See however dissenting
decision.
54 For a critical approach, see Kombos and Laulhé Shaelou, pp. 1414-15.
211
Cyprus
the prevention, investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences and law
enforcement. The balancing exercise between fundamental rights (privacy) and national
security is however inherent in the Constitution.
With respect to national legislation, it should be noted that section 33(4) law 125(I)/2018
pertaining to administrative offences and sanctions provides that if a person is convicted
of committing any of the offences referred to in section 33(4)(1), ‘which damages the
interests of the Republic or impairs the free governing of the Republic or compromises
national security,55 he or she shall be subject to imprisonment which shall not exceed five
(5) years or to a fine which shall not exceed fifty thousand (50,000) euro or to both of these
penalties.’ In the post-GDPR regime, national security therefore appears to constitute an
aggravating circumstance affecting the sanction imposed on any controller or processor
in breach of this provision.
Law 44(I)/2019 implementing the LED inCyprus provides in section 4(2) that its scope
does not extend to the activities of the Cyprus Intelligence Service and of the Police when
pertaining to the protection of national security. Section 15 of the law reproduces article
13 of the Directive on information to be made available or given to the data subject and
introduces an exception for national security among others, subject to a proportionality
test (section 15(3)(d)). Section 17 of the law reproduces article 15 of the Directive on
limitations to the rights of access and introduces an exception to protect national security
subject to a proportionality test (section 17(1)(d)). Section 18 of the law reproduces article
16 of the Directive on the right to rectification or erasure of personal data and restriction
of processing and introduces the possibility to restrict the obligation to provide information
on the refusal to erase on the grounds of national security, subject to the same
proportionality test (section 18(7)(d)). Following an assessment of the adequate level of
protection of personal data in the third country concerned, including by reference to its
national security, law 44(I)/2019 allows in sections 38(2) and section 41 the transfer of
personal data to third countries without prior authorisation or in special cases on grounds
of serious threats to national security.
In terms of administrative principles, procedures and practice, the powers of the Data
Protection Commissioner in Cyprus can be limited on national security grounds under
the pre-GDPR law 138(I)/2001. Section 23 provides that national-security-sensitive
information can be excluded from the scope of the law (paragraph 1) provided this is
documented through a formal confirmation from any Minister or the Attorney General
of the Republic of Cyprus that such information need to be excluded, in order to protect
national security (paragraph 2), unless such a disclosure would put national security at
risk (paragraph 3). Administrative practice also refers to national security as a potential
justification – interpreted strictly – for the restriction of privacy in highly risky workplaces,
55 Emphasis added.
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such as in the Data Protection Commissioner’s Opinion 2/2018 on the use of video
surveillance at the workplace and biometric systems56 and related decisions of the
Commissioner.57
More generally, national security constitutes an express restriction on the following
administrative rules, as expressed in the Law on good administration 158(I)/99: keeping
minutes (section 24(4)) and the publication of the due reasoning of an administrative act
(confidentiality) (Art 26(4). It should be noted that the publication of personal data
constitutes in both cases another exception to the said rules.
Thus, there appears to be no generic definition of national security in the Constitution,
legislation or in administrative practice other than the contextual delimitation of public
security, defence, State security and the fighting of crime, subject to proportionality. Judicial
practice may also be limited in the context of national security per se, for evident reasons,
but the increased focus on the protection of personal data at the European level in the last
decades, including through the Charter, has no doubt lent a new lens to the
contextualisation of law enforcement and/or national security activities at the national
level.
The question of the application of the Charter to law enforcement and/or national
security activities in Cyprus, in the context of personal data retention, disclosure and
protection, has increasingly come to the fore. In an appeal before the Supreme Court of a
decision of a lower court to allow the disclosure of personal data (IP address) in the course
of criminal investigations as provided by the law, the Court considered the extent to which
the Tele 2 Sverige AB jurisprudence of the CJEU on the interpretation of article 15(1) of
Directive 2002/58, could affect the domestic framework applicable to serious criminal
offences in Cyprus (Law providing for the Retention of Telecommunication Data with the
intention of investigating serious criminal offences 183(I)/2007 and laws related to child
pornography). This was so in view of the fact that the decision of the CJEU was issued
after the given order for disclosure and notwithstanding the previous rulings of the Supreme
Court inMatsias and Isaia.58 As theCJEU recalls, article 15(1) ofDirective 2002/58 provides
for derogations from the principle of confidentiality of communications and related traffic
data ‘to safeguard national security — that is, State security — defence, public security,
and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of
unauthorised use of the electronic communication system’, or one of the other objectives
56 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/page3f_gr/page3f_gr?opendocument (in
Greek).
57 See 2017 annual report, pp. 57-67 www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/reports_
gr/reports_gr?opendocument (in Greek).
58 Appeal 26/2017, Artemis Kkolos, judgment of 26 April 2018 (5 judges) (in Greek).
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specified in article 13(1) of Directive 95/46.59 The Supreme Court found that what was at
stake was the review of legality of the said order, also vis-à-vis EU law and the Charter in
accordance with article 1A of the Constitution, and that the interpretation of the Directive
given by the CJEU with respect to the protection of fundamental rights as per the Charter
must be treated as if it existed since the inception of theDirective. As stated inTele 2 Sverige
AB, it derives that ‘the importance both of the right to privacy, guaranteed in article 7 of
the Charter, and of the right to protection of personal data, guaranteed in article 8 of the
Charter, as derived from the Court’s case-law […], must be taken into consideration in
interpreting article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58’.60 The Supreme Court held that Tele 2
Sverige AB could affect the legality of the said order to the extent that access was given to
personal data retained on the basis of legal provisions which may be incompatible with
the Charter but that the review of legality would require the examination of the
constitutionality of the legal framework in Cyprus which the Court did not proceed to
carry out in this case.
The review of the legality of sections 4(1) and (4) law 183(I)/2007 allowing for the
storage of data for sixmonthswith no safeguardswas conducted by Judge Psara-Miltiadou
in an application for a Certiorari seeking to annul disclosure and investigation orders for
alleged serious criminal offences.61 Looking at the case ‘from the lens of EU law’ and
referring to Tele 2 Sverige AB, the Judge finds that the protection of telecommunication
data is not absolute and that Member States may derogate on the grounds as stated by the
CJEU in paragraph 90 of Tele 2 Sverige AB (exhaustive list). The orders at stake in the case
were found to be quite strict and clearly falling under the category of detection of criminal
offences, serious ones. She then turned to the principle of proportionality as examined by
the CJEU in Ministerio Fiscal,62 where the CJEU stated that the objective pursued by
legislation governing access to data ‘must be proportionate to the seriousness of the
interference with the fundamental rights in question that that access entails’ and that
‘serious interference can be justified, in areas of prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of criminal offences, only by the objective of fighting crime which must also
be defined as ‘serious’… By contrast, when the interference that such access entails is not
serious, that access is capable of being justified by the objective of preventing, investigating,
detecting and prosecuting ‘criminal offences’ generally’.63 Linking proportionality to the
discretion of the national courts in the process, she refers to two decisions of the Supreme
59 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C–203/15 and C–698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB [2016]
ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para. 90.
60 Ibid, para. 93.
61 Application 3/19, Michael DT, judgment of 16 January 2019 (in Greek).
62 Judgment of 2 October 2018 in Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:788.
63 Ibid, paras 51, 56-7.
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Court of Cypruswhere the proportionality test was applied,64 and leads to consider whether
the interference with articles 7 and 8Charter was ‘serious’. In all three cases the interference
with fundamental rights, if any, was deemed not serious.
It appears quite clearly from the above that the courts in Cyprus, who are also
responsible for issuing, limiting and/or rejecting access orders to personal data in specific
instances of law enforcement, have accepted the application of the Charter to data retention
for overriding purposes such as the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution
of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system. It
would be expected that the courts adopt a similar reasoning by analogy for the safeguard
of national security, defence or public security. For the moment however, it would appear
that the balance between law enforcement or overriding interests vis-à-vis fundamental
rights in the field of personal data retention leans towards the former, with not much
justification on the basis of the Charter.
64 Appeal 219/15, Eudoka, judgment issued on 29 December 2016 and Appeal 51/2017, judgment issued on




Ondřej Serdula and Vojtěch Bartoš*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The General Data Protection Regulation1 (hereinafter “GDPR”) was implemented2 into
the Czech legal order by two main instruments – Act no. 110/2019 Coll., on the Processing
of Personal Data (hereinafter “Data Processing Act”),3 and Act no. 111/2019 Coll.,
Amending Certain Laws in Connection with the Adoption of the Act on the Processing
of Personal Data (hereinafter “Accompanying Act”). The first thing to note about these
acts is that they both entered into force on the 24th April 2019, almost one year after the
GDPR. The unexpected delay in the legislative process has led to the undesirable situation
in which both the GDPR and the “old” national legislation implementing the Directive on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data4 (hereinafter
“Directive 95/46”) were in force for almost one year. Therefore, the addressees of these
norms had to find their way around which of the national rules should be completely
disregarded in favour of the GDPR rules and which, on the other hand, should be further
applied together with the new directly applicable EU legislation.
The Data Processing Act is divided into five chapters. The first chapter lays down the
aim and general scope of the Act. The second chapter implements the GDPR and as such
contains only the necessary rules to make the GDPR work within the national context.
* Ondřej Serdula is lawyer in the EU Law Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic
and Ph.D. student at the Law Faculty of Charles University in Prague. Vojtěch Bartoš is Junior Associate
at HAVEL & PARTNERS s.r.o., advokátní kancelář, member of its Privacy Expert Team. Presented views
are our own.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 It should be noted that in theCzech context, the term “adaptation” is generally usedwith regard to adjustment
of national legal order to the directly applicable instruments of EU law.
3 The word processing was chosen to distinguish the new legislation from the “old” Act no. 101/2000 Coll.,
on the Protection of Personal Data, which implemented the Directive 95/46.
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
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The third chapter implements Directive 2016/680 and as such deals with the processing
of personal data for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution
of criminal offenses. The fourth chapter regulates the processing of personal data for
national security and defence purposes. The last chapter determines the status and the
competences of the National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”).5
It is clear from the above-mentioned outline that although all three substantial chapters
of theData ProcessingAct cover the processing of personal data, each required a completely
different approach from the national legislator. For example, while the second chapter
needed to be strictly complementary to the GDPR, the third chapter, on the other hand,
needed to fully implement the directive and therefore contain all the relevant substantive
rules. The fourth chapter then deals with the very specific kind of processing that falls
completely outside the scope of the EU law. Therefore, the Data Processing Act contains
three very different sets of rules for the processing of personal data, depending on the
purpose of the processing. However, this can make the Act itself somewhat difficult to
understand for the common citizen.
While implementing the GDPR, the Czech government aimed for a somewhat
minimalist approach, clearly stating its goal not to increase the regulatory burden on
enterprises and avoid “gold-plating” at all costs. Although it is hard to judge whether the
Czech legislation made maximal use of all the possible exceptions provided for in the
GDPR, it probably comes very close. It certainly does notmake use of any of the possibilities
to increase such burden.6 The most important rule in this regard is contained in paragraph
11 of the Data Processing Act. This paragraph allows for restriction of all the obligations
and rights in articles 12 to 22 GDPR, as well as article 5 GDPR, with regard to all kinds of
processing, as long as these exceptions represent necessary and proportionate measures
to safeguard the interestsmentioned in article 23(1)GDPR. To prevent abuse of this general
exception, each controller is obligated to report every such restriction to theNSA.Although
it may be debatable whether such general exception is in line with the requirements of
article 23(2) GDPR, the author considers it completely logical, as it seems practically
impossible to explicitly and specifically cover all the necessary exceptions for all the possible
types of processing in national law. Moreover, the obligation to report these restrictions
to the NSA should pave the way to settled administrative practice and case law with regard
to the more common types of processing. Most importantly, the Accompanying Act
5 In the Czech Republic, the role of the NSA is performed by the Office for the Protection of Personal Data.
Office for the Protection of Personal Data, www.uoou.cz/en/. All webpages referred to were visited
3 February 2020.
6 See, for example, article 9(4), article 37(4) or article 35(10) GDPR.
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introduced more precise rules for many types of processing.7 These will take precedence
over the “catch-all exception” contained in paragraph 11 of the Data Processing Act.
The Data Processing Act itself then introduces more concrete exceptions with regard
to the processing necessary for compliance with a legal obligation or the performance of
a task carried out in the public interest. For instance, it provides for certain simplifications
with regard to the information duty of the controller or the exception from the obligation
to carry out data protection impact assessment.
The access to official documents within the meaning of article 86 GDPR is covered by
Act no. 106/1999 Sb., on the FreeAccess to Information, which states that access to personal
data should be granted only under the specific laws regulating the protection of personal
data. However, it also lays down some exceptions to this rule. For example, some personal
data about public officials or persons receiving public funding can be provided. The conflict
between the freedom of receiving information and protection of personal data is then
usually decided by the balancing of conflicting interests in each particular case. Because
of that, there is now a rather vast body of case law regarding these issues, with notable
cases dealingwith access to information about the salaries of public servants, past affiliations
of judges with the communist party etc.8
The processing of national identification numbers within the meaning of article 87
GDPR is governed mainly by Act no. 133/2000 Coll., on the Evidence of Residents and
Birth Certificate Numbers. This act allows for such processing only when it is prescribed
by a specific law, necessary for public administration purposes, necessary for exercising
legal claims or with the consent of the data subject. Naturally, many laws and regulations
require certain subjects (banks, employers, insurance companies) to process national
identification numbers. The Czech Constitutional Court also recently annulled the part
of the law which required the tax identification number (corresponding with the national
identification number) of the seller or service provider to be present on every receipt.9
The Data Processing Act does not contain specific rules for the processing of personal
data in the context of employment within the meaning of article 88 GDPR, so the general
rules of the GDPR will usually apply. Nevertheless, some specific rules for processing can
be found in Act. 262/2006 Coll., Labor Codex. For instance, except in some specific cases,
the Labor Codex generally forbids secret monitoring of behaviour or communications of
employees. It also forbids the employer to require disclosure of information that is not
directly related to the employment relationship, again with some minor exceptions.
Naturally, several acts of public law also require the employer to carry out the processing
7 For instance, the Accompanying Act contains specific rules for processing of personal data in areas of social
security, tax collection, insurance business, medical services etc.
8 Judgment of the Constitutional Court dated 17 October 2017, no. IV. ÚS 1378/16; Judgment of the Consti-
tutional Court dated 8 November 2011, no. IV. ÚS 1642/11.
9 Judgment of the Constitutional Court dated 12 December 2017, no. Pl. ÚS 26/16.
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of employees’ personal data, even after the termination of the employment contract (for
instance for tax or social insurance purposes).
Closely following the wording and logic of article 89 GDPR, the Data Processing Act
also introduces general exceptions with regard to processing for scientific, historical and
statistical purposes. Processing for archiving purposes is regulated by Act no. 499/2004
Coll., on Archiving, which was amended by the Accompanying Act.
The Czech NSA exercises all the oversight and supervisory competencies prescribed
by the GDPR towards all the processing covered by the GDPR, apart from processing
operations of courts acting in their judicial capacity and the processing for journalistic,
academic, artistic and literary purposes (see below). The NSA can also set the criteria and
requirements for the purposes of article 41(3), 42(5) and 43(1) GDPR, adopt standard
contractual clauses for the purposes of article 28(8) and 46(2) GDPR and approve codes
of conduct for the purposes of article 40(5) GDPR. The Czech NSA also exercises
supervisory competences over processing for the purposes covered by the third chapter
of theData ProcessingAct, except for processing operations of courts and public prosecutor
offices. The Czech NSA has no competences over the processing for national security and
defence purposes.
Last but not least, thanks to the unexpected MP amendment to the Accompanying
Act, the Czech NSA also gained the competence to review decisions of the other public
authorities in the area of access to official documents. It remains to be seen how it exercises
this new and from a comparative point of view rather unorthodox competence.
Question 2
In the Czech Republic, the catalogue of fundamental rights is not contained in the
constitution itself, but in a separate document, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms (hereinafter “national Charter”). Protection of the private sphere of the individual
is then somewhat scattered among articles 7, 10, 12 and 13 of the national Charter. Article
7(1) of the national Charter, which guarantees the inviolability of the person and privacy,
is mostly used in relation to interferences with physical and mental integrity. Articles 12
and 13 then explicitly cover some particular areas of the private sphere, namely the sanctity
of home and secrecy of communication. Therefore, the most important with regard to
privacy is article 10, reproduced below:
Article 10
1. Everybody is entitled to protection of his or her human dignity, personal integrity,
good reputation, and his or her name.
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2. Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized interference in his or her
personal and family life.
3. Everybody is entitled to protection against unauthorized gathering, publication or
other misuse of his or her personal data.
The content of article 10 of the national Charter is often being compared to the content
of article 8 of the EuropeanConvention onHumanRights (hereinafter “ECHR”). However,
unlike the Article 8 ECHR, article 10(3) of the national Charter explicitly mentions the
protection against unauthorized gathering, publication or other misuse of personal data.
Therefore, with regard to differentiating between privacy and data protection, the Czech
national Charter goes further than the ECHR, but not as far as the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “EU Charter”), which gives the right for
protection of personal data its own article, name, and also provides some other details,
such as rights of the data subject or the need for independent oversight.
In most cases concerning data protection, article 10(3) of the national Charter is
referenced as the key right, sometimes treated as sort-of semi-independent “right for
informational self-determination”. Nevertheless, the actual practice of national courts
varies. Article 10 as a whole or other related articles of the national Charter are also
sometimes referenced in these cases (for instance article 13 in cases concerning data
retention). It is hard to say if these inconsistencies have some real consequences, since
none of these rights is absolute and, in the end, themethods for assessing the proportionality
of interference or balancing conflicting rights are the same.
In the opinion of the author, the EU Charter did not particularly change the way in
which Czech courts approach data protection, since the fundamental rights character of
data protection was recognized even before its adoption, be it in the national Charter, the
ECHR (as a part of private life) or in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”). Nevertheless, especially higher courts nowadays
usuallymake reference the EUCharter and the relevant jurisprudence of theCJEUwhenever
the EU law applies. But once again, the actual practice varies, and the courts sometimes
reach their own conclusions even in cases where the interpretation of the EU Charter is
by no means clear or even where the CJEU would probably reach different conclusions.
The Supreme Administrative Court decision on access to information about the salaries
of public officials10 or the latest data retention judgment of the Constitutional Court11 come
to mind. Last but not least, the Constitutional Court maintains that although the Czech
national law must be interpreted in line with EU law and the EU Charter, the EU Charter
10 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court dated 22 October 2014, no. 8 As 55/2012.
11 Judgment of the Constitutional Court dated 22 May 2019, no. Pl. ÚS 45/17.
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alone cannot act as a reference point for assessing the constitutionality of national legal
acts.12
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The approach of private data controllers to the protection of personal data has long been
minimalistic. Arguably that was so mainly due to the limited enforcement activity of the
NSA which if a breach of the controller’s obligation was found firstly ordered to remedy
such breach. Only in a second step if the controller did not comply, the NSA imposed in
some cases a monetary sanction (often sanctions of not particularly dissuasive nature).
Together with the limited resources of theNSAboth financially and personally such system
created incentives for the controllers not to pay too much attention and money to the
implementation of the data protection legislation. Before the GDPR came into effect (or
before it became clear that it would become effective) the interpretation and application
of the principles of fair processing, purpose limitation and data minimisation by private
controllers was mainly the domain of Czech subsidiaries of multinational corporations
which obtained internal rules (including internal data protection directives) from their
parent companies and which also ‘inherited’ the processes of handling personal and other
data. Such companies generally complied with the standard level of protection of personal
data required by Directive 95/46 also in particular with regard to the principles of fair
processing, purpose limitation and data minimisation. That was not quite the case with
smaller or local business across the market where the knowledge of the legal regulation of
the processing of personal data was rather limited.
A relatively satisfying application of the principle of purpose limitation could be seen
even preGDPR in theHRdepartments ofmost controllers (i.e. when processing employees’
personal data). The majority of the employees’ data were processed for the purposes laid
down by the relevant legislation (labour law, social security, health insurance, etc.). Such
data were also usually handled with due care. Problems usually arose with regard to the
principle of data minimisation (employers often aggregated far more personal data than
required by law) and the principle of fair processing and transparency since employees
were usually not informed about the scope of the processing (such as transfers of personal
data of the employees to other countries in case of multinational corporations).
12 See above-cited Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. Pl. ÚS 45/17, para. 54.
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Usually satisfactory (at least in comparison to other data processing)was the application
and implementation of all the above mentioned principles with regard to the use of CCTV
(typically security cameras in business premises, parking lots, etc.). That was mainly due
to the fact that such security surveillance systems had to be notified to theNSA and therefore
certain minimal requirements such as complying with the principles of purpose limitation
and data minimisation had to be complied with. Also such systems have certain labour
law implications and therefore more attention was paid to their compatibility with all legal
requirements when installed. Operations of suchCCTV systemsweremoreover repeatedly
subject to review by domestic courts which set some border lines for the controllers.13
With the GDPR and in particular due to the potentially very high sanctions imposed
under it a big part of private data controllers sought out legal help and implemented the
fundamental principles of processing of personal data into their processes (the mere fact
that the majority of the companies on the market needed to implement even these
fundamental principles shows the state of things in the “pre-GDPR era”). Usually the
controllers had to newly adopt internal rules and policies for handling personal data,
handling the exercise of data subjects’ rights (usually no such processes existed, very often
in practice the relevantmanagers were not even aware of such rights or their understanding
was somewhat misguided), handling potential data breaches (some rules with regard to
general IT security were usually implemented however regardless of the data protection
legislation), data retention schemes and related processes for timely erasure of personal
data.
Firstly, it must be said that the NSA does not regularly publish its decisions. It only
publishes notices and summaries of chosen decisions. The authors therefore use the limited
public sources and their professional experience when they refer to the decisions of the
NSA.
The NSA has in general in its practice enforced the fundamental principles both pre
GDPR and after its adoption. The enforcement of the principles of purpose limitation and
data minimisation were probably in the centre of the enforcement activities of the NSA.
It can be illustrated on the decision making practice of the NSA related to the personal
data published in publically accessible registers such as the land register. It was a common
practice in the Czech Republic namely in the construction business that companies offered
their goods and services to persons on the basis of records in the land register. The NSA
however decided that such personal data cannot be fully used (i.e. not all of the data from
the register) for marketing and commercial purposes without further consent of the data
13 One of the cases from the Czech Supreme Administrative Court was submitted to the CJEU as a reference
for preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the household exemption in which the Court of Justice issued




subjects. Such processing would lack a proper legal basis and would be contrary to the
principle of purpose limitation and data minimisation.14 The GDPR made the use of such
publically available personal data even stricter since it does not contain any legal basis for
such processing compared to the former Data Protection Act.15 The principle of fair
processing is applied and assessed by theNSA together as onewith the principles of legality
and transparency.
Generally speaking, pre-GDPR the use of personal data as well as any other data by
most private controllers was in the Czech Republic governed mostly by their commercial
needs and not primarily by the legal principles of processing of personal data. That changed
partly with the GDPR which pointed the attention of the relevant managers also to the
privacy aspect. On the other hand with the limited resources the NSA has at its disposal
it focuses mainly on the application and enforcement of the fundamental principles set
out in article 5 GDPR. However, the NSA refuses to take a stricter approach towards the
controllers and impose fines in an amount that would be a more persuasive incentive for
the controllers to invest into the protection of personal data.16
Question 4
Firstly, there is so far no case law of any Czech court to the application and interpretation
of the GDPR in that regard. All cases cited relate to the Data Protection Act.
Particularly these two legal bases weremost distinctly applied and interpreted byCzech
courts in the context of the use of CCTV. In that regard the Czech courts and most notably
the Supreme Administrative Court explained that the operation of CCTV cannot be based
on the consent of the data subjects but rather on the protection of the legitimate interest
of the controller which until then was not properly understood by the recipients of legal
norms in the Czech Republic. When assessing the legitimate interest the Supreme
Administrative Court used the traditional proportionality test of the Czech Constitutional
Court when balancing two fundamental rights. Firstly, the use of CCTV must be suitable
14 Decision of the NSA of 2 September 2014 no. UOOU-06722/14.
15 Section 5 para. 5 of the Act No. 101/2000 Coll., on the protection of personal data and on the amendment
of other acts, as amended, allowed the use of contact details obtained from a public register for offering
goods or services to the data subjects. The Data Protection Act used to implement the Directive 95/46 and
was repealed by the Data Processing Act.
16 The highest penalty ever imposed by the NSA for the violation of the former Data Protection Act or the
GDPR was imposed in 2016 on T-Mobile Czech Republic a.s. for a data breach when a former employee
stole the database of T-Mobile’s clients and the fine amounted to 3.6 million Czech koruna which equals
to approximately 140 000 euro. However, such an amount of fine by the NSA is indeed extraordinary. Since
the GDPR came into effect the NSA imposed nine fines in total where six fines were in the amount of
approximately 200-1150 euro, one fine in the amount of 3000 euro and one fine in the amount of 10000
euro. Such amounts are much more illustrative of the practice of the NSA.
224
OndŘej Serdula and VojtĚch Bartoš
in order to achieve the pursued fundamental rights of the controller. Secondly, the use of
CCTV must be necessary in order to achieve the pursued aim. Thirdly, the importance
and gravity of the two fundamental right standing against each other must be assessed in
the light of the factual circumstances of the case at hand (balancing stricto sensu).17 In other
words when the processing of personal data is to be based on the legitimate interest, a test
of proportionality must be carried out.18
The Data Protection Act established the consent as the principal legal basis for any
processing of personal data from which other legal basis were merely an exception. As
such the consent was also applied by the courts and the exceptions to the principle were
to be interpreted narrowly. The right not to have personal data processed without consent
was interpreted to be a part of the right to the informational self-determination protected
by the Czech constitution, the right to private and family life protected by article 8 ECHR
and hence more broadly a part of one’s integrity as a fundamental precondition to a
dignified existence.19 Regardless of the change in the text of the relevant legal norm (the
GDPR formulates the different legal basis as equally valid) the aim and purpose of the
consent of the data subject remains and the Supreme Administrative Court itself noted
that the GDPR if applicable at the case at hand would not change its conclusions.
When interpreting the terms “consent” and “legitimate aim” the SupremeAdministrative
Court adopted the relevant case law of the ECJ as well as the opinions of the Article 29
Working Party an interprets these notions in their light.
Question 5
When entering the office, the chairwomen of the NSA issued a statement that personal
data and the right to have them protected is a fundamental and hence inalienable right.
However, there are decisions of the NSA which in fact allow trading of personal data for
a service.
In particular this practice developed in the context of loyalty programs which are very
common, process extremely large amounts of consumers’ personal data and became one
of the basic sources of business data for undertakings. Some controllers (most often
17 In its further case Law the Supreme Administrative Court explicitly refers in that regard to the analogical
case law of theCourt of Justice, namely judgment of 24November 2011 in JoinedCases C-468/10, Asociación
Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and C-469/10, Federación de Comercio
Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD), ECLI:EU:C:2011:777, judgment of 19 October 2016 in Case
C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v BundesrepublikDeutschland (Breyer), ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, judgment of 4May
2017 inCase C-13/16, Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde v Rīgas pašvaldības
SIA “Rīgas satiksme”, ECLI:EU:C:2017.
18 To that end see e.g. the judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court from 25 February 2015 no. 1 As
113/2012.
19 See in particular the judgement of the SupremeAdministrativeCourt from19April 2018 no. 2As 107/2017.
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companies selling consumer goods but also e.g. public transport companies) offer their
customers to become members of the loyalty program which gives the customer the
possibility of buying goods and services with discount, obtaining gifts and other benefits.
The terms and conditions of these loyalty programs mostly contain clauses regarding the
processing of personal data. Some of these programs present the processing of personal
data as based on the legitimate aim of the controller (processing being necessary for the
existence of the loyalty program), some of them process the clients’ personal data on the
basis of a contract (on themembership in the loyalty program) and other base the processing
of the personal data on the clients’ consent which is then a necessary prerequisite to the
membership in the loyalty program.
Admittedly the decisionmaking practice of theNSA in this regard is not very extensive
or unified. In the past the author in his practice came across opinions of the members of
the NSA who refused the consent as a basis for such processing of personal data with the
argumentation that such consent could not be regarded as freely given. On the other hand
the NSA issued a decision regarding the loyalty program of the Czech national railway
company which subjected the membership with two separate consents with processing of
personal data both for strictly marketing and individualised marketing purposes. In that
decision theNSA in principle stated that themembership in the loyalty program is entirely
voluntary for the customer who is not obliged in any way to take part in it. Also, according
to the NSA, not being a member of the loyalty program does not limit the customer in
using the services of the controller (i.e. mainly traveling by train). In the NSA’s opinion
the special prices and other special offers on the services of the controller are entirely in
the discretion of the controller and the customer cannot demand them. It is therefore for
the controller to decide under which conditions it will offer such benefits to its customers
including the requirement of processing of their personal data for marketing purposes.20
Question 6
The measures envisioned in article 22(2)(b) GDPR were introduced to several specific laws
through theAccompanying act. The automated decision-making and/or profiling is allowed
by law in the following areas: tax and duties collection, social security, medical insurance,
building and retirement savings, capital markets, financial crisis prevention and gambling
oversight. Generally, the automatic processing is by law allowed in situations where the
controller has to regularly issue a vast amount of rather trivial “decisions” (for example,
the yearly valorisation of pensions) or when automated processing and/or profiling seems
necessary to safeguard some important interests of state in themodern context (for example,
20 Decision of the NSA in the case no. UOOU-10668/18.
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using advanced data analytics for combatting tax fraud). Although the public authorities
still employ these methods rather rarely, their usage is expected to increase in the following
years with technological developments.
As for the safeguards, the controllers and processors are required to describe the relevant
algorithms and selection criteria in the records of processing activities and store them for
at least one year after the processing. It is also generally forbidden to issue “true
administrative decisions” within the meaning of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., Administrative
Procedure Code, based purely on automatic decision-making. Although the objection of
the data subject does not preclude further processing in these cases, the controller or the
processor is obliged to mark such personal data until the objection is resolved. Other
safeguards contained in the GDPR will generally also apply.
Question 7
On 25 January 2019 the NSA published a short notice regarding an inspection of the
controller Seznam.cz which is the second largest search engine in the Czech market after
Googlewith amarket share around 25%.According to the notice the inspectionwas focused
on the exercise of “the right to be forgotten”. The NSA found that all processes of the
controller when rights of data subjects under article 17 GDPR are exercised towards the
controller comply with the requirements of the GDPR.
In practice also other engines respond when data subjects exercise their rights. So far
to the best knowledge of the authors there has been no court litigation regarding “the right
to be forgotten” in the Czech Republic.
Question 8
In the Czech Republic, both the freedom of expression and the right to protection of
personal data are protected on the constitutional level, so the conflict between them is
usually resolved by a classic balancing rights test, considering all circumstances of each
particular case. Case law in this area, which often stems from civil law disputes concerning
media interference with personality rights of celebrities and public officials, closely follows
the jurisprudence of the ECHR in these types of cases. The public law regulation of media
also contains some specific legal institutes to remedy the interference with the privacy of
persons, such as the right to request publication of reaction or additional information.
The most serious interferences can also be dealt with under criminal law.
Interestingly enough, the previous Data Processing Act did not state any explicit
exceptionswith regard to freedomof expression. Therefore, in theory, all the data protection
rules applied also on data processing for journalistic purposes. In reality, this would
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disproportionately hinder all journalistic activities. Therefore, the NSA decided to enforce
the data protection rules in these cases much more reservedly in an effort not to disturb
the above-mentioned balance between the freedom of expression and the protection of
personal data.21
The lack of concrete rules for the reconciliation of these interests was meant to be
remedied by the Data Processing Act. Following discussions about various options with
media representatives and the NSA, the government proposal contained some specific
exceptions from the GDPR rules for the processing for journalistic, academic, artistic and
literary purposes. The goal of these exceptionswas to ensure that the duties of the controller
and the rights of the data subject cannot disproportionately hinder the freedom of
expression. For instance, the duty of the controller to inform the data subject (about the
identity of the controller, identity of its source and some other details about the processing)
or some rights of the data subject (to access, rectification, restriction of processing or right
to object) were in some way limited.
Nevertheless, the main goal of these exceptions was the adequate balance, so the duties
of controller or rights of the data subjects were generally not completely negated. They
were often only postponed, or they could be realized in some different way (for instance,
the information duty could be fulfilled by providing information about the general types
of regularly performed processing on the controller’s website). The extent of these
exceptions was also meant to reflect various stages of journalistic work (for instance,
limitations of data subjects’ right to access would be different before and after publication).
This approach was however met with great caution in the Czech parliament. Members
of the Parliament worried that these exceptions were to casuistic and that such approach
might lead to undesirable restrictions on the freedom of speech. In the end, the proposed
casuistic exceptions have been preserved, although some with different wording. More
importantly, the parliament also introduced a new general exception for the purposes of
journalistic, academic, artistic and literary processing. According to this general exception,
articles 5, 12 to 22, 33, 34, 56 a 58(1)(a),(b),(e),(f) and 58(2)(d),(f)(g) and chapters II, IV,
V and IX of the GDPR do not apply, apply proportionally or their use can be postponed
if it is necessary for the above-mentioned purposes. Chapter VII of the GDPR does not
apply at all. Application of some of these exceptions is however limited to cases where it
is unlikely to result in a high risk to the legitimate interests of the data subject.
Of course, such exception is extremely wide and vague. It is also quite poorly worded,
so its relation to the specific exceptions carried over from the government proposal is very
unclear. It seems that, in reality, all the actual balancing was once again left for the
administrative and judicial practice. This by itself does not pose an insurmountable problem,
since it is basically just a continuation of the previous state and prescribing the exact criteria
21 Office for the Protection of Personal Data, Opinion no. 5/2009, www.uoou.cz/files/stanovisko_2009_5.pdf.
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for the proportionality test in law is tricky anyway. Nevertheless, it is hard to see the logic
behind many of the exceptions, especially those from chapters VII and IX of the GDPR.
As mentioned above, the Data Processing Act entered into force quite recently, so it
remains to be seen how these exceptions are interpreted and applied in practice.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The NSA and the only responsible administrative authority enforcing the GDPR in the
Czech Republic is the Office for the Protection of Personal Data seated in Prague. The
NSA is established by law (formerly by the Data Protection Act and nowadays by the Data
Processing Act) which guarantees its formal and functional independence from the rest
of the executive branch.
The NSA has its own chapter in the state budget. The Chairperson is appointed and
dismissed by the President of the Republic on the basis of a proposal of the upper chamber
of the Parliament – the Senate. The Chairperson and the Vice-Chairpersons have to fulfil
some relatively strict requirements such as 40 years of age, bothmoral and criminal integrity
university education in the field of law or informatics, necessary knowledge of English,
German or French language and at least 5 years of practice in the field of data protection
or human rights. Different university education is also permissible if the person has at
least 10 years of relevant practice. The function of the Chairperson is incompatible with
the function of amember of the Parliament, judge, public prosecutor, or any other position
in the public administration and with the membership in any political party. The NSA has
two Vice-Chairpersons who are elected and dismissed on the basis of the Chairperson’s
proposal by the Senate. The NSA has further 7 inspectors who are appointed by the
President of the Republic on the basis of a proposal of the Senate for 10 years. Inspectors
have teams of co-workers on the executive level.22
It exercises all the competences given to the NSA by the GDPR and beyond that it also
exercises the competences of theNSAwithin themeaning ofDirective 2016/680.23 However,
it does not exercise these competences towards courts and public prosecutors which are
supervised within the structure of the courts or public prosecutors. Further it also compiles
22 Section 50 to 53 Data Processing Act.
23 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal




and publishes an annual report on its activities, ensures fulfilment of requirements following
from international treaties binding the Czech Republic, and from directly applicable law
of the EU and issues, on its own initiative, opinions to the Parliament, on the proposed
legislation in the field of personal data protection, if such legislation is not proposed by
the Government.24
TheNSA so far conducted approximately 53 inspections under the regime of theGDPR,
imposed 8 fineswhere the lowestwas approximately 200 euro and the highest approximately
10 000 euro.25
Question 10
The strategy for complaint-handling of the NSA is partly set by the legislation which
requires the NSA to have a yearly inspection schedule. The NSA then responds with the
rest of its capacities to the individual complaints and queries via its FAQs, a BasicHandbook
on the GDPR which was issued by the NSA and of course where necessary by assessing
individual complaints and if found appropriate initiating administrative proceedings
against the respective controller.
However, the NSA has not published any long-term complaint-handling strategy or
other information related to the key how it divides its resources.
Question 11
The Data Protection Act already offered the possibility (or rather obligation) of the NSA
to impose a corrective measure before it would impose a fine. It is therefore a standard
practice of the NSA even under the GDPR that it considers the gravity of the violation of
the GDPR and if possible it firstly imposes a corrective measure on the controller rather
than a fine (prompts the controller to remedy the situation immediately). Only if the
violation cannot be corrected, is grave or repeated, the NSA imposes a financial penalty.
The NSA indicated long before the GDPR became effective that it will not impose any
drastic sanctions under the GDPR as it was the general (mis)understanding namely of
articles 83(4) and (5) GDPR among the public. The NSA expressed through media and
other public channels that it considers the high sanction of 10 million euro or 20 million
euro respectively and the sanctions based on the turnover to be meant namely for large
multinational controllers and that it will more or less continue to impose fines up to 1 000
24 Section 54 of the Data Processing Act.
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000 Czech koruna (approx. 386,000 euro) which was the upper limit under the Data
Protection Act.
Given the relatively dramatic coverage of the GDPR in the Czech media before 25 May
2018 bordering sometimes with hysteria and at that time also no prospect of the
implementing national act being adopted soon the NSA presented that it wants to serve
as a place for consultations, help and support for the controllers and that it will be rather
lenient when assessing the violations and imposing any sanctions (at least for some time
after the effective date of the GDPR).
Question 12
TheCzech legal systemhas historically known the concept of damages for intangible harm.
Neither the Data Protection Act nor any other act however provided a specific damages
claim for a wrongdoing in the field of protection of personal data. As far as the authors
are aware there was no case in the Czech Republic in the “pre-GDPR era” where the courts
would adjudicate on such a claim brought under the general regime of damages provided
for by the Civil Code. Also we are not aware of any damages case brought to the Czech
courts under article 82 GDPR.
Until 2014 when the new Civil Code26 was adopted in the Czech Republic the damages
for intangible harm (in particular for personal injury) were strictly set by a Ministerial
Decree which provided a specific amount of damages for a particular type of personal
injury regardless of the circumstances of the individual case (set amount of damages for
e.g. a broken finger regardless of whether it was a finger of a piano virtuoso or a finger of
a parking lot guard). The new Civil Code to the contrary brought the (elsewhere not that
new) idea that damages for personal injury must be assessed by the courts individually in
the light of the particular case at hand. As a reaction to the new situation however the
SupremeCourt reacted by issuingmethodological guidelines for the assessment of damages
for personal injurywhich again brought backmany of the elements of the formerMinisterial
Decree.27 There is also in the Czech Republic a Government Regulation on the
Compensation ofWork Injury orOccupationalDiseasewhich implemented the very same
approach as the former Ministerial Decree.28
The compensation of intangible harm is therefore an area where there is no reliable
long-standing line of case law and theCzech courts are in general rather reluctant to award
high compensation for intangible harm. In the opinion of the authors it will require a
26 Act no. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code, as amended.
27 Accessible in Czech, https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/download/150027990.
28 Accessible in Czech, www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2015-276.
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significant amount of time until it becomes clear how the courts will approach the claims
brought under article 82 GDPR.
Question 13
The Czech law provides the possibility for data subjects to be represented by an NGO in
both civil and administrative proceedings. This is an exception to the general rule inwhich
only a natural person can act as such representative. However, there were already some
other areas of law where representation by an NGO was possible, mostly because it was
required by other EU law instruments (for instance in discrimination, consumer protection
and asylum cases).
To represent the data subject in court proceedings, the NGO must have the protection
of data subject rights listed as one of its activities in the founding document and must not
distribute its profits.Moreover, the person acting on behalf of theNGO in the proceedings
must have full legal education (there is no such requirement if the data subject decides to
be represented by natural person). There is no possibility for NGO’s to act by themselves
within the meaning of article 80(2) GDPR.
There are some NGO’s active in the field of data protection in the Czech Republic.29
Their activities include public information campaigns, submissions of comments on draft
legislation, granting awards and anti-awards, representing data subjects and even initiating
the constitutional review of the data retention legislation through MP’s.30 The Author is
not aware of any personal data cooperatives or unions in the Czech Republic.
Question 14
No formal platform for a regular cooperation of these bodies or regulators has been
established.
If any such cooperation exists it will be based almost entirely on personal relationships
between the individual officials or employees of the respective bodies and regulators.
29 Iuridicum Remedium, www.iure.org/EN; Data Protection Society www.ochranaudaju.cz/.
30 Share Safely, www.sdilejbezpecne.cz; Big Brother Anti-award https://bigbrotherawards.cz/.
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D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The Czech legal order does not contain a clear definition of “national security”. For the
purposes of this report, the notion of national security is perhaps best understood in
connection with the tasks of Czech intelligence services, as they are defined in the Act no.
153/1994 Coll., on the Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic. According to this act,
the tasks of the intelligence services include gathering and analysis of information:
– about intentions and activities directed against the democratic foundations, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic
– about foreign intelligence services
– about activities endangering state secrets
– about activitieswhose consequencesmay jeopardize the security or significant economic
interests of the Czech Republic
– about organized crime and terrorism
– important for the defence and security of the Czech Republic
The notion of public security is therefore quite extensive, including also the issues of
combatting organized crime and terrorism or safeguarding significant economic interests
of the state.
Asmentioned, chapter IV of theData ProcessingAct governs the processing of personal
data for these purposes. Its rules are however only subsidiary to specific laws governing
the activities of individual intelligence services. Understandably, the competences of
controllers and processors are generally much wider and the data subject’s rights much
more limited in this area. Although the GDPR did not have any impact on the processing
of personal data in this area, some changes are expected to come in reaction to the revision
of the CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data in near future.
National authorities did not accept the view that the conclusions of the Tele 2 and
Watson judgment31 apply on data retention for national security purposes. In fact, the
Czech Republic actively argues against this view in several ongoing CJEU cases.32 In the
view of the Czech government, even if EU law were to apply to such processing, the
31 Judgement of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C–203/15 and C–698/15, Tele2 Sverige v. Post-och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and others (Tele 2 and
Watson and others), EU:C:2017:214.
32 See ongoing cases C-623/17, Privacy International, C-511/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others and C-
520/18, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones a Germanophone and Others.
233
Czech Republic
conditions for proportionality would need to be vastly different from joined cases C–203/15
andC–698/15,Tele 2/Watson, due to the different nature of threats against national security
and instruments needed to prevent these threats.
However, it should also be noted that the Czech Constitutional Court recently ruled
that the general data retention obligation is in accordance with the Czech constitution,
even for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offences.33
33 See above-cited Judgment of the Constitutional Court no. Pl. ÚS 45/17.
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Denmark
Søren Sandfeld Jakobsen*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
InDenmark, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (theGeneralData ProtectionRegulation, hereinafter
“GDPR”) is implemented in Act no 502 of 23 May 2018 on Data Protection (in Danish:
“databeskyttelsesloven”).1 The Data Protection Act (or “the Act”) is based on Report no
1565 on GDPR and the Legal Framework for Danish Law (hereinafter “the Report”).
Although a regulation, GDPR offers considerable flexibility in that it stipulates that
Member States in several situations may or even shall adopt national rules. These national
rules may either specify a given rule in GDPR, make use of an option which has been left
to Member States, adopt exceptions to certain rights or obligations in the GDPR, or carry
out certain tasks or actions imposed on Member States under the GDPR.
The Data Protection Act (and the Report and preparatory works to the Act) reflects
the flexibility under theGDPR very carefully.With regard to the vital provisions regarding
lawful processing, for example, the authorization to specify in national law certain provisions
in articles 6 and 9 has partly been utilized, cf. sect. 6-7 of the Act. Other examples cover
article 87 regarding processing of national identification numbers (cf. sect. 11 of the Act)
and article 88 regarding processing in the context of employment (cf. section 12). In respect
of options, examples cover article 8, paragraph 1, concerning a child’s age when providing
a consent (cf. section 6, paragraph 2 and 3), and article 83, paragraph 7, concerning fines
imposed on public authorities (cf. section 41, paragraph 6, of the Act). Articles 23 and 89
authorize (subject to certain conditions) Member States to restrict by way of legislative
* Professor of the law of property and obligations, Copenhagen Business School; attorney at Gorrissen Fed-
erspiel, Copenhagen (Denmark).
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ L119/1. Legal literature
on Danish law on the protection of personal data since the coming into force of GDPR: P. Blume, Den nye
persondataret, 2nd Ed, Copenhagen, Djøf forlag, 2018; N.P. Langemark & J. Dall, Persondataforordningen
– en håndbog for praktikere, 2nd Ed, Copenhagen, ExTuto Publishing, 2019; J. Trzaskowski&M.G. Sørensen,
GDPRCompliance: Understanding theGeneral Data Protection Regulation, Copenhagen, ExTuto Publishing,
2019.
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measure the obligations and rights provided for in a number of provisions in the GDPR,
and this opportunity has been utilized various places in the Act. As example of certain
tasks which the GDPR imposes on Member States can be mentioned article 43 regarding
accreditation of certification bodies (cf. section 23 of the Act), and article 51 regarding the
supervisory body, cf. Part VI of the Act.
The national supervisory authority in Denmark, the Danish Data Protection Agency
(In Danish: “Datatilsynet”) supervises the adherence with the Data Protection Act in a
similar way and with similar means as the supervision of the GDPR, cf. chapter VI of the
GDPR.
In addition to the guidelines from the European Data Protection Board (hereinafter
“EDPB”), Datatilsynet also issues guidelines on the interpretation of the most significant
rules under the GDPR.2 The guidelines are not as such legally binding, as they only express
the opinion of Datatilsynet itself, not the courts. However, legal practitioners usually attach
considerable importance to the guidelines.
Question 2
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”) is part
of the EU Treaty, cf. article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union, and as such also a
part of the Danish legal order. In that respect, Danish law differentiates between article 7
(the general right to protection of privacy) and article 8 (the specific right to protection of
personal data). However, there is not yet any indication in Danish case law that article 7
of the Charter has directly influenced the interpretation of national Danish law.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The basic principles of Directive 95/46/EC have been maintained – and even strengthened
and specified – under the GDPR.3 The principle of “fair processing”, which was previously
found in article 6(1)(a), in the Directive, now follows from art. 5(1)(a) GDPR. In general,
2 Datatilsynet, www.datatilsynet.dk/generelt-om-databeskyttelse/vejledninger-og-skabeloner/, visited
1 February 2020.
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection




there is very little case law from the courts in Denmark regarding the Data Protection
Directive, and so far no case law regarding the GDPR. Consequently, Danish law in this
area is mainly being developed by the NSA, Datatilsynet. That goes for the principle of
“fair processing” too. Over the years, Datatilsynet has regularly referred to the principle
as part of the basis for the decisions and opinions.
As examples can be mentioned the requirement of providing prior information to the
data subjects at the time of coordination for control purposes, the requirement of notice
to staff, etc. on televisionmonitoring of jobs beforemonitoring commences, the restrictions
on the use of credit information in connection with job recruitments, and the duty to note
if a registered person has objections against the accuracy of registered personal data.
Furthermore, Datatilsynet has established that where personal data due to a security
breach has been disclosed to unauthorized persons, it will - depending on the specific
circumstances - result from the requirement of fair processing that the data controller shall
notify those concerned people. In addition, Datatilsynet has prepared guidelines on
accidental disclosure of personal data on the Internet that it is a manifestation of the
requirement of fair processing. It follows from the guidelines that data controllers must
seek to limit the damage in such instances, which includes removing the information from
the website as soon as possible, informing the persons concerned of the error, and
investigate whether the information is found on search engines and, if so, seek to have it
removed.
The principle of purpose limitation is also well-known from the 1995 Directive (article
6(1)(b)). In the only reported court case, the Eastern High Court stated that a real estate
agent who used his access to a credit information system to obtain and pass on information
about a local politician’s unpaid debt, was violating the principle of purpose limitation.4
There is an extensive practice from Datatilsynet on the principle. The core of this practice
is, that the data controller shall state a purpose which is sufficiently defined and delimited,
that the processing of personal data shall be for legitimate purposes only, and that
subsequent processing may not be inconsistent with the purposes for which the data were
originally collected.
From Datatilsynet’s practice can be mentioned a case involving the processing of
personal data in connection with an insurance case.5 In the case a policyholder complained
to Datatilsynet about his insurance company’s processing of personal data in connection
with a video recording and observation as part of the insurance company’s treatment of
a claim for damages raised by the policyholder. Among the information gathered was
information on the complainant’s conduct inside his house. Datatilsynet held that
recordings and observations inside a person’s home in the manner in question under the




circumstances might be justified in order to fulfill the stated purpose. However, there was
no information on whether the policyholder was doing something in the house that could
be relevant to the insurance case. Against this background, Datatilsynet found that
registration of the observation monitoring in question went beyond the purpose with the
monitoring, and thus was not compatible with the principle of purpose limitation.
The principle of “dataminimization” in article 5, paragraph 1, litra c, correspondswith
the principle of proportionality in article 6(1)(c) of the 1995 Data Protection Directive.
There appear to be no reported court cases regarding the interpretation of the principle,
but Datatilsynet has applied it in a number of cases. As an example can be mentioned a
case concerning electronic transfer of property information from a municipality to an
energy company, where Datatilsynet stated that the municipality should take measures to
ensure that the energy company was only given access to the information that the energy
company should use for calculation of a statutory heating duty.6
In a case concerning a municipality’s transfer of social security numbers to a housing
company, Datatilsynet stated that the municipality should not disclose information about
social security numbers to the private housing company as part of their communication.
Disclosure of social security numbers should only be done for the purpose of identifying
tenants receiving housing support. Information of tenant numbers would be sufficient
identification information.7
Question 4
There is an extensive practice from Datatilsynet regarding the interpretation of the notions
of “consent” and “legitimate interest”, but only a few court cases.
In the only reported case concerning consent, the Supreme Court stated in a decision
from 2011 that an unspecified consent to a potential new employer to collect references
from a former employer could not cover the collection of highly sensitive personal data,
e.g. regarding a possible alcohol abuse.8
With regard to “legitimate interest”, no reported court practice exists. However, there
is a rich volume of case law from Datatilsynet.9
6 Case 2003-323-0101.
7 Case 2003-323-0109.
8 Cf. the Danish Weekly Law Reports 2011, p. 2343 H.
9 The comprehensive case law is thoroughly reviewed in H. Waaben & K. Korfitz Nielsen, Lov om behandling
af personoplysninger med kommentarer, 3rd Ed, Copenhagen, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2015,




There is no evidence of any heated debate, or any decisions, in Denmark regarding the
validity of personal data as “counter-performance” for the provision of digital content.
The issue relates to the question whether a consent has been given voluntarily. In its
guidelines on the notion of consent, Datatilsynet notes, that if a contract, e.g. regarding
access to digital content, is conditioned on consent, the greatest possible consideration
must be given to whether, among other things, the fulfillment of a contract is conditional
upon consent to the processing of personal data which is not necessary for the performance
of the contract.10 In other words, it means that consent is not considered to have been
given voluntarily if, e.g. purchase of a product or service depends on consent, although
such consent is not necessary for the purchase of the product or service. This is in line
with article 7(4) and article 6(1)(b) GDPR.
Question 6
Article 22(2)(b) GDPR is basically regarded a continuation of the 1995 Data Protection
Directive’s article 15(2)(a). Denmark has in a number of situations introduced legislative
measures pursuant to the provision. An example is the legislation on student grants, which
prescribes that an application for a student grant must be provided via a fully digital and
self-serviced system that renders an automated decision. This legislative measure is
considered compliant with article 22(2)(b) GDPR, because the automated decisions can
be brought before a board of appeal. Another, very similar, example of a national legislative
measure is the set-off of a person’s debt to a public authority, which can be recovered via
a fully digital system. Automated decisions from the system can be brought before a board
of appeal in a fast-track process.11
There is no court practice on the subject.
Question 7
The right to erasure in article 17 GDPR, and its predecessor in the 1995 Data Protection
Directive, article 12, has not been applied byDatatilsynet or the courts.NoDanish domiciled
search engines exist.
10 Guidelines on Consent, November 2017, pp. 5-6.




Article 85 GDPR provides that
“Member States shall … reconcile the right to the protection of personal data
… with the right to freedom of expression and information, including
processing for journalistic purposes …”.
TheData ProtectionAct, like its predecessor, The Personal Data Act from 2000, transposes
article 85 by entirely exempting from the scope of the Act (and thus the GDPR) processing
of personal data for journalistic purposes and journalistic databases, cf. section 3, paragraphs
4-8.
Further, according to the Act, section 3, paragraph 1, the Act does not apply if this
would result in a violation of freedomof speech and freedomof information. The provision
refers to article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 11 of the
Charter, and it serves as a reminder that freedom of expression must be taken into
consideration when interpreting the data protection rules.
Datatilsynet has decided some cases, citing the provision (in the previous act). In one
case, the Danish People’s Party’s webpage published the names and districts of 3,218
persons who were granted Danish citizenship, including comments that some of them
were criminals. As the names were already published in connection with the granting of
citizenship, this publication was not violating the Act, and the comments fell within the
protected area for freedom of speech.12
In the second case, a company had published the name, position and workplace of a
public employee working for the Danish Working Environment Service and commented
his visit to the company. The Board found the mentioning acceptable, as it was a part of
a public debate.
In a later case, “The Black Register” ran an open webpage featuring names, job title,
work phone of public servants under the headings “neglect of duty” and “abuse of power”.13
Sometimes also date of birth and political affiliation were added to the personal data. The
Board dismissed the case, referring to what is now the Act, section 3, paragraph 1, arguing





C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Pursuant to Part VI of the Act, corresponding with Chapter VI of the GDPR, the primary
relevant public authority inDenmark is Datatilsynet (theDanishData ProtectionAgency),
which supervises compliance with the data protection rules, provides guidance and advice,
deals with complaints, makes inspections and issues responses to draft legislation etc. It
follows from sect. 37 of the Act that the Court Administration in accordance with Chapters
VI and VII of the GDPR supervises the processing of data carried out for the courts when
they do not act in their capacity of courts. In respect of other processing of data, the decision
must be made by the relevant court.
Datatilsynet is independent of Government and Parliament and consists – as before
the GDPR – of a Council and a Secretariat. The Council decides in leading cases, while
the Secretariat handles day-to-day cases and matters. The Council is appointed by the
Minister of Justice and consists of a chairman, who must be a high court judge or Supreme
Court judge, and of seven additional members. All members are appointed based on their
professional qualifications, and an appointment lasts 4 years, with the possibility to be
reappointed once.
The Secretariat consists of a Director and a staff of approximately 60 employees. There
are no special rules or policies regarding the employment process of the staff. The staff is
composed so that it comprises both legal and IT skills and competences. Both themembers
of the Council and Secretariat are subject to confidentiality obligations.
Datatilsynet’s powers correspond essentially with the GDPR. No additional powers
have yet been given, cf. article 58(6)GDPR, but section 35 of theAct authorizes theMinister
of Justice to allocate additional powers to Datatilsynet. The authorization has not yet been
utilized.
According to its latest annual report and statements to the press, Datatilsynet has
experienced a very significant increase in the case-load after the coming into force of the
GDPR, notably with regard to cases concerning notification of a personal data breach. In
general, Datatilsynet expects three to four times more cases under the GDPR than before.
With regard to the significantly increased level of fines, Datatilsynet has referred two
cases to the police with the view to criminal prosecution after the GDPR entered into force
on 25 May 2018. In the first case, following an inspection by Datatilsynet in October 2018,
a taxi company was reported to the police and Datatilsynet recommended a fine of DKK
1.2 million for violation of the GDPR.
The inspection was focused on whether the taxi company had retention and deletion
policies in place in accordance with article 5(1)(e) GDPR, and whether such policies were
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complied with internally in the company. Datatilsynet found that the taxi company had
only implemented superficial procedures that did not ensure compliance with the
requirements of data retention and deletion as set out in the GDPR. This conclusion was
primary based on the premise that the taxi company claimed to anonymize personal data
after a 2 year retention period by deleting only the name of data subjects, and by deletion
of telephone numbers only after a period of 5 years. At the time of the inspection, the taxi
company had information about 8,873,333 taxi trips, which were older than 2 years. The
case has not come to trial yet.
In the second case, Datatilsynet reported in June 2019 a furniture outlet business to
the police and recommended a fine of DKK 1.5 million for not having deleted personal
data concerning 385,000 customers which were no longer relevant. The case has not yet
come to trial.
Question 10
There is no published strategy from Datatilsynet regarding their complaint-handling.
However, asmentionedDatatilsynet has experienced a very significant increase in incoming
cases, including complaints, after the entry into force of the GDPR. This is forcing
Datatilsynet to be very selective when deciding what cases to pursue or not. Under article
57 GDPR, if a complaint is “manifestly unfounded or excessive”, the supervisory authority
can refuse to act on the complaint. Danish law places no constraints on such approach.
Question 11
The power to impose correctivemeasures, cf. article 58(2) GDPR, largely corresponds with
applicable Danish law before theGDPR.UnderDanish law, and in accordance with article
83(9) GDPR, Datatilsynet can as a main rule not impose administrative fines, only the
courts can do that.
With regard to the enhanced administrative fines under theGDPR, this is an innovation
under Danish law, where the fines previously have been rather low, not more than DKK
5-25,000. As described above, two court cases are pending under the GDPR with the
allegation of fines ofmore thanDKK1million.UnderDanish law, fines can also be imposed
on public authorities.
Denmark has not utilized the possibility to impose “other penalties” subject to article




Denmark has historically awarded damages for intangible (i.e. non-economic) harm, and
this is regarded to apply to intangible harm under data protection law, too. The legal basis
for awarding intangible harm is found in section 26 of the Civil Liability Act (in Danish:
“erstatningsansvarsloven”) concerning infringement of other people’s “freedom, privacy,
honor or person”.14 Only infringements of some severity are covered by section 26. The
awarded damage pursuant to section 26 is assessed based on an estimate and is normally
relatively low.
From case law can bementioned a judgment from theMaritime andCommercial Court
concerning an employer’s TV monitoring of an employee in a store.15 The monitoring
took place from the employer’s private residence in one half an hour to three quarters.
The surveillance was not work or safety-related justified and resulted in the collection of
personal data (images) in violation of the Personal Data Act then in force. The employee
was awarded DKK 25,000 in compensation under section 26 of the Civil Liability Act.
In a decision from 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that a municipality’s disclosure of
information on suspicion of alcohol abuse as part of a potential employer retrieval of
reference information was an unlawful disclosure under the Personal Data Act.16 The
Supreme Court did not consider that the employer would have obtained the employment
if the information hadnot been disclosed, so therewas no basis for damages for an economic
loss. However, the employee was awarded DKK 25,000 pursuant to section 26 of the Civil
Liability Act.
In a judgment from 2005, the Western High Court took a position on an employer
reading an employee’s private email correspondence, which resulted in an unjustified
termination of employment.17 The court found that the employer was accidentally
acquainted with the e-mail correspondence, and that without reading the correspondence
it was not possible to find out that it was private. There was therefore no violation of the
employee’s rights which could form basis for compensation under section 26 of the Civil
Liability Act. Since the employee had not suffered any financial loss, there was no basis
for damages pursuant to the Personal Data Act either.
14 Consolidated Act no 1070 of 24 August 2018.
15 Cf. The Danish Weekly Law Reports 2008, p. 727.
16 Cf. The Danish Weekly Law Reports 2011, p. 2343.




Under Danish law, there is in general broad access to be represented by others, and article
80 GDPR is not considered having any limiting effect on this access. Hence, no new
legislative actions have been taken pursuant to article 80. So far, NGO’s and other alternative
movements play no significant role in the data protection enforcement in Denmark.
Question 14
At the moment there is no tendency for other regulators besides Datatilsynet to intervene
in data processing related complaints. But Datatilsynet obviously cooperates with other
relevant authorities, e.g. the Consumer Ombudsman and the Competition and Consumer
Authority.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The notion of “national security” is not defined in either the Data Protection Act or the
national act transposing the Law Enforcement Directive (Act no. 410 of 27 April 2017 on
law enforcement authorities’ processing of personal data).
Following theCourt of Justice of the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “CJEU”) its judgment
in Tele2/Watson, the Danish Government has in principle accepted the application of the
Charter to data retention for national security purposes.18 However, like other EUMember
States, Denmark is still considering exactly what consequences the judgment shall have
for the Danish data retention rules.19 Hence, the judgment has not yet led to any changes
to the data retention rules.
The CJEU’s judgment in Tele2/Watson has been applied by the Danish Eastern High
Court in a recent case, where a group of copyright holders requested to obtain information
from a telecommunications company about the name and address of IP addresses that
had been used to download illegal material from the Internet.20 However, the request was
rejected. The court found, with reference to the relevant EU law and Tele2/Watson, that
18 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in C-203/15,Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State
for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others (Tele2/Watson), ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; See for more
detail: S. Jakobsen,H.Udsen&A.Møller Pedersen, ‘Data Retention in Europe – the Tele2 case and beyond’,
International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2018, pp. 160-174.
19 Case C-203/15, Tele2/Watson; Which are found in Executive Order no 988 of 26 September 2006.
20 The Danish Weekly Law Reports 2019, p. 2019.
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the protection of the personal data of the persons concerned exceeded the interest of the
rightsholder’s interest in obtaining the information.21





A Setting the Scene
Question 1
In Estonia, the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) is implemented
in two ways:1
1. the Personal Data Protection Act2
and
2. sector specific laws.
A The Personal Data Protection Act regulates:
1. protection of natural persons upon processing of personal data to the extent it elaborates
and supplements the provisions contained in the GDPR;
2. transposition ofDirective (EU) 2016/680 of the EuropeanParliament and of theCouncil
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free
movement of such data;3
3. the procedure for exercise of state supervision over compliance with the requirements
for the processing of personal data;
4. liability for the violation of the requirements for processing of personal data.
* CIPP/E (Certified InformationPrivacyProfessional/Europe), CIPM(Certified InformationPrivacyManager),
Data Protection Officer.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Personal Data Protection Act, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523012019001/consolide. All webpages
referred to were last visited 9 February 2020.
3 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on
the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ
L119/89.
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Specifications for application of the GDPR in the Personal Data Protection Act:
1. Processing of personal data for journalistic purposes;
2. Processing of personal data for academic, artistic and literary expression;
3. Processing of personal data for needs of scientific and historical research and official
statistics;
4. Processing of personal data for archiving in public interest.
Other cases of processing personal data stipulated in the Personal Data Protection Act:
1. Processing of the personal data of children for the provision of information society
services – minimum age requirement is 13;
2. Processing of personal data after the death of a data subject;
3. Processing of personal data in connection with violation of an obligation;
4. Processing of personal data in public places.
Overall, the Personal Data Protection Act is more about the transposition of Directive
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, rather than
implementation of the GDPR.
B Article 23 of the GDPR and sector specific laws:
1. The Personal Data Protection Act does not stipulate any restrictions based on article
23 GDPR;
2. Sector specific laws already in essence already entailed the types of restrictions set out
in article 23 GDPR before the GDPR became applicable on 25 May 2018;
3. Sector specific laws were reviewed in light of the restrictions stipulated in article 23;
4. Approximately 113 sector specific laws were reviewed, and all other amendments,
besides those related to article 23, were made. The focus on sector specific laws was
intended to eliminate themain discrepancies with theGDPR, and not only those related
to article 23.
National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”):
In Estonia, there is one Supervisory Authority, the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate,
which oversees the enforcement of the GDPR, the Personal Data Protection Act and the
provisions of sector specific laws that regulate personal data processing.
In addition to what is stipulated in article 57 GDPR, the Personal Data Protection Act
regulates the competences and rights of the NSA, but these competences and rights are
rather the reflection of article 57 GDPR than something relevantly new.
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The office of the NSA has not significantly increased the number of its employees in
light of the GDPR.
Question 2
Right to respect for private life and right to data protection:
The right to private life is regulated in § 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia
(hereinafter “Constitution”), which stipulates that everyone is entitled to the inviolability
of his or her private and family life.4 Government agencies, local authorities, and their
officials may not interfere with any person’s private or family life, except in the cases and
pursuant to a procedure provided by law to protect public health, public morality, public
order or the rights and freedoms of others, to prevent a criminal offence, or to apprehend
an offender.
Even though the Constitution does not regulate the right to data protection as an
independent right, the commentary of theConstitution includes the right to data protection
as an intrinsic part of one’s privacy.5 Sector specific laws regulate the right to data protection
and personal data processing, that is, the rules that must be applied when someone wants
to process personal data. Thus, the right to privacy is stipulated and regulated on the
constitutional level, and the right to data protection is regulated on the lower level of
legislation by general and sector specific laws. As the right to privacy is only regulated on
the constitutional level, this right has been defined based on the example of the
interpretation of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The GDPR, as
a directly applicable EU regulation, is already by default a reflection of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and its interpretation of the right to data
protection, which all EU Member States must implement on a daily basis.
Court practice:
The Estonian Supreme Court – Riigikohus has a long-standing practice concerning the
definition and scope of the right to privacy. In its decision 3-1-1-81-08, the Court explained
that private life entails a person’s entire private sphere, his or her entire way of life.6 Thus,
information about a person’s place of residence, registered vehicles and committed offences
can be considered part of his or her private life. In any case, the confidentiality of private
information must be presumed where confidential information cannot be obtained by
4 TheConstitution of the Republic of Estonia, §26, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide.
5 Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. https://pohiseadus.ee/.
6 State vs J.P, Penti (Sup. Ct. 23 February 2009).
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means other than through persons who have a statutory right to use confidential
information for professional or occupational purposes.
Another decision by the Supreme Court that clarifies the scope of the right to privacy
concerns the right to one’s own image.7 Here the Court has taken a firm view that the right
to one’s own image also belongs to the scope of §26 of the Constitution, in which the first
sentence provides that everyone is entitled to the inviolability of his or her private and
family life. Every person therefore has the right to decide how his or her image is used. In
the opinion of the Court, a person’s image can be used without the person’s consent only
to report on a current event involving the person. In addition, it is also required that use
of the person’s image is necessary for covering the current event and the public interest
outweighs the person’s interests. The defendant’s action was illegal, as the defendant used
the plaintiff’s image without his consent and thus intruded unlawfully into the plaintiff’s
private life.
The interpretation of private life/privacy and data protection is still emerging and is
only just finding its place compared to other areas of law, even though there was already
quite a substantial amount of court practice under the old data protection regime.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Controllers have the right to decide the purposes for which personal data is processed, the
type of data, on what legal ground, etc., as long as the GDPR requirements are fulfilled.
The interpretation and application of GDPR principles as well as other parts of the GDPR
may therefore vary depending on the area of business of the controller and the business
interests involved. The GDPR also introduced a new principle, accountability, which
obligates controllers to demonstrate that their processing activities are in accordance with
the GDPR principles, which the controllers must prove with proper documentation. In
general, this couldmean that different controllersmay interpret and applyGDPRprinciples
differently, as long as they are able to prove that they have not violated the core essence
of these principles. As the NSA’s enforcement practice under the new data protection
regime has been relatively, at the moment there is no clear understanding, at least on the
part of the NSA, as to how adequately or appropriately controllers have interpreted and
applied GDPR principles.
7 Tammeri vs TV3 AS (Sup. Ct.13 January 2010).
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The domestic courts, foremost the Supreme Court, have made decisions regarding the
legality of personal data processing under the old regime, based on Directive 95/46/EC,
which was transposed into the Personal Data Protection Act.8 The main questions have
regarded the disclosure of personal data and accessibility of personal data. Many of these
cases have related to the disclosure of personal data in the media or to a data subject who
has requested access to his or her personal data in the framework of criminal proceedings
or has requested access to his or her personal data that has been processed by public
authorities.
In its interpretations regarding these principles, the Supreme Court has relied mainly
on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”) as well as
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”). The broader practice
of the domestic courts relating to data protection and privacy is still emerging.
The NSA has provided a general guideline on the GDPR covering a range of topics,
but these principles have not yet been interpreted or applied by the NSA in practice. In its
publications, the NSA has referred to the principles stated in the GDPR as being a natural
part of all processing activity conducted by controllers, and hasn’t added any additional
explanations regards to principles.
Question 4
A recent decision by the Supreme Court on 6 June 2019 concerned the wrongful dismissal
of a public official.9 The official who had been dismissed fromher position had experienced
bullying at her workplace. To prove that she was being bullied, she recorded a conversation
without asking the permission of the official whom shewas recording. TheCourt concluded
that when assessing the legitimate interest of the dismissed official, it was not relevant
whether the personal data processing had helped achieve such legitimate interest. It is not
possible to know this for sure at the time of processing personal data. In this case what
was important was that personal data had been processed to achieve the legitimate interest,
and the plaintiff had disclosed the recordings only to the Tax and Customs Board officials
who had a decisive role in determining whether there had been bullying in the workplace.
When defining an unspecified legal term such as “legitimate interest”, it is first important
to note that the controller’s interest should be lawful for it to be achieved. It can also be
concluded from article 7(f) of Directive 95/46/EC that the need for processing personal
data should be real and not just hypothetical. The plaintiff had the overriding legitimate
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
9 Kingo vs Maksu- ja Tolliamet (Sup. Ct. 6 June 2019).
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interest to get evidence of the alleged bullying in the workplace in order to demand that
it be stopped.
This decision can be considered as the most detailed analysis of legitimate interest as
a legal ground for processing personal data by the Estonian courts. In other decisionsmade
by the courts regarding legitimate interest, of which there have been a limited number,
the courts have mostly referred to the case law of the CJEU.
The Estonian courts have not interpreted consent as the legal ground differently or in
more detail than the CJEU or ECtHR.
Question 5
There has not been any debate or decisions regarding this topic specifically, if at all. The
issue itself has been tied to other topics relating to personal data and its processing. In
recent years, the main debates have been about the GDPR specifically and what it states.
The need to address abuse of personal data as “counter performance” is the subtext of the
GDPR, but this has not yet been recognised in the national debate. Other EU level legal
acts and different EU authorities have discussed this issue as one of the key issues relating
to the digital single market.
Question 6
ThePersonalDataAct does not only implement theGDPRbased on the discretion provided
to the Member States, it also transposes the law enforcement directive, Directive (EU)
2016/680. In relation to implementation of the GDPR, the Act does not introduce any
additional measures for ensuring this right, but it does reflect this right with regard to law
enforcement, as provided for in the directive, which is transposed into national law through
the Personal Data Act.
Question 7
In 2014, in case 3-3-1-97-08, the Supreme Court decided to satisfy the request of the
petitioner to replace the petitioner’s name with initials.10 This right derives from the Code
of Administrative Court Procedure. In this decision, the Court stated that it had not
published the person’s name in theGoogle search engine, and that theCourt cannot replace
the person’s name with initials in the search engine.
10 M.O. application for deletion (Sup.Ct. 7 February 2014).
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Overall, there has been little practice relating to the right to erasure, which has not
received great attention by the courts or the NSA in Estonia so far.
Question 8
The PersonalData ProtectionAct states that personal datamay be processed and disclosed
in the media for journalistic purposes without the consent of the data subject, in particular
if there is public interest and this is done in accordance with the principles of journalism
ethics. Disclosure of personal data must not cause excessive damage to the rights of any
data subjects. This is a general normwhich is the foundation for processing for journalistic
purposes. The same Act states that personal data may be processed without the consent
of the data subject for the purpose of academic, artistic and literary expression, in particular
if this does not cause excessive damage to the rights of the data subject. The same logic
applies here as does in the case of journalistic purposes. There is no specific law that details
how and under what circumstances personal data processing is allowed for these purposes.
It is left to the courts and legal practice to develop the appropriate practice.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Under the GDPR, there is only one relevant public authority, that is, the Estonian Data
Protection Inspectorate.11 The Personal Data Protection Act regulates the qualifications
required for appointment as head of the EstonianData Protection Inspectorate. The Statute
of the Inspectorate states the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the head of the
Inspectorate, the number of staff of the Inspectorate and that the staff is to be appointed
by a decree of the head of the Inspectorate.
In addition to what is stated already under point 1, the Personal Data Protection Act
stipulates that in order to exercise state supervision provided for in the Personal Data
Protection Act, the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate may apply the specific state
supervision measures provided for in §§ 30-32, 44, 49-53 of the Law Enforcement Act on
the basis of and pursuant to the procedure provided for in the Law Enforcement Act.12
11 Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate, https://www.aki.ee/en.
12 Law Enforcement Act, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/525032019010/consolide.
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The NSA’s contact details as well as the staff of the NSA are public information. The
NSA currently employs 17 people, which also includes the head of the NSA, while two
positions have not yet been filled.
To date, the NSA does not have a notable enforcement record under the GDPR, but
they have executed some powers which fall under the scope of corrective and advisory
powers.
Question 10
There is currently no specific strategy in place, or at least it has not been published. The
Personal Data Protection Act states:
1. The Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate shall settle a complaint within 30 days after
the date of filing the complaint with the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate.
2. The Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate may extend the term for review of a
complaint by up to 60 days in order to additionally clarify circumstances relevant to
the settling of the complaint. The person who filed the complaint shall be notified of
extension of the term in writing.
3. If co-operation with other relevant supervisory authorities is necessary for settlement
of a complaint, review of the complaint shall be extended by a reasonable time period
which is necessary to hear the other co-operating supervisory authorities or for them
to state their opinion.
Question 11
No sanctions have been applied, although theNSAhas in a couple of cases exercised powers
which fall under the scope of corrective and advisory powers. Additional sanctions and/or
additionalmeasures that have been put in place to exercise supervision are described under
Points 1 and 9.
Question 12
The Supreme Court in its decision 2-15-16007 stated that in the case of intangible harm,
the court will determine fair compensation considering all the circumstances of the case.13
Intangible harm entails foremost the physical and emotional pain and suffering of the
person harmed. Damages for intangible harm are calculated based on the severity and the
13 Kulla vs Ekspress Meedia AS (Sup. Ct. 4 October 2017).
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scope of the harm caused and also the behaviour and attitude of the person at fault towards
the person who has suffered harm as a result of the violation. As there is no possibility to
prove the exact amount of intangible harm, for the compensation of intangible harm it
generally suffices to prove the circumstances which the law requires must exist for there
to be a claim of intangible harm. The unlawfulness of the behaviour of the defendant is
determined through weighing. The compensation for intangible harm is decided by the
court based on its discretion. This specific case was also referred to the ECHR14.
In the same decision, the Court referred to its previous decision15 where it stipulated
that when a person’s privacy rights are being violated through the illegal disclosure of
personal data, then for determining the amount of the sumof compensation, first the scope
of the violation (for example, if the article was only published on paper or additionally
online where presumably it will reach a significantly larger audience) must be taken into
consideration. Other peculiarities of press offences (for example, the need to protect people
from the forced commercialization of their lives)must also be considered. All circumstances
which could influence the determination of fair compensation in the court case must be
taken into consideration. In this case, the lower court awarded a total of 5000 euros for
intangible harm, which the Supreme Court confirmed.
Overall, this is the logic applied in determining compensation in intangible harm cases,
and most of these cases revolve around personal data disclosure in the media,
commentating/defamation online, etc.
Question 13
No legislative measures have been introduced for facilitating such representative actions.
At national level, there is one foundation,Eesti Isikuandmete Kaitse (Protection of Personal
Data of Estonia), and also one NGO, Eesti Andmekaitse Liit (Estonian Data Protection
Union). The activities of these organisations so far have been modest and are still evolving
and finding their role within the new data protection regime.
Question 14
In Estonia, being a small country, it is normal practice for regulators of different areas to
cooperate both formally and informally. There is no official mandate for cooperation
between these regulators, or at least nothing has been published.
14 Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], ECHR (2015), app. no. 64569/09, para. 34.
15 Plaintiff I, Plaintiff II vs Defendant (Sup. Ct. 26 June 2013).
255
Estonia
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
“National security” is not defined in domestic law. There have been no major changes
relating to data retention for national security purposes nor has this been specified in a
somewhat more clear and detailed manner. It is more based on a case by case assessment.
The Supreme Court has stated that the invalidity of the directive does not inevitably
cause the invalidity of the national rules, considering the goals of the directive.16 The
Member States have a certain level of discretion when adopting the national regulation.
The collection, retention and use of communication data in criminal proceedings infringe
the right to privacy. The Constitution allows for the restriction of this fundamental right
in the cases provided for by law and in the interests of health, morality, public order or for
the protection of other people’s rights and freedoms, or the prevention of crime or
apprehension of a criminal. The Supreme Court has found that requesting data from an
internet service provider in relation to a criminal case corresponds to the purpose of § 26
of the Constitution in the sense of preventing a crime or apprehending a criminal. This
measure is undoubtedly appropriate for guaranteeing these objectives. After the CJEU’s
decision in the Tele 2/Wat case, Estonia did not repeal the national law which transposed
the EU directive.17
In 2018, the Supreme Court requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the
following questions:
1. Is article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC(1) of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002, in conjunction with articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that in
criminal proceedings the access of State authorities to datamaking it possible to establish
the start and end point, the date, the time and the duration, the type of communications
service, the terminal used and the location of use of a mobile terminal in relation to a
telephone or mobile telephone communication of a suspect constitutes so serious an
interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in those articles of the Charter that
that access in the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offences must be restricted to the fighting of serious crime, regardless of the period to
which the retained data to which the State authorities have access relate?
16 R.V., J.L., T.S. and R.F. vs State (Sup.Ct. 23 February 2015).
17 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen




2. Is article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, on the basis of the principle of proportionality
expressed in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 October 2018 in Case C-207/16,
paragraphs 55 to 57, to be interpreted asmeaning that, if the amount of datamentioned
in the first question, to which the State authorities have access, is not large (both in
terms of the type of data and in terms of its temporal extent), the associated interference
with fundamental rights is justified by the objective of prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offences generally, and that the greater the
amount of data to which the State authorities have access, themore serious the criminal
offences which are intended to be fought by the interference must be?
3. Does the requirementmentioned in the judgment of theCourt of Justice of 21December
2016 in Joined Cases C-203/ 15 and C-698/15, second point of the operative part, that
the data access of the competent State authorities must be subject to prior review by a
court or an independent administrative authority mean that article 15(1) of Directive
2002/58/EC must be interpreted as meaning that the public prosecutor’s office which
directs the pre-trial procedure, with it being obliged by law to act independently and
only being bound by the law, and ascertains the circumstances both incriminating and
exonerating the accused in the pre-trial procedure, but later represents the public
prosecution in the judicial proceedings, may be regarded as an independent
administrative authority?18




Anu Talus and Tobias Bräutigam*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) has been implemented in
Finlandmainly through the newData ProtectionAct (1050/2018), which has been in force
since 1 January 2019.1 The Data Protection Act follows the structure of the GDPR. The
new law includes provisions on the legal basis for processing, the supervisory authority
and provisions regarding specific data or processing. According to the preparatory works,
the Finnish Government has chosen to use many of the exemptions and opening clauses
in order to be able to preserve the current legal situation. This concerns in particular the
rules regarding the insurance sector and freedom of speech.
According to theGovernment Proposal, therewas a special need to ensure that insurance
providers would continue to have the right to process data in order to investigate insurance
claims.2 Given that this often includes the processing of sensitive personal data, the Finnish
legislator wanted to ensure that there continues to be a legal basis for the processing.
Consequently, § 6(1)(1) of theData ProtectionAct uses the opening clause in article 9(1)(g)
GDPR to allow the processing of health data outside of the rules for processing sensitive
data. Insurance providers may process personal data related to criminal convictions and
offences, as § 7 of the Data Protection Act points to § 6 of the Data Protection Act. Also
teleoperators are entitled to process criminal records under certain circumstances, which
is regulated in a separate act.3
* Anu Talus is currently Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman at the Data Protection Ombudsman’s Office
(Finland). At the time of drafting the report she held a post at the Ministry of Justice as senior legal adviser.
Dr. Tobias Bräutigam is Senior Counsel at Bird & Bird, Helsinki (Finland).
1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001
and Decision No 1247/2002/EC [2018] OJ L295/39; Tietosuojalaki (“Data Protection Act”), 1050/2018, in
force since 1 January 2019.
2 HE9/2018 vp,Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle EU:n yleistä tietosuoja-asetusta täydentäväksi lainsäädännöksi
(hereinafter “Government Proposal”), p. 85 for further information on the legal basis.
3 Laki sähköisen viestinnän palveluista 145 §, 917/2014, in force since 1 January 2015 (“Electronic Commu-
nications Services Act”).
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Finland set the age limit for consent relating to the offering of information society
services to 13 years, which is in linewith otherNordic countries. TheGovernment Proposal
explains that the reasoning for having a lower age limit than the standard age limit of 16
years, set out in the GDPR, is that 13-year-olds are generally already used to using
information society services and that these services are an important platform for
self-expression and are also utilised for school work.4 It was also brought up by supporters
of a lower age limit that a higher age limit would simply lead to children circumventing
the higher age restriction by lying about their age.
Another set of changes introduced by the Data Protection Act concerns the system of
enforcement. The legislator thought it necessary to subject violations of article 10 GDPR
to fines, as article 10 is not explicitly mentioned in the catalogue of provisions of article
83GDPR.5 The scope of article 83 has been extended to cover the abovementioned breaches.
The Criminal Code has also been amended in connection with the implementation of the
GDPR. More precise provisions regarding specific situations of wrongful use of personal
data have been added to the Criminal Code. In particular § 9 of Chapter 38 of the Criminal
Code was replaced with a new provision, which is narrower in scope than the previous
provision. The new provision is titled Data Security Crime and it provides that criminal
sanctions are only applicable in cases where the illegal processing of personal data is not
within the scope of application of administrative fines provided by the GDPR. As the scope
of those GDPR fines is rather wide, there is limited room for criminal sanctions.6
The degree to which the legislator protected freedom of speech in the Data Protection
Act is especially interesting. In order to safeguard freedom of speech and the exchange of
information, the application of several provisions of the GDPR has been excluded with
regards purely journalistic purposes and the purposes of academic, artistic and literary
expression. This issue will be further addressed under Question 8.
Many other acts and provisions have also been changed in connection with the
implementation of theGDPR. These include acts on criminalmatters and national security
matters, law enforcement as well as social and health care.7
The FinnishData ProtectionOmbudsman is the supervisory authority and shall oversee
the application of the GDRP and the Data Protection Act in Finland. The Data Protection
Ombudsman is supported by two Data Protection Deputy Ombudsmen and a board of
five data protection experts. The Ombudsman may only issue fines jointly with the two
4 Government Proposal HE 9/2018 vp, p. 53.
5 Government Proposal HE 9/2918 vp, p. 10.
6 See, for example, art. 82(4)(a) GDPR, which includes a sanction for violations of art. 32 GDPR, the security
of processing.
7 See e.g.HaVM13/2018 vp,Hallintovaliokunnanmietintö, for a full list of the amendmentswww.eduskunta.fi/
FI/vaski/Mietinto/Sivut/HaVM_13+2018.aspx. All webpages referred to were visited 21 August 2019.
260
Anu Talus and Tobias Bräutigam
DeputyOmbudsmen. The group of theData ProtectionOmbudsman and the twoDeputies
is called seuraamuskollegio, sanction committee.
The Data Protection Ombudsman is also the supervisory authority for the Act on
Processing of Personal Data in Criminal Matters and National Security Matters and has
increased staff significantly over the years leading up to the GDPR.
Question 2
As a member of the European Union, Finland also follows the conceptual separation
between data protection and privacy made by important international human rights
instruments such as the Charter. The concepts are seen as different, albeit overlapping.8
The Finnish Constitution provides in Chapter 2 Section 10 “the right to privacy” which
states that “Everyone’s private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed.
More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act.”
There is no separate constitutional protection for data protection, but Chapter 2 Section
10 is generally seen as also covering the right to data protection; especially in the preparation
of new legal acts with an impact on data protection, the Constitutional Committee
frequently mentions Section 10 as the bases for the constitutional guarantee of data
protection.9
In legal practice, the difference is often not made explicitly. For example in a recent
case dealing with the right to be forgotten, the court quoted both data protection and
privacy, quite similar to the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereinafter “CJEU”).10 Finland follows the case law of the CJEU on data protection closely.
8 P.Korpisaari et al, Uusi tietosuoja-lainsäädäntö, Helsinki, Alma Talent, 2018, p. 14.
9 Compare pars pro toto the statement of 9 May 2019 by the Constitutional Committee concerning the
FinnishData ProtectionAct, which in its reasoning refers both to privacy and data protection as fundamental
rights engrained in Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution: Perustuslakivaliokunnan lausunto (“The Con-
stitutional Committee’s Opinion”) PeVL 14/2018 vp: www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Lausunto/Sivut/PeVL_
14+2018.aspx.




B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Traditionally the purpose limitation principle has been upheld in Finland in line with
other European countries. Fair processing as a concept is little talked about and interpreted
as linked to other principles of data protection, such as lawfulness, data subjects rights,
data minimization and purpose limitation.11
The Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman has recently published a decision
(2278/452/17) related to the credit information company Svea Ekonomi, where the
processing was considered not to be lawful and fair.12 According to the decision, the way
the credit scores were established was discriminating as a too low or high age would cause
an application for credit to be automatically inadmissible. As the activities were illegal,
personal data processing connected to activities could not be considered to fulfil the
requirements of lawful and fair processing. It is worth noting that the decision was not
only based on article 5(1) GDPR, but also on the Credit Information Act (luottotietolaki).13
Question 4
So far, there has not been any interpretation by Finnish courts on the concepts of consent
or legitimate interest. Legitimate interests as a legal basis was not included as such in the
Personal Data Act, which preceded the Data Protection Act in Finland. There was a more
specific provision in the Act that allowed processing of personal data based on a customer
or service relationship.14 Many cases that currently fall under the legal basis of legitimate
interest could be covered by this provision. When there was a need for legitimate interests
generally as a legal basis, practitioners either applied Directive 95/46 directly, based on the
CJEU judgment in ASNEF or asked the so called Data Protection Board for approval.15
11 The leading Finnish commentary on theGDPR includes only a few lines on the principle of fairness, whereas
other principles in art. 5 receive more attention, compare Korpisaari & Pitkänen & Warma-Lehtinen, 2018,
p. 90.
12 Tietosuojavaltuutetun päätös rekisteröidyn oikeuksien toteuttamisesta, 15 February 2019, Drn 2278/17,
pp. 6-7.
13 Luottotietolaki (“Credit Information Act”), 527/2007, in force since 1 November 2007. According to art.
33 of that law, the Data Protection Ombudsman is the supervising authority for this law concerning the
exchange of credit information.
14 Personal Data Act (“Henkilötietolaki”) 8 § (5), 1999/523, was applicable 01.06.1999 – 31.12.2018.
15 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31; judgment of 24 November 2011 in Joined Cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional
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The Data Protection Board elaborated the notion of legitimate interests when issuing
permits.With the newData ProtectionAct, theData Protection Board has been abolished.
It is too early to say how the concept of legitimate interests in data processing will develop
in Finland.
Question 5
There have so far been no decisions in Finland regarding the problem of the validity of
the business model of free digital content in return for personal data. In general, Finnish
media companies do not collect the same amount of personal data for personalization as
international social networks would do in their ‘counter-performance’ models.
The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority has warned consumers about the
value of data.16 The issue of data as payment falls under the competence of both the Finnish
Competition and Consumer Authority and the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman.
The latter did not address the issue specifically in its guidance on fairness of processing.17
Question 6
The Finnish legislator has chosen to limit the right not to be subjected to automated
decision-making, including profiling, under narrow circumstances. Data subjectsmay not
invoke this right in the event that personal data is processed for purely journalistic purposes
or for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression. This limitation of the right
was introduced to safeguard freedom of speech and freedom of expression, which are
protected under the Finnish Constitution.18 While the legal basis for the exemptions lie in
article 85 GDPR, not in article 22(2)(b), the effect is the same.
Question 7
Search engines in Finland operate under the same terms as in other EU countries.19 In the
first years after the Google Spain decision, the Data Protection Ombudsman exercised a
de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), Federación de Comercio Electrónico yMarketingDirecto
(FECEMD) v Administración del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2011:777, para. 52.
16 Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto (“Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority”), www.kkv.fi/ajankohtaista/
Uutiset/2019/28.2.2019-kuluttajavinkki/.
17 Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (“Office of theData ProtectionOmbudsman”), tietosuoja.fi/lainmukaisuus-
asianmukaisuus-lapinakyvyys.
18 Perustuslaki (“Finnish Constitution”) 12 §, 731/1999, in force since 1 March 2000.
19 The instructions on Google’s page on “Personal Information Removal” are a close translation from the
English text. The page is accessible at: policies.google.com/privacy?hl=fi&gl=fi#infodelete.
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certain restraint regarding complaints concerning the right to be delisted.20 In one
prominent case, the Ombudsman stated that there was no need to delete the search results
leading to a business register list because the person in question was still being involved
in business operations, including debt collection.21
In a more recent case, the Data Protection Ombudsman had requested Google to
remove links leading to websites that contained information on a murderer’s health
condition. The Ombudsman prevailed before the Supreme Administrative Court.22 In this
case, the applicant had been sentenced to prison for murder. He had been found criminally
responsible to a lower degree as he had Asperger syndrome. Persons typing the applicant’s
name in Google’s search engine were easily led to several search results in which the
applicant’s name, his medical condition and his criminal sentence were discussed. The
applicantmade a request to theData ProtectionAuthority to have theGoogle search results
removed. The Ombudsman then made a request to Google for removing the links to that
data, but Google denied this request. Google stated that it was in the public interest to keep
the information available to the public as there were strong legitimate interest grounds to
inform people of the applicant’s crimes for the protection of public safety.
The Ombudsman held that the data concerning the medical condition of the applicant
was not relevant information in the light of the Personal Data Act (the predecessor of the
current Data Protection Act) and therefore must be erased. The right to privacy of the
applicant overrode the public interest grounds that Google invoked. The first instance
administrative court sidedwith theData ProtectionAuthority’s reasoning and the Supreme
Administrative Court upheld the decision of the administrative court.
Question 8
As stated in the context of question 6, the Finnish legislator has decided to exclude many
provisions of the GDPR in favour of freedom of expression. This concerns the processing
of personal data for the purposes of journalistic, academic, artistic and literary expression.23
The application of the following provisions of theGDPRhas been excluded in this context:
article 5(1)(c-e), article 6, 7, 9 and 10, article 11(2), article 12-22, article 30, article 34(1-3),
articles 35-36, article 56, article 58(2)(f), articles 60-63 and article 65-67. Especially the
exclusions on the rights of individuals are wider than in many Member States.
20 Judgment of 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
21 Yle-article,Google wins first “right to be forgotten” case in Finland, 12 May 2015, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/
news/google_wins_first_right_to_be_forgotten_case_in_finland/7988957.
22 KHO:2018:112 (17 August 2018).
23 Government Proposal HE 9/2018, pp. 107-113; Tietosuojalaki (“Data Protection Act”) 27 §, 1050/2018, in
force since 1 January 2019.
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This approach has mainly been justified by reference to the status quo, i.e. the previous
Personal Data Act, and the goal to maintain a similar level of protection for freedom of
speech. Both the Finnish Act on Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Code include
safeguards for data subjects that are considered to balance out the exemptions made to
the application of the GDPR.
TheGovernment Proposal recognizes the conflict between freedomof speech and data
protection and points to the Satamedia case as an example of how two fundamental rights
can be balanced.24 In this case,25 the Court of Justice had to balance freedom of expression
versus data protection as fundamental rights and decided that limitations and exceptions
to the right to privacy had to be applied only in so far as strictly necessary. This balancing
approach is present in the Government Proposal, and Section 27 of the Finnish Data
Protection Act leaves it also in the future for the courts’ interpretation.26
Thewide exemptions to data protection rights and obligations date back to the previous
Personal Data Act. In the working group of the Ministry of Justice, the goal to preserve
the status quo was stressed.27 Certain rights are also safeguarded through provisions in the
Criminal Code and the Act on Freedom of Speech, such as the right to rectify incorrect
information.
According to the Government Proposal, the regulatory situation between the different
rights had been well balanced.28 This was the case partly due to the efficient self-regulatory
system for journalism in place in Finland.29 It remains to be seen how the courts will
interpret the vast restriction of data subject rights, including article 22 GDPR. In the past,
the Supreme Administrative Court took security measures into account to uphold data
subjects’ rights.30 In any case, the provisions in the Data Protection Act restricting Data
subject rights need to be interpreted in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “Charter”) and the EuropeanConvention onHumanRights.
24 Government Proposal HE 9/2018 vp, p. 46.
25 Judgment of 16 December 2008 in Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy
and Satamedia Oy, ECLI:EU:C:2008:727.
26 Tietosuojalaki 27 §, 1050/2018.
27 EU:n yleisen tietosuoja-asetuksen täytäntöönpanotyöryhmän mietintö, mietintöjä ja lausuntoja (“Ministry
of Justice working group paper on the implementation of the GDPR”) 35/2017, p. 65,
julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/80098/OMML_35_2017_EUn_yleinen_tietosuoja.pdf.
28 Government Proposal HE 9/2018 vp, p. 47 and p. 126.
29 Government Proposal HE 9/2018 vp, p. 47.




C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The Finnish Data Protection Act sets down the office of the Finnish Data Protection
Ombudsman.31 The Data Protection Ombudsman supervises the application of the GDPR
and the Law Enforcement Directive (hereinafter “LED”). The supervision of the Credit
Information Act falls also under the Data Protection Ombudsman’s remit.32 The scope of
this law covers more widely data related to credit information, including information
related to corporations and companies. Furthermore, sector specific legislation drawing
from the national margin to manoeuvre provided by the GDPR falls under the Data
Protection Ombudsman’s remit.
The Data Protection Ombudsman’s office builds on the institutional structure which
was in place under the previous data protection regime. The head of office is the Data
Protection Ombudsman as before. However, some significant changes were introduced
with the adoption of the Finnish Data Protection Act. For example, the Data Protection
Ombudsman institutionwas strengthenedwith twoDeputyData ProtectionOmbudsmen.
The Data Protection Act also reformed institutional structures of the enforcement
mechanism. Under the previous data protection regime, a Data Protection Board existed
parallel with the Data Protection Ombudsman. The Data Protection Board had some
enforcement powers and it also had a competence to issue permits for the controllers. This
Board was abolished with the new Data Protection Act.33 Instead a new Expert Board was
introduced with the Data Protection Act. The Expert Board consists of a chair, vice-chair
and threemembers.34 The government appoints the Expert Board for a termof three years.
The role of the Expert Board differs significantly from the previousData Protection Board.35
Where the Data Protection Board had the competence to issue binding decisions based
on Data Protection Ombudsman’s application, the Expert Board’s role is limited in giving
opinions upon a request by the Data Protection Ombudsman. The Data Protection Act
limits the Expert Board’s tasks to high profile issues related to application of the data
protection legislation.36 The opinions issued by the Board are not binding, but they can
provide very valuable insight in complex cases. The Expert Board as is the case with the
Data Protection Ombudsman is allowed to hear and use external experts.37
31 Tietosuojalaki 8 §, 1050/2018.
32 Luottotietolaki 33 §, 527/2007.
33 Tietosuojalaki 37 §, 38 § (1), 1050/2018.
34 Tietosuojalaki 12 § (1), 1050/2018.
35 Tietosuojalaki 12 §, 1050/2018.
36 Tietosuojalaki 17 § (1), 1050/2018.
37 Tietosuojalaki 17 § (2), 19 §, 1050/2018.
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The Data Protection Ombudsman is independent in its decision making and solves
the cases based on presentation of one its staff members. Similarly, the Deputy Data
Protection Ombudsmen make decisions independently based on presentation. The three
Ombudsmen can exercise certain powers only as a collegium. This is the case regarding
issuing administrative fines. The three Data Protection Ombudsmen form a collegium
and the collegium makes it decisions based on presentation by a staff member. In case the
collegium votes, position ofmajority prevails. If the votes are divided evenly, the less heavy
sanction prevails.38
The collegiumcomposition, ormore precisely any composition involvingmulti-member
formation,was required by theConstitutional Committee during the parliamentary process.
The Constitutional Committee underlined that significant public powers are appliedwhen
administrative fines are issued; the constitutional committee saw it therefore essential that
the decision making takes place in broader formation and not in a one-person
composition.39
The Data Protection Ombudsman and the Deputies are all selected and appointed in
a similar manner. Also, on more general terms, the same requirements apply for the Data
ProtectionOmbudsman and theDeputies.40 Furthermore, all Data ProtectionOmbudsmen
have the same enforcement powers.41 The Data Protection Act specifies the qualification
requirements for the Data Protection Ombudsman. The Data Protection Ombudsman
must have a higher legal degree, good knowledge in data protection issues andmanagement
experience. Also the skills to deal with international issues was seen necessary requirement
for the Data Protection Ombudsman due to the increasing role of the European decision
making body and international dimension of the data protection issues.
The government appoints theData ProtectionOmbudsman for a five-year term.42 This
term is renewable.43 The opening of the position is first published.44 Also the information
of the candidates is publicly available as a rule. The decision of the appointment is available
on the government’s website and thememorandum reasoning the appointment is provided
for anyone by a request. The non-chosen applicants can appeal the decision to
Administrative Court if they so wish.45 The First Deputy Data Protection Ombudsmen
38 Tietosuojalaki 24 § (2), 1050/2018.
39 PeVL 14/2018 vp; PeVL 24/2018 vp.
40 Unless otherwise indicated, what is said of the Data Protection Ombudsman in this writing applies to the
Deputies as well.
41 Unless precisely otherwise indicated, what is said about the Data Protection Ombudsman applies also to
the Deputy Ombudsmen.
42 Tietosuojalaki 11 § (1), 1050/2018.
43 See Government Proposal HE 9/2018 vp, p. 96. The Government Proposal clarifies that it follows from the
Finnish legal order that the term is renewable unless otherwise specifically regulated.
44 Valtion virkamieslaki (“State Official Act”) 5a §, 750/1994, in force since 1 December 1994 and regarding
35 § (1) since 1 January 1996.
45 Valtion virkamieslaki 59 §, 750/1994.
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were appointed in the end of April 2019. There were 19 and 13 candidates for these posts,
which had slightly different emphasis regarding the qualifications.
As for the recruitment of staff for the Data Protection Ombudsman’s Office, the new
Data Protection Act did not bring notable changes for the selection procedure. The most
significant amendment relates to the appointment of the administrative head of office.
When the administrative head of office (toimistopäällikkö) was previously appointed by
the Ministry of Justice, all staff members are now appointed by the Data Protection
Ombudsman, including the head of administration. Previously the head of administration
acted also as the deputy for the Data Protection Ombudsman. This has now changed with
the introduction of the Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman posts.
TheData ProtectionOmbudsmandid select and appoint its staff also under the previous
Data ProtectionAct. TheData ProtectionOmbudsman’s office has now been strengthened
with a significant number of new legal experts and other staff. The number of all employees
including the Data Protection Ombudsman and the Deputies is currently 44. Also, the
Data ProtectionAct itself underlines that the office shall have needed number of employees.
As for the Deputy Data Protection Ombudsmen, the Data Protection Act sets only a
minimum number for the deputies, which is two. However, there is an opening for more
than two deputies if this will later seem necessary. The minimum number of deputies
ensures that the data protection authority is always capable of using all of its powers,
including issuing fines.46
Besides the powers and tasks endowed to the Data Protection Ombudsman by the
GDPR and the LED, the Data Protection Ombudsman is provided with some additional
tasks deriving from the sector legislation. The Data Protection Ombudsman for example
supervises the application of the Credit Information Act (luottotietolaki). This might
include issues related to data which is not personal data. The Data Protection Act also
provides theData ProtectionOmbudsmanwith certain powers, which complete the powers
and tasks regulated in the GDPR. To ensure the proper functioning of the Data Protection
Ombudsman, the Data Protection Ombudsman has the right to receive the information
which is necessary for conducting his/her duties. Based on the national Data Protection
Act, the Data Protection Ombudsman has for example the right to receive all information
which is necessary to fulfil its duties. The Data Protection Act specifies that no costs can
be demanded from the Data Protection Ombudsman when exercising this right.
Furthermore, the Data Protection Ombudsman has the right to receive information
regardless of the rules on classification.47 The Data Protection Ombudsman has also the
right to receive assistance from the police in order to fulfil its duties.48
46 As explained earlier, certain powers can be applied only in a formation of three.
47 Tietosuojalaki 18 § (1), 1050/2018.
48 Tietosuojalaki 20 §, 1050/2018.
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Furthermore, the Data Protection Ombudsman has also the right to conduct a control
visit at premises, if this is necessary in order to investigate thematter and there is a specified
and reasoned ground to suspect that data protection provisions have been violated in a
manner which falls under administrative fines or criminal penalties.
Furthermore, besides the duties following from theGDPR, the FinnishData Protection
Ombudsman accredits the certification body. This follows from article 14 § 4 mom. of the
Data Protection Act.49
The Data Protection Ombudsman received 57 requests for statements from the
prosecutors and courts in 2017 and 64 in 2018. It gave 51 statements in 2017 and 80 in
2018.
Question 10
The Data Protection Ombudsman’s Office has not communicated a specific strategy for
GDPR supervision.
The legislative framework does not set limits for the Data Protection Ombudsman to
prioritize specific cases. Prioritizing could refer to allocation of resources or assessing how
time-pressure influences the proceedings. The Data Protection Ombudsman strives to
organize its work in the most effective manner. As an authority with statutory duties, the
Ombudsman is not free to drop cases, i.e. all cases, including non-prioritized, are examined
in due course.
In case data subjects are not satisfied with the treatment of their cases at the Data
Protection Ombudsman Office, they can lodge a complaint with the Parliamentary
Ombudsman or the Chancellor of Justice. Those institutions are the highest overseers of
legality in Finland. The complaint could relate for example the length of the decision
making.
Question 11
The Data Protection Act excluded the application of administrative fines on the public
sector. This was reasoned for example by the specific liability civil servants are bind to
when carrying out their duties. This restriction does not apply for conditional fines, which
can be issued to the public sector as well. Conditional fines are issued together with the
Data Protection Ombudsman’s decision and in case the addressee of the decision does not
complywith the decision, the conditional fines can be enforced on the addressee. In limited
cases, the Data Protection Ombudsman and Data Protection Board had this power also
49 Tietosuojalaki 14 § (4), 1050/2018.
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under the previous data protection regime.50 It was used quite sparingly as the decisions
made by these authorities were usually implemented by the controllers.
Question 12
It is possible to be awarded damages for intangible harm in Finland. However, this has
not occurred in the data protection field under the previous regime. The Finnish system
is generally speaking very restrictive in awarding damages for intangible harm. In other
areas of law, it is not uncommon that courts award almost symbolic fines.
Question 13
The Finnish Data Protection Act did not introduce any new measures related to article 80
of the GDPR nor is there general legislation on this topic. However, the so-called TATTI
working group, which did the preparatory work for the Data Protection Act did note, that
article 80 provides the possibility of representative actions. The TATTI working group did
conclude that there might be a need to seize the possibility provided by article 80. This
would, however, requiremore comprehensive analysis and preparatorywork. Theworking
group did propose that the demand for providing the means for this type of actions would
be examined later.51
In Finland, NGOs have not occupied a large space in the data protection discussion in
comparison with some other Members States, like Austria or Germany. Instead the
discussion has been dominated by public authorities, controller’s representatives andwhen
the focus is on the fundamental right dimension, academics. NGOs focusing data privacy
and digital rights do exist in Finland and they are becoming increasingly involved in the
public debate. For example, the Electronic Frontier Finland (Effi)52 and theOpenKnowledge
Finland (OKFI)53 have both contributed in the data protection discussion. During the
legislative procedure all parties willing to contribute in the process can submit their
statement on the draft law for the responsible ministry. The Ministry of Justice maintains
a platform providing this possibility and both Effi and OKFI did submit their statements
on the Finnish Data Protection draft law.54 Also, for example the former Finnish Data
50 Henkilötietolaki 46 §, was applicable 01.06.1999 – 31.12.2018.
51 EU:n yleisen tietosuoja-asetuksen täytäntöönpanotyöryhmän mietintö, mietintöjä ja lausuntoja (“Ministry




54 Ryhmäkannelaki, 444/2007, in force since 1 October 2007. For more information, see also:
www.lausuntopalvelu.fi/FI/Proposal/Participation?proposalId=1d738195-b96a-47b8-8a74-6ddda342da60.
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ProtectionBoard, which had a role in the enforcement of data protection law, had amember
with Effi-background.
Furthermore, sometimes data protection issues emerge in the consumer’s rights in a
manner, which leads into the involvement of consumer authorities. There are several public
authorities in Finland representing the consumer interest; Competition and Consumer
Authority55, Consumer Advisory Services56, Consumer Ombudsman57 and Consumer
Complaint Board58, which solves issues related to consumer rights.
Consumer authorities have certain tools to address situations where similar issues
occurs in multiple cases, these are group complaint and class action. The Consumer
Ombudsman has the competence to initiate a group complaint on his/her own initiative.
In such case the Consumer Ombudsman considers similar disputes as single matter. This
does not require a request from the consumer. The Consumer Ombudsman has also
competences to file a class action. Only the Consumer Ombudsman has this competence;
these competences were endowed to the Consumer Ombudsman to further strengthen
the group complaint. Themembers of the classmust be individually defined and theymust
opt-in to participate in the class action. The class action matters fall under the jurisdiction
of the district court of Helsinki.59
Question 14
TheData ProtectionOmbudsmanhas cooperatedwith other regulators, such as consumer
authorities, already during the previous data protection regime.
The cooperation has continued after the GDPR became applicable. A recent example
of cooperation between Data Protection Ombudsman’s Office and consumer authorities
dates from June 2019. The Data Protection Ombudsman addressed then jointly with the
consumer authorities the general public on robocalls. Robocalls had recently caused
confusion among consumers in Finland. Both the Data Protection Ombudsman and
consumer authorities are examining a case, where robocalls had been used for direct





59 Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority, Assisting the consumer in court-group complaint and class
action, 20 November 2014, www.kkv.fi/en/about-us/the-consumer-ombudsman/assistance-provided/.
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clarifies to which authority consumer should turn to depending on the specific robocall
issue at stake.60
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The LED was implemented into Finnish legislation by laki henkilötietojen käsittelystä
rikosasioissa ja kansallisen turvallisuuden ylläpitämisen yhteydessä (1054/2018). This
translates as an Act on the processing of personal data in criminal matters and in the
context of maintaining national security. It was a national decision to extend the scope of
the Act on implementing the LED to cover the processing of personal data when
maintaining national security. It follows from the Finnish Constitution that all processing
of personal data must be regulated by law. That includes processing for the purpose of
national security. This Act does not, however, try to define the concept of national security.
This solutionwas not widely debated during the legislative process, but was rather seen
as a reasonable solution. As the Act on implementing LED falls under the Data Protection
Ombudsman’s remit, the Ombudsman also supervises matters related to national security
in so far as the said Act is applicable.
Another Act covering the intelligence services entered into force on 1 July 2019. This
is of high relevance in the context of national security; it also includes location data, i.e.
personal data in this context. One of the safeguards to assure appropriate functioning of
intelligence services was setting up the institution of the “Intelligence Ombudsman”. The
new institution functions in the context of the Data Protection Ombudsman’s office, but
is a separate entity from the Data Protection Ombudsman.
60 The Data Protection Ombudsman, Robots cannot make telephone sales calls without consumer’s consent,
14 June 2019, tietosuoja.fi/fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/robotti-ei-saa-soittaa-myyntipuheluita-ilman-
suostumusta?_101_INSTANCE_ajcbJYZLUABn_languageId=en_US.
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France
Céline Castets-Renard, Mathieu Combet and Olivia Tambou*
A Présentation du contexte
Question 1
En France, les deux principaux textes adaptant le droit français au Règlement Général sur
la Protection des Données (ci-après « RGPD ») et transposant la Directive Police Justice
sont actuellement la nouvelle loi Informatique et Libertés (ci-après « LIL ») et le décret
n°2019-536 du 29mai 2019 entrés en vigueur le 1er juin 2019. La LIL comporte actuellement
128 articles répartis en cinq titres:
– Titre Ier: Dispositions communes, consacré notamment aux principes, définitions, à
l’autorité de contrôle qui est la Commission Informatique et libertés (ci-après « CNIL
»), formalités préalables, voies de recours,
– Titre II: Traitements relevant du RGPD
– Titre III: Dispositions applicables aux traitements de la directive Police Justice
– Titre IV: Dispositions applicables aux traitements intéressant la sûreté de l’Etat et la
défense;
– Titre V: Dispositions relatives à l’outre-mer
Cette présentation ainsi que le “choix” d’opérer de nombreux renvois au RGPD en raison
de son effet direct rend le texte final parfois peu lisible voire inintelligible pour des non
spécialistes. En outre, on constate des phénomènes tantôt de sur-adaptation visant à aller
au-delà des règles ayant effet direct du RGPD, tantôt de sous-adaptation visant à maintenir
des règles nationales antérieures dont la formulation n’est pas conforme à celle du RGPD.1
D’une manière générale, le gouvernement a estimé que le RGPD comportait une liste
de 56 renvois au droit national. Il a été décidé de faire une utilisation modérée des marges
d’appréciation2 laissées aux Etats membres par le RGPD. Une part importante de l’usage
* Les questions 3,5,6,10, 11 ont été préparées par Céline Castets-Renard, Full Professor à l’Université d’Ottawa,
les questions 2,4,7,12 et 14 par Mathieu Combet Maître de Conférences à l’Université de Saint-Etienne, les
questions 1,8,9,13, 15 par Olivia Tambou, Maître de Conférences à l’Université Paris-Dauphine.
1 C’est notamment le cas pour les règles relatives à l’article 80 RGPD cf. notre analyse question 13.
2 Pour plus de détails cf. notre article ‘French Adaptation of the GDPR’, inK. Mc Cullagh et al. (Eds), National
Adaptations of the GDPR, Collection Open Access Book, Blogdroiteuropeen, Luxembourg (2019), https://
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des dérogations et limitations concerne les autorités publiques ou certaines catégories de
traitements de données.
Les principales flexibilités au RGPD existant en France sont:
– Une disposition relative au droit applicable en cas d’usage de clauses ouvertes par
les Etats membres Cette question n’a pas été abordée dans le RGPD. La France a
néanmoins pris l’initiative de préciser que lorsque le RGPD renvoi au droit national
le soin de l’adapter le droit français s’applique en principe “lorsque la personne concernée
réside en France y compris lorsque le responsable de traitement n’est pas établi en France”
(article 3, II LIL). Le critère de résidence est remplacé par le critère de l’établissement
lorsque des traitements à des fins journalistiques ou à des fins d’expression universitaire,
artistique, ou littéraire sont en cause. Autrement dit, le droit français s’appliquera, dès
lors que le responsable du traitement est établi en France.
– Les données post-mortem (considérant 27 RGPD, articles 84-86). Exclues du champ
d’application du RGPD, les données personnelles des personnes décédées font l’objet
de dispositions introduites en France en 2016 par loi n° 2016-1321 dite République
numérique. Il s’agit notamment de permettre aux personnes de laisser des directives
relatives au traitement de leurs données personnelles après leur mort (testament
numérique) et de préciser les droits pouvant être exercés par les héritiers en l’absence
de ces directives.
– L’interdiction des traitements des données sensibles (article 9 RGPD, article 44 de
la LIL).
Six types de traitements de données sensibles sont possibles en France:
1. Les traitements nécessaires aux fins de la médecine préventive, des diagnostics
médicaux, de l’administration de soins ou de traitements, ou de la gestion de services
de santé et mis en œuvre par un membre d’une profession de santé, ou par une
autre personne à laquelle s’impose en raison de ses fonctions l’obligation de secret
professionnel
2. Les traitements statistiques réalisés par l’Institut national de la statistique et des
études économiques ou l’un des services statistiques ministériels
3. Les traitements comportant des données concernant la santé justifiée par l’intérêt
public
4. Les traitements conformes aux règlements types mis en œuvre par les employeurs
ou les administrations qui portent sur des données biométriques strictement
nécessaires au contrôle de l’accès aux lieux de travail ainsi qu’aux appareils et aux
applications utilisés dans le cadre des missions confiées aux salariés, aux agents,
aux stagiaires ou aux prestataires;
blogdroiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/national-adaptations-of-the-gdpr-final-version-27-february-
1.pdf. Toutes les pages Web ont été consultées pour la dernière fois le 5 février 2020.
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5. Les traitements portant sur la réutilisation des informations publiques sous réserve
que ces traitements n’aient ni pour objet ni pour effet de permettre la réidentification
des personnes concernées;
6. Les traitements nécessaires à la recherche publique
– L’âge du consentement du mineur (article 8 RGPD, article 45 de la LIL). La France
a opté pour une solution inédite qui prévoit:
– avant 13 ans le consentement du seul titulaire de l’autorité parentale,
a. entre 13 et 15 ans le consentement conjoint dumineur et du titulaire de l’autorité
parentale. La conformité du double consentement a été justifiée tant par le
gouvernement que par le Conseil constitutionnel français3 par la lettre 8 RGPD
qui distingue le consentement donné, du consentement autorisé. Pour autant,
cette interprétation unilatérale du RGPD peut interroger
b. Après 15 ans, le consentement du seul mineur.
– Traitement des données à caractère personnel relatives aux condamnations pénales
(article 10RGPD, article 46 LIL). Six catégories de personnes peuvent traiter ces données
particulières. La principale nouveauté est d’avoir introduit “Les réutilisateurs des
informations publiques … sous réserve que les traitements mis en œuvre n’aient ni
pour objet ni pour effet de permettre la réidentification des personnes concernée”. Il
s’agit de répondre à l’engagement politique de la France en matière d’Open Data.
– Fondement légal pour des décisions administratives individuelles exclusivement
automatisées (article 22 RGPD §2b), article 47 de la LIL cf. réponse question 6 pour
plus de détails)
– Quelques limitations de droits (article 23 RGPD, article 48, 49, 52, 58 LIL)
pas de droit à l’information pour les données collectées indirectement (article
14 RGPD) pour certains traitements mis en œuvre pour le compte de l’Etat
a.
intéressant la sécurité publique, le contrôle et le recouvrement des impôts (article
48 LIL)
b. pas de droit d’accès pour les traitements aux seules finalités d’établissement de
statistiques ou de réalisation de recherche scientifique ou historiques et sous
certaines conditions (article 49, alinéa 3 LIL).
c. droit d’accès, de rectification et d’effacement indirect par le biais de la CNIL pour
certains traitements liés au contrôle et recouvrement des impôts (article 52 LIL)
d. pas de communication à la personne concernée de violation de données (article
34 RGPD, article 58 II LIL) pour une catégorie de traitements dont la
communication serait susceptible d’engendrer un risque pour la sécurité nationale,
la défense ou la sécurité publique. Liste des traitements concernés à l’article. 85 du
décret n°2019-536.
3 cf. Point 63 de la décision du Conseil Constitutionnel nº 2018-765 du 12 juin 2018.
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– Des limitations de droits découlant de l’article 85 RGPD cf. question 9.
– Lemaintien de quelques formalités préalables (Chapitre IV de la LIL, articles 31-36):
Une autorisation préalable a été maintenue pour:
– des traitements de souveraineté, (article 31-1 LIL),
– certains traitements dans le domaine de la santé (article 66 III LIL),
– certains traitements de données génétiques ou biométriques (article 32 LIL).
– Etablissement d’une liste limitative de personnes pouvant traiter le NIR (numéro
d’inscription au répertoire), article 30 LIL, décret n°2019-341 du 19 avril 2019.
– Traitement des données dans le cadre des relations de travail (art. 88 du RGPD),
existence de règles en matière de vidéosurveillance, droit d’information du salarié,
traitement des fiches de paie, dans le code du travail (notamment article L1221-9 et
L-1222-4)
– Prise en compte de certains publics: mineurs, TPE, PME, collectivités locales
L’article 48 alinéa 2 de la LIL précise que l’information au titre de l’article 13 du
RGPD doit être transmise au mineur de moins de 15 ans “en langage clair et
facilement accessible”.
–
– Mission de la CNIL visant en accompagner plus particulièrement ces acteurs.
Question 2
En droit français, le droit au respect de la vie privée a été introduit à l’article 9 du Code
civil, introduit par la loi du 17 juillet 1970. De son côté, la protection des données
personnelles a été introduite par LIL en 1978modifiée par la loi n°2004-801 du 6 août 2004
pour l’adapter à la directive 95/46 CE et enfin par la loi n°2018-493 du 20 juin 2018 pour
l’adapter au RGPD et à la Directive Police Justice.
C’est en raison des risques d’atteintes à la vie privée des personnes que la protection
des données personnelles a été intégrée au droit au respect de la vie privée. C’est ce qui
ressort de certaines décisions du Conseil Constitutionnel comme la décision n°2012-652
du 22 mars 2012 sur la loi relative à la protection de l’identité sur le fondement de l’article
2 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789.
La Charte européenne sur les droits fondamentaux (article 8) a eu une influence sur
la protection du droit à la protection des données qui n’était pas reconnue comme un droit
fondamental en France. Au demeurant, le contentieux portant sur ces questions ne se
fonde pas directement sur les dispositions de la Charte, mais sur des textes nationaux ou
de droit dérivé. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de
l’Union européenne a eu une certaine influence sur la protection des données personnelles
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comme avec le droit à l’oubli avec notamment l’arrêtGoogle Spain de 20144 ou bien encore
l’arrêt Manni de 2017.5
Dans 13 arrêts rendus le 6 décembre 20196, le Conseil d’Etat s’est prononcé sur le droit
au déréférencement en tirant les conséquence de l’arrêt de la Cour de justice le 24 septembre
2019 consacrant le champ européen et nonmondial du « droit au déréférencement ».7 Cela
a été également le cas de la Cour de cassation dans un arrêt rendu le 27 novembre 2019.8
B Réception des dispositions de fond du RGPD dans l’ordre juridique
national
Question 3
Il a été décidé de ne pas répondre à cette question afin de respecter la taille et en raison de
l’absence d’éléments scientifiques pour y répondre.
Question 4
Le Conseil d’Etat a eu l’occasion de se prononcer sur la notion “d’intérêt légitime” dans
un arrêt du 18 mars 2019 dans le cadre d’une procédure d’une personne exerçant son droit
d’opposition à l’exploitation des données personnelles de ses enfants.9
Selon le Conseil d’Etat, le droit de toute personne physique de s’opposer au traitement
de ses données personnelles, conformément à l’article 38 de la LIL est subordonné à
l’existence de raisons légitimes. Ces dernières doivent tenir de manière prépondérante à
la situation particulière du demandeur. C’est-à-dire que le fait de faire état de craintes
d’ordre général sans pour autant évoquer des considérations qui sont propres à la situation
de ses enfants n’est pas suffisant pour établir l’existence d’un motif légitime.
Si le Conseil d’Etat ne s’est pas prononcé sur le fondement du RGPD en raison du fait
qu’il n’était pas applicable aux moments des faits, il est intéressant de noter que l’article
21 relatif au droit d’opposition prévoit, quant à lui, que « la personne concernée a le droit
de s’opposer à tout moment, pour des raisons tenant à sa situation particulière, à un
4 CJUE 13 mai 2014, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. c/ Mario Costeja González e.a., aff. C-131/12,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
5 CJUE 9 mars 2017, Camera di Commercio c/ S. Manni, aff. C-398/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:197.
6 CE, 6 déc. 2019, M. A. c/ CNIL, n°391000, n°393769 n°395335, n°397755, n°399999, n°401258, n°403868,
n°405464, n°405910, n°407776, n°409212 n°429154, n°423326.
7 CJUE, 24 sept. 2019, Google c/ CNIL, aff. C-507/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772.
8 Civ. 1re, 27 nov. 2019, FS-P+B+R+I, n° 18-14.675.
9 CE, 18 mars 2019, n°406313.
277
France
traitement des données à caractère personnel la concernant ». Partant, la position adoptée
par le Conseil d’Etat apparaît particulièrement proche de la notion d’intérêt légitime, telle
qu’elle est mentionnée dans le RGPD. On dénombre près d’une vingtaine d’affaires qui
ont été jugées par le Conseil d’Etat sur la notion d’intérêt légitime dans le cadre d’une
procédure portant sur le droit d’opposition. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la notion d’«
intérêts légitimes » mentionnée à l’article 6.1 du RGPD n’a pas encore fait l’objet d’une
interprétation des juridictions nationales.
En ce qui concerne le consentement, c’est surtout la CNIL qui s’est prononcée sur
cette notion. En vertu de l’article 2, point h) de la directive 95/46/CE, le consentement
s’entend comme toute manifestation de volonté, libre, spécifique et informée par laquelle
la personne concernée accepte que des données à caractère personnel la concernant fassent
l’objet d’un traitement. À cet égard, la notion de consentement, reprise dans le RGPD est
d’ailleurs plus exigeante dès lors qu’il est prévu que celui-ci doit être donné par un acte
positif clair par lequel la personne concernée manifeste de façon libre, spécifique, éclairée
et univoque son accord au traitement des données à caractère personnel la concernant.10
Il est à noter que le Tribunal de grande instance de Paris s’est prononcé sur 38 clauses
des «Conditions d’utilisation » et des « Règles de confidentialité » de Google qu’il a déclaré
comme abusives et certaines de ces clauses portaient sur le consentement des utilisateurs.
En effet, la rédaction de ces clauses faisait apparaître qu’il y avait une présomption de
consentement du consommateur à la collecte de ses données personnelles.
Le consentement a aussi été au cœur de la première condamnation de la CNIL post
RGPD qui a été rendue contre Google le 21 janvier 2019.11
Question 5
Cette question a fait l’objet de débats, spécialement dans le cadre de l’adoption de la directive
relative à certains aspects des contrats de fourniture du contenu numérique en avril 2019
(Directive 2019/770/UE).12 La proposition initiale de la directive ne considérait le prix à
payer pour la fourniture d’un contenu numérique que comme une somme d’argent. Or,
l’économie numérique est fondée sur la donnée et la fourniture de données à caractère
personnel constitue parfois le seul prix à payer. La fourniture de données à caractère
personnel a été réintroduite par le compromis adopté auConseil et la directive s’appliquera
désormais lorsque le consommateur fournit uniquement des données à caractère personnel.
Les services de communication interpersonnelle par contournement, les contrats groupés
10 Délibération CNIL n°2013-4203 du janvier 2014; Délibération CNIL n°MED-2018-023 du 25 juin 2018;
Décision CNIL n°MED-2018-02325 du juin 2018.
11 Délibération n°SAN-2019-001 du 21 janvier 2019.
12 JOUE du 22 mai 2019, L 136, 22.5.2019, p. 1–27.
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et le traitement des données à caractère personnel sont inclus dans le champ d’application
de la directive relative au contenu numérique. À l’issue des négociations, une référence
expresse au règlement général sur la protection des données personnelles (RGPD) a été
introduite dans la directive (voir notamment le considérant 37 et l’article 3§8).
Ces enjeux ont aussi fait l’objet de discussions au Sénat en France lors de la présentation
du rapport d’information n° 326 (2017-2018) deM.AndréGattolin etMmeColetteMélot,
fait au nom de la commission des affaires européennes, déposé le 21 février 2018.13
Notons que la Quadrature du net, association de défense des libertés fondamentales
dans l’environnement numérique, a défendu la position de ne pas considérer les données
personnelles comme une marchandise et de ne pas les introduire dans la directive sur la
fourniture de contenus numériques.14 Le considérant 24 de la directive précise au contraire
que: “tout en reconnaissant pleinement que la protection des données à caractère personnel
est un droit fondamental et que, par conséquent, les données à caractère personnel ne
peuvent être considérées comme des marchandises, la présente directive devrait garantir
aux consommateurs, dans le cadre de ces modèles commerciaux, le droit à des recours
contractuels”. L’article 3§1 porte sur le champ d’application et pose ainsi que la directive
s’applique lorsque le professionnel fournit ou s’engage à fournir un contenu numérique
ou un service numérique au consommateur et le consommateur fournit ou s’engage à
fournir des données à caractère personnel au professionnel, sauf lorsque les données à
caractère personnel fournies par le consommateur sont exclusivement traitées par le
professionnel pour fournir le contenunumérique ou le service numérique oupour permettre
au professionnel de remplir les obligations légales qui lui incombent.
Question 6
L’article 10 de la nouvelle LIL pose que “aucune décision produisant des effets juridiques
à l’égard d’une personne ou l’affectant de manière significative ne peut être prise sur le
seul fondement d’un traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel, y compris
le profilage, à l’exception: 1° des cas mentionnés aux a et c du 2 de l’article 22 du règlement
(UE) 2016/679 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 27 avril 2016 précité, sous les
réserves mentionnées au 3 du même article 22.”
13 Voir: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r17-326/r17-326_mono.html#toc8.
14 Cette association appelle à la reconnaissance d’un principe fondamental que le droit à la vie privée et à la




Exceptions prévues par le RGPD
Si cette partie de la LIL reprend le RGPD, il faut toutefois noter une formulation différente
entre le RGPD et la version française. Alors que le RGPD accorde clairement un droit au
profit de la personne concernée, “de ne pas faire l’objet d’une décision fondée exclusivement
sur un traitement automatisé, y compris le profilage, produisant des effets juridiques la
concernant ou l’affectant de manière significative de façon similaire”, la LIL affirme
qu’aucune décision ne peut être prise, ce qui semble être une obligation s’adressant au
responsable de traitement, sans pour autant qu’il en soit explicitement débiteur. La
reconnaissance d’un droit subjectif qui peut être mis en œuvre par un créancier de
l’obligation a sans doute plus de vigueur qu’une formulation générale impersonnelle de
nature à créer une obligation non explicitée à l’égard du responsable de traitement. Cette
remarque doit toutefois être nuancée par le fait que cette disposition de la LIL s’intègre au
chapitre V de la loi n° 2018-493 du 20 juin 2018 relatif aux “Dispositions particulières
relatives aux droits des personnes concernées”. L’intention du législateur français n’est
certainement pas de remettre en cause ce droit consacré par le RGPD mais on pourra
regretter qu’il n’ait pas repris lamême formulation. La forme de la LIL s’explique cependant
par la conservation de l’expression précédente prévue par la loi de 1978. Au demeurant,
le CEPD a bien précisé que l’article 22 consacre une interdiction.15
Garanties supplémentaires
Parmi les différences, il faut également relever que la LIL ajoute une condition tenant au
fait que “les règles définissant le traitement ainsi que les principales caractéristiques de sa
mise en œuvre” doivent être “communiquées, à l’exception des secrets protégés par la loi,
par le responsable de traitement à l’intéressé s’il en fait la demande”. Cette disposition
renforce la protection de la personne concernée, ce qui est compatible avec un des objectifs
du RGPD. On peut donc dire que le législateur français a adopté des mesures
supplémentaires de sauvegarde des droits, libertés et légitimes intérêts des personnes
concernées, y compris dans le cadre des exceptions prévues par le RGPD.
Une telle disposition traduit la volonté de reconnaître explicitement un droit à la
transparence et à l’explication qui est sous-entendu dans le RGPD et a fait l’objet de débats,
surtout parmi la doctrine aux États-Unis et en Europe sur le fait de savoir s’il existe ou
15 CEPD, Lignes directrices sur la prise de décision individuelle automatisée et le profilage, WP 251, 6 févr.
2018, p. 21.
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non un droit à explication à l’article 22 du RGPD,16 complété par les articles 13-15.17 Il
semble qu’il faille distinguer le droit à l’information, clairement consacré dans le RGPD,
et le droit individuel à explication qui n’est pas visé dans le RGPD lui-même mais
uniquement au considérant 71. Ce débat a peu été repris en France pour des raisons
expliquées ci-après.
Dispositions spécifiques à la France non directement liées au RGPD
La loi précitée n° 2016-1321 Pour une République numérique (ci-après LRN) posait déjà
des règles relatives à la transparence des décisions automatisées prises par l’administration.18
Elle contenait deux catégories de règles à l’égard des plateformes numériques, d’une part,
et des administrations, d’autre part. La loi du 20 juin 2018 est venue modifier les secondes.
La LRN a créé un nouvel article L. 311-3-1 du Code des relations entre le public et
l’administration (CRPA), selon lequel:
“une décision individuelle prise sur le fondement d’un traitement algorithmique
comporte une mention explicite en informant l’intéressé. Les règles définissant
ce traitement ainsi que les principales caractéristiques de sa mise en œuvre sont
communiquées par l’administration à l’intéressé s’il en fait la demande”. Ce
droit à l’information a été précisé par décret.19
16 B.Goodman and S. Flaxman, EURegulations onAlgorithmicDecision-Making andA « right to Explanation
» (2016): https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813; B. Goodman, A Step Towards Accountable Algorithms? Algo-
rithmic Discrimination and the European Union General Data Protection, 29th Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2016), Barcelone, Espagne; M. Hildebrandt, The New Imbroglio –
Living with Machine Algorithms, in The Art of Ethics in the Information Society (2016). S. Wachter, B.
Mittelstadt, L. Floridi, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the
GeneralData ProtectionRegulation?, InternationalData Privacy Law, 7(2), 76–99 (2017). AndrewD. Selbst
and Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, International Data Privacy Law,
vol. 7(4), 233-242 (2017). Voir aussi: L. Edwards et M. Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is ProbablyNot the RemedyYouAre Looking For, Duke Law&Technology Review, à paraître.
17 Rappelons que l’article 15h) du règlement consacre le droit d’obtenir du responsable de traitement des
informations sur l’existence d’une prise de décision automatisée, y compris un profilage, mais aussi « au
moins en pareils cas, des informations utiles concernant la logique sous-jacente, ainsi que l’importance et
les conséquences prévues de ce traitement pour la personne concernée ».
18 J.-M. Pastor, Accès aux traitements algorithmiques utilisés par l’administration, AJDA 2017, 604.
19 Un décret n° 2017-330 relatif aux droits des personnes faisant l’objet de décisions individuelles prises sur
le fondement d’un traitement algorithmique a été pris le 14 mars 2017 pour préciser l’obligation de com-
munication. Il indique désormais à l’article R. 311-3-1-2 du code des relations entre le public et l’adminis-
tration (CRPA) que: « l’administration communique à la personne faisant l’objet d’une décision individuelle
prise sur le fondement d’un traitement algorithmique, à la demande de celle-ci, sous une forme intelligible
et sous réserve de ne pas porter atteinte à des secrets protégés par la loi, les informations suivantes: le degré
et le mode de contribution du traitement algorithmique à la prise de décision; les données traitées et leurs
sources; les paramètres de traitement et, le cas échéant, leur pondération, appliqués à la situation de l’intéressé;
les opérations effectuées par le traitement ». Ce droit d’accès peut s’exercer auprès de toute administration,
y compris des collectivités territoriales, « sous réserve de ne pas porter atteinte à des secrets protégés par la
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En outre, l’article 6 de la LRN prévoit que
“Sous réserve des secrets protégés, les administrations (…) publient en ligne les
règles définissant les principaux traitements algorithmiques utilisés dans
l’accomplissement de leursmissions lorsqu’ils fondent des décisions individuelles”.
La possibilité ainsi laissée de se prévaloir des secrets risque de vider de sa substance le
principe de la diffusion de l’information. Dans son avis sur le projet de loi,20 le Conseil
d’Etat avait d’ailleurs mis en garde contre une trop grande précision des informations
données dans ce cadre à même de “permettre à des usagers de se constituer un profil
permettant de contourner les prescriptions qui seraient applicables aux opérateurs “.
Rappelons, en outre, que le considérant 63 encadre cette exception qui ne doit pas faire
obstacle à la transparence.21
Intégration de ces dispositions spécifiques dans le cadre de l’exception permise par le
RGPD (art. 22§2b)
Le législateur français a profité de la flexibilité offerte par l’article 22§2 b) du RGPD pour
modifier ces dispositions et renforcer l’exception en droit national au droit de ne pas faire
l’objet d’une décision automatisée comme le montre nouvel article 10 de la LIL.
Garanties pour les personnes concernées
S’agissant des mesures de sauvegarde des droits, libertés et légitimes intérêts des personnes
concernées, la nouvelle LIL prévoit un droit individuel à explication qui témoigne d’une
sur-adaptation du RGPD par le législateur français.
Interprétation et garanties précisées par le Conseil constitutionnel
Le Conseil constitutionnel a précisé que
“ces dispositions se bornent à autoriser l’administration à procéder à
l’appréciation individuelle de la situation de l’administré, par le seul truchement
d’un algorithme, en fonction des règles et critères définis à l’avance par le
loi » mais aussi dans les limites des restrictions et secrets énumérés au 2° de l’article L. 311-5 du CRPA.
Enfin, le silence gardé par l’administration au terme du délai d’un mois vaut décision de rejet (CRPA, art.
R. 311-12 et R. 311-13) du CRPA.
20 Avis du 3 déc. 2015, n° 390741.
21 Le considérant 63 du RGPD indique que le droit d’accès accordé à l’article 15 du RGPD « ne devrait pas
porter atteinte aux droits ou libertés d’autrui, y compris au secret des affaires ou à la propriété intellectuelle,
notamment au droit d’auteur protégeant le logiciel. Cependant, ces considérations ne devraient pas aboutir
à refuser toute communication d’informations à la personne concernée ».
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responsable du traitement. Elles n’ont ni pour objet ni pour effet d’autoriser
l’administration à adopter des décisions sans base légale, ni à appliquer d’autres
règles que celles du droit en vigueur. Il n’en résulte dès lors aucun abandon de
compétence du pouvoir réglementaire”.22
En outre, le seul recours à un algorithme pour fonder une décision administrative
individuelle est subordonné au respect de trois conditions:
1. d’une part, conformément à l’article L. 311-3-1 du CRPA, la décision administrative
individuelle doit mentionner explicitement qu’elle a été adoptée sur le fondement d’un
algorithme et les principales caractéristiques de mise en œuvre de ce dernier doivent
être communiquées à la personne intéressée, à sa demande. Il en résulte que, lorsque
les principes de fonctionnement d’un algorithme ne peuvent être communiqués sans
porter atteinte à l’un des secrets ou intérêts énoncés au 2° de l’article L. 311-5 du code
des relations entre le public et l’administration, aucune décision individuelle ne peut
être prise sur le fondement exclusif de cet algorithme.
2. D’autre part, la décision administrative individuelle doit pouvoir faire l’objet de recours
administratifs, conformément au chapitre premier du titre premier du livre quatrième
du CRPA. L’administration sollicitée à l’occasion de ces recours est alors tenue de se
prononcer sans pouvoir se fonder exclusivement sur l’algorithme. La décision
administrative est, en outre, en cas de recours contentieux, placée sous le contrôle du
juge, qui est susceptible d’exiger de l’administration la communication des
caractéristiques de l’algorithme.
3. Enfin, le recours exclusif à un algorithme est exclu si ce traitement porte sur l’une des
données sensibles mentionnées au paragraphe I de l’article 8 de la LIL qui reprend
l’article 9 du RGPD).
Par ailleurs, le responsable du traitement doit s’assurer de la maîtrise du traitement
algorithmique et de ses évolutions afin de pouvoir expliquer, en détail et sous une forme
intelligible, à la personne concernée la manière dont le traitement a été mis en œuvre à
son égard. Il en résulte que ne peuvent être utilisés, comme fondement exclusif d’une
décision administrative individuelle, des algorithmes susceptibles de réviser eux-mêmes
les règles qu’ils appliquent, sans le contrôle et la validation du responsable du traitement.
Au vu de tous ces éléments, le Conseil constitutionnel a estimé que le législateur a défini
des garanties appropriées pour la sauvegarde des droits et libertés des personnes soumises
aux décisions administratives individuelles prises sur le fondement exclusif d’un algorithme.
Le Conseil constitutionnel a ainsi réduit les risques liés à l’utilisation d’un algorithme
protégé par un secret ou un droit de propriété intellectuelle, lesquels secret et droit ne
22 CC décision n° 2018-765 DC du 12 juin 2018 (pts 69-72).
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pourraient faire obstacle à la transparence. Il a également précisé les conditions d’un recours
contre une décision prise sur le fondement d’un algorithme et le fait que l’explication doit
être apportée par un humain et non par un algorithme et sous contrôle judiciaire. Cela
suppose donc que le type d’algorithme utilisé soit maîtrisable et explicable, ce qui exclut
les outils auto-apprenants ditsmachine learning qui “apprennent” et évoluent sans contrôle
humain. Enfin, l’exclusion des données sensibles doit permettre d’éviter le risque d’une
discrimination algorithmique fondée sur des données biaisées concernant par exemple les
origines ethniques. Si ces dispositions vont dans le bon sens pour limiter les risques de
discrimination amplement relevés par la doctrine, notamment aux États-Unis,23 de tels
risques ne peuvent être totalement éliminés puisque d’autres facteurs en apparence objectifs
peuvent conduire à des résultats biaisés et discriminants. Ces facteurs dits “proxies” peuvent
être indirectement porteurs d’informations sensibles, comme par exemple le code postal
qui révèle souvent un niveau social voire une origine ethnique.
Décisions de justice
Par ailleurs, il faut remarquer que le début de l’article 10 de la LIL précise que “aucune
décision de justice impliquant une appréciation sur le comportement d’une personne ne
peut avoir pour fondement un traitement automatisé de données à caractère personnel
destiné à évaluer certains aspects de la personnalité de cette personne”. Cette disposition
n’est pas nouvelle et était déjà consacrée par la loi n° 78-27 du 6 janvier 1978.24 Une
évaluation automatisée des caractéristiques d’une personne conduisant à une décision ne
peut être réalisée sur la seule base de cette évaluation. Cela suppose donc que d’autres
critères soient pris en compte ou encore que d’autres moyens soient utilisés a minima en
complément pour aider la prise de décision et non pour la prendre.
Question 7
L’exercice du droit à l’effacement, tel qu’il ressort de l’article 17 du RGPD et 12 de la
directive 95/46/CE, a connu une application renforcée depuis l’arrêt Google Spain de 2014
rendu par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne.
En ce qui concerne le droit au déréférencement, il est possible de constater que le
contentieux qui s’y rapporte met en évidence, à la fois, un renforcement de la protection
23 Voir par exemple S. Barocas et A. Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’, Cal. L. Rev. Vol. 104, No. 3 (2016),
pp. 671-732; A. Chander, ‘The Racist Algorithm?’, Mich. L. Rev. Vol. 115, No. 6 (2017), pp. 1023-1045.
24 L’art. 10 de la loi n° 78-17 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés du 6 janvier 1978 prévoyait
ainsi que: « Aucune décision produisant des effets juridiques à l’égard d’une personne ne peut être prise sur
le seul fondement d’un traitement automatisé de données destiné à définir le profil de l’intéressé ou à évaluer
certains aspects de sa personnalité ».
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des droits des personnes physiques et le détermination d’un équilibre entre les droits des
personnes physiques et le droit à l’information.
Dans une délibération de 2016,25 la CNIL a infligé une sanction à Google de 100,000
euros pour avoir refusé demettre enœuvre des demandes bien fondées de déréférencement
de personnes physique sur l’ensemble des extensions de noms de domaine de son moteur
de recherche. Les juridictions administratives ont adopté une position similaire sur le «
droit au déréférencement » en imposant à des sociétés de répondre favorablement à des
demandes de particuliers.26
La Cour de justice a rendu une décision le 24 septembre 2019 consacrant le champ
européen et non mondial du « droit au déréférencement ».27 Dans un autre arrêt rendu le
même jour, la Cour de justice a également donné des éléments sur les conditions dans
lesquelles les personnes peuvent obtenir le déréférencement d’un lien apparaissant dans
un résultat de recherche lorsque la page auquel le lien renvoie contient des informations
relatives à des informations sensibles.28
Les juridictions judiciaires connaissent des problématiques similaires. Elles tentent de
trouver un juste équilibre entre la protection des droits des personnes et le droit à
l’information. Ainsi, dans une ordonnance de référé du 19 décembre 2014 le TGI de Paris
considère que la demanderesse « justifie de raisons prépondérantes et légitimes prévalant
sur le droit à l’information ».29 D’ailleurs, la Cour de cassation a également censuré dans
une décision du 27novembre 2019 un arrêt d’uneCour d’appel qui avait rejeté une demande
de déréférencement faite par un particulier auprès de Google.30
Question 8
Dès son origine en 1978 la LIL comportait une dérogation pour les traitements relatifs à
la liberté d’expression qui a été modifié pour l’adapter à l’article 85 RGPD. L’article 80 de
la LIL actuelle pose néanmoins trois séries de questionnements relatifs à sa conformité au
RGPD:
– l’article 80 LIL reste assez vague en ce sens qu’il ne saurait à lui seul permettre
véritablement de concilier le droit à la protection des données avec la liberté
d’expression. Le parti pris de l’adaptation française a donc été de considérer que l’article
85§1 ne posait pas d’obligation spécifique d’adopter une loi sur ce sujet. L’article 80 se
25 Délibération n°2016-054 du 10mars 2016 de la formation restreinte n° 2016-054 du 10mars 2016 prononçant
une sanction pécuniaire à l’encontre de la société X.
26 Conseil d’État, 10ème - 9ème chambres réunies, 19 juillet 2017, n° 399922.
27 CJUE, 24 sept. 2019, Google c/ CNIL, préc.
28 CJUE, 24 sept. 2019, GC e.a. c/ CNIL, aff. C-136/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:773.
29 TGI Paris, Ord., 24 novembre 2014, Marie-France M. / Google France et Google Inc.
30 Civ. 1re, 27 nov. 2019, préc.
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contente de dresser la liste des droits qui peuvent faire l’objet d’une dérogation pour
les quatre finalités prévues par l’article 85§2 RGPD.
– l’adaptation continue comme précédemment à se concentrer essentiellement sur les
traitements à des fins journalistiques et n’apporte aucune explication, définition relative
aux autres finalités de traitement visés par l’article 85 RGPD (traitement à des fins
d’expression universitaire, artistique ou littéraire).
– l’article 80 LIL n’est pas conforme à la lettre du RGPD dans la mesure où il maintient
comme auparavant que les restrictions ne concerne que les traitements mis en œuvre
“aux fins d’exercice à titre professionnel [mis en italique par nous], dans le respect des
règles déontologiques de cette profession” alors que cette la référence au caractère
professionnel n’existe pas à l’article 85 §2 du RGPD. Autrement dit, le droit français
ne permet pas l’application de ces dérogations aux journalistes blogueurs ne disposant
pas de carte professionnelle, voire les robots-journalistes. Pourtant, la CJUE a une
approche large de la notion d’activité de journalisme incluant « la divulgation au public,
sous quelque moyen de transmission que ce soit, d’informations, d’opinions ou d’idées
».31 L’approche française est bien plus centrée sur le journalisme et lesmédias classiques.
Les dérogations permises pour les traitements relevant des quatre finalités de l’article 85
RGPD sont:
– des dérogations à l’interdiction de traitement de données sensibles (article 9 RGPD)
ou des traitements de condamnation (article 10 RGPD)
– des dérogations au droit à l’information, au droit d’accès, mais aussi au droit de
rectification et de limitation. En revanche, aucune limitation au droit d’opposition, ni
au droit de portabilité, ni à l’article 22 RGPD n’ont été prévues.
L’article 80 de la LIL rappelle, par ailleurs, que la mise en œuvre d’une telle dérogation ne
remet pas en cause les règles de droit interne relatives à la possibilité d’exercer un droit de
réponse ou de se voir dédommager en cas d’atteinte à la vie privée ou à la réputation des
personnes.
Au-delà de l’article 80 de la LIL:
– l’article 19 de LIL rappelle que la CNIL doit exercer ses pouvoirs notamment de
contrôles en respectant « le secret des sources des traitements journalistiques ».
– En dehors de la LIL, la France a adopté plusieurs lois récemment visant à encadrer la
liberté d’expression sur internet, telles que deux lois sur les fake news.32 La proposition
31 CJUE 16 décembre 2008, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi et Satamedia, aff. C-73/07, EU:C:2008:727, point 61
CJUE, ou encore CJUE, 14 février 2019, Sergejs Buivids, aff. C-345/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:122, point 59.
32 Loi organique n°2018-1201 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information,
Loi n° 2018-120 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de l’information.
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de loi contre les discours de haine sur Internet actuellement en cours de discussions
est au cœur d’un vif débat politique sur l’interdiction ou le maintien de l’anonymat sur
Internet.33
C Application interne de la législation en matière de protection
des données
Question 9
En France, l’autorité de contrôle est la Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés
(ci-après « CNIL »). Il s’agit d’une autorité administrative indépendante au sens de la loi
n° 2017-55 qui ne dispose pas de la personnalité juridique. La CNIL est composée d’un
collège pluridisciplinaire de 18 membres dont 9 membres sont désignés par des organes
politiques (Parlement, gouvernement). Le Président de la CNIL est nommépar le Président
de la République, après validation de son candidat par les deux chambres du parlement.
Mme Marie- Laure Denis est la présidente actuelle de la CNIL depuis janvier 2019. Le
mandat des commissaires est de 5 ans ou, pour les parlementaires, d’une durée égale à leur
mandat électif. Il n’existe aucune restriction d’âge, ni de renouvellement.
La CNIL est actuellement composée de:
– 4 parlementaires (2 députés, 2 sénateurs)
– 2 membres du Conseil économique, social et environnemental, élus par cette
assemblée
– 6 représentants des hautes juridictions (2 conseillers d’État, 2 conseillers à la Cour
de cassation, 2 conseillers à la Cour des comptes) élus par leur assemblée générale
respectives
– 5 personnalités qualifiées désignées par le Président de l’Assemblée nationale (1
personnalité), le Président du Sénat (1 personnalité), en Conseil des ministres (3
personnalités). Ces personnes sont choisies pour leur connaissance du numérique et
des questions touchant aux libertés individuelles.
– Le Président de la CADA (Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs),
En outre, le défenseur des droits y participe avec une voix consultative.
La CNIL est structurée de manière à assurer une séparation fonctionnelle entre sa
mission de régulation et de contrôle. Elle comporte:
33 cf. Voir dossier législatif: www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/dossiers/lutte_contre_haine_internet.
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– une formation plénière dont la compétence principale est d’établir la doctrine de la
CNIL (avis, lignes directrices, autorisation, certification, agrément, référentiel, code
de conduite, clauses contractuelles, règlement intérieur etc.). Les décisions sont prises
à lamajorité absolue desmembres présents. UnCommissaire du gouvernement assiste
à la réunion plénière.
– un bureau: composé de la présidente et de deux Vice-Présidents. Le bureau peut, à la
demande du président de la CNIL rendre publique une mise en demeure prise à
l’encontre d’un responsable de traitement ne respectant pas les obligations issues de
la LIL, il habilite les agents de la CNIL pouvant exercer des contrôles, etc.
– une formation restreinte à laquelle aucun membre du bureau ne participe. Cette
formation restreinte est composée de 6 membres élus au sein du collège de la CNIL.
La formation restreinte dispose de son propre président. Elle assure la fonction de
contrôle de la CNIL (prise de mesures et sanctions).
En ce qui concerne ses missions, la CNIL assume des missions d’information, de
recommandation et de contrôle. Quelques spécificités:
– La CNIL peut certifier “des personnes et des produits, des systèmes de données ou de
procédures aux fins de reconnaître qu’ils sont conformes au RGPD”, soit directement,
soit par l’intermédiaire d’un organisme accrédité. Le champ de la certification va delà
de ce qui a été accepté par le CEPD dans ses lignes directrices. Ce dernier refuse
d’appliquer la certification aux personnes et notamment aux DPO. Pourtant, la CNIL
vient de procéder à l’agrément de l’AFNOR pour certifier les DPO sur la base de
référentiels.34
– Doit sensibiliser les médiateurs de la consommation et les médiateurs publics
– Promouvoir l’utilisation des technologies protectrices de la vie privée, notamment les
technologies de chiffrement
Le budget de la CNIL en 2019 est de 18,5 millions €, nombre d’employés 215. La majorité
des membres et du personnel de la CNIL ont un profil de juriste. Malgré une hausse de
son budget, la CNIL considère qu’elle n’a pas suffisamment de moyens pour répondre à
l’ensemble de ses missions.
34 CNIL, délibération n° 2018-317 du 20 septembre 2018 portant adoption des critères du référentiel d’agrément
d’organismes de certification pour la certification des compétences du délégué à la protection des données
(DPO) et CNIL, délibération n° 2018-318 du 20 septembre 2018 portant adoption des critères du référentiel
de certification des compétences du délégué à la protection des données (DPO) et CNIL, délibération n° 2018-
317 du 20 septembre 2018 portant adoption des critères du référentiel d’agrément d’organismes de certification
pour la certification des compétences du délégué à la protection des données (DPO), JORF n°235 du 11 octobre
2018 et Délibération n°2019-092 du 4 juillet 2019 portant agrément d’AFNOR CERTIFICATION pour la
certification des compétences du délégué à la protection des données (DPO).
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Question 10
La nouvelle LIL ne prévoit pas de dispositions particulières relatives au traitement des
plaintes. En revanche, le chapitre VI du règlement intérieur de la CNIL prévoit des
dispositions en la matière (articles 47 à 51).
Est considérée comme une plainte toute demande formée par une personne physique
ou morale identifiée relative à des faits susceptibles d’être contraires aux textes dont
l’application est confiée à la Commission. Les plaintes sont instruites par les services de la
Commission (article 47).
La Commission peut être saisie par voie postale ou électronique. Le plaignant indique
son nom et ses coordonnées sur la plainte (article 48).
Si la demande concerne l’exercice des droits d’accès, de rectification ou d’opposition
prévus par la loi du 6 janvier 1978 modifiée, et que le plaignant n’a pas cherché à exercer
ses droits directement auprès du responsable du traitement, les services de la Commission
lui adressent un courrier l’informant des démarches qu’il lui appartient d’engager
préalablement à toute saisine de la Commission (article 49).
L’objet de la plainte est communiqué au responsable du traitement mis en cause, ou,
le cas échéant, au correspondant, afin que celui-ci fournisse toutes les explications utiles.
Ces échanges peuvent avoir lieu par tout moyen.
Selon le rapport annuel de la CNIL, 11077 plaintes ont été déposées devant la CNIL
en 2018, soit une augmentation de 32% liée à l’entrée en application du RGPD et à la
sensibilisation qui l’a accompagnée. Ces plaintes ont fait l’objet de 6609 vérifications
indirectes et 4264 demandes de droit d’accès indirect.
Question 11
Application des sanctions par la CNIL35
La CNIL dispose d’une chaîne répressive complète lui permettant de recevoir des
signalements par des canaux divers, de réaliser des contrôles dont les suites peuvent aller
de la clôture, à la mise en demeure ou à la sanction financière ou non. Dans certains cas,
une publicité peut être décidée en fonction de la gravité des cas.
Le signalement peut provenir d’une plainte, autosaisine, faits signalés par la presse ou
par le signalement des autres autorités nationales de contrôle des autres États membres.
La CNIL a le pouvoir d’effectuer des contrôles auprès de l’ensemble des organismes
qui traitent des données à caractère personnel, soit les entreprises privées, associations ou
35 Source: site de la CNIL., https://www.cnil.fr/fr/mission-4-controler-et-sanctionner.
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encore organismes publics. Ces contrôles peuvent se dérouler sur place, sur pièces, sur
audition ou en ligne.
À l’issue de contrôle ou plaintes, en cas de méconnaissance des dispositions du RGPD
ou de la loi n° 78-17 de la part des responsables de traitement et sous-traitants, la formation
restreinte de laCNIL peut prononcer des sanctions à l’égard des responsables de traitements
qui ne respecteraient pas ces textes.
Lorsque des manquements au RGPD ou à la loi sont portés à sa connaissance, la
formation restreinte de la CNIL peut:
– Prononcer un rappel à l’ordre;
– Enjoindre de mettre le traitement en conformité, y compris sous astreinte;
– Limiter temporairement ou définitivement un traitement;
– Suspendre les flux de données;
– Ordonner de satisfaire aux demandes d’exercice des droits des personnes, y compris
sous astreinte;
– Prononcer une amende administrative (voir le RGPD).
Ces sanctions peuvent être rendues publiques.36
Àcompter de la date de notification de la décision de la formation restreinte, l’organisme
mis en cause dispose d’un délai de deux mois pour former un recours devant le Conseil
d’État contre la décision de la CNIL.
Notons que le Président de la CNIL peut adresser à un responsable de traitement ou
à un sous-traitant une mise en demeure de cesser un ou plusieurs manquement(s)
constaté(s) au RGPD dans un délai fixé. Elle intervient après une plainte reçue par la CNIL
ou un contrôle (en ligne ou sur place) effectué auprès d’un organisme.Unemise en demeure
n’est pas une sanction. Une mise en demeure peut-être publique.37 Dans ce cas, le bureau
de la CNIL, composé du Président et des vice-présidents, adopte une délibération dans
laquelle il explique les raisons pour lesquelles il décide de rendre publique la mise en
demeure. La mise en demeure publique fait l’objet d’un communiqué synthétique sur le
site de la CNIL et la décision est publiée sur Légifrance. Celle-ci est anonymisée au bout
de 2 ans,mais reste toujours accessible sur Légifrance. Si l’organisme s’estmis en conformité,
la clôture de la mise en demeure est également rendue publique et anonymisée au bout de
deux ans.
D’après le rapport annuel de la CNIL, 310 contrôles ont été effectués en 2018 avec 11
sanctions prononcées, dont 9 sanctions pécuniaires publiques, 1 avertissement non public
et un non-lieu.
36 Pour des exemples, voir: www.cnil.fr/fr/les-sanctions-prononcees-par-la-cnil.
37 Pour des exemples, voir: www.cnil.fr/fr/thematique/cnil/mises-en-demeure.
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Par ailleurs, 11077 plaintes ont été déposées, soit une augmentation de 32% et un chiffre
record lié à l’entrée en application du RGPD.
Sanctions additionnelles
Les sanctions additionnelles sont prévues à l’article 84§1 duRGPD. Le paragraphe 2 précise
que chaque État membre doit notifier à la Commission les dispositions légales qu’il adopte
en vertu du paragraphe 1 au plus tard le 25 mai 2018 et, sans tarder, toute modification
ultérieure les concernant.
Les sanctions pénales en cas de manquement aux règles en matière de protection des
données étaient déjà prévues en droit français avant l’adoption du RGPD et réprimées par
les articles 226-16 à 226-24 du Code pénal (section 5 du chapitre VI du titre II du livre II
du code pénal). Elles peuvent aller jusqu’à une amende de 300 000 euros et 5 ans
d’emprisonnement.
L’article 41 de la loi n° 78-17 de la nouvelle LIL dispose que “le procureur de la
République avise le président de la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés
de toutes les poursuites relatives aux infractions prévues par la section 5 du chapitre VI
du titre II du livre II du code pénal et, le cas échéant, des suites qui leur sont données. Il
l’informe de la date et de l’objet de l’audience de jugement par lettre recommandée adressée
au moins dix jours
Question 12
Le droit français prévoit effectivement une indemnisation des préjudices moraux avec
l’octroi de dommages-intérêts. Généralement, les actions sont fondées sur les articles 1240
et 1241 nouveaux du code civil et non sur la LIL. Il découle des principes régissant
responsabilité civile délictuelle que le préjudice doit être réparé dans son intégralité, sans
toutefois excéder lemontant de ce préjudice.Or, aucune disposition ne prévoit une sanction
spécifique ou un montant en cas de préjudice moral. Une analyse de la jurisprudence
montre qu’en raison du fait que le préjudice moral est difficilement quantifiable, la
réparation de celui se fait selon une « logique rétributive et non réparatrice par volonté de
dissuasion d’actes jugés antisociaux ».38 Au demeurant, la réparation du préjudice moral
repose sur une appréciation in concreto de la situation. Dès lors, pour obtenir réparation
d’un tel préjudice, il convient de vérifier l’existence de conditions de mise en jeu de la
responsabilité civile délictuelle, c’est-à-dire l’existence d’une faute, d’un dommage et d’un
lien de causalité entre les deux.
38 F. Gras, « L’indemnisation des atteintes à la vie privée », LEGICOM, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1999, pp. 21-25.
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Une analyse de la jurisprudence montre que les juridictions ne suivent pas de règles
spécifiques pour établir le montant du préjudice moral qu’elles accordent à la victime.
Certaines juridictions accordent des indemnisations sans justifier le choix du montant.39
Parfois, les juridictions procèdent à une analyse in concreto pour évaluer le montant de la
somme pour l’indemnisation d’un préjudice moral par exemple.40
Question 13
En France, l’action de groupe en matière de protection des données à caractère personnel
a été introduite en 2016 par la LRN. Elle ne concernait que l’action en cessation de
manquement. Le nouvel article 37 III de la LIL y ajoute désormais une action en réparation.
La France a ainsi utilisé la clause ouverte laissée par l’article 80 §1 duRGPD. Les organismes
concernés sont les associations déclarées, les associations agréées, les organisations
syndicales de salariés ou de fonctionnaires, (cf. article 37 IV LIL) qui peuvent agir avec
(article 38 LIL) ou sans mandat de la personne concernée. (article 80 §2 RGPD)
L’article 37 de la LIL pose néanmoins plusieurs difficultés de conformité41 au regard
du RGPD:
– D’une part, il limite explicitement les personnes à qui un mandat peut être donné:
Associations régulièrement déclarées depuis 5 ans. Cette limitation issue du droit
antérieur français n’a pas été supprimée, alors qu’il n’existe aucune limite temporelle
dans le RGPD, (sous-adaptation du droit français).
– D’autre part, le droit français permet une action de groupe en réparation y compris
lorsque la personne concernée n’a pas donnée de mandat. Or, l’article 80 §2 RGPD
n’évoque une telle possibilité que pour une action en cessation de violation.
(Sur-adaptation du droit français).
39 CA Paris, Pôle 5 – Ch. 1, 7 mars 2017, Sound Strategy / Concepson. En ce sens également: TGI Clermont-
Ferrand, Chambre correctionnelle Jugement du 26 septembre 2011, Sociétés X. et Y. / Mme Rose; TGI de
Paris, 17e ch., 21 novembre 2018, Mme X. / Sarl Denim.
40 CA Paris, pôle 5 – chambre 1, 10 mars 2015, Stéphane B. / Artnet France et Artnet Worldwide Corporation.
41 cf. Alexia Pato, The National Adaptation of Article 80 GDPR, Towards the Effective Private Enforcement
of CollectiveData ProtectionRights, blogdroiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/national-adaptations-
of-the-gdpr-final-version-27-february-1.pdf.
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Dans la pratique, l’association Que Choisir?42 et l’association la Quadrature du net43 ainsi
que l’Open Internet Society France44 sont les trois entités françaises à s’être emparées de
ces possibilités d’actions collectives.
Notons, qu’au-delà de la multiplication des associations de DPO,45 un syndicat des
DPO a vu le jour en France en avril 2019.46 Sa vocation est de protéger la profession des
DPO, notamment dans leurs possibles conflits avec leurs employeurs responsables de
traitements ou sous-traitants et de favoriser les médiations.
Question 14
Le développement du numérique a forcé les autorités nationales à mettre en place une
meilleure coordination et coopération entre les différents régulateurs. Le 24 juin 2019,
plusieurs régulateurs (l’Autorité de la concurrence, l’Autorité des marchés financiers,
l’Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières, l’Autorité de régulation des
communications électroniques et des postes, la Commission nationale de l’informatique
et des libertés, la Commission de régulation de l’énergie et le Conseil supérieur de
l’Audiovisuel) se sont réunis afin demettre en place desmutualisations entre ces autorités.47
Cesmutualisations portent sur différents thèmes tels que la commande publique, la gestion
des connaissances et les ressources humaines. Cette rencontre a permis d’établir un rapport
rendu public le 8 juillet 2019 sur leur approche commune de « la régulation par la donnée
».48
L’objectif de cette coopération est de développer une régulation par la donnée afin de
permettre aux différents régulateurs d’acquérir de nouvelles compétences en matière
d’échange de données ou encore d’appropriation de nouvelles technologies. Il ressort du
rapport que le développement des nouvelles technologies engendre pour les régulateurs
“de nouveaux besoins en compétence technique, notamment en matière d’analyse de
données et d’algorithmesmais également de stockage et gestion de gros volumes de données.
42 www.quechoisir.org/action-ufc-que-choisir-vie-privee-donnees-personnelles-action-de-groupe-contre-
google-n68403/: Première action de groupe devant le TGI de Paris en juin 2019.
43 gafam.laquadrature.net/: première plainte collective (art. 77 RGPD) en mai 2018.
44 www.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-tech/la-premiere-action-de-groupe-contre-facebook-en-france-sera-lancee-
en-septembre-20190327.
45 A côté de l’ancienne Association Française des Correspondants à la Protection des Données à Caractère
Personnel (AFCPD), l’Association desData ProtectionOfficers créée en 2016, et l’Union desData Protections
Officers.





D Traitement de données pour des motifs de sécurité nationale
Question 15
En droit français la notion de « sécurité nationale » est définie, à l’art. L 1111-1 du code
de la défense.
Les autorités françaises ontmanifesté une grande réticence à l’application des décisions
Tele2 et Watson. Elles considèrent que la conservation des données est nécessaire afin de
pouvoir faire face aux menaces. Cette conviction relative à l’utilité de la conservation des
données se reflète dans les questions préjudicielles posées par le Conseil d’Etat dans les
affaires en cours initiés à l’échelle nationale par la Quadrature du Net (aff. C-511 et
C-512/18). Ces interrogations sont assez proches de celles qui sont à l’origine d’autres
questions préjudicielles C-623/17 (International Privacy), C-520/18 (Ordre des barreaux
francophone et germanophone) qui sont pendantes devant la CJUE.49
49 Affaire C-520/18: Demande de décision préjudicielle présentée par la Cour constitutionnelle (Belgique) le
2 août 2018 — Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Académie Fiscale ASBL, UA, Liga voor
Mensenrechten ASBL, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme ASBL, VZ, WY, XX/ Conseil des ministres JO C 408
du 12.11.2018, p. 39–40; Affaire C-623/17: Demande de décision préjudicielle présentée par le Investigatory
Powers Tribunal — London (Royaume-Uni) le 31 octobre 2017 — Privacy International/ Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs e.a, JO C 22 du 22.1.2018, p. 29–30.
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Germany
Dieter Kugelmann*
A Setting the Scene – Weichenstellung
Frage 1
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (DS-GVO)1
parallel zu ihrem Wirksamwerden am 25. Mai 2018 auf Bundesebene umgesetzt. In einem
umfangreichen Artikelgesetz, dem 1. Datenschutz-Anpassungs- und Umsetzungsgesetz,
wurde eine Reihe von Vorschriften der Bundesgesetze geändert. Im Zentrum stand die
Neufassung des Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes (BDSG), die grundlegendeWeichenstellungen
enthält.2 Auch wenn einige Bestimmungen des BDSG berechtigter Kritik begegnen,3 sind
damit Rahmenbedingungen und modellhafte Regelungen geschaffen worden, die für die
weitere Gestaltung der Fachgesetze des Bundes und für die Gestaltung des Landesrechts
Bedeutung entfalten.
Im Bundesstaat sind auch die Länder der Bundesrepublik verpflichtet, ihre
Rechtsordnung entsprechend umzustellen. Die Länder haben das inzwischen alle getan,
manche mit etwas Verspätung. Dies betrifft eine Reihe von Landesgesetzen und
insbesondere die Landesdatenschutzgesetze. Vielfach haben sie sich am
Bundes-Datenschutzgesetz orientiert.
Auf Bundesebene ist Ende 2019das 2.Datenschutz-Anpassungs- undUmsetzungsgesetz
in Kraft getreten, mit dem 154 Gesetze geändert werden.4 Auch das
Bundes-Datenschutzgesetz selbst erfährt einige Modifikationen. Am meisten
Aufmerksamkeit hat die Änderung erfahren, dass die in § 38Abs. 1 BDSG festgeschriebene
Pflicht von Verantwortlichen einen Datenschutzbeauftragten zu benennen, nun nicht
mehr ab 10mit automatisierterDatenverarbeitung beschäftigtenPersonen entsteht, sondern
* Landesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit, Rheinland-Pfalz.
1 Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 27. April 2016 zum Schutz
natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten, zum freien Datenverkehr und zur
Aufhebung der Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung), ABl. 2016 L 119/1.
2 Als Artikel 1 des Gesetzes zur Anpassung des Datenschutzrechts an die Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 und
zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/680 (Datenschutz-Anpassungs- und Umsetzungsgesetz), BGBl.
I 2017, S. 20197; dazu Greve, NVwZ 2017, 737; Kühling, NJW 2017, 1985.
3 Siehe die kritische Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, BR-Drs. 110/17.
4 BGBl. 2019 I, S. 1626.
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erst ab 20 Personen. Diese Änderung verfolgt das Ziel, die behaupteten Belastungen
kleinerer und mittlerer Unternehmen oder anderer Verantwortlicher wie Arztpraxen
durch die DS-GVO zu verringern. Dabei wird in dieser weiter anhaltenden Diskussion oft
vernachlässigt, dass die Pflicht zu Einhaltung der Vorschriften des Datenschutzrechts
selbstverständlich besteht und ohne betrieblichen Datenschutzbeauftragten der
Sachverstand zur Erfüllung dieser Pflicht beim Verantwortlichen gerade fehlen könnte.5
DieÖffnungsklauseln derDatenschutz-Grundverordnung eröffnen denGesetzgebern
Spielräume, um Besonderheiten des innerstaatlichen Rechts gerecht zu werden und
besondere Interessenlagen zu berücksichtigen.6 Diese Spielräume sind zwingend zu nutzen,
um das innerstaatliche Recht in Einklang mit der Verordnung zu bringen.7 Zentrales
Instrument hierzu ist dasDatenschutzgesetz. DieDatenschutzgesetze in Bund undLändern
sind an die Begriffe, Verständnisse und Regelungen der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung
anzugleichen.
Von den Öffnungsklauseln der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung wurde in
umfangreichem Maße Gebrauch gemacht. Dies betrifft insbesondere das
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, aber auch die Landesdatenschutzgesetze. Diese Erweiterungen
sind unabhängig davon, dass nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. c und e i.V.m. Abs. 3 DS-GVO die
Gesetze zur Erfüllung öffentlicher Aufgaben auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit der
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung geprüft werden müssen. Zumeist sind die gesetzlichen
Änderungen allerdings technischerNatur. Begriffe werden umgestellt („Verantwortlicher”
statt „verantwortliche Stelle” usw.). Das europarechtliche Wiederholungsverbot, das der
EuGH festgelegt hat, ist durchaus sehr weit verstanden worden. An mancher Stelle kann
man anzweifeln, ob der nationale Gesetzgeber hier überzogen hat.8
Großen Bedenken begegnete von Beginn an der § 4 BDSG zur Videoüberwachung
öffentlich zugänglicher Räume. Die Konferenz der unabhängigen
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder hat bereits früh seine
Vereinbarkeit mit dem vorrangigen Unionsrecht bestritten. Nunmehr hat das
Bundesverwaltungsgericht festgestellt, dass der Anwendungsvorrang des Unionsrechts
insoweit greift.9 Im konkreten Fall stellt es fest, dass die Videoüberwachung in einer
Arztpraxis an Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f DS-GVO zu messen ist. Der innerstaatliche Gesetzgeber
hatte in § 4 BDSG eine stärkere Gewichtung von Sicherheitsinteressen in einer Reihe von
5 Ablehnend hierzu die Entschließung „Keine Abschaffung der Daten- schutzbeauftragten” der Konferenz
der unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder vom 23.4.2019 (https://
datenschutz-online.de). Hinweis: Die Fundstellen derOnline-Quellenwurden zuletzt am 12.8.2019 besucht.
6 Albrecht/Jotzo, Das neue Datenschutzrecht der EU. Grundlagen – Gesetzgebungsverfahren – Synopse,
2017, S. 133.
7 Kühling/Martini/Heberlein/Kühl/Nink/Weinzierl/Wenzel, Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung und das
nationale Recht, 2017, S. 1 f.
8 Kugelmann, DuD 2018, 482.
9 BVerwG, Urteil vom 27. März 2019 - BVerwG 6 C 2.18, DuD 2019, 518.
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SituationenderVideoüberwachung, etwa vonEinkaufzentren, Parkplätzenoder Sportstätten
festgelegt. Diese Gewichtung enthält Art. 6 der DS-GVO nicht. Aus diesem Grunde ist §
4 BDSG unanwendbar. In der Konsequenz wird die Interessenabwägung nach Art. 6 Abs.
1 DS-GVO durchgeführt.
Die innerstaatlichen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden üben eine umfassende Aufsicht
im Bereich der DS-GVO aus. Dies betrifft auch die Nutzung der Öffnungsklauseln. Daher
habendieAufsichtsbehörden von vornherein § 4BDSGaufgrunddesAnwendungsvorrangs
der DS-GVO nicht angewendet.10 Auch in anderen Zusammenhängen sind die
Aufsichtsbehörden berufen, inAnwendungsfällen derVorschriften, dieÖffnungsklauseln
nutzen, konkret die Vereinbarkeit mit dem Unionsrechts zu prüfen. Dabei wird die
europarechtskonforme Auslegung angewendet.
Schwächer ausgestaltet sind die Aufsichtsbefugnisse zur Aufsicht über die Richtlinie
2016/680.11 Gerade auf Bundesebene hat der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz hier
nicht vollständig ausgestaltete Befugnisse.
Hervorzuheben ist § 21 BDSG, der den Aufsichtsbehörden die Befugnis zu einem
Antrag auf gerichtlicheEntscheidungbei angenommenerRechtswidrigkeit einesBeschlusses
der Europäischen Kommission einräumt. Damit wird eine Anforderung des
Safe-Harbor-Urteils des EuGH in innerstaatliches Recht überführt.12 Hält eine
Aufsichtsbehörde einenAngemessenheitsbeschluss der EuropäischenKommission, einen
Beschluss über die Anerkennung von Standardschutzklauseln oder über die
Allgemeingültigkeit von Angemessenheitsbeschlüssen der Kommission, von
Verhaltensregeln, auf dessen Gültigkeit es für die Entscheidung der Aufsichtsbehörde
ankommt für rechtswidrig, so hat die Aufsichtsbehörde ihr Verfahren auszusetzen und
einen Antrag auf gerichtliche Entscheidung zu stellen. Zuständig ist im ersten und letzten
Rechtszug das Bundesverwaltungsgericht (§ 21 Abs. 3 BDSG).
Frage 2
Das Grundgesetz enthält keine ausdrückliche Regelung zum Schutz der Privatheit und
ebensowenig eine ausdrückliche Regelung zumDatenschutz. Beide Rechtspositionen sind
aber infolge der Rechtsprechung insbesondere des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
grundrechtlich geschützt. Zudem treffen eine Reihe von Verfassungen der Länder
ausdrückliche Regelungen.
10 Entschließung der unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder (DSK) vom
9. November 2016 (https://datenschutz-online.de).
11 Golla, Datenschutzrechtliche Schattengewächse in den Ländern – Herausforderungen bei der Umsetzung
der JI-Richtlinie für die Polizei, KriPoZ 4/2019 (https://kripoz.de).
12 EuGH, Urt.v.6.10.2015, C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, Rn. 29 - Schrems / Digital Rights Ireland.
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Im Grundgesetz wird das Recht auf den Schutz des Privatlebens wie es Art. 7 GRCh
beinhaltet im Schwerpunkt durch Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG geschützt.13 Der Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG
schützt alle Gehalte des Schutzes der Privatheit, die nicht in anderen Grundrechten des
GG spezifisch erfasst sind und damit insbesondere den engeren Bereich persönlichen
Lebens, der aber soziale Bezüge aufweisen kann.14
Hier ist auch das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht verfassungskräftig verankert, das für
die freie Entfaltung des Einzelnen ein Recht auf Respektierung eines geschützten Raums
sichert.15 Dieses Recht auf den Schutz der Persönlichkeit ist vor dem Hintergrund des
Privatrechts bereits früh in der zivilrechtlichen Rechtsprechung aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 i.V.m.
Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG entwickelt worden.16 Dabei geht es etwa umFallkonstellationen, in denen
im Fall des Eingriffs in das Persönlichkeitsrecht durch Presseveröffentlichungen ein
Ausgleich bei der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprüchen geschaffen werden
muss (s.u. Frage 12).17
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 i.V.m. Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG das
Grundrecht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung abgeleitet. Die genaue dogmatische
Konstruktion wird in der Wissenschaft unterschiedlich beurteilt. Jedenfalls ist das Recht
auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung eine Entfaltung von Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG. Damit hat
die Judikative einGrundrecht kreiert. DiesesGrundrecht betrifft personenbezogeneDaten.
Dabei hat es eine auch stark technisch orientierte Komponente, da der Datenschutz auch
technische und organisatorische Maßnahmen umfasst. Dagegen schützt das allgemeine
Persönlichkeitsrecht die Freiheit, das eigene Bild in derÖffentlichkeit zu gestalten. Teilweise
sind die Übergänge fließend.
Der Art. 8 GRCh hat die Interpretation des innerstaatlichen Rechts bisher wenig
beeinflusst zumal seine Auslegung selbst Fragen aufwirft.18 Da seit 1983 mit dem
Volkszählungs-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts das Grundrecht auf informationelle
Selbstbestimmung besteht19 und die Datenschutzgesetze dieses Grundrecht in der Folge
ausgestaltet haben, war die informationelle Selbstbestimmung Kern der deutschen
Rechtsprechung und Lehre zu den Fragen von Datenschutz.
13 Eingehend Schöndorf-Haubold, Das Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens – Problemstellungen im Digital-
bereich, eine rechtsvergleichende Perspektive – Deutschland (Studie für den Wissenschaftlichen Dienst
des Europäischen Parlaments, abrufbar unter http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/de/home.html).
S. auch Britz, Freie Entfaltung durch Selbstdarstellung, 2007.
14 Lang, in: Epping/Hillgruber (Hrsg.), Beck-OK GG, Art. 2 Rn. 41 ff.
15 BVerfGE 54, 148.
16 BGHZ 13, 334; 24, 72; 27, 284.
17 BVerfGE 101, 361.
18 Vgl. Marsch, Das europäische Datenschutzgrundrecht, 2017.
19 BVerfGE 65, 1.
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B Die Annahme von materiell-rechtlichen DSGVO-Vorschriften in
der nationalen Rechtsordnung
Vorbemerkung
Vor demWirksamwerden derDatenschutz-Grundverordnungwar in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland bereits ein rechtlich ausgefeiltes System des Datenschutzes etabliert. Im Jahr
1970 hatte Hessen das erste Datenschutzgesetz der Welt, Rheinland-Pfalz dann 1973 nach
Schweden das dritte. Das erste Bundesdatenschutzgesetz stammt aus dem Jahr 1977.Diese
Gesetze waren noch stark informationstechnisch geprägt.20
Dies änderte sich mit dem Volkszählungs-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,21 da
Datenschutz nunmehrGrundrechtsschutz ist. DenndieKonsequenz derHerausarbeitung
des Grundrechts auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung ist, dass jeder staatliche Eingriff
einer gesetzlichenGrundlage bedarf. In der Folgewurde seit den 80iger Jahren eineVielzahl
von Ermächtigungsgrundlagen geschaffen, um insbesondere die Erfüllung öffentlicher
Aufgaben zu gewährleisten. Ein wichtiges Feld ist das Polizei- und Sicherheitsrecht.22
Aus der Sicht der materiellen Grundsätze hat sich daher für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland manches nur wenig geändert oder ist gar gleich geblieben, etwas im
Beschäftigtendatenschutz. Die Modifikationen der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung sind
wichtig, wesentlich und zukunftsweisend. Zahlreiche praktische Fragen haben sie im
Hinblick auf die Ergebnisse von Einzelfällen allerdings nicht komplett umgewälzt, sondern
auf eine neue Grundlage gestellt und anders akzentuiert.23
Frage 3
Die Grundsätze der Verarbeitung nach Treu und Glauben, der Zweckbindung und der
Datenminimierung haben bereits vorher Bestand gehabt. Ihre konkreten Ausprägungen
aufgrundderDatenschutz-Grundverordnung sind rechtsdogmatisch aber neu zu bewerten.
Es dürfte einige Modifikationen geben, die in der deutschen Diskussion nicht immer
hinreichend beachtet werden, weil die Beharrungskraft eingeschliffener
datenschutzrechtlicher Lösungen stark ist. Dies betrifft etwa die Datenminimierung, die
an die Stelle der Datensparsamkeit tritt. Damit könnten Änderungen verbunden sein, die
aber oft nicht wahrgenommen werden. Auch Zweckbindung und insbesondere
Zweckänderung nach Art. 6 Abs. 4 DS-GVO zeigen bei genauer Lektüre andere
Ausprägungen, als sie das vorherige Recht kannte.
20 Schulte, Vom quantitativen zum qualitativen Datenschutz, 2018, S. 60 ff.
21 BVerfGE 65, 1.
22 Dazu Zaremba, Die Entwicklung polizeirelevanter datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen, 2014.
23 Roßnagel, Das neue Datenschutzrecht, 1. Aufl. 2018.
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Diese rechtsdogmatischen Feinheiten haben bisher in der Praxis noch keine Rolle
gespielt. Die nationalenAufsichtsbehördenwenden dieGrundsätze auf derGrundlage der
DS-GVO an und in einer Vielzahl von Fällen sind die kleineren Modifikationen ohne
praktische Auswirkung. Die Rechtsprechung hat bisher nur selten zu den Neuregelungen
Stellung nehmen können.
Frage 4
Da in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Datenschutz traditionell als das Grundrecht auf
informationelle Selbstbestimmung verstanden wird, hat die Einwilligung als Ausdruck
der freien Entscheidung über die Selbstbestimmung wesentlichen Einfluss.24 Diese Rolle
erscheint an mancher Stelle übergewichtet angesichts der Realitäten der Digitalwirtschaft,
in der eine freiwillige und informierte Einwilligung oftmals schwer zu erteilen ist.25
Rechtsprechung undLehre halten aber überwiegend an der zentralenRolle der Einwilligung
fest.26 Sie erfordert die Festlegung des Zwecks der Verarbeitung und die Information der
betroffenen Person, weil sie nur dann freiwillig und informiert i.S.d. Art. 4 Nr. 11 DS-GVO
abgegeben werden kann.27
Zunächst ist derVertrag oder die Einwilligung als Rechtsgrundlage vorrangig zu prüfen
(Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a und b DS-GVO). Berechtigte Interessen kommen ergänzend zum
Tragen. Denn die Einwilligung legt die Verfügungsmacht in die Hände des Betroffenen,
das berechtigte Interesse bestimmt dagegen der Verantwortliche.
Die Rechtsgrundlage der berechtigten Interessen wird von den Aufsichtsbehörden
konzeptionell eher eng gesehen. Allerdings hat sich in der Praxis erwiesen, dass es eine
Vielzahl von Anwendungsfällen gibt. Es handelt sich aber bei Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. f DS-GVO
nicht umeinenAuffangtatbestand, da sonst einAnreiz dafür geschaffenwird, allemöglichen
Datenverarbeitungen auf die berechtigten Interessen zu stützen. Die Leitlinien 2/2019 des
Europäischen Datenschutzausschusses halten diese Grundsätze fest.28
Die berechtigten Interessen spielen in der Praxis allerdings gerade im Bereich der
Dienstleistungen und Inhalte, die im Internet angeboten werden, also in der
Plattformökonomie eine erheblicheRolle. Die in Erwägungsrund 47 derDS-GVOeröffnete
24 Schantz, in: Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, 1. Auflage 2019, Art. 6 Abs. 1
DSGVO, Rn. 3.
25 Kritisch Krönke, Der Staat 2016, 319; Veil, NJW 2018, 3337 (3344).
26 Buchner/Kühling, DuD 2017, 544; Heberlein, in: Ehmann/Selmayr (Hrsg.), DS-GVO, 2. Auflage 2018, Art.
6 Rn. 5; Schantz, in: Simitis/Hornung/Spiecker gen Döhmann, Datenschutzrecht, 1. Auflage 2019, Art. 6
Abs. 1 DSGVO, Rn. 3.
27 Schwartmann/Klein, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage
2018, Art. 6 Rn. 13f.
28 Guidelines 2/2019, (https://edpb.europa.eu).
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Möglichkeit, Direktwerbung auf die Grundlage der berechtigten Interessen zu stützen, ist
anerkannt.
Jedoch ist mangels einer ePrivacy-Verordnung der Verantwortliche verpflichtet, die
Einwilligung etwa bei dem Einsatz von TrackingTools einzuholen. Da die
ePrivacy-Verordnung noch nicht existiert, gilt die DS-GVO für soziale Netzwerke und
Telemedien direkt.29 Die deutsche Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK) hat in einem
Positionspapier vom 29. März 2019 festgehalten, dass daher grundsätzlich Einwilligungen
für Maßnahmen des Tracking erforderlich sind und diese nur in Ausnahmefällen auf Art.
6 Abs. 1 lit. f DS-GVO gestützt werden können.
Im Fall der Rechtsgrundlage Einwilligung (Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a DS-GVO) besteht ein
besonderer Schutzmechanismus für die Verfügungsmacht des Einzelnen über seineDaten.
Die Regelung des Art. 7 Abs. 4 DS-GVO wird als Kopplungsverbot mit begrenzter
Reichweite verstanden.30 Ein striktes Kopplungsverbot ist der Vorschrift wohl nicht zu
entnehmen. Die Freiwilligkeit der Einwilligung muss aber gewährleistet sein, auch dann,
wenn weitere vertragliche Pflichten daran hängen.31
Bei allen weiteren Rechtsgrundlagen ist der rechtliche Anknüpfungspunkt für die
Ausübung der Verfügungsmacht über die eigenen Daten der Grundsatz der
Erforderlichkeit.32 Die Erforderlichkeit nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. b ff. DS-GVO ist ein
Standardinstrument des Datenschutzrechts. Datenverarbeitungen sind dann rechtmäßig,
wenn sie erforderlich sind. Dieser allgemeineGrundsatz wird konkret in unterschiedlichen
rechtlichen Situationen relevant. Die Erforderlichkeit steht in engem Zusammenhang mit
der Zweckbindung und derDatenminimierung.Nur dieVerarbeitung personenbezogener
Daten, die für die Vertragserfüllungwirklich erforderlich sind, ist zulässig, darüber hinaus
dürfen die Daten nicht verarbeitet werden. Bei vertraglichen Beziehungen, die der
Datenverarbeitung zugrunde liegen (Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. b DS-GVO) führt dies zu einer
Bindung der Reichweite der Datenverarbeitung an den Vertragszweck. Dabei wird
überwiegenddie Erforderlichkeit in einemweiten Sinne auf dieDurchführung des gesamten
Vertrages und nicht nur auf eine konkrete Erfüllungshandlung bezogen.33
Die Interessenabwägung zwischen dem Interesse des Verantwortlichen an der
Datenverarbeitung und den Rechten und Freiheiten der betroffenen Person spielt eine
zentrale Rolle auch bei der Datenverarbeitung durch öffentliche Stellen. Das
29 Richter, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage 2018, Art. 95
Rn. 8 ff.
30 Golland, MMR 2018, 130; Heberlein, in: Ehmann/Selmayr (Hrsg.), DS-GVO, 2. Auflage 2018, Art. 7 Rn.
53.
31 Kugelmann, DuD 2016, 566 (567).
32 Reimer, in: Sydow (Hrsg.), Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung, 2. Auflage 2018, Art. 6 Rn. 12.
33 Petri, in Kühling/Buchner (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 2. Auflage 2018, Art. 6 Rn. 42; Schwartmann/Klein,
in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage 2018, Art. 6 Rn. 49.
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Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat entschieden, dass auf den presserechtlichen
Auskunftsanspruch nach innerstaatlichem Landesmediengesetz, das auf der Grundlage
von Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. e i.V.m. Abs. 3 DS-GVO beruht, der Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit f. DS-GVO zwar
nicht unmittelbar anwendbar ist, aber seine Maßstäbe der Abwägung übertragbar sind.34
Frage 5
Die Thematik der Daten als Gegenleistung für Datenverarbeitungen wird in Deutschland
umfangreichund intensiv diskutiert.DieseDiskussionwirdunter verschiedenenVorzeichen
geführt. Zum einen wird der Begriff der Datensouveränität gebraucht, der allerdings
schillernd ist. Souverän kann hier der Einzelne sein, indem er über seine Daten selbst
bestimmt. Souverän kann aber auch der Datenverarbeiter, also der Verantwortliche sein,
indem er berechtigte Interessen festlegt. Das Zivilrecht wird darauf geprüft, ob und
inwieweit es Ansatzpunkte für eine Bewältigung der Fragen bietet, die aus dem Charakter
der Daten als Gegenleistung entstehen und ob andere Vertragstypen erforderlich sind.35
Eine insbesondere wirtschaftsrechtlich geführte Diskussion dreht sich um den Begriff
desDateneigentums.36 Eswird behauptet,man könne EigentumanDaten haben, das dann
auch zivilrechtlichen Regelungen unterfallen soll, die an Regelungen des Eigentums
angelehnt sind. Dabei wird verkannt, dass personenbezogene Daten eigenen Charakter
aufweisen, dermit einemausschließlichenund absolutenEigentumsrecht nicht einzufangen
ist. Diese Debatte geht aber weiter.
Die werbetreibende Wirtschaft versucht, den Begriff des Dateneigentums und die
Frage, bezahlen mit Daten, zu akzentuieren. Hier geht es um eine Ausweitung der
Verfügungsmöglichkeiten über personenbezogene Daten durch die Verantwortlichen.
Aus zivilrechtlicher Sicht ist die Frage der Einwilligung von großer Bedeutung, da es hier
auch umVertragsabschlüsse geht. DieWiderruflichkeit der Einwilligung ist für denBestand
von zivilrechtlichenBeziehungennicht unproblematisch.Daherwird teilweise angezweifelt,
ob diese Widerrufbarkeit tragfähig ist. Aus datenschutzrechtlicher Sicht ist die Rechtslage
allerdings klar, da die Einwilligung widerrufbar sein muss, um der Freiheitsausübung
Rechnung tragen zu können.
Auch auf politischer Ebene gab es Diskussionen um die Verwendung von
personenbezogenen Daten als Gegenleistung für die Bereitstellung von digitalen Inhalten.
Es wurde vorgeschlagen, einen freien Zugang zu Daten zu ermöglichen, also
Verantwortliche dazu zu verpflichten, bei ihnen vorhandene Daten öffentlich zugänglich
34 BVerwG, Urt.v.27.09.2018, Az. 7 C 5.17, DVBl. 2019, 765.
35 Specht, JZ 2017, 763.




zu machen (open access – „Daten für alle”). Dies zielte nicht zuletzt auf Google oder
facebook, die dann ihren Datenschatz zugänglich machen müssten. Diese politischen
Bestrebungen haben bisher keine konkreten Folgen gezeitigt.
Frage 6
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wurde auf der Grundlage des Art. 22 Abs. 2 lit. b
BDSG insbesondere die Vorschrift des § 37 BDSG geschaffen.37 Die Regelung erlaubt
AusnahmenbeiVersicherungsverträgen. Erfolgt die Leistungserbringung indessenRahmen,
kann eine Entscheidung ausschließlich auf automatisierte Entscheidung gestützt werden.
Voraussetzung ist, dass entweder demBegehren der betroffenenPerson stattgegebenwurde
(§ 37 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 BDSG) oder verbindliche Entgeltvorschriften im Hinblick auf
Heilbehandlungen bestehen, die dem Betroffenen weitere Schutzrechte einräumen (§ 37
Abs. 1 Nr. 2 BDSG). Ziel ist die reibungslose Abwicklung von Massenverfahren, deren
Abwicklung im Interesse der Person liegt, die bereits einen entsprechenden Vertrag
geschlossen hat.38
Frage 7
Die betroffene Person hat ein subjektives Recht auf Löschung, wenn die Daten für die
Erreichung der Zwecke, zu denen sie erhoben oder verarbeitet werden, nicht mehr
notwendig sind (Art. 17Abs. 1 lit. aDS-GVO).39 Ist die Speicherung nichtmehr erforderlich,
sind die Daten zu löschen, um damit auch dem Grundsatz der Datenminimierung (Art.
5 Abs. 1 lit. c DS-GVO) und dem Grundsatz der Zweckbindung (Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. b
DS-GVO) Rechnung zu tragen. Anknüpfungspunkt für die Verpflichtung des
Verantwortlichen zur Löschung ist der im deutschen Datenschutzrecht schon immer
zentrale Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit der Datenverarbeitung (s. Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. b, c, d,
e, f DS-GVO).Daher ist das Recht auf Löschung schon seit langemeinwesentliches Element
des deutschen Datenschutzrechts. Nach § 35 BDSG und ähnlichen Regelungen des
innerstaatlichen Rechts ist das Recht auf Löschung beschränkt, wenn die Löschung
unverhältnismäßig hohen Aufwand bedeuten würde und weitere Voraussetzungen
vorliegen.
37 Atzert, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage 2018, Art. 22
Rn. 76.
38 Paschke/Scheurer, in: Gola/Heckmann (Hrsg.), BDSG, 13. Aufl. 2019, § 37 Rn. 2.
39 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1.
Aufl. 2018, Art. 17 Rn. 18.
303
Germany
DieDatenschutzaufsichtsbehörden verlangen grundsätzlich von denVerantwortlichen
Löschungskonzepte. Solche Konzepte bestehen allerdings eher selten. Im Kern geht es um
ein Datenschutzmanagement, das der Frage Rechnung trägt, wie lange man die
personenbezogenen Daten benötigt.
Löschfristen können nur im Hinblick auf einzelne Situationen der Datenverarbeitung
zu bestimmen. Dem Grunde nach ist dann zu löschen, wenn die Datenverarbeitung nicht
mehr erforderlich ist. Dies kann im Privatrechtsverkehr sehr unterschiedliche Zeitdauern
betreffen. Hier ist angesichts der Vielfalt der Situationen, in denen verarbeitete Daten
gelöscht werden sollten oder müssten, keine abstrakte Vorgabe ersichtlich. Die
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden arbeiten an der Bewertung von Einzelfällen. Allgemeine
Richtlinien werden nicht erlassen.
In der Verarbeitungssituation der Videoüberwachung vertreten die Daten-
schutzaufsichtsbehörden grundsätzlich eine Löschungspflicht nach 72 Stunden.Wird also
eine zulässigeVideoüberwachung durchgeführt, etwa imöffentlichenPersonennahverkehr,
sind dieAufnahmen spätestens nach 72 Stunden zu löschen,wenn sich keineAnhaltspunkte
ergeben, die eine weitere Speicherung erlauben. Gleiches gilt etwa für Videoüberwachung
in Einkaufszentren oder Kaufhäusern.
Die Löschungspflichten staatlicher Stellen werden teils strenger gehandhabt als für
private Stellen. Dies gilt etwa für die Aufzeichnung personenbezogener Daten durch die
Polizei. Dies erfolgt zwar auf der Rechtsgrundlage der Richtlinie 2016/680, folgt aber
ähnlichen Maßgaben. Hier bedarf es der Prüfung, wie lange die Speicherung erforderlich
ist.
Das Recht auf Löschung wird begleitet durch die Notwendigkeit der Dokumentation.
In diesem Umfeld spielen technische und organisatorische Maßnahmen nach Art. 24, 32
DS-GVOeine großeRolle.WennDatennicht gelöschtwerden,muss dokumentiert werden,
warum ihre weitere Speicherung für erforderlich gehalten wird.
Wenn ein Einzelner sein subjektives Recht auf Löschung nachArt. 17DS-GVOgeltend
macht, wird in diesem Fall geprüft, ob den allgemeinen Maßgaben Rechnung getragen
wurde. Das Recht auf Löschung wird allerdings deutlich seltener geltend gemacht als das
Recht auf Auskunft.
Nach der Entscheidung des EuGH im Fall Google/Spain40 haben die Niederlassungen
der Betreiber von Suchmaschinen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland überwiegend
Mechanismen eingerichtet, um das Recht auf Vergessenwerden zu verwirklichen. So hat
Google ein Verfahren etabliert und berichtet öffentlich über Löschungsverfahren und
Löschungsentscheidungen.41
40 EuGH, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 - Google/Spain; dazu Nolte, NJW 2014, 2238.
41 Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1.




In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wurde in großem Maße von der Möglichkeit nach
Art. 85 DS-GVO, im Medienbereich spezifisches innerstaatliches Recht zu erlassen,
Gebrauch gemacht. Dies liegt daran, dass Medien und Kultur zu den
Gesetzgebungszuständigkeiten der Länder zählen.Daherwurden die Landesmediengesetze
jeweils angepasst. Die Medien- oder Pressegesetze der Länder enthalten nunmehr
Regelungen zur Wahrnehmung des Datenschutzes. Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion steht
dabei die Frage der Kontrolle. Im Schwerpunkt wird auf die Selbstkontrolle der Medien
gesetzt. Dies unterliegt durchaus Zweifeln angesichts der Regelung des Art. 85 DS-GVO.
Die Länder haben dabei unterschiedliche Kontrollsysteme etabliert. Die Einbeziehung der
staatlichenDatenschutzaufsichtsbehörde des jeweiligen Landes ist dabei der entscheidende
Punkt, da jeder Anschein von Zensurmöglichkeiten vermieden werden soll.42
Für die audiovisuellen Medien wird in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland die
Rechtsgrundlage Staatsvertrag gewählt. Alle Länder haben gemeinsam Staatsverträge
geschlossen, die den Rundfunk regeln.43 Der Rundfunkstaatsvertrag enthält Regelungen
für die Datenschutzbeauftragten der Rundfunkanstalten. Der Rundfunkstaatsvertrag ist
begleitet von einemStaatsvertrag zu der Frage, wie die Finanzierung des Rundfunks geregelt
wird.44 Dieser Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag enthält auch die Regelung, dass die
Haushaltsabgabe, die neu eingeführt wurde, im Rahmen eines Meldedatenabgleiches
festgestellt werden kann. Die auf der Grundlage des Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrages
etablierte Einrichtung, der Beitragsservice, hat also Rechte gegenüber den staatlichen
Meldebehörden, um festzustellen, welche Personen in welcher Wohnung gemeldet sind.
ImKern geht es darum, dass jederHaushalt verpflichtet ist, die Rundfunkabgabe zu zahlen.
Diesen Rundfunkbeitrag festzustellen ist das ausschlaggebende Problem. In der nunmehr
für 2020 geplanten Neufassung des Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrages wird alle vier Jahre
ein umfassender Meldedatenabgleich erlaubt. Damit können die Beiträge für den
öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk gerecht ermittelt werden, da auch Personen, die sich
nicht freiwillig beim Beitragsservice der Rundfunkanstalten melden, entdeckt werden
können. Allerdings sind dies in der Relation nur wenige Personen. Die
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden halten einen vollständigen Meldedatenabgleich der
Gesamtbevölkerung für diesen Zweck für verfassungsrechtlich zweifelhaft, weil er
42 Dazu mit pressefreundlicher Ausrichtung Cornils, ZUM 2018, 561 und ders., Das datenschutzrechtliche
Medienprivileg unter Behördenaufsicht? Der unionsrechtliche Rahmen für die Anpassung der medien-
rechtlichenBereichsausnahmen (in § 9c, § 57RStV-EunddenLandespressegesetzen) andie EU-Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung, Tübingen, 2018.
43 Vgl. BVerfGE 136, 9, Rn. 44 ff. – ZDF-Fernsehrat; s. BVerfGE 73, 118 zum dualen System.




ernsthaften Bedenken im Hinblick auf die Verhältnismäßigkeit des Eingriffes in das
Grundrecht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung begegnet.
C Nationale Durchsetzung von Datenschutzrecht
Frage 9
Die Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland sind auf derGrundlage ihres jeweiligenBundes- oder Landesgesetzes errichtet.
Die Aufgaben und Befugnisse folgen unmittelbar aus Art. 57, 58 DS-GVO.45 Soweit der
private Bereich betroffen ist, gibt es keine darüber hinausgehenden Befugnisse. Der
Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit ist in §§ 8 ff. BDSG
geregelt. Die Mehrzahl der Landesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz sind zugleich auch
Beauftragte für die Informationsfreiheit nach dem jeweiligen Landesinformationsfreiheits-
oder Landestransparenzgesetz.46 In drei Ländern der Bundesrepublik gibt es bisher kein
entsprechendes Informationsfreiheitsrecht (Bayern, Niedersachsen, Sachsen), dort sind
die Landesbeauftragten nur für den Datenschutz zuständig.
DieDatenschutzaufsichtsbehörden in der BundesrepublikDeutschland sind regelmäßig
oberste Bundes- oder Landesbehörden (z.B. § 8 Abs. 1 S. 1 BDSG). Derart wird die
Konsequenz aus der Unabhängigkeit gezogen, die der EuGH fordert.47 Der oder die
Beauftragte wird vom jeweiligen Parlament gewählt (z.B. § 11 BDSG). Der Bundestag oder
die Landtage legen also die Behördenspitze durchWahl fest. Dieweitere Zusammensetzung
der Behörde erfolgt nach allgemeinen Regeln des öffentlichen Dienstrechtes. Die
Personalhoheit obliegt der oder dem Beauftragten.48 Maßgeblich für die Personalstärke
der Behörde ist der jeweilige Haushalt. Die Regelung des Art. 52 Abs. 6 DS-GVO wird in
den Ländern und im Bund unterschiedlich konkretisiert. Hier besteht eine indirekte
Möglichkeit der Einflussnahme, indemdas jeweilige Parlament Stellen bewilligt oder nicht.
Dies hat konkreteAuswirkungen auf dieArbeitsfähigkeit der Behörde und dieMöglichkeit,
Aufgabenwahrzunehmen.Umgekehrt ist aufgrund der beschränkten Personalausstattung
eine Prioritätensetzung durch die Behörde selbst regelmäßig unabweisbar. Der von den
Beauftragten vorgetragene Mehrbedarf an Personal zur Verwirklichung der DS-GVO
45 Kugelmann, ZD 2020 (Heft 2), Ziff. III.
46 Kritisch zu dieser Personalunion Ibler, in: Festschrift Peine, 2016, S. 457.
47 EuGHUrt.v.9.3.2010, C-518/07, ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 - Kommission/Deutschland; EuGHUrt.v.16.10.2012,
C-614/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:631 – Kommission/Österreich; EuGH Urt.v.8.4.2014, C-288/12,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:237 - Kommission/Ungarn.




wurde im Bund und den Ländern in sehr unterschiedlichem Ausmaß vom
Haushaltsgesetzgeber aufgegriffen.49
Die besondere Situation derWahrnehmung vonGrundrechten durch eine unabhängige
Stelle erfordert spezifische Regelungen für die unabhängigen Stellen. Dies stellt Art. 8 Abs.
3 GRCh klar. Konsequenz ist, dass eine Aufsicht im hergebrachten Sinne über die
Datenschutzbeauftragten unzulässig ist. Dies folgt auch ausArt. 52Abs. 1 und 2DS-GVO.50
Aus dem deutschen Verfassungsrecht wird grundsätzlich die Vorgabe abgeleitet, dass
Behörden, die Eingriffsverwaltung durchführen, einer Aufsicht unterliegen sollen, um
insbesondere die demokratische Legitimation des Verwaltungshandelns sicherzustellen.51
Dies wurde von der Bundesregierung in dem Verfahren C-518/07 auch im Hinblick auf
die Datenschutzbeauftragten vorgetragen, aber vom EuGH zurückgewiesen.52
In der konkreten Rechtspraxis und in den Regelungen der Bundes- und
Landesdatenschutzgesetze stellt sich die Situation differenziert dar. Hier werden praktische
Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme durchaus sichtbar. Ob und inwieweit diese Situation
mit denRegelungen derDatenschutz-Grundverordnung vollständig vereinbar ist, begegnet
Bedenken, da auch indirekte Einflussnahmen nach der Rechtsprechung des EuGH
unzulässig sind.53 Die Diskussion führt in die Gemengelage zwischen Unionsrecht und
innerstaatlichem Verfassungsrecht. Zweifel wirft etwa die Frage der Aufsicht über den
Beauftragten auf.54 Einige Landesdatenschutzgesetze sehen eine Dienstaufsicht vor (§ 14
Abs. 1 Satz 2 LDSG Rheinland-Pfalz).55 Teils ist dies auch in den Landesverfassungen
angedeutet. Trotz des Anwendungsvorrangs des Unionsrechts sind hier die Spielräume
zu beachten, die das innerstaatliche Verfassungsrecht noch ausnutzen kann. Daher kann
eine generelle Beurteilung sämtlicher Regelungen nicht pauschal erfolgen. Allerdings ist
auch festzustellen, dass es in der Praxis fast nie Probleme gibt. DieDatenschutzbeauftragten
sind aufgrund ihrer Wahl und ihrer unabhängigen Stellung in einer herausgehobenen
Position, die allgemein von der Politik auch anerkannt wird.
49 Zum Ganzen Roßnagel, Datenschutzaufsicht nach der EU-Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, 2017.
50 Kugelmann, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage 2018, Art.
52 Rn. 17.
51 Eingehend Thomé, Reform der Datenschutzaufsicht, 2015, insbesondere S. 107 ff.; vgl. Wolff, ThürVBl.
2015, 205 (209) f. zu einem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschuss über das Vorgehen eines Landes-
datenschutzbeauftragten.
52 EuGH Urt.v.9.3.2010, C-518/07, ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 - Kommission/Deutschland, Rn. 25.
53 Kugelmann, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage 2018, Art.
52 Rn. 37.
54 Thomé, Reform der Datenschutzaufsicht, 2015, S. 123.
55 Für zulässig hält dies Glauben, DVBl. 2017, 488; für unzulässig Boehm, in: Kühling/Buchner (Hrsg.), DS-
GVO/BDSG, 2. Auflage 2018, Art. 52 Rn. 25; Nguyen, in: Gola (Hrsg.), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung,
2. Auflage 2018, Art. 52 Rn. 12.
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Die Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder arbeiten in der
Datenschutzkonferenz zusammen.56 In regelmäßigen Konferenzen werden gemeinsame
Positionen festgelegt, umdie Rechte der Betroffenen zu schützen unddenVerantwortlichen
Hilfestellung in der Anwendung zu geben. Dies betrifft konkrete Orientierungshilfen zu
bestimmtenThemen. Es betrifft Positionspapiere zurHandhabung rechtlicher Regelungen.
Die Datenschutzkonferenz trifft Entschließungen zu datenpolitischen Fragen. Sie hat etwa
Kurzpapiere zur Auslegung der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung geschaffen. Jeder und
jede Datenschutzbeauftragte ist unabhängig. Damit kann es sein, dass in einem Land der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland vereinzelt andere Handhabungen Bestehen als in einem
anderen Land.
Alle Datenschutzbeauftragten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind sowohl für
Datenverarbeitung durch private wie durch öffentliche Stellen zuständig (vgl. z.B. § 1
BDSG). Die Zuständigkeiten für den öffentlichen Bereich umfassen auch Polizei und Justiz
im Sinne der Richtlinie 2016/680.
Im Anwendungsbereich der DS-GVO verfügen die Beauftragten über alle Befugnisse
des Art. 58 DS-GVO (vgl. deklaratorisch § 16 Abs. 1 S. 1 BDSG). Gegenüber öffentlichen
Stellen besteht allerdings keine Möglichkeit, Geldbußen zu verhängen. Als zusätzliche
Maßnahme ist die Beanstandung vorgesehen (§ 16 Abs. 2 BDSG). Das hergebrachte
Instrument der Beanstandung einesDatenschutzverstoßes wird aus dem vorherigen Recht
fortgeschrieben.Dabei handelt es sich umeineMaßnahme, die einerVerwarnung gegenüber
privaten Stellen ähnelt. Der Datenschutzverstoß wird festgestellt und die weitere
Verarbeitung vonDatenwird auf rechtmäßiger Basis angemahnt unddaraufhin kontrolliert.
Die zuständige Rechtsaufsicht wird informiert und prüft die Einhaltung der Vorgaben.57
Für dieDatenverarbeitung privater Stellen sind die Landesbeauftragten zuständig. Der
Bundesbeauftragte hat lediglich beschränkte Zuständigkeiten für Unternehmen der
Telekommunikation, also etwa für die Deutsche Telekom und die Post (§ 115 Abs. 4 TKG,
§ 42 Abs. 3 PostG). Die Aufsicht und Kontrolle über die private Wirtschaft obliegt den
Landesbeauftragten. Dies hält § 40 BDSG fest.58
Die Rechtsdurchsetzungsbilanz fällt dem Grunde nach deshalb positiv aus, weil
insbesondere Verwarnungen und auch Geldbußen erfolgt sind. Die Mehrzahl der Fälle
trägt innerstaatlichen Charakter. Dies betrifft etwa Fälle der Videoüberwachung oder der
Falschübermittlung vonDaten in geringemUmfang. Folglich bewegt sich die überwiegende
Zahl der Geldbußen im 3- oder 4stelligem Bereich.
Die deutschen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden sind sich ihrer Verantwortung für die
Rechtsdurchsetzung bewusst. Angesichts der beschriebenen längeren Dauer und der
56 S. http://www.datenschutzkonferenz-online.de.
57 Wieczorek, in: Kühling/Buchner (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 2. Auflage 2018, § 16 BDSG Rn. 15.
58 Dix, in: Kühling/Buchner (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 2. Auflage 2018, § 40 BDSG Rn. 1.
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rechtsstaatlichenAnforderungen an dieVerfahren sind dieMaßnahmen auf derGrundlage
der DS-GVO erst langsam in Gang gekommen. Sie können nur Verstöße betreffen, die
unter der Geltung der DS-GVO, also seit dem 25. Mai 2018, vorgekommen sind. Diese
Verstöße werden durch Beschwerden von Individuen oder auf anderem Wege etwa durch
die Meldung von Datenschutzverletzungen nach Art. 33 DS-GVO oder durch Hinweise
desDatenschutzaufsichtsbehörden bekannt. Sodann treffen diese Ermittlungsmaßnahmen.
Das Verfahren beginnt regelmäßig mit den Informationsersuchen gegenüber dem
Verantwortlichen, damit Stellung gegenüber demVorwurf genommenwerden kann.Diese
Verfahren sind teils langwierig. Dies betrifft gerade auch die Geldbußen. Hier ist nach
bundesdeutscher Rechtslage das Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) einschlägig. Die
Feststellung des Verstoßes kann mit einer Geldbuße nach Art. 83 DS-GVO geahndet
werden.DasVerfahren erfolgt aber nach demOrdnungswidrigkeitengesetz undunterliegt
den einschlägigen Regelungen. Einige Regelungen des Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetzes
kommen aufgrund des Anwendungsvorrangs des Unionsrechts nicht zum Zuge. Dies
betrifft nach zutreffender Auffassung etwa die §§ 30, 130 OWiG mit der Folge, dass nicht
nur Organisationsverschulden zugerechnet werden kann, sondern auch das Verhängen
einer Geldbuße gegenüber einer juristischen Person zulässig ist.59
Frage 10
Rechtliche Einschränkungen, die der Strategie von Behandlungen von Beschwerden
auferlegt wurden, sind nicht ersichtlich. Sie wären auch schwerlich mit Art. 78 DS-GVO
zu vereinbaren. Indirekte Folgewirkungen haben die Präzisierung von
Anwendungsbereichen oder die Einschränkung vonBetroffenenrechten auf derGrundlage
desArt. 23DS-GVO.DasRecht auf Beschwerde ist ansonsten abschließend in derDS-GVO
geregelt.
Die deutschen Aufsichtsbehörden haben im Jahr 2018 nach Inkrafttreten und
Wirksamwerden der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung einen Schwerpunkt auf die
Behandlung von Beschwerden gelegt. Grund dafür ist, dass nach Art. 78 Abs. 2 DS-GVO
jede betroffene Person das Recht auf einen wirksamen gerichtlichen Rechtsbehelf hat,
wenn nicht die zuständige Aufsichtsbehörde sich innerhalb von drei Monaten mit der
Beschwerde befasst. Aufgrund dieserDreimonatsfrist ist die Behandlung vonBeschwerden
durchgehend als Priorität gesehen worden. Die Beschwerde drückt die individuelle
Freiheitsgestaltung des einzelnen Beschwerdeführers aus, der sich in seinen Rechten aus




dem Datenschutzrecht verletzt fühlt. Auch angesichts der Verknüpfung mit der
grundrechtlichenGewährleistung ist die Beschwerde nachwie vor als Priorität einzustufen.
Jenseits von der Festlegung proaktiver Strategien stand zunächst die Umstellung auf
die Beschwerden nach der DS-GVO und ihre Bewältigung im Vordergrund. Dies hat zu
organisatorischen und verfahrensmäßigen Konsequenzen geführt. Die Behörden haben
sich intern so organisiert, dass sie eine angemessene Behandlung der Beschwerden
gewährleisten können. Dies betrifft insbesondere auch die Erörterung von Beschwerden
mit grenzüberschreitendem Bezug. Denn im Falle grenzüberschreitender Verarbeitungen
oder erheblicher Beeinträchtigung im Sinne des Art. 56 Abs. 1 und 2 DS-GVO ist die
Zuständigkeit festzustellen. Dann greift der Mechanismus der
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, dass eine federführendeAufsichtsbehörde dasVerfahren
zentral führen soll. Zu diesem Zweck ist eine Online-Plattform etabliert worden, die eine
schnelle und reibungsloseZusammenarbeit der europäischenDatenschutzaufsichtsbehörden
ermöglichen soll. Diese IMI-Plattform hatte Anlaufschwierigkeiten, da zunächst die
Rahmenbedingungen ihrer Nutzung und die konkrete Handhabung der verschiedenen
Möglichkeiten auf europäischer Ebene geklärt werden mussten. Dies hat die Behandlung
von Beschwerden zunächst etwas kompliziert gemacht. Inzwischen ist mit einer
Arbeitsgruppe und weiteren verfahrensmäßigen Hilfestellungen der Zustand verbessert
worden. Dennoch bleibt die weitere Optimierung dieser Plattform eine Daueraufgabe.
Einschränkungen der Behandlung von Beschwerden liegen in den vorhandenen
Ressourcen. Die deutschen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden sind teilweise im Personal
aufgestockt worden. Zum einen betrifft dies aber nicht alle, zum anderen ist die Last der
Behandlung vonBeschwerden auchmit demerweiterten Personalstock kaumangemessen
zu bewältigen.
Angesichts der begrenzten Ressourcen in den Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden sind
jeweilsWeichenstellungen vorgenommenworden, umdemenormgestiegenenArbeitsanfall
Rechnung zu tragen. In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat sich diese Abstimmung
teilweise auf der Ebene der Datenschutzkonferenz abgespielt. Die unabhängigen
Aufsichtsbehörden des Bundes und der Länder sind in der Datenschutzkonferenz
zusammengeschlossen, um gemeinsame Linien zu finden. Im 2. Halbjahr 2018 und auch
noch zu Beginn des Jahres 2019 betrafen die Weichenstellungen u.a. auch die Frage der
Behandlung von Beschwerden. Beispiele sind die innerstaatliche Abgabe oder das
Verständnis von nicht grenzüberschreitenden Fällen gem. Art. 56 Abs. 2 DS-GVO. Die
innerstaatliche Abgabe betrifft die Zusammenarbeit der deutschen Behörden. Hier wird
analog der europäischen Vorgabe des Art. 56 Abs. 1 DS-GVO auf die Hauptniederlassung
abgehoben. Beschwerden gegenüber einemUnternehmenmit Sitz inNordrhein-Westfalen
werden dann an die nordrhein-westfälische Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörde abgegeben.
Einzelheiten sind hier streitig, etwa die Frage, ob und von wem die Benachrichtigung des
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Betroffenen über die Abgabe erfolgt. In der Zwischenzeit konnten hier handhabbare
Kompromisse in der DSK erzielt werden.
Die Bewertung als grenzüberschreitend oder nicht grenzüberschreitend und die
Bewertung eines Falles als lokal begrenzt sind wichtige und ausschlaggebende Fragen in
der täglichen Behördenarbeit.60 Die Auslegung des Verständnis des Art. 56 Abs. 1 und 2
DS-GVOsollen vomEuropäischenDatenschutzausschuss in einschlägigenHandreichungen
konkretisiert werden. Die konkrete Vorgehensweise der europäischen
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden unterscheidet sich im Detail durchaus noch. Dies kann
Auswirkungen auf den Einzelfall haben, etwa im Fall unterschiedlicher Bewertungen
konkreter Verarbeitungen als lokal begrenzt. Teilweise finden hier auch bilaterale Kontakte
der jeweiligen Behörde mit der grundsätzlich federführenden Behörde für das
verantwortliche Unternehmen statt. Beschwerden gegen Facebook, Google oder Amazon
sind Massenphänomene, die daher auf europäischer Ebene besonders Berücksichtigung
in der Bearbeitung von Beschwerden finden.
Frage 11
Das BDSGund die Landesdatenschutzgesetze enthalten eigene strafrechtliche Tatbestände
und nutzen damit Art. 84 DS-GVO.61 Nach § 42 Abs. 1 BDSG wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis
zu 3 Jahren oder Geldstrafe bestraft, wer Daten wissentlich an Dritte übermittelt und
gewerbsmäßig handelt. Mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 2 Jahren oder Geldstrafe wird gemäß §
42 Abs. 2 BDSG bestraft, wer unberechtigt Daten verarbeitet und gegen Entgelt oder mit
Schädigungsabsicht handelt. Sanktionen des Strafrechts für etwa dasAusspähen vonDaten
gem. § 202 a Strafgesetzbuch sind hiervon unabhängig.
Andere verwaltungsrechtliche Sanktionen im Sinne des Art. 84 DS-GVO bestehen in
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht. Die breit gefächerten Befugnisse des Art. 58
DS-GVO und die Regelung des Art. 83 DS-GVO zu den Geldbußen werden insofern als
ausreichend erachtet.
Die deutschen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden machen von den Abhilfebefugnissen in
unterschiedlichem Ausmaß gebrauch. Ein Schwerpunkt liegt bei dem Instrument der
Verwarnung. In derVergangenheit liegendeVerstöße gegen dasDatenschutzrecht können
nach Art. 58 Abs. 2 lit. b DS-GVO damit angemessen geahndet werden.62 Angesichts der
durchaus aufwändigenVerwaltungsverfahren, umVerwaltungsakte oder auchGeldbußen
60 Kugelmann/Römer, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1. Auflage
2018, Art. 56 Rn. 24 ff.
61 Ehmann, in: Gola/Heckmann (Hrsg.), BDSG, 13. Auflage 2019, § 42 Rn. 3.
62 Kugelmann/Buchmann, in: Schwartmann/Jaspers/Thüsing/Kugelmann (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 1.Auflage
2018, Art. 58 Rn. 82.
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zu erlassen, sind eine Reihe von Maßnahmen erst deutlich nach dem 25. Mai 2018 in Gang
gekommen und erlassen worden. Die betrifft insbesondere auch die Geldbußen.
Vondem Instrument derGeldbußennachArt. 83DS-GVOwurde durchausGebrauch
gemacht. Allerdings ist zu beachten, dass die Mehrzahl der Fälle kleinere Verstöße betraf.
Hier ging es etwa um die rechtswidrige Nutzung von Dashcams oder anderen
Videoübertragungseinrichtungen oder um kleinere Fälle von Datenübermittlungen an
einen falschen Adressaten. Größere Geldbußen sind in Deutschland erst wenige verhängt
worden, die Zahl nimmt aber beständig zu. Diese betreffen insbesondere Unternehmen,
die aus dem Bereich der Datenverarbeitung oder sozialen Netzwerke kommen und
Unternehmen oder Einrichtungen aus dem Bereich der Gesundheit.
Im Fall der Geldbußen ist zudem hervorzuheben, dass aufgrund des
Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetzes die ordentlicheGerichtsbarkeit zuständig ist. Klagen gegen
Geldbußen gehen vor das Amtsgericht, also den Einzelrichter, und haben dort oftmals
insoweit teils Erfolg, als die Geldbuße verringert wird. Die Regelung des § 41 BDSG, die
das Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz für das Datenschutzrecht in Bezug nimmt, legt eine
Neuerung fest, da im Fall einer festgesetzten Geldbuße, die den Betrag von 100.000 Euro
übersteigt, das Landgericht entscheidet (§ 41 Abs. 1 Satz 3 BDSG).63 Bisher ist allerdings
keine Entscheidung eines Landgerichts in diesem Zusammenhang ersichtlich.
Die Priorisierung erfolgt anhand von Schutzgütern und anhand des Risikos für diese
Schutzgüter, weil dies dem risiko-basierten Ansatz der DS-GVO entspricht. Ein
einschlägiges Kurzpapier der Datenschutzkonferenz (DSK) zur Risikobewertung geht in
diese Richtung.64 DieKontrollorientierung erfolgt gegenüber denWirtschaftsteilnehmern,
die an derVerarbeitung vonDaten selbst verdienen und ihrGeschäftsmodell entsprechend
auf Datenverarbeitung ausgerichtet haben. Online-Banken, soziale Netzwerke zur
Erleichterung von Kommunikation in bestimmten wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhängen
oder Unternehmen, die Apps betreuen und organisieren, stehen eher im Fokus der
deutschen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden als kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen des
Einzelhandels oder der verarbeitenden Industrie.
Eine besondereGewichtung gibt Art. 9DS-GVOvor.Die dort festgelegten besonderen
Kategorien personenbezogener Daten erfordern besondere Maßnahmen vom
Verantwortlichen und stehen damit auch unter besonderer Beobachtung durch die
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden.Dies betrifft insbesondereGesundheitsdaten. Gesundheit
ist ein wesentlicher infrastruktureller Aspekt des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Von der
Digitalisierung im Gesundheitswesen sind nicht nur viele Bürgerinnen und Bürger
betroffen, zugleich geht es um besonders sensible Daten, die Aussagen über privateste und
63 Brodowski/Nowak, in: Wolff/Brink (Hrsg.), Beck-OK (28. Edition), § 41 BDSG Rn. 36.
64 Kurzpapier Nr. 18 (https://datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/kurzpapiere.html).
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intimsteDinge beinhalten. DerenVerarbeitung bedarf besonderer Aufmerksamkeit.65 Vor
diesem Hintergrund sind Krankenhäuser oder Einrichtungen, die entsprechende
Abrechnungen vonArztbesuchen vornehmen, besonders intensiv zu beobachten. Zugleich
sind hier auch Beschwerden zu verzeichnen, die von Patientinnen und Patienten
vorgebracht werden.
Eine Möglichkeit, Spielräume zu nutzen, bietet die Beratung. Die Beratung privater
und öffentlicher Stellenwird traditionell alsAufgabe vondenBeauftragtenwahrgenommen.
Jedoch enthält die DS-GVO keine umfassende Aufgabe der Beratung. Die Maßnahmen,
mit denen Veranstaltungen durchgeführt, Informationsmittel veröffentlicht oder
Verantwortlichemit Empfehlungen für dieAusgestaltungderDatenverarbeitungunterstützt
werden, werden auf Art. 57 Abs. 1 lit. b DS-GVO gestützt. Die Setzung von Prioritäten
obliegt dem jeweiligen Beauftragten. Das Verhältnis von Beratung zu eingreifenden
Maßnahmen oder Sanktionen kann daher in den Ländern unterschiedlich gestaltet sein.
Die DS-GVO hat die Arbeitsweise der Behörden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
verändert. Vor dem Wirksamwerden der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung waren auch
vielfach informelle Möglichkeiten gegeben. Nunmehr ist die Tätigkeit der
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden sehr viel stärker behördlich geprägt, weil sie
Eingriffsverwaltung betreiben. Eine Reihe von Maßnahmen aus Art. 58 DS-GVO wie z.B.
die Verwarnung oder Anordnung sind nach bundesdeutschem Verwaltungsrecht
Verwaltungsakte. Ein Verwaltungsakt als konkret individuelle Entscheidung, um Rechte
und Pflichten eines Betroffenen festzulegen, wird nach den Regeln des
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetzes erlassen. Damit sind die allgemeinen Regeln anwendbar.
In der Konsequenz sind rechtsstaatlich gebotene Verfahrenshandlungen wie Anhörung
oder Begründung entsprechend vorzunehmen (§§ 28, 39 VwVfG). Damit dauern die
Verfahren länger, als sie teils vorher gedauert haben. Die Erweiterung der Befugnisse der
Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden durch dieDS-GVOhat also zu einer stärkeren behördlichen
Prägung des konkreten Tätigwerdens geführt.
Frage 12
Nach der Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland können immaterielle Schäden
nach § 253 Abs. 1 BGB ersetzt werden. Landläufig wird oft von „Schmerzensgeld”
gesprochen. Damit sollen die Einbußen am Wohlbefinden ausgeglichen und eine
Genugtuung für erlebtes Unrecht ausgesprochen werden, um zugleich künftige
Verletzungen durch Abschreckung zu verhindern.66 Fälle sind etwa die Verletzung des
65 Buchner, Datenschutz im Gesundheitswesen, 2019; Paschke, in: Specht/Mantz (Hrsg.), Handbuch des
deutschen und europäischen Datenschutzrechts, 2019, § 13.
66 BGH NJW 1976, 1147.
313
Germany
allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts, z.B. durch unautorisierte Bildveröffentlichungen, aber
insbesondere auch Schmerzen nach Schadensereignissen. Die Beeinträchtigung etwa des
allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechtsmuss schwerwiegendenCharakter haben.Dies ist dann
der Fall, wenn den Schädiger schwere Schuld trifft oder das Persönlichkeitsrecht in
erheblichem Grade verletzt wird.67 Dabei sind die gesamten Umstände des Einzelfalles zu
würdigen.68
Im Fall des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts ist die Rechtsgrundlage § 823 BGB, der
in Abs. 1 Schadensersatzansprüche bei Verletzungen sonstiger Rechte beinhaltet. Die
sonstigen Rechte bestehen hier im Grundrecht gewährleisteten Recht der allgemeinen
Persönlichkeit nach Art. 1 und 2 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz.69 Dies hat das
Bundesverfassungsgericht bestätigt.70
Angesichts derNähe desRechts auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung zumallgemeinen
Persönlichkeitsrecht, die beide in Art. 2 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz wurzeln, können gewisse
Grundzüge der zivilgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung zu § 253 BGB auf ihre Übertragbarkeit
geprüft werden. In der Einzelfallbeurteilung sind die von der Rechtsprechung zur Höhe
von Bußgeldern entwickelten Ermessenskriterien zu beachten, die im jeweiligen Fall auf
ihre Anwendbarkeit und ihre Reichweite geprüft werden. Dabei kann die Anzahl der
betroffenen Personen, die Dauer der vorgenommenen Verarbeitung oder die Bedeutung
des Grundrechtseingriffes eine Rolle spielen. Hier ist durchaus eine schutzgutorientierte
Betrachtung auch für Art. 82 DS-GVO angebracht. Die Beeinträchtigung muss dabei ein
gewisses Gewicht erreichen.
Jedoch dürften bei Art. 82 DS-GVO höhere Schadensersatzsummen als im Fall von
Verletzungen des Persönlichkeitsrechts angemessen sein. Denn der Schadensersatz soll
abschreckenden Charakter haben und Art. 82 DS-GVO erfasst nicht nur schwer wiegende
Verletzungen des Datenschutzrechts, sondern jede Verletzung.71
Einschlägige Rechtsprechung ist bisher nur vereinzelt ersichtlich. EineWahrnehmung
undKonsolidierung vonKriterien zurAnwendung desArt. 82DS-GVOwird erst in einem
mittelfristigen Zeitraum zu erwarten sein.
Frage 13
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat kollektiver Rechtschutz keine Tradition. Der
Individualrechtsschutz dominiert nach wie vor. Erst im Zusammenhang mit dem
67 BGHZ 35, 363.
68 BGH NJW 2005, 58, 59.
69 BGH NJW 2014, 2871, 2872.
70 BVerfG 34, 269; NJW 2004, 591.
71 Bergt, in: Kühling/Buchner (Hrsg.), DS-GVO/BDSG, 2. Aufl. 2018, Art. 82 Rn. 18.
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Umweltschutz sind kollektive Rechtschutzmöglichkeiten eingeräumt worden. Dabei war
das Europarecht in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH der Auslöser und die treibende Kraft.72
Die Berechtigung zur Klageerhebung ist oft auf besonders anerkannte oder qualifizierte
Einrichtungen beschränkt. Dies wird etwa deutlich im Fall der anerkannten
Umweltverbände nach § 29 Abs. 2 BNatSchG oder im Fall von § 85 SGB IX der Verbände,
die nach ihrer Satzung Behinderte vertreten. Inzwischen ist festzustellen, dass die
Verbandsklage und andere Möglichkeiten kollektiven Rechtschutzes anerkannt sind.73
DerArt. 80Abs. 1DS-GVOmanifestiert gewisseAnforderungen an dieOrganisationen
der Vereinigung. Nach Art. 80 Abs. 1 DS-GVO kann eine betroffene Person eine
Einrichtung, die entsprechende Voraussetzungen erfüllt, damit beauftragen, in ihrem
Namen eine Beschwerde einzureichen. Dies ist eine Möglichkeit, die bisher kaum in
Anspruch genommen wurde.
Das Verbandsklagerecht des Art. 80 Abs. 2 DS-GVO verwirklicht das
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz nicht. Aufgrund der innerstaatlichen
Gesetzgebungszuständigkeiten für die Gerichtsbarkeit kann nur der Bund eine
entsprechende Regelung erlassen. Dies hat er nicht getan.
Ein datenschutzrechtliches Verbandsklagerecht bleibt damit auf das am 24.02.2016 in
Kraft getretene Gesetz zur Verbesserung der zivilrechtlichen Durchsetzung von
verbraucherschützenden Vorschriften des Datenschutzrechtes beschränkt.74 Danach
können Verbände und Kammern die Einhaltung datenschutzrechtlicher Vorschriften mit
zivilrechtlichenMitteln durchsetzen.75 Nach demneuen § 2Abs. 2 Satz 1Nr. 11 desGesetzes
über Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts- und anderen Verstößen wurde dies
ermöglicht. Nach dieserVorschrift sind auchVorschriften, die die Erhebung, Verarbeitung
oderNutzung vonpersonenbezogenenDaten einesVerbrauchers durch einenUnternehmer
betreffen, Verbraucherschutzgesetze im Sinne dieses Gesetzes. Dieses kollektive Klagerecht
der Verbraucherzentralen ist damit auf das Verbraucherschutzrecht beschränkt.
WeitergehendeOptionennachArt. 80Abs. 2DS-GVO, die darüber hinausgehendeAspekte
aufgreifen könnten, wurden nicht ergriffen.76 Der § 2 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 11 UKLRG ist nicht
als Ausformung des Art. 80 DS-GVO zu verstehen.77
Die im föderalen Staat dezentral organisierten Verbraucherzentralen nehmen ihr
kollektives Recht auf Klage aktiv wahr. Der Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband und eine
72 Seibert, NVwZ 2013, 1040.
73 Wahl/Schütz, in: Schoch/Schneider/Bier (Hrsg.), Beck-OK VwGO, § 42 Abs. 2, Rn 228 ff.
74 BGBl. I 2016, S. 233.
75 EuGH, C-40/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629, Fashion ID GmbH & Co KG / Verbraucherzentrale NRW, Rn.57 f.,
K&R 2019, 562, hält dies unter der Geltung der Richtlinie für die zulässige Nutzung von Spielräumen.
76 Korreng, in: Gierschmann u.a., DS-GVO, 1. Aufl. 2018, Art. 80 Rn. 40.




Reihe vonVerbraucherzentralen in etwa 8 der 16 Länder der BundesrepublikDeutschland
gehen mit Klagen auch auf dem Gebiet des Datenschutzes gegen private Unternehmen
vor. Klagegegner sind dabei durchaus auch Facebook oder Google.
Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen spielen durchaus eine Rolle bei der Wahrung von
Datenschutzrechten in der Öffentlichkeit. Hier geht es insbesondere um Sensibilisierung
und Aufdecken von Missständen. Angesichts der schon vor der DS-GVO wichtigen Rolle
derDatenschutzaufsichtsbehördenwar allerdings dieDurchsetzung im staatlichen Bereich
verortet. Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen haben jedoch vielfachVerfassungsbeschwerden
gegen staatliche Sicherheitsgesetze erhoben, die den Grundrechten auf Privatheit,
informationelle Selbstbestimmung oder anderenGrundrechtenwidersprochen haben. Die
Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen die Vorratsdatenspeicherung sind nur ein Beispiel von
vielen. Zwar bedurfte es aufgrund des innerstaatlichen deutschen Prozessrechtes immer
individueller Personen, die letztlich die Klagen erhoben haben. Sie wurden und werden
aber unterstützt von Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen.
Frage 14
Datenschutz istmitDatensicherheit eng verwoben.Die technischen und organisatorischen
Maßnahmen nach Art. 24, 32 DS-GVO stehen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in
enger Verbindung mit einschlägigen Regeln des IT-Sicherheitsrechts. Das Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik spielt daher durchaus eine Rolle imweiterenKontext
auch des Datenschutzes. Ein Gesetzesvorhaben, das durch eine Neufassung des
IT-Sicherheitsgesetzes78 eine Erweiterung der Handlungsoptionen und Zuständigkeiten
des BSI betrifft, ist gerade in Vorbereitung.
Das Bundeskartellamt hat in einer aufsehenerregenden Entscheidung gegen Facebook
auchVerstöße gegen dasDatenschutzrecht geahndet.79 Die entsprechendeGeldbuße gegen
Facebook wird mit Verstößen gegen das Datenschutzrecht begründet. Die
Wettbewerbsbehörden können durchaus schmerzhafte und weitreichende Sanktionen
verhängen. Allerdings ist zu beachten, dass das Bundeskartellamt dabei auf
wettbewerbsrechtliche Verstöße begrenzt ist. Das Verhältnis von Datenschutzrecht und
Wettbewerbsrecht ist dynamisch.80 Eine entsprechende Gesetzesänderung hat allerdings
das Datenschutzrecht insoweit auch in den Anwendungsbereich des Gesetzes über die
78 Gesetz zur Erhöhung der Sicherheit informationstechnischer Systeme (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz) v. 17.7.2015,
BGBl. I 2015, S 1324.
79 BKartA (6. Beschlussabteilung), Beschluss vom 06.02.2019 - Aktenzeichen B6-22/16, BeckRS 2019, BeckRS
2019, 4895.
80 Peitz/Schweitzer, NJW 2018, 275.
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Wettbewerbsbedingungen gebracht und damit demBundeskartellamt erlaubt, einschlägige
Maßnahmen zu ergreifen.
Der Verbraucherschutz in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist nicht einer Behörde
im Schwerpunkt zugewiesen. Vielmehr sind die Verbraucherzentralen als zivilrechtliche
Vereine organisiert. Sie verfügen über besondere Befugnisse, wie etwa das
Verbandsklagerecht. Der Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband betreibt politische
Einflussnahme und entsprechendeÖffentlichkeitsarbeit. Dabei spielt dasDatenschutzrecht
durchaus eine Rolle.81 Dies gilt auch für die Beratungspraxis der Verbraucherzentralen
gegenüber Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher.
Die Frage, ob weitere Behörden erforderlich sind, um Regulierungen im Internet oder
für Systeme künstlicher Intelligenz zu schaffen, wird durchaus diskutiert. Hier ist aber
tendenziell eine gewisse Zurückhaltung festzustellen. Zum einen liegt dies daran, dass mit
dem Bundeskartellamt, dem BSI und den unabhängigen Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden
des Bundes undder Länder bereits starke undmit entsprechendweitreichendenBefugnissen
ausgestattete Behörden bestehen. Darüber hinaus wird der Selbstkontrolle in mehreren
Zusammenhängen großer Raumgegeben.Dies betrifft etwa die Selbstkontrolle derMedien,
aber auch die von Intermediären.82 DieVerantwortlichenwie Facebook oderGoogle sollen
selbst dafür sorgen, dass etwa strafbare Inhalte zügig gelöscht werden.Dies hat nur teilweise
Erfolg gehabt. Aus diesem Grund wurde das umstrittene Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz
erlassen, mit dem Verantwortliche verpflichtet werden, strafbare Inhalte zu löschen.83
Konkret betrifft dies insbesondere YouTube.
Eine Zusammenarbeit der Datenschutzaufsichtsbehörden mit anderen
Regulierungsbehörden erfolgt im Einzelfall, eine entsprechende Struktur der
Zusammenarbeit besteht nicht.
D Datenverarbeitung für nationale Sicherheitsbelange
Frage 15
Sicherheit gegenüber anderen Staaten betrifft insbesondere die territoriale Integrität. Neben
diese äußere Sicherheit tritt die innere Sicherheit als Aufrechterhalten von Recht und
Ordnung innerhalb des Staatsgebietes.84 Diese Begriffsverwendung trägt rechtspolitischen
Charakter. In der geschriebenen Rechtsordnung ist die öffentliche Sicherheit das zentrale
81 Specht, in: Specht/Mantz (Hrsg.), Handbuch des deutschen und europäischen Datenschutzrechts, 2019,
§ 9.
82 Paal, MMR 2018, 567.
83 Eifert, NJW 2017, 1450; Lang, AöR 143 (2018), 220; Löber/Roßnagel, ZD 2019, 71.
84 Götz, in: Isensee/Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts III, 2. Aufl. 1996, § 79.
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Schutzgut des Polizei- und Ordnungsrechts, das die Unverletzlichkeit der Rechtsordnung
insgesamt bezeichnet und in der Rechtsprechung umfangreich ausgearbeitet ist.85 In der
Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird zur Beschreibung eines Interesses
an der Wahrung innerer Sicherheit auch der Begriff der „Sicherheit des Bundes oder eines
Landes” genutzt. In Art. 73 Abs. 1 Nr. 10 lit. b GG wird die Gesetzgebungskompetenz des
Bundes für den Verfassungsschutz festgelegt und Verfassungsschutz dabei als Schutz der
freiheitlichen demokratischenGrundordnung, des Bestandes undder Sicherheit des Bundes
oder eines Landes definiert. Die Verwendung dieses Begriffs erfolgt zur Umschreibung
schutzwürdiger Belange, die ein Vorgehen staatlicher Sicherheitsbehörden erlauben.
Nach § 22 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 lit. b BDSG ist die Verarbeitung besonderer Kategorien
personenbezogener Daten durch öffentliche Stellen auch dann zulässig, wenn sie zur
Abwehr einer erheblichen Gefahr für die öffentliche Sicherheit erforderlich ist. Derartige
Regelungen sind häufig anzutreffen.DieWahrnehmung derAufgabe, öffentliche Sicherheit
zu gewährleisten, erlaubt die Erhebung und Übermittlung von Daten. Die auf Art. 6 Abs.
1 Buchstabe c und e DS-GVO beruhenden innerstaatlichen Gesetze, die die
Aufgabenwahrnehmung öffentlicher Stellen betreffen, enthalten regelmäßig derartige
Vorschriften.
In der Umsetzung der Richtlinie über Polizei und Justiz 2016/680 ist im
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz sowie denLandesdatenschutzgesetzen eineAbgrenzung enthalten,
die auf die nationale bzw. innere Sicherheit zielt. So will § 45 BDSG die Anwendbarkeit
der umsetzenden Vorschriften auf die Nachrichtendienste ausschließen.86 Denn nach
überwiegender Auffassung ist die Richtlinie nicht auf Nachrichtendienste anwendbar. In
der Umsetzung der Richtlinie kann aber das innerstaatliche Recht Regelungen enthalten,
die auch auf die Nachrichtendienste Anwendung finden. Denn die Nachrichtendienste
sind öffentliche Stellen. Allgemeine Regelungen über öffentliche Stellungen, die keine
Ausnahmetatbestände enthalten, findendaher auchAnwendung auf dieNachrichtendienste,
womit das Datenschutzrecht in allgemeiner Form auf diese erweitert wird. Dies ist etwa
der Fall des § 10 LDSGRP, der eine entsprechendeAnwendung derVorschriften des LDSG
zur Ergänzung der DS-GVO auf Datenverarbeitungen anordnet, die nicht unter die
DS-GVO fallen. Die speziellen Regelungen des Datenschutzes in den Gesetzen über den
Verfassungsschutz oder den BND bleiben davon unberührt. Hier ist allerdings die
Kontrollbefugnis der unabhängigen Beauftragten regelmäßig ausgeschlossen.
Fragen der Anwendbarkeit datenschutzrechtlicher Vorschriften stellen sich auch bei
der Kooperation zwischen Sicherheitsbehörden. Nach § 57 BDSG haben betroffene
Personen ein Auskunftsrecht. Bezieht sich die Auskunftserteilung allerdings auf die
Übermittlung personenbezogener Daten an Verfassungsschutzbehörden, den
85 Kugelmann, Polizei- und Ordnungsrecht, 2. Aufl. 2012, 5. Kap Rn 35 ff.
86 So auch § 26 LDSG RP.
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Bundesnachrichtendienst, den militärischen Abschirmdienst und, soweit die Sicherheit
des Bundes berührt wird, andere Behörden des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung, ist
sie nurmit Zustimmung dieser Stelle zulässig (§ 57Abs. 5 BDSG). Die Vereinbarkeit dieser
Vorschrift mit der Richtlinie begegnet dabei durchaus erheblichen Zweifeln.87 Sieht der
Verantwortliche von der Auskunft ab oder beschränkt er sie, kann die betroffene Person
ihr Auskunftsrecht auch über den Bundesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz ausüben (§
57 Abs. 7 BDSG). Selbst gegenüber dem Bundesbeauftragten ist aber eine Beschränkung
des Auskunftsrechtes wirksam. Denn die zuständige oberste Bundesbehörde kann im
Einzelfall feststellen, dass durch die Auskunft die Sicherheit des Bundes oder eines Landes
gefährdet würde (§ 57 Abs. 7 Satz 3 BDSG). Damit kann etwa das Bundesamt für
Verfassungsschutz als oberste Bundesbehörde die Auskunftserteilung verhindern. Auch
die Vereinbarkeit dieser Regelung mit der JI-Richtlinie ist überaus zweifelhaft.
Die Vorratsdatenspeicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein Thema, das seit
Jahren die Rechtsprechung und den Gesetzgeber beschäftigt. Das ursprüngliche Gesetz
über die Vorratsdatenspeicherung in Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2006/24/EG wurde vom
Bundesverfassungsgericht für verfassungswidrig erklärt.88 In seiner Rechtsprechung zur
Vorratsdatenspeicherung hat der EuGH die Richtlinie 2006/24/EG dann in der Folge für
nichtig erachtet.89 Vor dem Hintergrund der Richtlinie 2002/58/EG zum Datenschutz in
der elektronischen Kommunikation hat er zudem hohe Anforderungen an die
Rechtmäßigkeit von umfassenden Eingriffen durch innerstaatliche Regelungen zur
Vorratsspeicherung gestellt.90 Eine anlassloseVorratsdatenspeicherungdürfte kaumzulässig
sein.91
Nach den Entscheidungen der deutschen und europäischen Rechtsprechung hat der
Bundesgesetzgeber ein neues, eng umgrenztesGesetz zurVorratsdatenspeicherung erlassen.
Auch diese gesetzlichen Regelungen zur Einführung einer Vorratsdatenspeicherung (am
10. Dezember 2015 wurde das Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer
Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten beschlossen), die am 1. Juli 2017 in Kraft treten
sollten,92 begegnen jedoch Zweifeln hinsichtlich ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit dem Recht der
EU. Das Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen in Münster hat diese
87 Kugelmann, in: Zöller/Esser (Hrsg.), Justizielle Medienarbeit im Strafverfahren, 2019, S. 205 (226 ff.).
88 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08, BVerfGE 125, 260 – Vorratsdatenspeicherung; dazu Roßnagel, NJW 2010, 1238 ff;
s Scholz DVBl 2014, 197 (202).
89 EuGH (GK), Rs C-293/12 und C-594/12 – Digital Rights Ireland, Rn 44.
90 EuGH, verbRsC-203/15 undC-698/15 –Tele2 SverigeABund Secretary of State for theHomeDepartment
/ Watson, Rn 93, 96 ff.
91 Priebe, EuZW2017, 136; Roßnagel, NJW2017, 696; Schiedermair/Mrozek, DÖV2016, 89; zurNeuregelung
durch den Bundesgesetzgeber Roßnagel, NJW 2016, 533.




Bedenken geteilt und einen einzelnen Provider von der Speicherpflicht befreit, woraufhin
die Bundesnetzagentur die Umsetzung der Speicherverpflichtung zunächst generell
ausgesetzt hat.93 Die neuen Regelungen werden daher nach wie vor nicht angewendet
(Stand: August 2019).
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seiner Entscheidung zurVorratsdatenspeicherung
grundlegende Aussagen zum Verhältnis des Grundrechtsschutzes auf EU-Ebene zum
Grundrechtsschutz nach dem Grundgesetz getroffen, die seine generelle Linie
weiterführen.94 Dabei geht es vor dem Hintergrund der Anwendbarkeit der
Grundrechte-Charta auf innerstaatliche Umsetzungsakte um die Reichweite der
Durchführung gem. Art. 51 GRCh und damit um die Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten
von BVerfG und EuGH. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht nimmt für sich in Anspruch, die
Verfassungsmäßigkeit von innerstaatlichen Rechtsnormen, mit denen Unionsrecht
umgesetzt wird, in vollem Umfang zu prüfen, soweit die Umsetzungs- und
Handlungsspielräume des deutschen Normsetzers reichen. Infolge der unmittelbaren
Anwendbarkeit von Verordnungen nach Art. 288 UAbs. 2 AEUV betrifft diese
Rechtsprechung die Richtlinien. Das innerstaatliche Gesetz oder die gesetzesgleiche
Regelung, die derUmsetzung dienen, ist an den innerstaatlichenGrundrechten zumessen.
Der Spielraum des innerstaatlichen Gesetzgebers spiegelt sich in der Anwendbarkeit des
Grundgesetzes auf dieNutzung dieses Spielraums. ImUrteil zumEuropäischenHaftbefehl
hat daher das Bundesverfassungsgericht das deutsche Gesetz, das den Rechtsakt der EU
umsetzte,95 für nichtig erklärt.96
Die Entscheidung zurVorratsdatenspeicherung führt diese Rechtsprechung fort.97 Das
Bundesverfassungsgericht hält fest:
„Mit diesem Inhalt kann die Richtlinie ohne Verstoß gegen die Grundrechte des
Grundgesetzes umgesetzt werden. Das Grundgesetz verbietet eine solche
Speicherung nicht unter allen Umständen. Vielmehr kann sie auch unabhängig
von einem etwaigen Vorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts nach den Maßgaben der
Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes zulässig angeordnet werden (s. unten IV). Eine
Prüfung der angegriffenen Vorschriften insgesamt am Maßstab der deutschen
93 OVG NRW, Beschluss vom 22.06.2017 - 13 B 238/17, in: Zeitschrift für Datenschutz (ZD) 2017, S. 485.
94 Bäcker, EuR 2011, 103 ff.
95 Es handelte sich um einen Rahmenbeschluss nach dem alten EUV; diese Rechtsaktform steht seit dem
Vertrag von Lissabon nicht mehr zur Verfügung.
96 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04, BVerfGE 113, 273 – Europäischer Haftbefehl; dazu Tomuschat, EuGRZ 2005, 453
ff; Vogel, JZ 2005, 801 ff; vgl. das Urteil des polnischen Verfassungsgerichts vom 27.4.2005, Az. P 1/05, EuR
2005, 494, in dem das polnische Umsetzungsgesetz für teilweise verfassungswidrig erklärt wurde.
97 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08, Rn. 186 f., BVerfGE 125, 260 – Vorratsdatenspeicherung.
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Grundrechte gerät damit nicht in Konflikt mit der Richtlinie 2006/24/EG, so
dass es auf deren Wirksamkeit und Vorrang nicht ankommt.”98
Die Anwendbarkeit der Grundrechte-Charta wird also nicht etwa verneint, weil es sich
um ein Gesetz auf dem Gebiet des Sicherheitsrechts handelt. Die Wahrung der Sicherheit
spielt allenfalls eine Rolle, um den Handlungsspielraum des die Richtlinie umsetzenden
Gesetzgebers zu beschreiben. Die Grundrechte-Charta ist aber nach Auffassung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts deshalb nicht anwendbar, weil es sich nicht um die
Durchführung von Unionsrecht nach Art. 51 GRCh handelt und daher die Grundrechte
des Grundgesetzes zur Anwendung gelangen.99
Diese Rechtsprechungslinie ist in den wegweisenden Grundsatzurteilen vom 6.
November 2019 zum „Recht auf Vergessen neu gezeichnet worden, insbesondere indem
das Bundesverfassungsgericht entgegen seiner vorherigen Rechtsprechung für sich in
Anspruch nimmt, in den vom Unionsrecht belassenen Spielräumen des nationalen
Gesetzgebers selbst die Grundrechte-Charta anzuwenden.100
98 BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08, Rn. 187, BVerfGE 125, 260 – Vorratsdatenspeicherung.
99 Zum Ganzen Kugelmann, in: Niedobitek (Hrsg.), Europarecht, 2. Aufl. 2019, § 4 Rn. 49 ff.
100 BVerfG Beschluss vom 6.11.2019, 1 BvR 16/13 – Recht auf Vergessen I, K&R 2020, 51; Beschluss vom




Anna Pouliou, Virginia Tzortzi and Despina Vezakidou*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
Greece adopted Law 4624/2019 to implement Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data
ProtectionRegulation, hereinafter “GDPR”).1 With this Law theGreek government replaced
the legislative framework regulating the establishment and operation of the Hellenic Data
ProtectionAuthority (hereinafter “HDPA”), adapted theGreek data protection legislation
to the GDPR and transposed Directive 2016/680/EU (“Law Enforcement Directive”,
hereinafter “LED”) into national law. Law 4624/2019 largely repeals Law 2472/1997 that
implemented Directive 95/46/EC in Greece.2
Law 4624/2019 introduces a distinction between “private” and “public” bodies as
controllers which, although not contrary to the provisions of the GDPR, is founded on a
different perception than the one of the repealed Law 2472/1997 and its interpretation,
both by courts and the HDPA.
Concerning the most notable flexibilities (opening clauses):
i. The lower age for a child’s consent in relation to information society services offered
directly to him/her has been set to 15 years. The processing of personal data of a child
under 15 requires the consent of its legal representative;3
ii. The prohibition on the processing of genetic data for health and life insurance purposes
is expressly provided for.4 This prohibition should, however, be extended to the context
of employment, while a provision on data that reveal a genetic predisposition would
be useful;
* Anna Pouliou is Privacy & Data Protection Partner at Deloitte’s Cyber Risk Advisory and a Member of the
GDPRMulti-stakeholder ExpertGroup at EuropeanCommission (Business EuropeRepresentative). Virginia
Tzortzi is Assistant Professor of EULaw,Department of Law,DemocritusUniversity of Thrace and Secretary
of the CIEEL Board of Directors. Despina Vezakidou is TMT and Privacy Lawyer.
1 Greek Law 4624/2019 was published in Government Gazette No A’ 137/29.8.2019. Note that the law was
heavily criticized by the HDPA in its Opinion No. 1/2020.
2 Art. 84 Law 4624/2019.
3 Art. 21 Law 4624/2019 - art. 8 GDPR.
4 Art. 23 Law 4624/2019 - art. 9(4) GDPR.
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iii. With regard to the processing in the context of employment, the notion of employees
includes employees both in the public and private sectors, jobseekers and former
employees.5 Law 4624/2019 maintains consent as a basis for legitimate processing,
despite the HDPA’s serious concerns about the validity of employees’ consent in the
context of employment. This consent could be conceived only in processing that is not
directly related to the employment contract, but is intended only to provide employees
with benefits, e.g. participation in a group insurance contract or in a share disposal
plan. In principle, the consent should be given in writing, electronic means included.
However, oral consent is not precluded. The employer must inform the employee of
her right to withdraw her consent;
iv. The processing of personal data for the purposes of exercising freedom of expression,
including academic freedom, is permitted when the data subject has given her explicit
consent, or when the processing concerns personal data which have been publicly
disclosed by the data subject, is about issues of general interest or concerns personal
data of public persons and is limited to the extent necessary.6 Under the Law 4624/2019
the freedom of the press takes precedence over the right to data protection, in the form
of the non-application of the rights of the data subject, e.g. the right to erasure.7
In Greece, the HDPA is a constitutively appointed Administrative Authority. Article 4(c)
Law 4624/2019 reiterates the definitions of article 4 GDPR and confirms the role of HDPA
as a supervisory authority. The HDPA is competent to supervise the application of the
GDPR, Law 4624/2019 and any regulation concerning the protection of the individual
against the processing of personal data.8
Question 2
The Constitutional review of 2001 in Greece brought significant improvements to the
strengthening and protection of fundamental rights. Particular attention should be paid
to the explicit protection of personal data as provided for under article 9A of the
Constitution.9
Article 9A, belonging to the new generation of “e-rights”, focuses on electronic data
processing, but also covers non-automated, conventional processing by traditionalmeans.
5 Art. 27(2) Law 4624/2019 - art. 88 GDPR.
6 Art. 28 Law 4624/2019 - art. 85 GDPR.
7 See Opinion no. 1/2020 of the HDPA.
8 Arts 9 and 13(1)(a) Law 4624/2019.
9 J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, General theory of fundamental rights [in Greek], Athens, Sakkoulas Eds, 2018, pp.
11-12.
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It is a defensive right. The protection of individuals is safeguarded towards both the State
and individuals.10 However, the right is not absolute. It is subject to restrictions, based on
the principle of non-discrimination (under article 25§1 Constitution), the principle of the
overriding public interest (under article 8§2 ECHR)and article 52§1 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”). Subjects of the right
of article 9A are nationals as well as non-nationals in Greece. The right is granted only to
individuals.
Under the Greek Constitution the right to protection of personal data of article 9A is
not identical to the right to private and family life of article 9.11 The Constitution also
differentiates between article 9A and article 19, which ensures the secrecy of letters and
all other forms of free correspondence or communication in any printed, verbal or electronic
form. Limitation on the right is imposed by a judgment opposing its protection, for example,
in cases provided for in the Penal Code, where the lift of secrecy is necessary due to
necessity, proportionality or best interests.
Moreover, the Greek Constitution provides for separate, constitutionally independent
administrative authorities that protect the differentiated legal rights conferred by articles
9A and 19.
The Charter should be taken into account in the interpretation of article 9A.12 The
right to data protection under article 8 of the Charter, entailing the key data protection
principles associated with this fundamental right by explicitly mentioning consent, right
of access and rectification, enjoys broader protection in relation to the right of article 9A
of the Greek Constitution.13 The only reference so far to article 8 of the Charter by the
HDPA is in Opinion no. 4/2011 as to whether the Ministry of Finance may publicise on
the internet the names of the persons with mature debts to the State on the basis of article
9 of Law 3943/2011 concerning combating tax evasion, where the HDPA took the view
that such measure does not violate art. 8 Charter.14 Under article 10(5) of Law 4624/2019,
the HDPA is not competent to review personal data processing operations of the judicial
and prosecutorial authorities in the context of their judicial function. However, the
designation of another supervisory authority, consisting of judges, which would be
responsible for the processing operations of the courts is not provided for. The resulting
gap is held to be in breach of article 8(3) of the Charter.15
10 Judgment no. 1616/2012 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
11 On the differentiated nature of the rights in article 9 and 9A see, among many, E. Papakonstantinou,Dikaio
Pliroforikis,Athens, Sakkoulas Eds, 2010, p. 34.
12 Opinion no. 1/2009 of the HDPA, p. 5
13 Iliopoulos-Strangas, 2018, p. 696.
14 See Opinion no. 4/2011 of the HDPA, paras 1, 9, 1, 2.
15 See F.Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi, ‘Law 4624/2019 and implementation of the GDPR: very promising, but
delayed’ [in Greek], Syntagmawatch, 9 September 2019, www.syntagmawatch.gr/trending-issues/nomos-
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B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Any processing of personal data should be lawful and fair according to the provisions of
theGDPR.16 In otherwords, lawful data processing should be fair otherwise data processing
will not meet the GDPR requirements.
“Fairness” is a term with several dimensions, not only legal but also ethical and
philosophical.17 In general, as defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary “fair” as an
adjective means something that is marked by impartiality and honesty: free from
self-interest, prejudice, or favoritism.18
“Fairness” has not been interpreted in a specific way by Greek courts especially in the
context of data protection. Thus, data controllers have interpreted and applied the principle
of “fair processing” in combination with the “lawfulness” and “transparency” principle as
an unseparated bunch of fundamental principles regarding data processing.
Although theHellenicDPA refers to “fair”processing quite often in numerousDecisions
and Opinions, it has not defined in a specific way the meaning of “fair” processing by
setting, for example, criteria of “fairness” or providing concrete examples whereby
processing is considered as “fair”.19
Choosing the right legal basis according to article 6 GDPR is closely linked to the
principle of fair processing as well as with the purpose imitation principle. The controller
must not only select the appropriate legal basis prior to processing and substantiate this
option in accordance with the accountability principle, but he also must inform the data
subject according to articles 13(1)(c) and 14(1)(c) GDPR, as the choice of any legal base
has legal effect on the exercise of the rights of the data subjects.20
4624-2019-kai-efarmogi-gdpr-polla-yposchomenos-alla-parallila-kathysterimenos/. All webpages referred
to were visited 15 September 2019.
16 Recital 39 GDPR.
17 See for an analysis of the GDPR from an ethics perspective: V. Papakonstantinou, “What is “fair” in “fair
and lawful” processing of personal data? “, http://www.papakonstantinou.me/blog-posts/what-is-fair-in-
fair-and-lawful-processing-of-personal-data/.
18 See: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fair.
19 See: UK ICO checklist in relation to fair processing that is used more widely by stakeholders also outside
the UK including Greece. “Fairness: We have considered how the processing may affect the individuals
concerned and can justify any adverse impact.-We only handle people’s data in ways they would reasonably
expect, or we can explain why any unexpected processing is justified.-We do not deceive or mislead people
when we collect their personal data”, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-
to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/principles/lawfulness-fairness-and-transparency/.
20 DPA Decision 26/2019.
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In accordance with article 5(1) GDPR the personal data should be adequate, relevant
and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed (purpose
limitation).21 This requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for which the personal
data are stored is limited to a strictminimum.Moreover, personal data should be processed
only if the purpose of the processing could not be reasonably fulfilled by other means.22
In order to ensure that personal data are not kept longer than necessary, time limits
for erasure or for a periodic review should be established by the controller.
The Hellenic DPA decided in numerous cases that for personal data to be processed
lawfully and fairly, all the conditions with regard to the application of and compliance
with the principles set out in article 5(1) GDPR should be met.
Furthermore, under the principle of accountability, the controller should implement
all the necessary measures to comply with the principles set out in Article 5(1) GDPR and
demonstrate their effectiveness.23
Question 4
The Greek courts have found that consent does not suffice for the processing to be
legitimate, if the processing is carried out in breach of the principles that should govern
the legitimate collection and processing of data.24 Standard terms in contracts that are not
negotiable are not sufficient to demonstrate that consent was given.25
In the employment context, the Greek courts have held that an employment contract
does not obviate the lack of consent, since the processing without consent was carried out
for a purpose not necessarily related to the performance of the employment contract.26
The employer was under an obligation to seek consent of his/her employee-opposing party
for the use of the latter’s personal data in the trial, but he was required to inform him/her
of their impending use.27 In the same vein, it was considered that the disclosure by the
employer to a third party of the amount of the compensation, received by the employee
in the case of dismissal, requires a prior notification to the employee.28
Furthermore, the Greek courts condemn the practices followed by the banking sector.
In particular, it has been decided that the processing of adverse financial data by banks
21 DPA Decision, among many, 16/2019.
22 Recital 39 GDPR.
23 DPA Decision, among many, 26/2019.
24 See art. 4(1) Law 2472/1997 and judgments nos. 2285/2001, 749/2005, 2254/2005 and 2255/2005 of the
Council of State.
25 Judgment no. 147/2004 of the Athens Court of Appeal; judgment no. 5825/2019 of the Athens Court of
First Instance.
26 Judgments nos 94 and 95/2003 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
27 Judgment no. 7/2007 of the Corinth Court of First Instance.
28 Judgment no. 87/2013 of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal.
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without consent and, in particular, the transfer of personal data from a bank to a lawyer29
or to debt collecting companies,30 is unlawful. In addition, a fixed telephone and internet
service provider was condemned as it repeatedly contacted an individual in order to
promote its products, despite the explicit opposition of the individual, which had been
expressed in various ways.31 The statements contained in the insurance contracts constitute
consent to the processing of health data related to the coverage of particular insurance
risk.32 The taking of photoswith the consent of the depicted individual and their subsequent
posting by her on the internet does not constitute consent for displaying the photos on
the TV news,33 while the data subject’s consent to the processing of personal data that have
been posted on Facebook, was deemed indispensable.34
With regard to legitimate interests as a basis for lawful processing, the Greek courts
have ruled that the processing is permitted, without consent, only if it is carried out for
the purpose it seeks to fulfill, and not for any other purpose, for which the consent has not
been requested.35 The legitimate interest is required to obviously override the rights of the
data subject, up to the point where the fundamental freedoms are not affected.36 Thus, the
elements comprising the financial behavior of an individual, resulting in her insolvency,
are amongst the personal data whose processing is allowed even without consent of the
data subject, if the processing is indeed necessary to satisfy the legitimate interest of specific
recipients, such as banks.37 However, checking bank account activity, which is necessarily
used for payroll of the employee-user of the system, in order disciplinary control to be
exercised on her, is not legitimate, irrespective of whether it is necessary for the performance
of the employment contract or to satisfy the legitimate interests of the bank.38
Question 5
The use of personal data in exchange for the provision of digital content or services has
received attention in theGreek legal literature for three reasons: 1) because of the discussion
at a global level around the risks of the use of social media following various failures of
29 Judgment no. 168/2018 of the Thessaloniki District Court.
30 Judgments nos 1319/2019 and 5825/2019 of the Athens Court of First Instance; judgments nos 437/2014
and 2887/2010 of the Athens Court of Appeal.
31 Judgment no. 629/2017 of the Heraklion Court of First Instance.
32 Judgment no. 292/2019 of the Symvoulio Epikrateias.
33 Judgment no. 5336/2015 of the Athens Court of Appeal.
34 Judgment no. 346/2015 of the Larissa Court of Appeal.
35 Judgments nos. 94/2003, 3908/2004, 2254 and 2255/2005, 3775/2012 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
36 Judgment no.1988/2002 of the Athens Court of First Instance; judgment no. 2950/2002 of the Thessaloniki
Court of First Instance; judgment no. 3833/2003 of the Athens Court of Appeal.
37 Judgment no. 2965/2017 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
38 Judgment no. 3908/2004 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
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tech giants to ensure appropriate protection that have made it into the press in the past
few years, 2) because of the discussions related to the proposed “Directive on certain aspects
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content” at European level that have been
taking place since 2015, and 3) because of the overall discussion about the protection of
consumer rights and the proposal of the European Commission of the “New Deal for
Consumers” on 11 April 2018 with proposed measures for the enforcement of the rights
of consumers on the internet that the Greek civil society for consumer rights has been
participating in.
The Greek privacy legal community has been following all these issues with great
interest and many articles have been in the Greek press and in legal magazines39 with
opinions of Commissioner Jourova and other officials as well the late European Data
Protection Supervisor Buttarelli who referred to the intersection of privacy and the proposed
Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of
consumers.40
One particular element that has received some debate by privacy professionals as well
as the wider press in Greece is the use of personal data, and often times sensitive personal
data, of children in particular as they are more vulnerable at the idea of obtaining digital
content without realising the risks of “paying” for it with their personal data. This is
particularly true as the average age of children that are exposed to the risks and benefits
of the internet has already reached the age of 4 almost a decade ago according to OECD
data.41
Therefore, while no supervisory authority decision and no jurisprudence is available
yet in Greece on the issue of the conditions and the validity of the provision of personal
data as counter-performance in exchange for digital content, the topic has been on public
debate for a few years now. While there is awareness of the risks, there is also the
understanding of the benefits of technology when safeguards are in place. “The idea that
technology often forces us to cease being the owners of our data […] should lead us to the
use of technology with awareness of our involvement and to the selection of those services





41 OECD (2011-05-02), “The Protection of Children Online: Risks Faced by Children Online and Policies to
Protect Them”, OECDDigital EconomyPapers, No. 179, OECDPublishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/
20716826.
42 S. Tassis, ‘Privacy in exchange for the development of technological innovation’, Law of Information &




Law 4624/2019 has not made use of article 22(2)(b) GDPR and has not introduced any
legislative measures in deviation of article 22(1) GDPR. This is perhaps not surprising as
there has not been relevant national legislation in the pre-GDPR era in Greece and –
presumably- the issue was not raised by stakeholders in the consultation process of Law
4624/2019.
Question 7
TheGreek legislation on the protection of personal data does not explicitly refer to “a right
to be forgotten”. It was nevertheless enshrined in article 4(1)(d) and article 2 of Law
2472/1997 (which implemented Directive 95/46/EC) by providing for the erasure of the
data that were not necessary for the fulfillment of a processing purpose. It was further
established under article 13 of Law 2472/1997, referring to the right of the data subject to
object to the processing of the data concerning her. A right to erasure is now enshrined
in article 34 of the Law 4624/2019.
Google has refused the erasure of links from search results based on the applicants’
names.Nevertheless, in caseswhereGoogle accepts the request to erase the links in question,
the latter must be removed from both “google.gr” and “google.com” concerning access
from Greece. However, this does not cover the erasure of links when the search takes place
outside of Greece. Therefore, the right to erasure is only partially satisfied.43
The HDPA has established, as an expression of the principle of proportionality, the
need to limit the retention time of adverse financial data (downgrading, availability,
dismissal) as well as the limitation of the wide dissemination of adverse acts, both online
and offline.44
The HDPA essentially confirms the approach that Article 17 GDPR relates to a right
to erasure and not to a right to be forgotten. In actions brought against Google, the HDPA
acknowledged a conditional erasure from the search engine results (delisting), but not
from the source of the information.
Furthermore, the HDPA makes a distinction between personal data and defamatory
value judgment,45 while it renders its rulings only on the basis of specific allegations.46
Thus, there is a tendency of self-restraint in dealing only with the violation of personal
data. The practice followed by the HDPA is that if the claimant invokes in her claim an
43 Decisions nos. 83, 84, 86/2016 and 74/2018 of the HDPA.
44 Cf. Decision no. 62/2004 and Opinions no. 1/2010 and 2/2011 of the HDPA.
45 See, among many, G/S/691/3.2.2014 of the HDPA.
46 Decision no. 84/2016 of the HDPA.
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offense against her personality, the DPA rejects her claim as this allegation is being
examined by the competent courts.47 In any case, theHDPA stresses that it is first necessary
to submit a request to the controller before submitting a complaint to the HDPA.
The Greek courts seem to move towards the same direction. Regarding, for example,
the distinction between personal data and defamation value judgments they have held that
the disclosure of the score of each student on the notice boards of each school […] cannot
abolish the personal character of the data, protected under Law 2472/1997.48 Recently, the
Symvoulio Epikrateias (Greek Court of State) has confirmed that when the personal data
are communicated to third parties, the data subject should be previously informed in order
to exercise the right of objection.49
Question 8
As stated in answer 1 above, the Hellenic Republic has recently enacted national legislation
to implement the GDPR. Pursuant to Article 85(2) GDPR, according to which Member
States are allowed to legislate to reconcile the right to data protection with the right to
freedom of expression, the Greek Law 4624/2019 in its Article 28 under the title “Data
processing and freedom of expression and information” sets the requirements for lawful
processing:50
To the extent necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data
with the right to freedom of expression and information, including for
journalistic purposes, and for academic, artistic or literary purposes, the
processing of personal data shall be permitted where:
(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent; (b) relates to personal data
which has been made publicly available by the subject himself (c) outweighs
the right to freedomof expression and the right to information over the subject’s
right to the protection of personal data, in particular on matters of general
interest or when it concerns personal data of public persons; and (d) limited
to the extent necessary to secure freedom of expression and the right to
information, in particular when it relates to specific categories of personal data
as well as criminal proceedings, convictions and related security measures;
having regard to the right of the subject to private and family life.
47 Decision no.86/2010 and Proceedings 28/6/2016 of the HDPA. See also the Annual Report 2012 of the
HDPA, Ch. 3.12.3.
48 Judgment no. 4796/2013 of the Thessaloniki Administrative Court of First Instance.
49 Judgment no. 1817/2018 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
50 Recital 152 GDPR.
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The following paragraph (2) allows exceptions to the right to data protection in the context
of the processing of personal data for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes
where the following shall not apply:
(a) Chapter II of the GDPR “Principles” except article 5; (b) Chapter III of the
GDPR “Data Subjects Rights”; (c) Chapter IV of the GDPR” Data Controller
and Data Processor”, except articles 28, 29 and 32; (d) Chapter V of the GDPR
“Transfers of PersonalData to ThirdCountries or InternationalOrganizations”;
(e) ChapterVI of theGDPR “Independent SupervisoryAuthorities”; (f) Chapter
VII of theGDPR “Cooperation and coherence; and (g) Chapter IX of theGDPR
“Provisions relating to special cases of processing.
In general, the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes
should be compatible with the freedom of expression and information. Articles 5(1) and
9(1), read in conjunction with Article 2(1) of the Greek Constitution, establish the
protection of human value, as this derives from the right to personality, as well as the right
to the protection of personal data in Article 9A of the Greek Constitution.
The Constitution further stipulates the right of the press to inform the public and the
corresponding claim of citizens to information, in accordance with its Article 14 (1)
(freedom of expression, right to information). Pursuant to Article 5A of the Constitution,
the right to be informed is necessary to enable everyone to participate in the social,
economic and political life of the country.
According to the Hellenic DPA:
The Constitution does not imply in abstracto the prevalence of one right over
another. In other words, the scope of conflicting rights must be defined in a
concrete manner, in accordance with the principles of ad hoc balancing of
opposing interests and practical harmony and proportional balancing, applying
the principle of proportionality which is constitutionally enshrined in Article
25 (1) in such away that protected rights (freedomof information and citizens’
right to information - Articles 14 (1) and 5A - and the right to privacy and the
right to self-determination) maintain their regulatory scope. The judgment as
to whether a specific processing was lawfully exercised or, on the contrary,
whether it violated the right to information and the privacy affected, is so
dependent on the criterion of whether that processing served the interest of
the public which prevailed in the specific case of the right to privacy and to
what extent the infringementwaswithin the proportionality principle necessary
for the exercise of the right to information. The principle of balancing is
accepted by the Greek courts and the European Court of Human Rights
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(hereinafter “ECtHR”). According to this principle, the media have, pursuant
to article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter
“ECHR”), and as validated byGreek Law 53/1974, the duty to inform the public
of matters of public interest and respectively the public has the right to be
informed of matters and cases of general interest. Especially when it comes to
public life or issues of public interest, the need to inform the public is greater.
For this reason, the ECtHR recognizes the role of journalists as “public
watchdogs” […] Public officials cannot escape journalistic scrutiny and criticism
in order to ensure that public opinionmeets their public duties and the purpose
of their mission.51
The Hellenic DPA has issued many Decisions on the conflict between the right to data
protection (article 9A of the Greek Constitution) and the freedom of the press (article
14(1) and (2) of the Constitution) and the right to information (article 5A of the
Constitution). In Decision 41/2017 the DPA ruled that publishing excerpts of letters
concerning a judge’s love life on a web site and reproducing it on web pages and in print
and electronic newspapers is against data protection Law 2472/1997.52 The Hellenic DPA
also prohibited a reporter and the television station frombroadcasting transcript containing
illegally processed personal data.53
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The second subparagraph of article 9A of the Greek Constitution provides that the
protection of personal data is ensured by an independent authority, which is constituted
and operates as specified by law. The relevant public authority in Greece is the HDPA, a
constitutionally consolidated independent Authority,54 under the Ministry of Justice,
Transparency and Human Rights.
The HDPA was established by Law 2472/1997, which transposed into the Greek law
theDirective 95/46/EC.ThePresident of theHDPA isKonstantinosMenoudakos,Honorary
President of the Symvoulio Epikrateias.
51 www.dpa.gr/portal/page?_pageid=33,23093&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL#2.
52 See also Decisions nos. 100/2000, 24/2005, 25/2005, 26/2007, 165/2012, 16/2015, 17/2015 of the HDPA.
53 Decision no. 38/2005 of the HDPA.
54 On independence of the HDPA see judgments nos. 2279/2001 and 96/2003 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
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Law 4624/2019 defines, in detailed provisions, the function, the powers and the
composition of theHDPA,while the right to bring an action for annulment of its decisions
before the Symvoulio Epikrateias is also provided.
The HDPA consists of the President, the Deputy President and 6 members (and their
Alternates) who are appointed for a six-year term that cannot be renewed, in contradiction
towhat was provided for by Law 2472/1997 (four-year termwhich could be renewed once).
Members of the HDPA are senior state officials. The President, the Vice President or a
permanent member of the Authority should be a Supreme Judge in order to avoid the risk
of issuing acts that do not meet legal guarantees.
The election and appointment of the President and the members of the HDPA shall
be made in accordance with Article 101A of the Greek Constitution. In particular, the
members of DPA enjoy personal and functional independence.55 Their selection is made
by the Conference of the Presidents of the Parliament,56 by a four-fifths majority of its
members.57
The President and members of the HDPA are under a duty of confidentiality. Specific
restrictions on the professional activity of members of the HDPA are introduced for a
period of two years after the expiry of their term of office to ensure their independence
and impartiality.58 With a view to enhancing its flexibility, the possibility of the HDPA
also acting as a unilateral body is further established.59
Apart from the tasks under article 57 GDPR, the HDPA may issue guidelines and
recommendations and provide its Opinion on any provision, concerning the personal data
protection, to be included in law.60 The submission of a report of the HDPA’s activity to
the President of the Parliament and the Prime Minister is also provided for.61
In addition to the powers provided for under article 58 GDPR, the HDPA has access
to any data and personal information, can impose sanctions and issue regulatory
administrative acts to regulate specific, technical and detailed matters. Furthermore, the
President of HDPA may issue a provisional order where necessary for the restriction of
the processing.62
The HDPA has issued the first Decisions in accordance with the provisions of the
GDPR. In particular, the HDPA reprimanded a controller for unlawful processing of
personal data in order to send promotional messages via the Viber application.63 Also, the
55 Art. 11 Law 4624/2019 - arts 52, 53 and 54 GDPR.
56 The composition of this body is determined by art. 13(1) of the Parliament‘s Rules of Procedure.
57 Iliopoulos-Strangas, 2018, pp. 180-181.
58 Art. 16 Law 4624/2019 - art. 54 GDPR.
59 Art. 17 Law 4624/2019.
60 Art. 13 Law 4624/2019.
61 Art. 14 Law 4624/2019 - art. 59 GDPR.
62 Art. 15 Law 4624/2019.
63 Decision no. 66/2018 of the HDPA.
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HDPA reprimanded a controller for violating article 32 GDPR with regard to the security
of the processing -and, by extension, Article 5(1)(f) GDPR- because the company had not
updated the software and lacked adequate systems to detect security attacks or procedures
for the regular assessment of safety measures.64 The HDPA, furthermore, reprimanded
banks for failing to notify a personal data breach in a timely manner.65
The HDPA recently imposed a fine in three cases. The first one concerned a European
MEP candidate for unsolicited political communication, following a lawyer‘s complaint
that the candidate used data from websites managed by the Bar Associations and the
Plenary of the Bar Associations.66 The second one related to the Price Waterhouse Coopers
company for non-cumulative compliance with the terms concerning the application and
compliance with principles under Article 5(1)(a-c) GDPR67 and the last one the Aegean
Marine Petroleum Network Inc for unlawful access and coping of all the server content,
including personal data shared by both the above company and other companies in the
same group as well as employees of companies outside the group.68
Question 10
TheHellenicDPA adopts a “selective to be effective” approach to complaints. Under article
57(1)(f) GDPR, the extent to which every complaint is examined depends on the HDPA.
Before the submission of a complaint, the entitled individuals must appeal to the controller
or theDPO, if appointed. Only in case the issue is not resolved, the individualsmay submit
a complaint to theHDPA. In case the aforementioned procedure is not followed, theHDPA
might not examine the complaint. Complaints that are vague, unsubstantiated, submitted
abusively, especially due to a repetitive pattern, or filed anonymously may be deemed
inadmissible (archived) by the HDPA. Moreover, the order of priority in the examining
of complaints is assessed by the HDPA on the basis of the importance and general interest
of the subject matter in question.69 Nevertheless, an act of the HDPA stating the
unlawfulness of the processing of personal data is not legitimate, unless it is preceded by
a hearing.70
The Constitution of Greece recognizes the HDPA as an independent administrative
authority, responsible for ensuring the protection of personal data. The delegation of
powers referred to in the Constitution is not subject to restrictions. Its specific case-by-case
64 Decision no. 67/2018 of the HDPA.
65 Decisions nos. 68 and 69/2018 of the HDPA.
66 Decision no. 19/2019 of the HDPA.
67 Decision no. 26/2019 of the HDPA.
68 Decision no. 44/2019 of the HDPA.
69 Art. 13(2) Law 4624/2019 - art. 57 GDPR.
70 Judgment no. 96/2003 of Symvoulio Epikrateias.
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powers and the specific circumstances of monitoring may, nevertheless, be limited by law.
However, the general withdrawal by law of its competence to monitor any personal data
processing, which is carried out in Greece, is not constitutionally allowed.71
A limitation of the competences of the HDPA was set by the provisions introduced in
Article 3(2) of Law 2472/1997 by article 8 of Law 3625/200772 and article 12(1) of Law
3783/2009. These amendments exempted from the application of Law 2472/1997 and from
themonitoring byHDPA the processing carried out by judicial and prosecuting authorities.
The HDPA is still not competent to monitor the processing which is carried out by courts
and prosecuting authorities in the context of their jurisdictional competence.73
Finally, the competences of theHDPAare limited in relation to the broadcastingmedia,
for which it shares competence with the National Council for Radio and Television
(NCRTV) in the case of collecting and retaining personal data by automated means or
archive. In particular, in cases concerning the same or substantially the same facts, if one
of the two competent authorities has rendered a decision on the merits, the other cannot
deal with the case and possibly impose sanctions.74
Question 11
The Hellenic DPA has frequently been issuing warnings and even “strict” warnings in the
pre-GDPR era. In more severe cases, fines were being issued.
Law 4624/19 has been adopted with a delay, only a few days before the completion of
this report, coming into force on 29August 2019. Therefore, theGreek supervisory authority
has been applying the GDPR sanctions directly in the meantime.
In its recent Decision 26/2019 the Hellenic DPA issued the corrective measures of
article 58(2)(d) (order to bring processing operations into compliance) and a fine of EUR
150,000 pursuant to article 83 to PriceWaterhouse Coopers for violations of article 5(1)(a),
(b), (c) and 6(1) of Regulation 2016/679. Prior to that, minor fines were being issued by
the supervisory authority, an example being Decision 13/2019 to a medical center
performing unsolicited calls with -inter alia- no transparency according to article 14GDPR
regarding the identity of the caller and their contact details.
71 Opinion no. 1/2009 of the HDPA.
72 The Law 3625/2007 was issued after the Prosecutor of Areios Pagos (Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of
Greece) issued Opinion 14/2007 on the use of cameras and other technical means by the police authorities
at gatherings and in particular before, during or after the termination of protests.
73 Art. 10(5) Law 4624/2019. On the constitutionality of these provisions see L. Mitrou, The General Data
Protection Regulation, Athens, Sakkoulas Eds, 2017, p. 149.
74 Decision no. 122/12 of the HDPA.
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The Hellenic DPA has similarly used the reprimand of article 58(2)(b) in some cases:
to the Public Power Company for violations of article 12(3) and (4) of the GDPR in its
Decision 15/2019 and to a physical person for violations of article 13(3) inDecision 16/2019.
Law 4624/19 introduces additional penalties in accordance with article 84 GDPR, and
in particular criminal sanctions, in its article 38:
1. Up to one year of imprisonment, if not more severely foreseen, to anyone who
illegitimately a) interferes in the filing of personal data to get access to it b) copies,
removes, alters, damages collects, registers, organises, corrects, stores, adapts changes,
damages, recovers, searches information, relates, combines, restricts, deletes or destroys
the data.
2. Imprisonment, if not more severely foreseen, for anyone who uses, disseminates,
discloses by transferring, disposes, announces or renders accessible personal data that
he obtained by interfering with its filing or allows persons not entitled to be informed
of the data.
3. Imprisonment of at least one year and a penalty of 100,000 euro, if not more severely
foreseen, if the acts under 2 above concern the special categories of personal data of
article 9 (1) GDPR or data regarding the criminal convictions and offences or related
security measures of article 10 GDPR.
4. Prison sentence up to ten (10) years in any of the above cases if the person responsible
for these acts had the intention to create an illegal profit for himself or another person
or material damage or harm to another person and the total profit or total damage
incurred exceeds the amount of 120,000 euro.
5. Prison sentence and penalty of up to 300,000 euro if there was danger to the free
functioning of the democracy or national security.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that the Greek law, made use of article 83(7) GDPR
to introduce administrative fines to be imposed on public authorities and bodies in its
article 39. The Hellenic DPA can impose an administrative fine of up to 10,000,000 euro
to public sector entities (as these are defined in article 39(1) of the Law) in their capacity
as controllers for the following infringements:
1. Article 83 (4) (a) (except for articles 8, 27, 29, 42, 43) GDPR,
2. Article 83 (5) and (6) (except for articles 17, 20, 47, 90 and 91) GDPR
3. Article 5, 6, 7, 22, 24, 26, 27 (except for paragraph 7), 28 to 31, 32 (1) (a), 33 to 35 of
the Law.
Regarding the calculation of such fine, the Law incorporates the following GDPR clauses:




The Greek legislation has historically awarded damages for intangible harm in several
areas, such as in Civil or Criminal Law.
More specifically, the Civil Code (articles 57, 59 and 932) sets the requirements for
awarding damages for intangible harm in the event of unlawful abuse of personality
(personality right) and determines what a reasonable compensation is.According to these
provisions, compensation consists either of paying a sum of money, making a corrective
post in the media or whatever is required in the circumstances of each individual case.75
Moreover, the Greek courts have held that fault or negligence are prerequisites for such
compensation although this is disputed by legal scholars.
In the context of data protection, the Greek legal system regards the protection of
personal data as a constitutional right deriving from the protection of personality as detailed
under answer 2 above. The national Courts and the DPA respectively adopt and apply the
fundamental principle of “proportionality”, as laid down in article 25(1)(d) of the Greek
Constitution, when determining the amount of compensation including damages for
intangible harm to the data subjects. Adjusting this principle in the field of data protection,
the type, the severity and the size of the penalties and fines should correspond to the gravity
of the infringement in each case.
TheGreek legal systemon the protection of personal data explicitly referred to intangible
harm. Previous Greek Law 2472/1997, article (23)(2) provided for compensation for
personal data breaches and set a minimum amount of compensation for intangible harm
to 5,869.40 euro. Moreover, the award for intangible harm was irrespective of any material
harm. As it was ruled by the Greek Courts, this specific provision of Law 2472/1997
regarding a minimum amount of compensation is unconstitutional as it is opposed to the
fundamental principle of proportionality.76 Admittedly, after the entry into force of
Regulation 2016/679, the above provision of article 23 no longer applies, since civil liability
is now regulated by article 82GDPRwhich does not provide for the authority of the national
legislator to regulate the issue of compensation at national level.
GreekCourts have adopted the following criteria to calculate a reasonable compensation
for intangible harm caused by infringements of the data protection legislation taking into
account the following factors:
– The nature of the legally protected rights affected
– The extent of the infringement
– The circumstances of the data breach in each case
75 E. Alexandropoulou - Egyptiadou, Personal Data (in Greek), Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2016, pp. 187-191.
76 Thessaloniki Court of Appeal 733/2009, DIMEE 2009/614), Prof. L. Mitrou, p. 519.
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– The degree of liability and
– The social and financial status of the parties
For example, the Supreme Court awarded damages of 15,000 euro for intangible harm
caused by the illegal transmission of medical data (ultrasound) from a diagnostic center
to an insurance company.77
Question 13
The Hellenic Republic has recently introduced legislative measures to facilitate
representative actions in accordance with the provisions of article 80 GDPR.
More specifically, pursuant to article 41 of the new Law, under the title “Representation
of data subjects”, where the data subjects consider that the processing of their personal
data infringes the provisions of the GDPR or Chapter C of the Law respectively, they have
the right to mandate a non-profit body, organization or association to lodge a complaint
and to exercise the rights referred to in articles 77 and 78 GDPR and article 2078 of the Law
on their behalf.
While there are several NGOs in Greece either active in the field of human rights and
freedoms in the digital era including the right to privacy or focusing on the protection of
internet users, none of them has undertaken a more specific role in data protection
enforcement yet.79
By the time this report is filed, there are no other alternative movements in Greece
such as personal data cooperatives or unions which are constituted in accordance with the
Greek Law, have statutory objectives which are in the public interest and are active in the
field of the protection of personal data to mitigate information or power asymmetries
between data controllers and data subjects in particular in the online environment.
Greek consumer associations and civil society in general have showed interest in aspects
of data protection, including the relevant risks on the internet and the “New Deal for
Consumers”, as mentioned under answer 5 above, that will introduce consumer class
actions. That interest however has not been concretised in specific legal actions in the data
protection field so far.
77 Supreme Court 2100/2009 (Areios Pagos), NoB 58 (2010), 1222.
78 Art. 20 refers to the right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority.





The HDPA cooperates with other regulators. In Greece, the independent administrative
authorities for the protection of communications are, apart from the HDPA, the Hellenic
Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (hereinafter “ADAE”) and theHellenic
Telecommunications and Post Commission (hereinafter “EETT”).
In particular, the ADAE has been established under Law 3115/2003 and according to
Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the confidentiality of letters and
free correspondence or communication in any possible way.80
The HDPA and the ADAE issue a joint Act which specifies all matters related to the
procedure and the implementation of the provisions of article 7 Law 3917/2011 regarding
the obligations of electronic communications service providers or public communications
networks with respect to the protection and security of retained data, as defined in the
aforementioned law. Further, the HDPA and the ADAE issue a joint Act which provides
instructions to communication service providers with regard to the notification of personal
data breaches, the template of the notifications and the manner that the notifications
should take place, pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of Law 4070/2012.
Apart from the constitutionally provided HDPA and ADAE, a large number of
independent authorities are also provided for by law. Among them is the EETT, an
independent administrative authority, having a general competence for telecommunications.
The EETT supervises and regulates the telecommunications market and the market for
postal services, including the internet. The relationship between the competences of the
three authorities is determined by Law 3471/2006.
In addition, the HDPA cooperates on a regular basis with the Hellenic Consumers’
Ombudsman. In the context of the above cooperation, theHDPA recently issuedDecision
48/2018, which concerns the protection of consumerswho use cards of intact transactions,
concluding that the data sent by a MasterCard card via its intact operation is not only the
card number and expiration date, but also other non-encrypted data about recent card
movements (date of movements and the corresponding amounts). On these grounds, the
HDPA has asked credit institutions, which are the issuers of problematic cards, to carry
out, as processors, a series of actions.81
Finally, the HDPA cooperates with the National Council for Radio and Television
(NCRTV), a Greek independent administrative authority that supervises and regulates
the radio/televisionmarket, founded in 1989. TheHDPAand theNCRTVshare competence
80 Art. 1 Law 3115/2003.
81 Annual report of the HDPA, 2018, pp. 162 seq.
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in the case of the collection and retaining of personal data (audio, image, text) by automated
means or archive, and the ne bis in idem principle is applicable.82
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The notion of “national security” is to be found in article 19 of the Greek Constitution that
establishes the right to the protection of the confidentiality of any type of communication.
Article 19 foresees that the law sets the guarantees under which the judicial authorities are
not bound by this confidentiality for reasons of national security or for the determination
of particularly serious crimes.
The procedure for the legal lifting of this confidentiality was indeed set out in detail in
Law 2225/1994. Other applicable laws are 3115/2003 (establishing the ADAE analysed
under question 14), 3674/2008 (strengthening the institutional framework for ensuring
the confidentiality of communications), 3917/2011 (implementing Directive 2006/24),
3471/2006 (implementing Directive 2002/58) and Presidential Decree 47/2005 (on
procedures and technical and organisational guarantees for the lifting of the confidentiality
of communications).
“Furthermore, the constitutional protection of the confidentiality of
communications is completed with the adoption of criminal sanctions against
infringers with article 370A of the Criminal Code. From these provisions it is
derived that the protection of the confidentiality of correspondence and free
connection and communication by any means is absolutely guaranteed not
only against public bodies and companies but also against private ones”.83
By “national security” we mean the protection of a country as a whole, its territorial
integrity, and political independence from foreign powers. Despite the above mentioned
robust protection framework, the term is very generic and vague and might be applied in
an abusive manner.
Article 3 of Law 2225/1994 foresees the lifting of confidentiality upon request of the
public authority in charge of the national security matter to the prosecutor of the Court
of Appeals who will decide within 24 hours.
82 Decisions nos. 122/2012 and 140/12 of the HDPA. See also: DIMEE 4/2012, pp. 583 seq.
83 Decision 1/2017 of the Supreme Court of Greece (Areios Pagos).
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Therefore, the law does not foresee any specific conditions for the lifting of
confidentiality leaving room for the discretionary power of the prosecutor (not an
independent authority) andnotmeeting the requirements for predictability and accessibility
for a serious intervention on someone’s privacy in accordance with the ECHR. The broad
notion of national security as the basis for lifting confidentiality would be justified if the
individuals under surveillancewere suspected for criminal offences against national security
and these matters were further defined in the law.
Furthermore Law 3917/2011 that implemented the Data Retention Directive foresees
the retention of telecommunications data for a period of 12 months with the purpose of
determining “particularly serious crimes”. Despite the fact that the Court of Justice of the
European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”) has invalidated the Data Retention Directive, the
implementing Greek Law is still in force.84 The reason is that the law could not be
automatically considered unconstitutional or invalid in the Greek legal order. However,
the Ministry of Justice has formed a Special Legislative Committee for the proposition of
annulment or amendment of the national law in order to be in compliance with the CJEU
Judgment.85
Finally, the upcoming new ePrivacy and Data Retention Directives are anticipated in
Greece as in all other EU Member States, in order to provide the appropriate guarantees
for the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens of the Union in line with the
CJEU rulings and the GDPR.
84 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and
Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
85 G. Tsolias, “Privacy, Data Retention And Data Protection In The Electronic Communications Sector -
ProvidersOf Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services -Competent Supervisory Independent
Administrative Authorities”, Greek Law Digest, 5 March 2019, http://www.greeklawdigest.gr/component/
k2/item/84.
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Hungary
Tamás Bendik, Dániel Eszteri, Attila Kiss, Melinda Kovács, Ágnes Majsa and Katalin
Siklósi-Somogyi*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
1.1.
As an integral part of the legal developments aiming at and leading to democratic transition
in Hungary, the fundamental right to the protection of personal data was enshrined in the
Constitution of Hungary amongst other fundamental rights in 1989 for the first time.
Prior to Hungary’s accession to the European Union, Act LXIII of 19921 regulated data
processing operations at a general level and provided for a level of protection that the
European Commission,2 based on an opinion,3 of the Article 29 Working Party, formally
considered “adequate” in 2000. Upon accession Directive 95/46/EC4 was also transposed
into the Hungarian legal system by the amendment of this Act.
On 11 April 2011 a new constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, was adopted,
providing for a new legal basis for the regulation of data protection. Thus, Act LXIII of
1992 was repealed and its provisions were replaced by Act CXII of 2011 (hereinafter
“Privacy Act”) which entered into force on 1 January 2012.5
* The authors are senior experts of the Hungarian Data Protection Authority, the National Authority for
Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság).
1 Act LXIII of 1992 of 17November 1992 on the protection of personal data and the disclosure of information
of public interest.
2 CommissionDecision 2000/519/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant toDirective 95/46/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided inHungary [2000]OJ L215/4.
3 Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data: Opinion
6/99 of 7 September 1999 (WP 24) concerning the level of personal data protection in Hungary.
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L
281, 23.11.1995, p. 31).
5 Act CXII of 2011 of 26 July 2011 on the right to informational self-determination and on the freedom of
information. The English translation of the Act currently in force is available at: www.njt.hu/translated/
doc/J2011T0112P_20190426_FIN.pdf. All webpages referred to were last visited 1 February 2020.
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BothAct LXIII of 1992 and the PrivacyAct created an omnibus data protection regime,6
i.e. they were applicable as leges generales to all data processing operations regardless of
the public or private legal status of those performing such operations, including also law
enforcement, national security and defence sectors.Moreover, functioning as leges speciales,
a large number of sectoral laws and rules regulated specific data processing situations.
1.2.
This sector-neutral and generally applicable nature of the Hungarian data protection
regimewas, to the extent possible, consciously retained by the legislator when the necessary
legislative steps were taken to align theHungarian legal systemwith the EUdata protection
reform. The Hungarian lawmaker decided not to repeal the Privacy Act but to amend it
substantially in order to implement the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter
“GDPR”)7 and to transpose the Law Enforcement Directive (hereinafter “LED”) into the
Hungarian legal system.8
Taking a number of steps,9 this approach resulted in a legislative framework where the
Privacy Act supplements a directly applicable GDPR10 and continues to apply to all data
processing operations (including law enforcement, national security and defence) under
Hungarian jurisdiction.
1.3.
With regard to the issues the GDPR leaves to the national legislator to regulate, two types
of provisionmight be distinguished: on the one hand, there are those that are indispensable
in implementing the Regulation (mandatory legislation), while, on the other hand, there
are the so-called flexibility, or opening, clauses providing significant leeway to introduce
or maintain domestic legal requirements supplementing the rules of the GDPR.
Stemming from its general nature, the Privacy Act intends to follow to a certain extent
both types of regulatory path, as detailed below.
6 On the features of an omnibus regime see, for instance: O. Lynskey, The Foundations of EUData Protection
Law, 1st ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 15-30.
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
8 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89).
9 In connection with the data protection reform, the Privacy Act was amended by Acts XIII and XXXVIII of
2018, while the sectoral laws were amended by Act XXXIV of 2019.
10 Section 2(2).
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a. In order to provide an unhampered application of the GDPR, the Privacy Act inter
alia
– establishes the national supervisory authority, regulates its organisational structure
and the procedural framework through which it exercises the tasks and powers
specified in the Regulation;11
– regulates the supervisory regime applicable to processing operations of courts acting
in their judicial capacity;12
– prescribes that data processing operations according to article 6(1)(c) and (e) of
the GDPR shall be further regulated by sector-specific legislation.13
b. With the aim to make use of a number of opening clauses incorporated in the GDPR,
the Privacy Act
– provides for rules designed to reconcile the right to access public information with
the right to the protection of personal data;14
– extends, to a limited extent, the scope of data protection rules to the processing of
personal data of deceased persons;15
– prescribes that, with regard to data processing operations according to article 6
(1)(c) and (e) of the GDPR, a data protection impact assessment, as well as prior
consultation shall be carried out during the process of drafting of the sector-specific
legislation that requires processing.16
Further flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR, especially in Chapter IX thereof, are dealt
with by sector-specific legislation.17
1.4.
Formerly, the Hungarian legal system provided for a single supervisory organ responsible
for monitoring and promoting the enforcement of both the right to the protection of
personal data and the right to freedom of information. According to Act LXIII of 1992,
an ombudsman-type of institution, the Data Protection Commissioner, was designated to
exercise this competence. The Fundamental Law of Hungary, however, shifted to an
authority-type of institution, and thus the National Authority for Data Protection and
11 Chapters V and VI.
12 Chapter VI/A.
13 Section 5(3).
14 Chapters III and IV (relating to art. 86 GDPR).
15 Section 25 (relating to Preamble (23) GDPR).
16 Section 25/G(6) and Section 25/H(2) (relating to art. 35(10) and 36(4) GDPR).
17 See, for instance, Act XX of 1996 on national identity numbers (relating to Article 87), Chapter 5/A of Act




Freedomof Information (Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és InformációszabadságHatóság, hereinafter
“the NAIH”) was established and has been operating since 1 January 2012.
Prior to the EU data protection reform these supervisory organs were empowered to
monitor and enforce the application of legal requirements stemming from the fundamental
right to the protection of personal data, without any exception regarding the specific
characteristics of the data processing operations. Due to the EU data protection reform,
this holistic approach, however had to be limited, as, according to the GDPR and the LED,
the competence of the supervisory authorities shall not cover the processing of personal
data “when courts are acting in their judicial capacity”.18 Hence, the Hungarian legislator,
by the amendment of the Privacy Act, established a mechanism according to which the
oversight of such data protection operations are entrusted to courts specifically empowered
to carry out such supervision activity.
Question 2
With the adoption of the constitutional amendments paving the way to the democratic
transition of Hungary in 1989, the Constitution had expressis verbis incorporated the right
to the protection of personal data as a full-fledged fundamental right and thereby also
clearly distinguished between the right to the protection of personal data and other
fundamental rights concerning private and family life, which the Fundamental Law currently
in force continues to maintain. Hence, this distinction had been an integral part of
Hungary’s constitutional system prior to the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, and thus this feature of it has not had a role in the
interpretation of national law regarding these fundamental rights.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The Hungarian legislator adopted and the courts have been applying the principles of
purpose limitation and data minimisation following Decision 15 of 1991 (IV. 13.) of the
Constitutional Court.19 This decision declared that, in the absence of a definite purpose
and for arbitrary future use, the collection and processing of personal data is
18 Art. 55(3) GDPR and art. 45(2) LED.
19 Decision 15 of 1991 (IV. 13.) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on the use of personal data and the
personal identification number hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_0015_1991.pdf.
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unconstitutional, and therefore personal data may only be processed for a definite and
legally-justified purpose to which every stage of the process has to conform. The principle
of fair processing of personal data was also provided for in Act LXIII of 1992 together with
the said principles, in line with Convention ETS No. 108.
Among a number of relevant cases, a decision of the NAIH was challenged and even
heard by the Curia of Hungary (Supreme Court) regarding the infringement of the said
principles by a winding-up institution.20 In 2014, the NAIH established that one of the
biggest winding-up institutions had been processing a wider set of data of debtors and
third parties (including the neighbours and familymembers of the debtors) than necessary,
and thus its data processing operations concerning debt collection were unlawful. The
decision, which was upheld also by the court, stated that the collection of data concerning
medical condition, private and family life, and processing of tax identification numbers,
as well as data on work conditions of data subjects cannot be justified by the business
interests of the controller and was not necessary to exercise legal claims, and therefore
violated the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation even though data
subjects have given their consent to the processing. The collection of photocopies of cards
officially verifying the home address of debtors was found to be unnecessary and also
infringed the principle of data minimisation, as all winding-up institutions have the
statutory right to access to the national Personal Data and Address Register.
The controller appealed against the decision, and the court interpreted the principle
of “fair” processing as a broader requirement for data processing than the principle of
lawfulness, because, according to the court, it can be derived not only from the data subject’s
right to informational self-determination (protection of personal data) but also his or her
right to privacy and the right to the protection of human dignity.21 Concerning the
controller’s collection of third parties’ data, the court also established the violation of the
principle of fair processing as this activity interfered with the rights of the individuals,
since it created a situation of disparity between the data controller and the data subject
where the data subject was not in a position to be aware of what the data controller knew
about him or her. In 2017, the Curia upheld this decision and added that no personal data
may be lawfully collected if it has no effect whatsoever on the purpose forwhich the personal
data are processed.22
A recent, post-GDPR decision of the NAIH reviewed the data processing of the “Sziget
Festival” in relation to its check-in system.23 The controller collected personal data during
mandatory security screenings of thousands of festival guests by making copies of IDs and
20 Decision no. NAIH/2015/16/H.
21 Decision of Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labour Court No. 28.K.30.283/2016/42.
22 Decision of the Curia No. Kfv. 37.370/2017/7.
23 Decision No. NAIH/2019/55.
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taking photos at the entry gate. TheNAIH found that the scope of data processed (including
citizenship, number and expiration date of IDs, date of birth and gender) compared to the
stated purpose and the retention period of these data (one year) was excessive, violating
the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation.
Question 4
In 2016, the NAIH issued guidelines on the basic requirements of data processing in the
context of employment, where it highlighted that consent is only valid when freely given
and informed, adding also that data subjects are subordinated in the employment context,
hence data controllers may rely on consent only in exceptional situations.
Later, a NAIH decision also regarded the consent of employees as invalid in relation
to obligatory package scanning and inspection routine carried out at the entrance of a
workplace.24 The court upheld the findings of the supervisory authority that fraud and
stealth prevention, as well as securing the physical integrity of employees may be regarded
as legitimate interests of the employer, but such processing may not be based on consent
of the data subjects.25 The court added that it is the obligation of the employer to balance
interests and take into account all the relevant factors and rights of the individuals prior
to the introduction of such security measures.
A number of data subjects initiated inquiries with the NAIH aiming at the prohibition
of processing operations performed on their personal data by financial providers following
the withdrawal of their consent. In these cases, the decisions of NAIH and the courts26
came to the conclusion that, based on the legitimate interests of the controller, a necessary
and proportionate set of personal data may be processed lawfully (including their transfer
to winding-up institutions) despite the objections of debtors.
Several court decisions interpret the validity of consent similarly to the interpretation
provided by Article 29 Working Party guidelines, emphasising the criteria ‘freely given
and informed’.27 Another court decision found that consent should be clear and
unambiguous, therefore consent to publish voice recordings cannot be validly given by
simply sharing personal information during a conversation if the data subject was not
informed of such publication.28
24 Decision No. NAIH/2017/439/H.
25 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court No. 13.K.700.011/2018/5.
26 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court No. P. 25.023/2013/15.
27 Also ruled by Curia in Decision No. Kfv. 37.886/2015/7 and Decision No. Kfv. 37.330/2017/5.
28 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional CourtNo. P. 25.091/2016/16 andDecisionNo. P. 20.989/2015/13.
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According to the information provided by the National Office for the Judiciary, the
Hungarian courts have issued no final and binding decision acknowledging communication
of personal data as a counter-performance in exchange for the provision of digital services,
and there has been no judicial procedure in progress with the same subject either. The
National Office for the Judiciary also stated that no lawsuit with a similar subject had been
initiated and no legal reasoning or legal reference with a similar aspect had been expressed
thus far.
5.2.
To state that there was public debate over the subject in questionwould be an exaggeration;
nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the draft “Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing
of personal data under article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online
services to data subjects” (hereinafter “draft guidelines”) has received strong criticism
among Hungarian data protection experts. One author29 criticised the draft guidelines, i.e.
the European Data protection Board (hereinafter “EDPB”), for:
– applying the underlying conceptions of the GDPR to data processing activities that are
in fact fundamentally different from those data processing activities theGDPR ismeant
to regulate;
– treating data protection as some kind of super law, the principles / regulations of which
should be given more weight than the regulations of other areas of the law;
– intending to enforce data protection rules as some autotelic regime of norms, thereby
not taking the data subjects’ genuine will into consideration; finally
– applying an unduly narrow scope as regards the definition of “contract” in contradiction
to the European traditions of civil law.
Unfortunately, these critical remarks were not discussed on their merits publicly.
5.3.
As for theNAIH, up to this date no decision or legal opinion has been issued in connection
with the above question.
Nevertheless, theNAIH took an active part in the drafting of the abovementioned draft
guidelines and managed to represent its views successfully, therefore the current version




predominantly reflects its legal point of view. (Please note that, according to the NAIH,
some points still require further refinement.)
Question 6
The Hungarian legislator introduced some legislative measures that allow for certain data
controllers to carry out automated decision-making (and profiling) in certain situations.
Note thatmost of the following examples fromHungarian law had already been introduced
before the applicability of the GDPR, 25 May 2018.
6.1.
Example No. 1: Act CL of 2016 on the Code of General Administrative Procedure
TheHungarianCodeofGeneralAdministrativeProcedure regulates general applicability
of automated decision making as follows:
Section 40 [Automatic decision-making]
Automatic decision-making shall apply if
a. it is permitted by an Act or government decree,
b. all data are available to the authority at the time of the submission of the
application,
c. decision-making does not require deliberation, and
d. there is no party with opposing interests.
Moreover, Section 42 of the same Code provides for the right to request the authority to
reconsider the automatic decision in a full (human-controlled) procedure as follows:
“Section 42 [Adjudicating an application in a full procedure]
If no appeal lies against a decision made in an automatic decision-making
procedure […], the party may request the authority, within five days following
the communication of the decision, to reconsider his application in a full
procedure.”
Finally, Section 80 (2) a) contains the following administrative safeguard regarding
automatic-decision making:
“Where the authority refrains from adopting a final decision within the
administrative time limit (legitimate silence), the party shall be entitled to exercise
the right applied for. Legitimate silence shall be allowed if it is not excluded by
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an Act or government decree in a case which may be administered through
automatic decision-making.”
6.2.
Example No. 2.: Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services
The Hungarian Act on national security services regulates automated decision making
in relation to the Passenger Names Record (PNR) System. In Hungary the PNR System is
used to share data of air passengers between airline companies and a specialised national
security agency, the Counter-terrorism Information and Criminal Analysis Centre for
counter-terrorism and crime prevention purposes. The establishment of the national PNR
system is based on European law.
The relevant provisions of the Act reads as follows:
Section 52/H. (6):
“The Counter Terrorism-information and Criminal Analysis Centre carries out
its risk-assessment activity at first by way of automated risk assessment. If the
automated risk assessment results in a hit, the Counter Terrorism-information
and Criminal Analysis Centre investigates the hit individually by human
intervention.”
6.3.
Example no. 3.: Act LIII of 2017 on the prevention of money-laundering and terrorism
financing
The Hungarian Act on the prevention of money-laundering and terrorism financing
regulates automated decision making in relation to the national Financial Information
Unit (hereinafter “the FIU”). The FIU’s task is to analyse financial and transaction
information sent by financial institutions for anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism
financing purposes. The establishment of the national FIU is based on European law.
The relevant provisions of the Act reads as follows:
Section 39. a):
“[…] The FIU during its operative analysis compares the received data with the
data stored for analysis and evaluation purposes taking into account the risks






The NAIH has received numerous complaints/applications from data subjects regarding
the right to erasure under the regimes of bothDirective 95/46/EC and theGDPR.According
to the NAIH’s practice, it is not excluded per se that data subjects seek the authority’s aid
in the first place in order to exercise their right to erasure (i.e. without turning to the data
controller first), nevertheless the likelihood of a breach of law shall be a precondition of
any formal procedure of the authority. In other words, the NAIH encourages data subjects
to turn directly to the data controller in the first place: in order to facilitate this, the authority
provides detailed information for data subjects seeking counsel.
7.2.
A special aspect of the right to erasure is when it is exercised against the operators of search
engines; in connection with this, we draw attention to the followings:
7.2.1.
On the basis of the information available, data subjects have oddly enough initiated judicial
proceedings only in a relatively small number of cases with reference to the right to erasure.
An interesting exception from this general tendencywas the case where an attorney-at-law,
whose father had been accused of serious criminal offences, requested the erasure of certain
articles from the web page of a newspaper and the search results of the internal search
engine of the webpage of the newspaper since these articles contained some indirect
reference to the attorney-at-law, especially his profession. This case is also remarkable
because the plaintiff (the attorney-at-law) sought judicial remedy at all possible instances
of the court system, including the highest judicial forum, the Curia, which reviewed the
final decision when it was challenged through an extraordinary remedy by the plaintiff.
The court of first instance rejected the plaintiff’s claim, firstly, because, in the opinion
of the court, the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union30 (hereinafter
“CJEU”) was not applicable in the case contrary to the plaintiff’s reasoning. The reason
for this was that in the opinion of the court of first instance the said judgement had
relevance only in relation to search engines, but the defendant was merely a newspaper
even if it operated a search engine in relation to its website. Secondly, in the opinion of
the court of first instance, the right to erasure cannot be exercised subsequently if the
publishing of the personal data in question had been lawful originally, not evenwith respect
to the passage of time. According to the court, the reason for this is that the press is also
30 Judgment of 13May 2014 in caseC-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Google Spain), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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responsible for providing information in relation to past events, even if they have already
lost their currency.31 On the basis of the plaintiff’s appeal the Budapest-Capital Regional
Court of Appeal partially overruled the judgement of the court of first instance32, clarifying
that the lawfulness of the original publication of the personal data is in fact irrelevant, in
other words, the right of erasure is exercisable in case of both lawful and unlawful data
processing. The court of second instance was of the opinion that the Google Spain
judgement33 had no relevance in the case either, the legal dispute could and should be
settled purely on the basis of Hungarian legal norms (note that the plaintiff had requested
erasure from the defendant in March 2016). In order to perform this, the interest to the
exercise of the right of freedom of expression and information shall be balanced against
the interest of the data subject’s right to privacy. As a result of this balancing of interests
the court of second instance found that the plaintiff’s action was partially founded, a
conclusion also shared by the Curia.34
7.2.2.
Subsequent to the publication of the guidelines on the implementation of the judgement
of the CJEU in the Google Spain case,35 the NAIH also published a document providing a
thorough explanation of the guidelines on 28 July 2015.36 When assessing complaints
regarding the right to erasure against operators of search engines, theNAIHhas consistently
adhered to the aforementioned guidelines and national communication.
7.2.3.
In the NAIH’s experience, the operators of search engines denying requests for erasure
most often refer to the right to freedomof expression and information, further, if applicable,
the data subjects’ role in public life, which also invokes an enhanced need for information
on the side of the public.
31 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court No. 27.P.22.284/2016/24.
32 Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal No. 8.Pf.20.407/2017/3.
33 Case C-131/12, Google Spain.
34 Decision of the Curia No. Pfv.IV.22.393/2017/4.
35 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the
European Union Judgement on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Protección de Datos (AEPD)
and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12, https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf.
36 Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság (NAIH), A Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információsz-
abadság Hatóság tájékoztatója a személyes adatoknak a Google keresőmotorjának találati listájából való






A significant example of a piece of legislation adopted by theHungarian legislator pursuant
to article 85GDPR, is the PrivacyAct. This Act creates a specific type of data: ‘data accessible
on public interest grounds’, defining it as “any data (including personal data), other than
data of public interest, the disclosure, availability or accessibility of which is prescribed by
an Act for the benefit of the general public” (Section 3.6.). This implies that the legislator
can specify in an Act that even personal data have to be considered public if it is justified
by public interest. For example, the Act on private entrepreneurs and sole proprietorships37
stipulates that the private entrepreneur’s surname and forename, and other data specified
in the Act, such as the entrepreneur’s main activity, the address of its registered office and
permanent establishments, shall be made available to the general public.
The Privacy Act itself also qualifies some personal data accessible on public interest
grounds: Section 26 (2) declares that “the name of the person acting within the functions
and powers of the organ performing public duties, as well as his functions and duties,
executive mandate, his other personal data relevant to performing public duties, […] shall
qualify as data accessible on public interest grounds”. Based on this provision, the NAIH
confirmed several times that the remuneration of a head of an organ performing public
duties shall be deemed data accessible on public interest grounds, to which any person
shall be allowed to have free access. It is important to note however that the Act introduces
a limit to the publicity of these data by prescribing that this type of data shall be
disseminated in compliance with the principle of purpose limitation.38
8.2.
Some other examples of legal provisions adopted by the legislator to reconcile the right to
the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information
are the following:39
8.2.1.
TheCivil Code40 stipulates that the exercise of fundamental rights ensuring a free discussion
of public affairs may limit the personality rights of public figures to an extent that is
necessary and proportionate and is without prejudice to human dignity. It adds that such
37 Act CXV of 2009.
38 Section 26(2) Privacy Act.
39 Based on the notification of Hungary sent to the European Commission according to the GDPR, published
on the Commission’s website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/hu_notification_art_51.4_84.2_
85.3_88.3_90.2_publish.pdf.
40 Section 2:44 of Act V of 2013.
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an act shall not violate their private and family life and home. This provision constitutes
an exemption from theGDPR, relating to a specific category of data subjects, namely public
figures. According to these provisions, the processing of personal data of a public figure
may be lawful if the processing relates to the discussion of public affairs, the limitation of
the right to the protection of personal data is necessary and proportionate, and it does not
harm human dignity.
8.2.2.
The Act on freedom of the press and on the basic rules relating to media content41 declares
that exercising the right to the freedom of the press shall not violate the rights of others
relating to personality, including but not limited to the right to protection of personal data,
under any circumstances. This provision has to be read together with the abovementioned
exemption for public figures laid down in the Civil Code. The same Act creates an
exemption from the principles enshrined in the GDPR by providing the right of media
content providers not to reveal the identity of any person from whom they receive
information relating to their activities in providing media content in court and authority
proceedings, and to refuse to surrender any document, written instrument, article or data
medium that may reveal the identity of the source of information.42
8.2.3.
The Criminal Code creates some specific rules which aim to reconcile the right to the
protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression. These include the
provisions concerning the criminal offenses of misuse of personal data, defamation,
production or publication of sound or video recordings of defamatory and slanderous
nature.43
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
9.1.
Article VI (3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary states that everyone shall have the right
to the protection of his or her personal data, as well as to access and disseminate data of
public interest. Furthermore, Article VI (4) stipulates that the application of the right to
41 Section 4(3) Act CIV of 2010.
42 Section 6 Act CIV of 2010.
43 Sections 219, 226, 226/A, 226/B and 227 Act C of 2012.
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the protection of personal data and to access data of public interest shall be supervised by
an independent authority established by a cardinal Act.
Based on the aforementioned constitutional provision, the Privacy Act established the
NAIH and regulates its operation in detail. From an organisational perspective, the NAIH
is an autonomous state administration organ; it may not be instructed in its functions and
shall operate independently of other organs and of undue influence. The tasks of theNAIH
may only be determined by an Act of Parliament.
9.2.
The head of the NAIH is its president. The president shall be appointed by the President
of the Republic, on the proposal of the Prime Minister. The president shall be selected
from those Hungarian citizens who have a law degree and the right to stand as candidates
in parliamentary elections, have at least ten years of experience in auditing procedures
related to data protection or freedom of information, or who hold an academic degree in
either of those fields. The President of the Republic shall appoint the president of theNAIH
for a term of nine years. After the termination of his mandate, the president may be
reappointed on one occasion. On 29 November 2011, Dr Attila PÉTERFALVI was
nominated for the position of president of the NAIH for a period of nine years beginning
on 1 January 2012.
The president shall appoint a vice-president for an indefinite period to assist his work.
The vice-president shallmeet the requirements set out for the appointment of the President,
with the provision of having at least five years’ experience in procedures related to data
protection or freedom of information. In the event that the president is temporarily
prevented from performing his duties, or if the office of the president is vacant, the powers
and duties of the president shall be exercised by the vice-president. From 1 January 2012,
the post of the Vice-President is held by Dr Endre Győző SZABÓ.
As of 2019 the NAIH is allocated a staff of 114. The president shall exercise the
employer’s rights over the public officials and employees of the NAIH.
In accordance with the Privacy Act, the NAIH shall be responsible for monitoring and
promoting the enforcement of two fundamental rights: the right to the protection of
personal data and the right to freedom of information (access to data of public interest
and data accessible on public interest grounds). Accordingly, the NAIH is entrusted with
duties in connectionwith the Schengen Information System (SIS), theCustoms Information
System (CIS), Europol, Eurodac and the Visa Information System (VIS).
9.3.
The following chart displays the number of cases with the NAIH between 25 May 2018
and 25 May 2019:
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During the period between 25 May 2018 and 25 May 2019, the following amounts of fines
were imposed by NAIH:
– Data protection fines: 113,833.00 euro;
– Fines based on data breach notification: 37,074 euro;
– Procedural fines: 2,604 euro.
Question 10
10.1.
TheNAIHconducts two types of procedure in data protection cases covered by theGDPR:
‘inquiries’ which are less regulated from a procedural point of view and ‘administrative
procedures for data protection’ regulated by administrative procedural rules. An inquiry
might be initiated on the basis of the complaint of the data subject (or a third party different
from the data subject or the data controller/processor) or ex officio, while an administrative
procedure for data protection is started on the application of the data subject (or his or
her representative) or ex officio. Irrespective of the exact procedural form, the NAIH is
basically obliged to deal with the complaint/application received from data subjects, except
for such cases when the authority is entitled, or even obliged to reject the complainant’s
submission.
10.2.
The legal grounds for refusing a complaint/application are determined in a detailedmanner
in the relevant laws for both types of the said procedure.
10.2.1.
As for the inquiry, the legal grounds for dismissal are defined in Section 53 (2)-(3) of the
Privacy Act. According to the provisions of Section 53(2) of the Act, complaints may be
dismissed if they refer to minor infringements or if they are anonymous, thus in these
cases dismissal is dependent on the deliberation of the Authority. In contrast, Section 53(3)
contains an exhaustive list of the cases where complaints shall be dismissed without any
room for deliberation, e.g. if court proceedings are in progress in connection with the
complaint, or if the complaint has been re-submitted and it contains no new facts or




As for the administrative procedure for data protection at the application of the data
subject, Section 36 of Act CL of 2016 on the Code of General Administrative Procedure
(hereinafter “Administrative Code”) provides the general requirements of applications.
Moreover, Section 60(5) of the Privacy Act also defines additional requirements regarding
the form and the content, if these requirements are not met, the NAIH shall advise the
applicant on one occasion to remedy the deficiencies within the prescribed time limit,
indicating also the legal consequences of non-compliance, exceptwhere otherwise provided
for by an Act or government decree.
According to Section 46(1) of the Administrative Code, the NAIH shall reject the
application when:
a. a condition specified by law for the commencement of the procedure is not met and
this Act does not attach further legal consequences thereto, or
b. an application for the assertion of the same right has already been adjudicated, on the
merits, by the court or the authority and the contents of the application and the relevant
legal regulations have not changed.
Further, according to Section 46(2) of the Administrative Code the NAIH may reject the
application if it does not comply with formal requirements.
In addition, Section 47(1) of the Administrative Code contains an exhaustive list when
a procedure shall be terminated, the reason for this is an omission of the client (the
requestor) in most cases.
10.2.3.
In summary: the NAIH always acts on complaints/applications meeting the formal
requirements defined in the relevant laws in a detailed manner. As it can be seen from the
relevant legal regulations referred to above, there is little room for deliberation by the
Authority, rejection or admissibility of complaints/applications ismainly based on objective
criteria. It should be noted that, in cases where the formal requirements are not met, the
NAIH may launch an ex officio inquiry/administrative procedure for data protection if it
is deemed reasonable on the basis of the facts of the case. It is also worth mentioning that
the NAIH acts also on submissions received from persons/organisations that are not
concerned in the data processing as data subjects or as their representatives; these
submissions are dealt with in inquiry procedures.
10.3.
As for the obligations of the data protection supervisory authorities derived from article
78(2) GDPR [which is supplemented by Section 60/A(6) of the Privacy Act], the NAIH
informs the complainant/data subject filing a request on the progress of the
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complaint/application lodged pursuant to article 77GDPR. Furthermore, theNAIH always
provides detailed information on the outcome of the case regarding both inquiries and




The corrective measures provided by article 58(2) and article 83 GDPR have not invoked
radical changes in the sanctioning practice of the NAIH due to the fact that the sanctions
specified therein were available to the authority in the pre-GDPR-period, too. Of course,
article 83(4)–(6) empowers the NAIH to impose significantly higher administrative fines,
nevertheless, neither the maximum amount nor the percentage cap determined in the
abovementioned articles has been reached.
11.2.
It is also worth mentioning that, on the basis of article 58(7) of the GDPR, the Hungarian
legislator has introduced certain restrictions regarding the amount of the fine if the data
controller is a budgetary agency:
“The amount of the fine shall be between one hundred thousand and twenty
million forints if the fine is imposed:
[…]
b) pursuant to article 83 of the General Data Protection Regulation and the
party required to pay the fine imposed in a decision adopted in accordance
with an authority procedure for data protection is a budgetary organ.”44
11.3.
As for the existence of additional sanctions adopted by the national legislator, according
to Section 75/A of the Privacy Act:
“The Authority shall exercise its powers specified in article 83(2) to (6) of the
General Data Protection Regulation according to the principle of
proportionality, in particular by primarily issuing, in compliance with article
58 of the General Data Protection Regulation, a warning to the controller or
processor for the purpose of remedying the infringement when the provisions,
44 Point b) of Section 61(4) Privacy Act.
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laid downby law or a binding legal act of the EuropeanUnion, on the processing
of personal data are first infringed.”
Question 12
Damages for intangible harm as a result of violation of personality rights have been awarded
by both the former Act IV of 1959 and Act V of 2013 on Civil Code (hereinafter “the Civil
Code”) currently in force. While Act IV of 1959 awarded ‘non-pecuniary damages’ in case
of extra-contractual liability and to any person whose personality rights have been violated
only in case of some kind of immaterial disadvantage was proven, the Civil Code replaced
it by a conceptually new institution, the right to claim a ‘grievance award’ (Schmerzensgeld,
solatium doloris) in case a non-material harm was done to him. Under Section 2:52(2) of
the Civil Code, “conditions of the obligation to pay grievance award, and in particular the
identification of the person who is under the obligation to pay and the ways of exculpating
him, shall be governed by the rules on liability for damages, with the proviso that, apart
from the fact of the violation, there is no need to prove further loss.”45
The Civil Code stipulates that the court shall determine the amount of the grievance
award in one sum, taking into account the circumstances of the case, in particular the
gravity of the violation, whether it was committed on one or more occasions, the degree
of fault, and the impact of the violation on the aggrieved party and his environment.46
Following general guidance and the case law of higher courts, judges must consider,47
at their own discretion, all circumstances of the case.48 The amount of the grievance award
should be appropriate to compensate the harm or loss done and to prevent from further
violations,49 and calculated based on:
– the severity of the infringement;
– the repetition of the infringement;
– the degree of fault;
– the impacts of the infringement on the victims and on their environment, including
changes to their mental or physical condition;
– and any other, even subjective elements, that may have effects on the given case.50
45 See also Á. Fuglinszky, ‘Risks and Side Effects: Five Questions on the ‘New’ Hungarian Tort Law’, ELTE
Law Journal, Vol. 2, 2014, pp. 201-202.
46 Section 2:52(3) Civil Code.
47 Cs. Szabó, ‘“A sérelem bére” – új bírói gyakorlat a nem vagyoni sérelemmegítélése kapcsán.’ Polgári Jog, Vol.
2017/9.
48 Section 279 (3) Code of Civil Procedure (Act CXXX of 2016).
49 Decision of the Curia No. Pfv.IV.20.903/2016/7.
50 Opinion of the judicial college of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal No. 1/2013 (VI. 17.).
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In case of the violation of personality rights, in particular the right to keep personal secrets
and the right to the protection of personal data and the right to the protection of one’s
image and recorded voice, the data subject may claim a grievance award from a data
controller even after an inquiry of the NAIH has been concluded.
Question 13
The general provisions for representation are laid down in the Civil Code, providing that
a juridical act may also be made via another person. The right of representation may be
based, among other things, on an authorization (power of attorney), the rules of which
are also detailed in the Civil Code.51 Given that the general rules of representation and
data protection enforcement procedures allow for a great flexibility, and therefore the
enforcement of data subjects’ data protection rights is not and was not burdensome before
the GDPR, the legislator did not introduce additional measures to the pre-existing ones
following the entry into force of the GDPR.
There are several ways in which the data subject can enforce his data protection rights,
in which the possibilities for representation can be summarized as follows:
13.1.
Any person shall have the right to initiate an inquiry with the NAIH free of charge, by
submitting a notification of an alleged infringement or an imminent threat of infringement,
relating the processing of personal data. Authority inquiries can also be initiated
anonymously. The NAIH may dismiss such anonymous notifications without examining
it on its merits, however, it is the consistent practice of the Authority, that it conducts the
inquiry based on such notifications, unless it is not possible to investigate the infringement.
Since there are no specific rules laid down in the Privacy Act, the general rules of
representation, as explained above, are applicable. Consequently, the data subject can also
authorise an NGO by a power of attorney to act on his behalf before the NAIH.52
13.2.
If the data subject considers that the processing of personal data relating to him infringes
the GDPR, he can submit an application for commencing an administrative procedure for
data protection.53 The application has to meet the substantive requirements prescribed by
the Privacy Act and the rules laid down in the Administrative Code. The general rules of
representation under the Administrative Code prescribe that, where a party is not required
51 Sections 6:11-6:20 Civil Code.
52 Sections 52-53 Privacy Act.
53 Section 60 Privacy Act.
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by an Act to proceed in person, his statutory representative or the person authorised by
him or by his statutory representative may proceed in his stead, or they can proceed jointly.
The representative shall provide proof of his right to represent to be able to act on behalf
of the data subject.54 Based on these provisions, an NGO, or a lawyer, providing a valid
authorization may represent the data subject in administrative procedures.
13.3.
If the data subject considers that the controller or the processor infringes, in the course of
processing his personal data, the GDPR or other data protection related provisions laid
down in laws, he may seek judicial remedy against the controller or the processor. Any
person who otherwise does not have the capacity to be a party may be a party to the court
action, and the NAIH may intervene in the action in order to facilitate the success of the
data subject. These judicial procedures belong to the competence of regional courts. As a
general rule laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure55, an agent authorised by the party
or by his statutory representative may act as the representative of the party. The Code of
Civil Procedure, however, also makes it a general rule that legal representation shall be
mandatory during the litigation procedure. Consequently, it is necessary to have a legal
representative, who complies with the conditions56 laid down in theCode of Civil Procedure
(for example attorneys-at-law or law firms).
Question 14
14.1.
In certain cases, the PrivacyAct itself obliges theNAIH to co-operate with other authorities.
Accordingly, in the event that, in the course of its procedures, theNAIHhas awell-founded
suspicion of a criminal offence, an infraction or a disciplinary offence, it shall initiate
proceedings before the organ entitled to conduct criminal, infraction or disciplinary
proceedings. The acting organ shall inform the NAIH of its opinion with respect to
commencing the proceedings within 30 days and, with respect to the outcome of the
proceedings, within 30 days from the time of concluding the proceedings.
14.2.
Section 22 of Act C of 2003 on electronic communications contains special rules on
cooperation between the National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the
54 Sections 13-14 Administrative Code (Act CL of 2016).
55 Sections 74-76 Code of Civil Procedure (Act CXXX of 2016).
56 Section 75 Code of Civil Procedure (Act CXXX of 2016).
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NAIH, according to which they shall cooperate in matters affecting the electronic
communicationsmarket and information society services in cases of personal data breach.
According to these rules, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the
NAIH shall agree in writing concerning the details of their cooperation. The agreement
shall be reviewed annually and made available to the public. In the agreement the National
Media and Infocommunications Authority and the NAIH shall inter alia define the
conditions of cooperation so as to ensure that personal data protection regulations are
properly enforced and exercised in accordance with the law. The National Media and
Infocommunications Authority and the NAIH signed a Cooperation Agreement on
20 November 2013 with a special focus on promoting the conscious use of the Internet by
children.
In order to strengthen their cooperation, the NAIH and the Hungarian Competition
Authority signed a Cooperation Agreement on 17 February 2015. They agreed on regular
expert and management level consultations on law enforcement and legislative issues, as
well as joint participation in professional events.
InMarch 2015, theNAIHsigned aCooperationAgreementwith theHungarianNational
Bank, the central bank of Hungary, with the aim of ensuring a coordinated and more
effective protection of personal data of consumers using services provided by organisations
controlled by the National Bank, and to promote publicity of data of public interest.
14.3.
In addition to the formal cooperation agreements, the NAIH has regular informal
cooperation with other regulators, as well as with the Commissioner for Fundamental
Rights including consultations, delivery of opinions and interpretation of the legislation
on data protection and freedom of information.
Furthermore, theNAIHoperates a legislationmonitoring system, and regularly follows
drafting activity relating to its competence, and, if necessary, ex officio delivers opinions
on draft legislation or modifications proposed to bills already on the agenda of the
Parliament.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services defines ‘national security interest’ as
follows:
Section 74. a):National security interest: the ensuring of the independence anddefending
of the legal order of Hungary, in particular:
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• aa) the detection of offensive attempts against the state’s independence and territorial
integrity,
• ab) the detection and prevention of concealed efforts to harm or threaten the state’s
political, economic and defence interests,
• ac) the acquirement of foreign or foreign-related information necessary for
governmental decisions,
• ad) the detection and prevention of concealed efforts to unlawfully alter or disrupt
the state’s legal order granting fundamental human rights, functioning of the
multi-party system and representative democracy or the legitimate institutions, as
well as
• ae) the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism, illegal guns and drug trafficking
and illegal traffic of internationally controlled goods and technologies.
Following the Tele 2/Watson judgment,57 the Hungarian legislator initiated the revision
and future amendment of the relevant Act about data retention periods, in particular Act
C of 2003 on electronic communications. Section 159/A of that Act prescribes a general
one-year time period for electronic communication service providers to retain particular
personal data of their customers for law enforcement, national security and military
purposes. The retained data can be provided only to law enforcement, national security
and military agencies for the aforementioned purposes and only upon their official and
justified request. According to publicly available information, the revision of the Act by
the legislator is still ongoing.
57 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for theHomeDepartment v TomWatson andOthers, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
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Ireland
Kate Colleary and Emily Gibson*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The relevant national legal instrument is the Data Protection Act 2018 (hereinafter “the
2018Act”). This covers, inter alia, derogations from theGeneralData ProtectionRegulation
(hereinafter “GDPR”)1; a revised structure and new powers and functions granted to the
supervisory authority (the Data Protection Commission, hereinafter “DPC”); detailed
processes setting out how investigationsmust be carried out by theDPC; and it implements
the provisions of the Law Enforcement Directive (hereinafter “LED”).2
The DPC is the supervisory authority within the meaning of and for the purposes
specified in the GDPR and the LED. It is granted powers under the 2018 Act to regulate
compliance with the GDPR and the provisions of the 2018 Act.
In terms of the flexibilities incorporated in the GDPR, we have set out below the most
notable, as provided for in the 2018 Act.
Article 6(1)(c) and (e) and articles 2 and 3GDPRdeal with the lawfulness of processing
and allow Member States to maintain or introduce more specific provisions with regard
to processing necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is
subject and processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest.
* Kate Colleary: Director of Pembroke Privacy and Principal, Colleary & Co. Solicitors. Emily Gibson: Bar-
rister, Bar of Ireland. With thanks to James Byrne BL for his assistance. Thanks for comments are also due
to Maureen O’Neill of MON Legal Consulting.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
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Section 38 of the 2018 Act concerns processing necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest and provides that processing is lawful to the extent that
it is necessary and proportionate for the performance of a function under national law.
Section 38 of the 2018 Act also allows for processing that is carried out by a controller
who is an air/sea carrier for the purposes of preserving the Common Travel Area (i.e.
Ireland, UK, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man).
Finally, processing will be lawful insofar as it is specified in national regulations to be
enacted by theMinister for Justice, Equality and LawReform. There is a procedure provided
for these regulationswhich involves consultationwith theDPCwhomaymake observations
on issues of concern and if the Minister proposes to proceed, despite the concerns, s(he)
must give a written explanation as to why. Thus there is DPC oversight of this process.
Article 23 GDPR allows Member State law to restrict the scope of the obligations and
rights provided in articles 12-22 and article 34 and, to a limited extent, article 5 GDPR.
These restrictions, insofar as they have been implemented in Ireland, are set out below:
Section 59 of the 2018 Act provides that the right of a data subject to object to processing
is restricted in relation to certain electoral activities and in relation to certain processing
activity by the Referendum Commission.
Section 60 of the 2018 Act provides for restrictions on the obligations of controllers
and rights of data subjects for important objectives of general public interest. The rights
and obligations are restricted to the extent that:
a. The restrictions are necessary and proportionate -
To safeguard cabinet confidentiality, parliamentary privilege, national security,
defence and the international relations of the State
i.
ii. For the prevention/investigation of crime
iii. For the administration of tax/duties owed to the State
iv. For legal privilege
v. To enforce civil law claims
vi. To estimate the controller’s liability on foot of a claim.
b. where the information consists of an expression of opinion about the data subject given
in confidence;
c. where the information is held by the Irish supervisory authority (the DPC); the
Information Commissioner or Comptroller and Auditor General for the performance
of their functions.
The rights may also be restricted by Ministerial regulation where necessary for the
protection of a data subject and also where such restrictions are necessary of the purpose
of safeguarding important objectives of public interest e.g. public security and safety;
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investigations; immigration and other objectives and other similar important objectives
set out in section 60(7).
Where further regulations may be made by the Minister, under section 60 of the 2018
Act, such regulations must undergo a consultation process with the DPC. The DPC may
make observations in writing on matters which are of significant concern in relation to
the proposed regulations. If the Minister proposes to proceed and make the regulations
notwithstanding the DPC’s concern, the Minster must give a written explanation as to
why. Thus, the DPC exercises a degree of oversight on any further flexibilities allowed
under this section.
Section 61 of the 2018 Act provides for the restriction of data subjects’ rights where
necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest; scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes and where the exercise of any of those rights would be
likely to render impossible, or seriously impair, the achievement of those purposes.
The 2018 Act provides the following derogations in relation to articles 86-90 GDPR:
Article 86 GDPR: Processing and public access to official documents.
Section 44 of the 2018 Act allows for the disclosure of personal data contained in a
record where a request for access to the record is granted by virtue of a request under the
Freedom of Information Act 2014 or a request under the Access to Information on the
Environment Regulations.
Article 89(2) and (3): Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical
purposes.
Section 61 of the 2018 Act – see above.
Question 2
The right to privacy in the national legal order
The right to privacy – as distinct from a right to data protection per se – has been protected
in Irish law through a number of mechanisms:
i. First, at common law, a right of action existed in breach of confidence where a person
had disclosed confidential information;
ii. Second, a constitutional right to private life was first recognised in McGee v. Attorney
General.3 In Kennedy v. Ireland, the Irish courts accepted that State surveillance of
3 [1974] IR 284.
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journalists’ phones without lawful justification constituted a breach of the journalists’
rights to privacy.4
As well as placing limits on State action, the right to privacy can also be invoked as a
constitutional tort as between private citizens. InHerrity v. AssociatedNewspapers (Ireland)
Limited, the High Court outlined the following relevant principles:5
… What does emerge from the decisions to which I have referred and in
particular from the decision inCogley v. RadioTelefis Eireann6 are the following
principles: –
i. There is a constitutional right to privacy;
ii. The right to privacy is not an unqualified right;
iii. The right to privacymay have to be balanced against other competing rights
or interests;
iv. The right to privacy may be derived from the nature of the information at
issue – that is,matters which are entirely private to an individual andwhich
it may be validly contended that there is no proper basis for the disclosure
either to third parties or to the public generally;
v. There may be circumstances in which an individual may not be able to
maintain that the information concerned must always be kept private,
having regard to the competing interests which may be involved but may
make a complaint in relation to the manner in which the information was
obtained;
vi. The right to sue for damages for breach of the constitutional right to privacy
is not confined to actions against the State or State bodies or institutions.
This analysis was recently cited with approval by the Court of Appeal (Peart J.) in Nolan
v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd.7
iii Third, the right to private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) became part of Irish law pursuant to the European
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.
4 [1987] IR 587.
5 [2011] 1 IR 228.
6 [2005] IEHC 180, [2005] 4 I.R. 79.
7 [2019] IECA 141, (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 15 May 2019).
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Influence of the right to data protection
The Charter right to data protection can and does influence Irish courts when addressing
questions of national privacy law.
In Dwyer v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána,8 the plaintiff challenged the
compatibility with EU law and constitutionality of the provisions of the Communications
(Retention of Data) Act 2011. The 2011 Act had originally been enacted to transpose the
requirements of Directive 2006/24/EC (hereinafter “Data Retention Directive”)9 which
had required mass retention of telecommunications data for law enforcement purposes
namely the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a serious offence, the
safeguarding of the security of the State, and the saving of human life. The Data Retention
Directive which mandated bulk data retention had been annulled by the Court of Justice
(hereinafter “CJEU”) in 2014 in Digital Rights Ireland, finding that “general and
indiscriminate” retention was incompatible with EU law.10 Subsequently, in 2016, the
CJEU had indicated in Tele2 and Watson that national law data retention measures for
criminal justice purposes could infringe EU law.11 Only targeted retention to fight serious
crime was acceptable.
The plaintiff had been convicted ofmurder in circumstanceswhere telecommunications
data obtained under the 2011 Act had been used in his trial. The Court found that the 2011
Act was incompatible with EU law due to the absence of prior independent scrutiny of the
scheme of retention and access and/or safeguards against abuse.
However, the court did go on to consider the constitutional question briefly before
concluding that it was unnecessary. The Court noted:
5.20 The Court will not make a declaration concerning the alleged repugnancy
of sections 3 and 6 of the 2011 Act with the Constitution. The discussion of
the invalid 2006 Directive together with the referred legislation from England
and Sweden that were considered in Tele2 do not require this Court to
determine the constitutionality of the impugned sections. That does not mean
that the in-depth analysis by the ECJ cannot influence the reasoning to be
adopted if this Court could decide or was obliged to decide on the Plaintiff’s
8 [2018] IEHC 685.
9 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communi-
cations services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 89 [2006] OJ
L105/54.
10 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others,
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
11 Judgment of 21 December 2016, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Watson [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
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claim of invalidity having regard to the Constitution relating to retention and
access.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
How have data controllers applied these principles?
These principles have been applied in many organisations as part of “data-mapping”
projects. The principle of “fair processing” has been implemented by many organisations
by drafting fair processing notices (as required by articles 13 and 14) in a fair and
transparent manner. However, there remains a concern that while an organisation could
be compliant with the principles of the GDPR, they must also ensure that they process
personal data “fairly”. This is an opaque conceptwhichwill, no doubt, be further considered
by the DPC, the courts and the European Data Protection Supervisor in time.
The requirement to identify a lawful basis for processing has beenwidely implemented
by organisations carrying out GDPR readiness projects where a lawful basis for each
category of data collected is identified.
In relation to the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation, most
organisations have, as part of their datamapping exercise, identified appropriate retention
periods and have reassessed their data collection processes to only collect personal data
that is relevant and appropriate to the identified lawful purpose for collection.
Consideration by the DPC and the national courts:
The concepts of fair processing, purpose limitation and data minimisation have been the
subject of substantial consideration by the DPC. The DPC publishes case studies of its
decisions on data protection complaints and investigations to provide guidance on these
issues.
In its 2018 Report, the DPC published Case Study 2 of 2018 based on a complaint
handled in accordance with the GDPR and the 2018 Act which related to the provision of
CCTV footage concerning a data subject by the data controller (a bar) to that data subject’s
employer. The DPC was satisfied that this processing by the bar was necessary in pursuit
of the legitimate interests of the employer. It would have been unreasonable for the bar to
refuse the employer’s request in circumstances where there was an allegation that a serious
assault had taken place at the bar during an employee social event. Further, there was
adequate signage in the bar regarding the presence of CCTV.
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Similarly, the issue of the correct use of CCTVhas arisen inmany previous case studies
published by the DPC. In Case Study 12 of 2015 which concerned a complaint handled
under the previous legislative regime of the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 (which
transposed the 1995Data ProtectionDirective), a bus operator had, while reviewingCCTV
footage in the context of a customer complaint, discovered one of its drivers using a mobile
phonewhile drivingwhen reviewingCCTV footage in the context of a customer complaint.
The driver later complained of the use of this footage against him in a disciplinary
procedure. The operator was found to have contravened the principles of fairness of data
processing in circumstances where it had failed to properly or fully inform staff that CCTV
footage might be used in disciplinary proceedings.
In Case Study 14 of 2018, issues of lawfulness, fairness and accuracy of processing arose
in connection with data subjects incorrectly being associated with media articles by a news
feature of a professional networking platform. Persons were matched by name only with
media articles which was found to be insufficient and gave rise to data protection concerns.
The DPC currently has a number of statutory inquiries open in relation to complaints/
potential infringements concerning cross border processing bymultinational organisations
for which the DPC is the lead supervisory authority, where it is examining compliance
with the principle of fairness in contexts such as transparency, retention and fair processing.
It is anticipated that the decisions in these cases (which will be subject to the one-stop-shop
decision making process under article 60 GDPR) will provide practical reference points
and guidance for controllers as to NSAs’ application of the concept of fairness in high
volume data processing scenarios.
The concepts have not yet received substantial judicial consideration at the level of the
Superior Courts. Appeals from decisions of the DPC are heard in the first instance by the
Circuit Court and are frequently further appealed to the Superior Courts.
Question 4
The concept of “legitimate interests” has received some consideration by the Superior
Courts.
In EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd. v. Eircom Ltd.12, the High Court was asked whether the
processing of IP address data could be necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests
pursued by the defendant. The purpose of that processing was to identify those who might
be illegally downloading copyright works from the internet. The Court approached this
issue by reference to the principle of proportionality and a balancing of the right of owners
of copyright to have the fruits of their labour protected, versus any right which an internet
12 [2010] 4 I.R. 349.
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user might have to access the internet and not to have that access terminated. The judge
recognised that the protections afforded to copyright were not limited to those provided
under the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000, but that protection of copyright was
also a fundamental right afforded protection by the Constitution. This being the case, it
was not only legitimate for the defendant to pursue a policy whichwould afford protection
to copyright, but the court would expect the defendant to do so.
More recently, in B.S. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal,13 the appellants challenged the
Tribunal’s provision of information to the UK authorities as inter alia a breach of data
protection law. The Court held:
63. In relation to the provision of the fingerprints to the UK as part of the
information request, there is no question but that this comprises a legitimate
interest for the purposes of s. 2A of the Data Protection Act, 1988. As one sees
from article 4 of the Dublin III Regulation itself, the authorities here are obliged
upon an application for asylumbeingmade to inform the applicant of a number
of matters including at (e) “the fact that the competent authorities of Member
States can exchange data on him or her for the sole purpose of implementing
their obligations arising under this Regulation”. By providing to the UK
authorities the fingerprints lawfully taken from the appellants, ORAC was
doing so in pursuit of the legitimate interest of obtaining information relevant
to the task of determining the member state responsible for examining the
appellants’ applications. That is a legitimate interest which fulfils the
conditionality specified in s. 2A of the 1988 Act for the processing of personal
data.
This finding was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in B.S. v. Refugee Appeals
Tribunal14.
In cases where the DPC has examined reliance on the legal basis of legitimate interests,
it has applied the rationale of CJEU in Rīgas, in which it considered the application of
article 7(f) of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)15 and identified three conditions
that must be met in order to justify the processing.16 These were as follows: a) there must
be the existence of a legitimate interest justifying the processing; b) the processing of the
13 [2017] IECA 179.
14 [2019] IESC 2.
15 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
16 Judgment of 4May 2017 inCase C-13/16,Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde
v Rīgas pašvaldības SIA “Rīgas satiksme [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:336.
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personal data must be necessary for the realisation of the legitimate interest; and c) that
interest must prevail over the rights and interests of the data subject.
In the context of ongoing statutory inquiries by theDPC concerning systemic and high
volume data processing operations by multinational organisations, there are a number of
cases where theDPC is examining reliance on legal basis, including consent and legitimate
interests for specific processing operations. Again, the DPC’s decisions in these cases will
be subject to the article 60 decision making process under the GDPR.
Question 5
In mid-2018, the Irish Government, through the Department of Business, Enterprise and
Innovation issued a call for views17 on the “NewDeal forConsumers”whichwas announced
by the European Commission in April 2018.18 While not specifically dealing with the issue
of personal data as counter-performance for the provision of digital content, this package
of legislative reforms proposed, amongst other things, extending consumer rights protection
to so-called “free” digital services where personal data is provided instead of payment.
Separately, the DPC has a number of inquiries currently ongoing concerning
cross-border processing involving the use of personal data to conduct online targeted
advertising. TheDPC’s decisions in these cases will again be subject to the article 60 decision
making process under the GDPR.
Question 6
Section 57 of the 2018 Act provides that:
“Subject to suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject, the right of a data subject not to be subject
to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, shall,
in addition to the grounds identified in article 22 not apply where—
a. the decision is authorised or required by or under an enactment, and
b. either
17 “Call for views on Proposed EU Directive on the Better Enforcement and Modernisation of EU Consumer
Protection Rules, https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Consultations/Call-for-views-Proposed-EU-Directive-Better-
Enforcement-and-Modernisation-EU-Consumer-Protection-Rules.html and also https://dbei.gov.ie/en/
Consultations/Consultations-files/Call-for-views-Better-Enforcement-and-Modernisation-EU-Consumer-
Protection-Rules.pdf. All webpages referred to were visited on 29 February 2020.




the effect of that decision is to grant a request of the data subject, ori.
ii. in all other cases adequate steps have been taken by the controller to
safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject which steps shall
include the making of arrangements to enable them to make
representations/request human intervention/request to appeal the
decision.”
The “suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject” are set out at section 36 of the 2018 Act and include:
a. explicit consent of the data subject for the processing of his or her personal data for
one or more specified purposes,
b. limitations on access to the personal data undergoing processing within a workplace
in order to prevent unauthorised consultation, alteration, disclosure or erasure of
personal data,
c. strict time limits for the erasure of personal data and mechanisms to ensure that such
limits are observed,
d. specific targeted training for those involved in processing operations, and
e. having regard to the state of the art, the context, nature, scope and purposes of data
processing and the likelihood of risk to, and the severity of any risk to, the rights and
freedoms of data subjects -
i. logging mechanisms to permit verification of whether and by whom the personal
data have been consulted, altered, disclosed or erased,
ii. in cases in which it is not mandatory under the Data Protection Regulation,
designation of a data protection officer,
iii. where the processing involves data relating to the health of a data subject, a
requirement that the processing is undertaken by a person referred to in section
52 (2),
iv. pseudonymisation of the personal data, and
v. encryption of the personal data.
Additional suitable and specific measures may be introduced by regulation.
In making such regulations the Minister shall have regard to the public interest and
the need for protection of individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data
and in particular—
a. the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing,
b. risks arising for the rights and freedoms of individuals, and
c. the likelihood and the severity of the risks for the individuals concerned.
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Question 7
Following the Judgment of 13 May 2014 in Google Spain19 search engines throughout the
EU introduced “Right to Be Forgotten” processes to facilitate the exercise of these rights.
In Savage v. Data Protection Commissioner,20 Mr. Savage sought to have a Reddit
discussion delisted fromGoogle search results.He had been a candidate in the local elections
in 2014 and the article criticised his campaignmaterial, describing him as a “homophobic”
candidate. Google had refused to delist the result and theDPChad found no contravention
of data protection law. However, on appeal in the Circuit Court, the Judge had upheld Mr.
Savage’s appeal on the narrow basis that the heading of the Reddit discussion, describing
Mr. Savage as homophobic, did notmake it clear that that was the individual Reddit poster’s
opinion. It therefore risked inaccuracy.
On appeal, the High Court considered an argument that the Circuit Court had been
obliged to consider the entirety of the text of the Reddit discussion rather than merely the
heading and held:
a. That the Circuit Court Judge had been wrong to consider the URL heading in isolation
as that Court “in applying the jurisprudence of Google Spain had a duty to consider
the underlying article the subject of the search”;21 and
b. That, if the court had considered the underlying discussion thread it could not have
come to the conclusion that it was inaccurate data and factually incorrect, or an
appearance of fact.22
Notably, the Court held Google had not been obliged to edit the search results to place
parenthesis around the URL heading. The responsibility placed on the data controller by
theCJEU inGoogle Spainwas to delist the search once appropriate criteria were considered.
During the period from 25 May to 31 December 2018 (on which the DPC’s first annual
report under the GDPR was based), approximately 25% of all cross-border processing
complaints received by the DPC under the one-stop-shop mechanism related to exercise
of the right to erasure/ right to be forgotten. In a large proportion of such cases, complaints
are not dealt with by theDPC but are handled locally by the receivingNational Supervisory
Authority (hereinafter “NSA”). This is generally for either of two reasons. Firstly, with
complaints relating to the Google search engine, the controller in question is not Google
Ireland Limited but rather is Google LLC in the US (it not having a main establishment
in the EU) and so the DPC is not the lead supervisory authority. Accordingly, the
19 Judgment of 13May 2014,Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
20 [2018] IEHC 122.
21 Ibid, para. 35.
22 Ibid, para. 36.
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one-stop-shop mechanism does not apply and rather each NSA in the EU has competence
to handle such complaints under article 55 GDPR. Secondly, where right to be forgotten
complaints which relate to cross border processing by other controllers are received, these
will also generally be handled locally by the receiving NSA (and not the DPC even where
it is the lead supervisory authority) under article 56(2) GDPR as a derogation from the
principle of the lead supervisory authority’s competence. This is because such cases will
generally involve an assessment of a single data subject request in the context of local,
on-the-ground conditions.
Question 8
Section 43(1) of the 2018 Act provides that processing of personal data for the purpose of
exercising the right to freedomof expression, including inter alia processing for journalistic
purposes, is exempt from compliance with certain provisions of the GDPR “where, having
regard to the importance of the right of freedom of expression and information in a
democratic society, compliance with the provision would be incompatible with such
purposes”. Provision is also made for the DPC to make a referral to the High Court for its
determination on any question of law relating to whether a specific processing operation
is exempt on grounds of freedom of expression and information, from compliance with
a provision of the GDPR.
Section 43(1) suggests a balancing approach similar to that adopted in respect of
journalistic privilege in other areas of national law. The national law concept of journalistic
privilege is heavily influenced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter “ECtHR”). In Mahon v. Keena,23 the Supreme Court considered the scope of
journalistic privilege in the context of confidential information having been leaked from
the Planning Tribunal to a national newspaper. TheCourt referred to the following passage
from the judgment of the ECtHR in Goodwin v. United Kingdom:24
Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press
freedom, as is reflected in the laws and the professional codes of conduct in a
number of Contracting States and is affirmed in several international
instruments on journalistic freedoms. Without such protection, sources may
be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public onmatters of public
interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be
undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable
23 [2010] 1 I.R. 336.
24 (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123.
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information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the
protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society
and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the
exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with article 10
of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the
public interest.
The Supreme Court went on to refer to the test set by the Strasbourg Court: “[t]he court
laid emphasis on the need for any restriction on freedom of expression to be ‘convincingly
established’. It said that the ‘nationalmargin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest
of democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press’. Therefore, ‘limitations on
the confidentiality of journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by the court’”.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The relevant public authority in Ireland is the DPC.
Composition:
No more than three members; each being known as a Commissioner for Data Protection
(a Commissioner). There is currently only one Commissioner, Helen Dixon, who was
recently reappointed to the role for a further term of 5 years. Where there is more than
one Commissioner, a chairperson may be appointed by the Minister.
Appointment process for members and staff:
A Commissioner is appointed by the Government on the recommendation of the Public
Appointments Service for a period of not less than 4 and not more than 5 years from the
date of appointment. The Public Appointments Service appoints a selection panel and
holds an open selection competition. It must ensure that a person is recommended for
appointment only if it is satisfied that the person has the qualifications, experience and
skills necessary to enable the DPC to effectively perform its functions. A Commissioner
whose term expires may be reappointed for one further period of not less than 4 and not
more than 5 years without the need for a further open selection process.
Staff may be appointed by the DPC and such staff are civil servants.
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Additional power or duties the NSA is entrusted with under national law:
In addition to the functions assigned to the Commission as the NSA under the GDPR and
the LED, there are a number of general functions includedwithin theDPC’s role including
all functions assigned under the 2018 Act and other functions as may be assigned from
time to time by other enactment. In addition to specific data protection legislation, there
are in the region of 20 other pieces of legislation, spanning a variety of sectoral areas
concerning the processing of personal data, where the DPC must perform a particular
supervisory function assigned to it under that legislation.
The DPC is also the relevant supervisory authority for the purposes of processing of
personal data in the context of certain electronic communications (including, amongst
other things, unsolicited electronic communications made by phone, e-mail, and SMS)
under the specific laws set out in the “ePrivacy Regulations” (S.I. No. 336 of 2011), under
which the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC (as amended by Directive 2006/24/EC and
2009/136/EC)25 was transposed into Irish law.
The DPC also monitors the lawfulness of processing of personal data in accordance
with Regulation (EU) No 603/201326 – on the establishment of Eurodac.
The DPC is designated for the purposes of Chapter IV (Mutual assistance) of the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, 1981.
Details regarding its ‘enforcement record’ under the GDPR:
During 2019 (the first full calendar year of application of the GDPR), the DPC received
in excess of 6000 valid data breach notifications, over 700 new DPO notifications (bringing
the total number of such notifications to 1596 at year end) and in excess of 7000 complaints.
Over 450 cross-border processing complaints were received through theGDPR’s One Stop
Shop mechanism. There were nearly 48,500 contacts made with the DPC’s Information
& Assessment unit in this period. During 2019 there were also 70 statutory inquiries
underway at the DPC, examining matters of compliance under the GDPR and the LED as
transposed, including 21GDPR inquiries relating to international tech companies. In 2019,
25 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the pro-
cessing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive
on privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L201/37.
26 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member
States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation
(EU)No1077/2011 establishing a EuropeanAgency for the operationalmanagement of large-scale IT systems
in the area of freedom, security and justice [2013] OJ L180/1.
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the DPC concluded its first inquiry and issued a decision under the Irish Data Protection
Act 2018 (specifically under the provisions that transpose the LED) in relation toAnGarda
Síochána (the Irish police force).27 This included the exercise of three corrective powers
(a reprimand, an order to bring processing into compliance and a temporary ban on
processing). The first decisions (and exercise of corrective powers if there are findings of
infringements) arising from inquiries in relation to compliance with the GDPR (including
relating to international tech companies) are expected during the first half of 2020.
Question 10
There is a formal complaint handling process set out in detail in Chapter 2 of Part 6 the
2018 Act which gives further effect to the obligation on NSAs under article 57.1(f) GDPR
to handle every complaint and investigate it to the extent appropriate. (A separate but
equivalent process for the handling of complaints under the LED as transposed is set out
in Chapter 3 of Part 6). It provides that the DPC must examine the complaint and take
such action in respect of it as the DPC considers appropriate having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the complaint. The DPC may take such steps to arrange or facilitate
an amicable resolution of the complaint. Where an amicable resolution cannot be reached
within a reasonable time, unlike under the previous legislative regime in Ireland, the DPC
is not under an obligation to reach a statutory decision in relation to each and every
complaint it receives. Instead there is a range of tools available to the DPC, e.g. reject or
dismiss the complaint, provide advice to the complainant; serve an enforcement notice
on the controller or processor; undertake such inquiry as the DPC thinks fit and take such
other action as the DPC considers appropriate. Consistent with the obligations under
articles 77 and 78 GDPR, the DPC must update the complainant on the progress of his or
her complaintwithin 3months after it has been received andmust also give the complainant
a notice in writing, informing him or her of the ultimate action taken in relation to the
complaint.
As set out in its first annual report on its activities under the GDPR, the DPC’s
fundamental objective in handling the very large volumes of complaints which it receives
is to vindicate the rights of data subjects. As stated in that annual report, in the DPC’s
experience, a high proportion of the complaints which it handles are amenable to being
amicably resolved in a timely fashion without the DPC’s having to consider whether it
27 In relation to the DPC’s enforcement record under the pre-GDPR regime of the Data Protection Acts 1988
and 2003, see also theDPC’s report and ensuing enforcement action in relation to the processing of personal
data carried out by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection in connection with the




should exercise its formal powers under the 2018Act and theGDPR.However, evenwhere
a complaint has been resolved amicably — i.e. to the satisfaction of the complainant —
the making of the complaint might have brought wider or systemic compliance issues
within the data controller/processor organisation to the attention of the DPC. Where the
DPC has been alerted to such issues, it has a range of other audit and investigatory powers
at its disposal outside of the complaint-handling mechanisms under the 2018 Act (for
example, it can open an inquiry of its own volition into the issues or conduct an audit) to
further address the core issues identified.
The rules of natural justice will apply so that the DPC must act fairly and impartially
in investigating complaints etc.
Fair procedures in the context of a data protection investigation arose in the High
Court case, Shatter vData ProtectionCommissioner.28 There, theDPChad issued a decision
which found the former Minister for Justice had breached the data protection rights of
another member of the Irish parliament. In coming to this conclusion, the DPC placed
some reliance on an internal police email. The DPC had been shown the email but had
never received a copy and had not furnished the Minister with a copy either. The High
Court held:
43. Fair procedures would require that, at least, a copy of this document would
also be shown to [the Minister]. This was not done. As a result, [the Minister]
was deprived of an opportunity to make any observations or submissions
concerning this central piece of evidence in the complaint.
Question 11
As noted above, there are currently 61 statutory inquiries underway examining matters of
compliance under the GDPR and the LED as transposed, including 19 GDPR inquiries
relating to international tech companies. The first wave of decisions, and corrective actions
– where there are findings of infringements – arising from these inquiries was expected
in the final quarter of 2019.
Question 12
No. The Data Protection Act 1988-2003 (as amended) did not provide for an award of
damages for intangible harm. A plaintiff would have to establish material loss in order to
succeed in an action for damages under those Acts.
28 [2017] IEHC 670.
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A2013 case, Collins v FBD Insurance p.l.c,29 clarified the position that claimants would
have to establish material loss in order to recover damages under the 1988-2003 Acts.
Question 13
Section 117(7) of the 2018 Act mirrors the GDPR and provides that a data protection
action may be brought on behalf of a data subject by a not-for-profit body, organisation
or association. In practice, Irish law does not currently provide for “class actions”. However,
a representative action as provided for by section 117 may be brought.
At the time of writing, there have been no Court decisions on any section 117 actions.
Nor have data cooperatives or unions emerged at this stage.
However, privacy advocacy groups are active in Ireland and have brought actions in
the public interest under the pre-GDPR regime.Notably, Digital Rights Ireland have taken
a number of actions, one ofwhich resulted in the judgment inDigital Rights Irelandwherein
the Data Retention Directive was invalidated.30
Question 14
TheDPC considers that cross-sectoral regulatory engagement is a vital aspect to the effective
protection and vindication of individuals’ rights as users of digital services. The DPC
maintains close engagement with a range of domestic regulators, including with other
competent authorities under the 2006 Regulation.31
The updated Consumer Protection Regulation (Regulation 2017/2394)32 came into
operation in January 2020, replacing the 2006 regulation, under which the DPC has been
a competent authority for the purposes of co-operation regarding the E-Privacy Directive
since 2009.Under the newRegulation, competent authorities are able to request the exercise
of enforcement powers by other competent authorities. There are also provisions which
allow for coordinated actions across member states, which may involve the Commission
in some circumstances. It is likely that theDPCwill continue to be the competent authority
for the purposes of ePrivacy matters.
29 [2013] IEHC 137.
30 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland.
31 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the
Regulation on consumer protection cooperation) [2004] OJ L364/1.
32 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 [2017] OJ L345/1.
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The DPC also engages with other regulators in EU member states, and beyond, both
on specific issues and more generally. In addition, the DPC participates in the Digital
ClearingHouse – a cross-regulatory initiative established by the European Data Protection
Supervisor bringing together regulators in the digital space (especially data protection,
consumer law and competition law) and aimed at increasing co-operation and coherence,
and deepening synergies between regulators.
The 2018Act specifically recognizes the importance of collaboration between regulators/
other statutory bodies at both domestic and international level by way of Section 26 which
creates an exemption from the general prohibition on the disclosure of confidential
information by staff/ officers/Commissioners of the DPC, where such disclosure is made
“to a public authority, whether in the State or otherwise, for the purposes of facilitating
cooperation between the Commission and such authority in the performance of their
respective functions”.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2018 Act notes that while National Security and
defence lie outside the scope of EU law, the Council of Europe’s 1981 Data Protection
Convention (Convention 108) is relevant to data processing for the purposes of safeguarding
national security, defence and international relations in States that have ratified the
Convention. The Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 (which amongst other things gave
effect to the State’s obligations under Convention 108 and transposed the Data Protection
Directive into Irish law) have been largely repealed as of 25 May 2018 by the 2018 Act
(save that they apply to certain types of processing and legacy - pre-25 May 2018 -
complaints and investigations). One of the purposes for which that previous legislative
regime has been retained relates to the processing of personal data for the purposes of
safeguarding the security of the State, the defence of the State or the international relations
of the State. Accordingly, complaints, contraventions and the obligations of relevant
controllers in this sphere are found in the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 rather than
in the 2018 Act.
The meaning of “national security” within the context of data protection law received
some consideration in the judgment of the High Court in Data Protection Commissioner
v. Facebook Ireland Ltd.33 In particular, in response to Facebook’s argument that EU law
33 [2017] IEHC 545.
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was not engaged insofar as the case concerned processing for national security purposes,
the Court held inter alia at para. 61:
… (4) This case is concerned with processing consisting of the transfer of data
by a private company from a Member State to a private company in a third
country. Thereafter, the datamay be processed in the third country, theUnited
States, for the purposes of national security, counter-terrorism and the
prevention and detection of serious crime. The processing that arises for
consideration is not solely the processing of data by the United States in its
surveillance activities. Furthermore, the processing concerns commercial
activities. This is not processing concerning public security, defence or state
security. The parties to the transfers effected under the SCCdecisions are private
persons and companies, not State actors. The processing of the data by the
United States subsequent to the transfer is unknown and uncertain. At the
point of transfer it will not be known which data (if any) will be subject to
surveillance. It follows that it cannot be said that the transfers concern public
security or are for the purposes of national security. The argument is
inconsistent with the case Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson & Ors (joined
cases C-203/15 and C-698/15) (hereinafter “Watson”). The case concerned the
interpretation of article 15 (1) of the Directive 2002/58/EC (the e-Directive).
The legislation under review included measures adopted in Sweden and the
United Kingdom for reasons of national security. The CJEU held that the
national legislation fell within the scope of the e-Directive, notwithstanding
article 1 (3) of that Directive which excluded from its scope “activities of the
state” in specified fields, including activities of the State in areas of criminal
law and in the areas of public security, defence and State security, including
the economic well-being of the State, when the activities relate to state security
matters by analogy with the first indent of article 3 (2) of Directive 95/46. (see
paras. 69 and 81).
It remains to be seen to what extent the CJEU will consider this issue in the context of the
reference made by the Irish High Court to the CJEU in the proceedings taken by the DPC,
concerning the validity of standard contractual clauses insofar as they apply to EU to US
data transfers, whichwere heard before theCJEU in July 2019. TheOpinion of theAdvocate
General in that reference case was delivered on 19 December 2019.
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In addition, the judgment in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15,Tele2 andWatson34
was applied in Dwyer v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána35 to the question of data
retention for the purposes of combatting serious crime. The Irish data retention legislation
(the 2011 Act) forced telecom providers to retain all telephony metadata for two years,
and provided for disclosure to the Irish police force to prevent, detect, investigate or
prosecute “serious” offences; safeguard national security; or save human lives. The plaintiff’s
challenge dealt only with the serious offences part of the framework.
In its ruling, the High Court agreed that aspects of the 2011 Act governing retention
and disclosure of telephony data contravened EU law (other than where the mobile phone
data was needed for national security or to save a human life) as they allowed for
inappropriate, unnecessary or disproportionate use of data.
TheCourt disagreedwith the State’s argument that the judgment inTele2 andWatson36
should be interpreted narrowly, and that the Irish framework was acceptable under the
CJEU’s definition of “general and indiscriminate” retention. The Court said that position
was difficult to reconcile with the conclusions of the CJEU which clearly state that the
objective of fighting serious crime cannot in itself justify legislation providing for general
and indiscriminate retention of data.
TheCourt refused to rule that the legislation’s retention obligations were incompatible
with the ECHR. The ECtHRhas yet to rule onwhether general and indiscriminate retention
is compatible with the Convention, the Court noted, finding that the Court could therefore
not declare the regime to be incompatible with the ECHR.
However, the Court held that the legislation’s data access provisions violated the ECHR
and EU law, as it set out no prior judicial or independent administrative review for
telephony data access, and inadequate legislative guarantees against abuse.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and the judgment was delivered on
24 February 2020.
34 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 and Watson.
35 [2018] IEHC 685. Further background on this case is set out in response to Question 2 above.
36 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 and Watson.
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A Setting the Scene
Question 1
Article 13 of Law 163/2017mandated the Italian government to issue one ormore legislative
decrees to adapt the national regulatory framework to the provisions of Regulation (EU)
2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”).1 Within this
framework, Legislative Decree 101/2018 amending the Legislative Decree 196/2003
(hereinafter the “Personal Data Protection Code”) was adopted.2
The new articles from 2-ter to 2-septiesdecies of the Personal Data Protection Code
deal with the subjects expressly delegated by the GDPR to the national standard. These
rules govern the processing of particular categories of data (personal data carried out for
implementing a task of public interest or related to the work of public authorities, health
data, child data, data relating to criminal sentencing and criminal offences) and dictate
restrictions on the rights and obligations of theGDPR for judicial reasons, national security
and public interest.
In particular, article 2-quater ensures that the ItalianData ProtectionAuthority (Garante
per la protezione dei dati personali, hereinafter, the “Italian Authority” or the “Authority”)
promotes the adoption of Codes of conduct for services provided for by articles 6(1)(c),
9, 86-90 GDPR.
TheseCodes of conduct cover: (i) processing and freedomof expression and information
(article 85 GDPR); (ii) necessity of the processing to comply with a legal obligation to
* Professor of European Union Law, University of Milan, Italy.
1 Respectively, Law 163/2017, in GURI, 6 November 2017, No. 259 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingDirective 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Leg. dec. 101/2018, in GURI, 4 April 2018, No. 205. Leg. dec. 101/2018 is divided into six chapters and
consists of 28 articles, dedicated to specific aspects of subject: Chapters I to IV (arts 1 to 16), with novelistic
technique make the Code the necessary changes to ensure its compliance with the GDPR, repealing the
incompatible provisions, amending others and inserting in some cases new provisions for implementing
the regulatory reserves provided by the GDPR (see par. 2.1.1); chapters V and VI, on the other hand, cover
the extra-codicist part of the regulatory intervention.
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which the controller is subject (article 6(1)(c) GDPR); (iii) processing and public access
to official documents (article 86 GDPR); (iv) processing of the national identification
number (article 87GDPR); (v) processing in the context of employment (article 88GDPR);
(vi) processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes (article 89 GDPR).
In addition, article 45-bis of the PersonalData ProtectionCode states that the provisions
contained in the new Part II implement the restrictions of article 23 GDPR about the
processing necessary to fulfil a legal obligation or to carry out a task of public interest or
related to the work of public authorities.
The ItalianAuthority has implemented the instruments of regulatory flexibility through
the adoption of ethical rules that replaced the previous codes of ethics and good conduct
(annexes A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.6 of the former Personal Data Protection Code) as per the
combined provisions of articles 2-quater of the Personal Data Protection Code and 20(4),
of the Legislative Decree 101/2018. These rules, submitted by the Italian Authority to a
compatibility reviewwith Regulation (EU) 2016/679, were published in the ItalianOfficial
Journal, under the name of “Codes of conduct” and reported in annexe “A” of the Personal
Data Protection Code.3 As a result, their violation entails the application of the
administrative penalty referred to in article 83(5) of the GDPR, and article 166 of the
Personal Data Protection Code.
Furthermore, the Italian Authority has adopted detailed requirements concerning the
processing of particular categories of data referred to in articles 6, 9 and 86-90 GDPR.4
3 Code of Practice Concerning the Processing of Personal Data in the Exercise of Journalistic Activities,
provision 491/2018, in GURI, 4 January 2019, No. 3; Code of conduct and professional practice applying
to the processing of personal data for statistical and scientific research purposes within the framework of
the national statistical system, provision 514/2018, in GURI 11, 14 January 2019, No. 11; Code of conduct
and professional practice applying to processing of personal data for statistical and scientific purposes,
provision 515/2018, in GURI, 14 January 2019, No. 11; Code of Practice Applying to the Processing of
Personal Data Performed with a View to Defence Investigations, provision 512/2018, in GURI, 15 January
2019, No. 12; Code of conduct and professional practice Regarding the processing of personal data For
historical purposes, provision 513/2018, in GURI, 15 January 2019, No. 12.
4 Provision of 5 June 2019, containing the requirements relating to the processing of particular categories of
data, under article 21(1) of leg. dec. 101/2018, in GURI, 29 July 2019, No. 176. In specific terms, these
requirements include: (i) the processing of particular categories of data in employment reports (general
authorisation of 1/2016); (ii) the processing of particular categories of data by membership bodies, founda-
tions, churches and associations or religious communities (general authorisation of 6/2016); (iii) the pro-
cessing of particular categories of data by private investigators; processing of genetic data (general authori-
sation of 8/2016); (iv) the processing of personal data for scientific research purposes (general authorisation
of 9/2016).
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Question 2
The Italian legislation does not provide for specific rules for the implementation of articles
7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter
“Charter”).5 However, the updated article 1 of the Personal Data Protection Code ensures
that personal data is processed “in respect of human dignity, rights and fundamental
freedoms of the person”. Therefore, it indirectly protects the rights provided by articles 7
and 8 of the Charter.
The Charter has influenced the Italian case-law on the relationship between the right
to anonymity and the right of reporting.6 Indeed, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di
Cassazione) – addressing the subject of confidentiality, under articles 8 and 10(2) of the
European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) and articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter – stated that the right to anonymity, in certain circumstances, can be constricted
in favour of the equally fundamental right to of reporting.7 These circumstances include:
1) the contribution made by broadcasting the image or news pertaining to a debate in the
public interest; 2) the actual and current interest in broadcasting the image or news; 3) the
high degree of notoriety of the subject represented, for the role covered within the public
life of a country; 4) the ways used to obtain and give information, which must be truthful,
proportionate to the purpose of informing in the public interest, and free from insinuations
or personal considerations; 5) prior information about the publication or transmission of
the news or image, so as to allow the right to reply before the disclosure to the public.
5 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.
6 Cass. civ., 22 November 2018 No. 30193; Cass. civ., 9 August 2017, No. 19761; Court of Appeal, 24 June
2016, No. 13161; Cass. civ., 26 June 2013, No. 16111; Cass. civ., 5 April 2012, No. 5525. The Italian Consti-
tutional Court No. 20/2019, in GURI, 27 February 2019, No. 9.
7 Cass. civ., 20 March 2018, No. 6919. Cass. civ. and 5 November 2018, No. 28084 which referred to the
United Sections, the question of balancing the right to comment – intended to at the service of the public
interest – and the right to be forgotten.
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Concerning the principle of “fair processing”, the monitoring activity by the Italian
Authority wasmainly dealingwith the phenomenon of wild telemarketing.8 In this context,
the Italian Authority has made numerous requests for information to telephone operators
(articles 157 and 158 of the Personal Data Protection Code) to acquire evidence to verify
their approach in order to ensure the correct processing of the data of the data subjects.
Therefore, the ItalianAuthority has ascertained several violations of the principle of fairness
provided by Legislative Decree 196/2003.9
In addition, in February 2018, the Authority initiated proceedings against the Italian
Democratic Party following individual reports complaining of the sending of political
propaganda text messages in violation of the principle of fair processing.10
Furthermore, the Authority, by stating its opinion on the text “Update 2018-2019 of
the National Statistical Programme 2017-2019”, has informed the Parliament that in the
context of the processing of data for statistical purposes it is necessary to provide the parties
concerned with all the information referred to in articles 13 and 14 GDPR.11
Lastly, the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio has specified that the possible
unlawful collection ormismanagement of data present on a platform, constitutes a possible
violation of the principles of correct management of personal data, for which the Data
Protection Authority is responsible for investigating.12
Purpose limitation
As part of its advisory activity, the Authority intervened on the concept of “purpose
limitation”. In particular, it issued a favourable opinion on the Framework Convention
scheme between the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance and the company Soluzioni
per il Sistema Economico S.p.A. (SOSE), since the Convention itself identified the data
8 In 2018 this monitoring activity was marked by the adoption of injunction orders for the total amount,
limited to this sector, of 3,440,000 euro (decisions 18 January 2018, No. 16; 22 May 2018, No. 330; 5 July
2018, No. 412; 26 July 2018, No. 441; 29 November 2018, No. 493).
9 Dec., 8 March 2018, No. 140; dec., 31 May 2018, No. 368 and 369, with which the Authority has prohibited
unlawful processing by a call centre operating as a subcontractor on behalf of telephone operators in the
absence of a specific and informed consent of those concerned.
10 Dec., 10 January 2019, No. 3.
11 Dec., 9 May 2018, No. 271.
12 Tar Lazio, 7 May 2018, No. 5043.
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made available by SOSE, in accordance with the principles of purpose limitation and
retention, integrity and confidentiality.13
Furthermore, despite the contrary opinion expressed by the Authority, the decree
amending the discipline on the criminal record (Legislative Decree 122/2018) ruled out
death as a reason for the cancellation of the registration in the criminal record, thus violating
the principles of proportionality and purpose limitation referred to in article 5 GDPR and
article 3 of the Legislative Decree 51/2018.
In addition, the Italian Supreme Court ruled on the judgement of legitimacy (i.e. the
correct application of the law), establishing that the appeal to the SupremeCourt containing
a request for reduction of the penalty imposed by the Authority on the basis of the
assessment of objective elements of the conduct and the purpose of the data processing is
inadmissible, as it involves a new question which requires investigation of the facts.14
In its jurisdiction, the Court of Cagliari upheld the appeal made by a company against
the Authority’s order which had wrongly ascertained the disproportion between the
processing of the data and the purpose of the data processing.15 In the Court’s view, the
Authority’s order made it very difficult for the applicant to carry out an activity which
ensures the respect for fundamental rights and constitutional values, including social
dignity (article 3 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic), scientific research (article 9
of the Constitution of the Italian Republic) and the right to health (article 32 of the
Constitution of the Italian Republic).
Data minimisation
The principle of data minimisation has been widely applied in the context of civic access
to Public Administration documents. In this regard, the Authority has stated that the
display of personal data must not lead to an unjustified and disproportionate interference
in the rights and freedoms of the persons to whom such data refer.16 In accordance with
the principle of minimisation, the Authority has also ordered a ban on the processing of
data relating to employees through the use of vehicle tracking systems.17
The Supreme Court dealt with a case concerning the conduct of employees and data
minimisation and ruled that employees must comply with the principle of data
minimisation, according to which any person authorised for the processing must have
access only to the personal data for which they have been authorised since they relate to
13 Dec., 26 July 2018, No. 439.
14 Cass. civ., 11 May 2018, No. 17278.
15 Court of Cagliari, 6 June 2017, No. 1569.
16 Dec., 20 December 2018, No. 518; dec., 24 December 2018, No. 519; dec., 11 October 2018, No. 464 and
dec., 19 December 2018, No. 517.
17 Dec., 28 June 2018, No. 396 and 19 July 2018, No. 427.
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the performance of their duties.18 In the case at hand, an employee of a bank was
transmitting the data of a customer to a colleague, in breach of his authorisation.19
Question 4
In light of the Italian Supreme Court’s interpretation, consent (article 23 of the Personal
Data Protection Code) is validly provided only if it is freely expressed and if it is clearly
linked to a specific and identified processing.20 Therefore, a website which provides fungible
services can legitimately condition the provision of its services to the processing of data
for advertising purposes, provided that the consent is individually given and linked to the
specific purpose. However, the Italian Supreme Court considered that newsletter services
dealingwith finance, taxation, law and employment, which influence consumers by sending
news under a general consent to receive “promotional information” violated consumers’
privacy. In addition, the Italian Supreme Court interpreted the relationship between
freedom of information and the consent of claimants, stating that TV broadcasters must
pay compensation for damages resulting from the violation of privacy due to the
broadcasting of a TV report without the consent of the person filmed, whose sensitive data
are shared.21
There are no relevant judgments as to the legitimate interest of the data controller.
Question 5
The issue has been widely debated at national level. The Big Data fact-finding survey,
jointly launched by the Italian Competition Authority (hereinafter AGCM), the
Communications Regulatory Authority (hereinafter “AGCom”) and the Data Protection
Authority, shows that data is collected through increasingly complex and innovative
technologies to extract an informative value.22 The authorities noted that the transfer of
personal data for the use of free web services is implicit, i.e. not contractual. This implicit
business relationship is based on the lack of economic compensation, since the market,
missing a regulatory framework on the trade of data, does not assign any price to the
transaction.
18 Cass. pen., 8 January 2019, No. 565.
19 In infringement of article 615-ter of the Italian Criminal Code.
20 Cass. civ., 2 July 2018, No. 17278.
21 Cass. civ., 21 June 2018, No. 16358; see also the Court of Turin (27 February 2019, No. 940) that has also
recently expressed its opinion that, without the consent of the claimants, any broadcasting of the image of
known persons is prohibited if it does not respond to social usefulness; Court of Milan, 12 February 2019,
No. 1355.
22 The joint inquiry on “Big data” launched by the AGCOM deliberation No. 217/17 / CONS.
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In addition, the recent “policy guidelines and recommendations” have specified that
information asymmetries between users and digital operators must be reduced in data
collection.23 To this end, the synergy between the personal Data Protection legislation and
the consumer protection reduces this information asymmetry by ensuring that users receive
“adequate, timely and immediate information about the purpose for collecting and using
their data”.
Question 6
With regard to the implementation of article 22 GDPR, Legislative Decree 51/2018 is
particularly important.24 The Decree provides an organic protocol for the processing of
personal data carried out for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties. In particular, article
8 of Legislative Decree 51/2018 provides for the prohibition of decisions based exclusively
on automated processing, including profiling, which produce negative effects on the data
subject. Automated processing authorised by EU law or by specific legal provisions are
exempted. However, adequate guarantees must be ensured for the data subject’s rights
and freedoms, including the right of the data subject to obtain the human intervention of
the data controller. Furthermore, article 2-octies of the Personal Data Protection Code
establishes the principles for the processing of data relating to criminal convictions and
offences. Specifically, the provision states that, except the cases provided for by Legislative
Decree 51/2018, the processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions outside
the control of the public authority is only permitted in the specified areas (article
2-octies(3)), if it has been previously authorised by laws or regulations that provide for
appropriate guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the data subjects (article 2-octies(1)).
In the absence of such provisions, the processing operations and related guarantees are
identified by decree of theMinister of Justice, pursuant to article 17(3) of the Law 400/1988,
after consultation with the Authority (article 2-octies(2)).
Last, articles 2-undecies and 2-duodecies of the Personal Data Protection Code restrict
rights and obligations provided by articles from 12 to 22 GDPR, for judicial reasons.
23 Big data Interim report 2018 and Big Data: Policy Guidelines and Recommendations of 2 July 2019 in the
context of the joint inquiry on “Big data” launched by the AGCOM deliberation No. 217/17 / CONS.
24 Leg. dec., 18 May 2018, No. 51, in GURI, 24 May 2018, No 119, on the Implementation of the Directive
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal




Among the guarantees, chapter II of Decree 51/2018, under the heading “Rights of the
data subject”, provides for the obligation of the data controller to inform the data subject
of the information referred to in articles from 10 to 14 and 27, so that he can exercise his
rights to access, rectify, cancel and complain to the Authority or to file a judicial appeal
(article 9).
In addition, article 21 stipulates that the collection, modification, consultation,
communication, transfer, interconnection and deletion of data, performed in automated
processing systems, must be recorded in dedicated log files, to be kept for the period
established by decree of the President of the Republic, adopted pursuant to article 17(1)
of the Law 400/1988. Article 25 of Decree 51/2018 establishes an obligation for the data
controller and the data processor to implement technical and organisational measures to
ensure an appropriate level of security for the risk of data breach, balancing technical
knowledge, implementation costs, nature, object, context and purpose of the processing,
as well as the degree of risk for the rights and freedoms of individuals.
Excluding the cases governed by that decree, articles 2-undecies and 2-duodecies of the
Personal Data Protection Code stipulate that the exercise of the rights of the data subject
may be delayed, restricted or excluded. However, that limitation must be communicated,
without delay, to the data subject, unless such communication could compromise the
purpose of the limitation, for the time and to the extent that it constitutes a necessary and
proportionate measure, considering the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the
data subject.
Question 7
Since the application of the GDPR, there has been an increase in the number of requests
to obtain the updating or removal of data which, initially processed lawfully, due to a
change in the situation or the passage of time, are subject to the “right to be forgotten”
discipline.25 This right is intended as a dynamic projection of the person’s right not to
remain indefinitely exposed to further damage to his honour and reputation that may
result from the repeated publication of news legitimately disclosed in the past.
In this context, the Authority’s efforts focused on complaints about the removal of
URLs addressed to various search engines (Bing, Yahoo, Virgil and, especially, Google
Inc.), considering prevailing, in most cases, the interest of the public to have access to the
controversial information.26 Conversely, the Authority, where it considered that the public
interest was recessive with respect to the right to honour, accepted the complaint of the
25 Judgement of 13May 2014 inCase 131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Google Spain), [ECLI:EU:C:2014:317].
26 Dec., 13 December 2018, No. 503; dec., 13 December 2018, No. 505; dec., 13 December 2018, No. 506.
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data subject by inhibiting the disclosure of personal data.27 The Court of Lucca has ruled
that the so-called “right to be forgotten” should be excluded if a short interval has elapsed
between the facts from which the case originated and the final moment of the case itself,
which is undeniably insufficient to weaken the collective interest in knowledge and
disclosure.28 This decision is consistent with the previous decision of the Italian Supreme
Court according to which the protection of the right to be forgotten must also be assessed
with reference to the time of storage of personal data in public records.29
With regard to the relationship between the Authority and the ordinary jurisdiction,
the Court of Milan overturned an Authority’s order stating that the defamatory nature of
the contested linksmust be examined by the ordinary judgewho is responsible for balancing
the right to honour or reputation and the right to freedom of expression of thought.30 Last,
the Court of Milan – in the proceedings in which the Authority opposed Yahoo Emea
Limited, starting from the assumption that the search engine is the data controller and not
a mere intermediary – ruled that any real and effective activity, even minimal, exercised
by them through a permanent organisation, is relevant to the jurisdiction of the Italian
court.31
Question 8
Article 12 of LegislativeDecree 101/2018 – in implementation of article 85GDPR – provides
for amendments to Title XII (articles 136 to 139) of the Personal Data Protection Code,
the heading of which has been replaced in “Journalism, Freedom of Information and
Expression”, whose provisions apply both to the processing carried out in the exercise of
the profession of journalist and to the processing aimed exclusively at the publication or
dissemination, even occasional, of articles, essays and other manifestations of thought,
including academic, artistic and literary expressions.
In addition, pursuant to article 2-quater and 139 of the Personal Data ProtectionCode,
the Authority promotes the adoption by the National Council of the Order of Journalists
of rules of conduct that, relating to the processing of data under article 136, provide for
measures to protect the data subject, differentiated on the basis of the nature of the data.
In this regard, pursuant to article 20(4) of the Legislative Decree 101/2018, the Authority
27 Dec., 26 October 2017, No. 444; dec.,16 November 2017, No 487; dec., 7 February 2019, No. 38.
28 Trib. Lucca, 19 January 2019, No. 96.
29 Cass. civ., 20 March 2018, No. 6919; Cass. civ., 22 November 2018, No. 30193; Cass. Civ., 9 April 1998, No.
3679; Cass. civ., 9 August 2017, No. 19761.
30 Court of Milan, 5 September 2018, No. 7846 overturned the Italian Data Protection Authority’s order of
Dec., 21 December 2017, No. 557.
31 Respectively, Court of Milan, 22 January 2018, No. 491 and the Italian Data Protection Authority’s order
of Dec., 26 January 2017, No. 30.
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has verified the compatibility of the code of ethics of journalists with the GDPR.32 As part
of this verification, the Authority has identified provisions deemed compatible with the
GDPR in order to have them published in the Official Journal under the new name of
“Rules of conduct relating to the processing of personal data in the exercise of journalistic
activities.” These rules of conduct have been listed in annex A of the Personal Data
ProtectionCode in place of the previous Codes of conduct.33 Therefore, the new provisions
constitute essential conditions for the legality of the processing of data in the journalistic
field, as provided for in the combined provisions of articles 2-quater, 102 and 136-139 of
the Personal Data Protection Code.
TheAuthority has addressed numerous interventions related to the interaction between
freedom of expression of thought and potential violations of the right to privacy by the
media. In this regard, the Authority has adopted, as a matter of urgency, some measures
to limit the further dissemination of television reports and articles containing detailed
information suitable for identifying, albeit indirectly, the victims of sex crimes.34 In some
cases, on the other hand, the reasons of the data subject have been considered recessive
with respect to the right of information: this is the case with press articles concerning the
criminal record of persons carrying out professional activities of public importance.35
The freedomof expression of thought has been subject to some interventions by Italian
judges. The Italian Supreme Court has ruled that - pursuant to article 137(2) of Legislative
Decree 196/2003 - the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes may be carried
out without the consent of the data subject.36 However, such processing must include
procedures that ensure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, the dignity of the
data subject, the right to personal identity, and the code of conduct of journalists, which
is a regulatory source pursuant to article 139 of Legislative Decree 196/2003. Moreover,
the relevant case-law has established that the presence of the conditions legitimising the
exercise of the right of reporting does not exhaust, in itself, the analysis of the legitimacy
of the publication or broadcasting of the image of the persons involved.37 To this end, the
public interest in the knowledge of a certain news must first be distinguished from the
autonomous and specific public interest in the knowledge of the appearance of the
protagonists of the narrated event. In the second case, the precautions that surround the
32 Dec., 29 November 2018, No. 491.
33 Min. Dec., 31 January 2019, in GURI, 11 February 2019, No. 35.
34 Dec., 29 November 2018, No. 486, 487, 488, 489 and 490.
35 Dec., 13 December 2018, No. 505 and No. 506.
36 Cass. civ., 9 July 2018, No. 18006. The Supreme Court upheld the judgement as to the merits which ruled
that the journalist had to compensate the damages arising from the unlawful disclosure of a recorded con-
versation without the person’s knowledge, in violation of Art. 2 of the Journalists’ Code of conduct.
37 Court of Lucca, 19 January 2019, No. 96.
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diffusion of the image, due to the greater offensive potential of the visual instrument, must
be more stringent.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The Italian Data Protection Authority is established by the so-called Privacy Act of 1995.38
Article 2-bis of the Personal Data Protection Code, as amended by Art. 14 of the
Legislative Decree 101/2018, entrusts the Authority with the task of implementing the
provisions of the Personal Data Protection Code and the GDPR, as well as to supervise
their proper observance, regulating how they operate in accordance with the principles
and in harmony with other rules in force. The Personal Data Protection Code regulates:
(i) the organisation chart and the organisational structure (article 153); (ii) the requirements
and procedures for the choice of employees, as well as the tasks and emoluments due to
them (articles 153, 155 and 156); (iii) tasks and powers (articles 154 and 154-bis); (4) the
measures which it may enact, with the express exclusion of its intervention in relation to
the processing of data carried out by the judicial authorities in the exercise of their functions
(articles 157 and 158). Finally, the Authority is entitled to act and to be in Court through
professionals of the State Attorney’s Office, its own qualified employees or further lawyers
(article 154-ter).
The first report on the application of theGDPR in Italy, which refers to the period between
25 May and 31 March 2019, lists 48,591 communications of the contact details of the Head
ofData Protection (article 37(7) GDPR and article 28(4) of the LegislativeDecree 51/2018),
7,219 reports and complaints, 946 notifications of Data Breach and 18,557 contacts with
the Public Relations Office.39
38 Law, 31 December 1996, No. 675, in GURI, 8 January1997, No. 5; the law has been repealed under Art.183,
para. 1, a), of the Personal Data Protection Code.
39 See GDPR Application Budget (25 May 2018 – 31 March 2019) published by the Italian Data Protection
A u t h o r i t y , [ w w w . g a r a n t e p r i v a c y . i t / d o c u m e n t s / 1 0 1 6 0 / 0 /
REGOLAMENTO+UE++Il+bilancio+di+applicazione+dal+25+maggio+2018+al+31+marzo+2019.pdf/




The Personal Data Protection Code provides that the data subject has the right to lodge a
complaint (article 141) andmay address a report (article 144) to theAuthority who governs
the respective proceedings with its own regulations (article 142(5)). In this regard, the
Authority, by resolution of 4 April 2019, adopted Regulation 1/2019, relating to the
procedures for examining the complaints and reports.40 Specifically, chapter I of Regulation
1/2019, entitled “Procedures concerning protection before the Authority”, consists of two
sections governing complaints and reports respectively. More in detail, the first section
regulates complaints, i.e. acts indicating the elements provided for by article 142 of the
Personal Data Protection Code, including the detailed indication of the facts and
circumstances on which it is based, the provisions which are presumed to have been
violated, the measures requested and the documentation useful for its evaluation (article
8). Specific provisions are also provided for in relation to the various phases of the procedure
for examining the complaint, such as the processing (article 9), the preliminary investigation
(articles 10 and 11) and the decision (articles 14 to 18).
The reports are identified instead with the residual category of acts originating by
anonymous complaints, which, different from the requests for opinion, questions and
complaints, are directed to solicit a control by the Authority on the relevant discipline in
relation to personal data processing (article 19(1)). The second section also provides that
the Authority may use the information indicated in the reports if it deems it necessary to
start controls on cases in which it sees the risk of serious prejudice or retaliation to the
detriment of subjects concerned by the processing, or for cases of particular gravity (article
19(2)).
Although the report can be examined by the Authority for the purposes of verification
of a possible breach, this does not involve the necessary adoption of a measure (article
19(3)). In fact, the Authority can conclude the examination of the report by arranging its
filing when one of the conditions set out in article 11(1) occurs, or in the case of completely
generic reports, or limited to imputing to a subject facts which do not contain any
circumstantial evidence or elements that allow for the data controller to be easily identified
(article 19(5)). If the report is not filed under article 19(5), the Authority may initiate the
preliminary investigation and the administrative procedure for which the provisions for
complaints in articles 9 to 18 are observed (article 20).
The law has inserted in the Data Protection Code a new Chapter 0.1 entitled
“Alternativeness of the forms of protection” which consists of a single article 140-bis
“Alternative Forms of Protection”. This provision, given that articles 77 and 79 GDPR do
not prejudice the possibility of availing of any other available administrative or extra-judicial
40 Regulation 1/2019, in GURI, 8 May 2019, No. 106.
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recourse, confirms the referral of the choice to the data subject to lodge a complaint to the
Authority or appeal to the Judicial Authority if he considers that the rights he enjoys on
the basis of the regulations on the protection of personal data have been violated,
safeguarding the rule of the alternativeness of judicial protection with that before the
Authority. This applies only to cases proposed for the same subject and between the same
parties, to avoid duplication of proceedings with the risk, in case of an appeal of the
Authority’s decision, of a potential conflict of “judgements”.
In addition, it is appropriate to recall the instruments for regulating complaints, reports
and requests for preliminary verification pursuant to articles 18 and 19 of the Legislative
Decree 101/2018. These provisions introduced, respectively, the procedure of facilitated
definition of the violations in matters of protection of personal data and the handling of
past business. In the first case, starting from 19 September 2018, offenders were given the
faculty to define, on a facilitated basis, the sanction procedures concerning the violations
referred to in articles 33, 161, 162, 162-bis, 162-ter, 163, 164, 164-bis(2), which were not,
at the date of application of the GDPR, already defined with the adoption of the
injunction-order.
This procedure of facilitated definition registered a scarce adhesion by the subjects
involved, leading to the definition of the aforementioned 88 sanctioning proceedings and
to the subsequent collection of a total amount of 386,400 euro. With regard to the handling
of past business, it was provided that, by 4 December 2018, the data subjects could submit
a request to the Authority for handling complaints, reports and requests for preliminary
verifications relating only to the institutions governed by the Data Protection Code prior
to the amendments made to it by the application of the GDPR. This interpretation was
based, on the one hand, on the fact that the right to file complaints or reports based on
the new regulations could not bewaived (article 77GDPR; articles 141 to 144 of the Personal
Data Protection Code, as amended by the Legislative Decree 101/2018), prevailing over
any conflicting internal sources, and on the other hand, on the fact that, following the date
of application of theGDPR, the institution of the preliminary verificationwas incompatible
with the Regulation itself.41
Question 11
One of the most relevant aspects of Legislative Decree 101/2018 is the system of sanctions,
not only for its evident centrality in the new European Data Protection regulation, but
also because the system of referrals to the various regulatory provisions contained therein
41 Dec., 27 September 2018, No. 455, in GURI, 4 October 2018, No. 231.
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(including those of Legislative Decree 196/2003 which the law did not repeal) involves
difficulties of interpretation.
By virtue of the faculty provided by article 84 GDPR, Legislative Decree 101/2018 has
made significant changes to Part III, Title III of the Personal Data Protection Code. In
particular, pursuant to article 15(3) of the Legislative Decree 101/2018, the Authority is
the competent body to impose the administrative pecuniary sanctions referred to in article
166 of the Personal Data Protection Code. In this regard, in 2018, the Authority started
707 administrative sanctioning proceedings, whose acts were adopted on the basis of the
previous discipline under Law 689/1981, as referred to in the Personal Data Protection
Code before the entry into force of Legislative Decree 101/2018.42
All these sanctioning proceedings, including those initiated after theGDPR’s application
date, concern the ascertainment of violations that occurred before 25 May 2018, i.e. at the
time when the Personal Data Protection Code was in force in its formulation prior to the
amendments introduced by Legislative Decree 101/2018. Therefore, by virtue of the
principle tempus regit actum, these violations were challenged according to the procedure
provided for by the aforementioned Law 689/1981. With regard to the measures issued
under the new legislation, excluding those concerning the Rousseau Association, Tim
S.p.A. and Eni Gas e Luce S.p.A., the Authority did not impose any relevant pecuniary
sanction.43
With regard to criminal penalties, the GDPR allows Member States to lay down the
provisions relating to them.Therefore, theData ProtectionCode, as amended and integrated
by LegislativeDecree 101/2018, regulates the criminal cases relating to: unlawful processing
of data (article 167); unlawful communication and dissemination of personal data subject
to large-scale processing (article 167-bis); fraudulent acquisition of personal data subject
to large-scale processing (article 167-ter); falsity in the declarations made to the Authority
and interruption of the execution of the tasks or the exercise of the powers of theAuthority
itself (article 168); non-compliance with the provisions issued by the Authority (article
170).
42 Law, 24 November 1981, No. 689, in GURI, 30 November 1981, No. 329.
43 For the measures issued under the new legislation see Dec., 4 April 2019, No. 90; 18 April 2019, No. 96;
30 April 2019, No. 106; 29 May 2019, No. 121; 5 June 2019, No. 125;12 June 2019, No. 130; 20 June 2019,
No. 137 and 20 June 2019, No. 141. For the measure concerning the Rousseau Association Tim S.p.A. and
Eni Gas e Luce S.p.A. see respectively Dec., 4 April 2019, No. 83; Dec., 15 January 2020, n. 7; Dec.
11 December 2019, n. 232.
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Question 12
From a literal point of view, the Italian legal system does not recognise the dichotomy
between “material damage” and “immaterial damage”. However, these categories can be
traced back respectively to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages provided by the
Italian Civil Code. In this regard, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, non-pecuniary
damages can be compensated only in the cases “provided for by the law”, i.e., according
to a constitutionally oriented interpretation of Article 2059 of the Civil Code: (a) when
the illicit act is abstractly configurable as a criminal offence; in such a case, the victim will
be entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damages arising from the injury of any
interest of the person protected by the law, even if not of constitutional relevance; (b) when
one of the cases in which the law expressly allows the compensation of non-pecuniary
damages even outside of a crime hypothesis (e.g. unlawful processing of personal data)
occurs; in this case, the victim will be entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary
damages resulting from the injury of the interests of the personwhom the legislator intended
to protect through the rule conferring the right to compensation (such as the right to
confidentiality or not to suffer discrimination); (c) when the unlawful act has seriously
violated the person’s inviolable rights, as such an object of constitutional protection; in
this case, the victim will be entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary damages resulting
from the injury of such interests, which, contrary to the first two hypotheses, are not
identified ex ante by law, but must be selected by the judge on a case-by-case basis.44
With regard to the conditions for compensation for damage, the sole circumstance
that the data have been used by the controller or anyone else in an unlawful or incorrect
manner does not legitimise the data subject to claim compensation for non-pecuniary
damages. Indeed, the damage from violation of the fundamental right to the protection
of personal data does not escape the verification of the seriousness of the injury and of the
damage (as a personal loss actually suffered by the data subject). In fact, alsowith reference
to this right, the balance is made with the principle of solidarity pursuant to article 2 of
theConstitution of the Italian Republic, to which the principle of tolerance of theminimum
injury is intrinsically linked. Therefore, a mere violation of the Personal Data Protection
Code does not entail an unjustifiable violation of the right, but a significant offence should
recur.
Moreover, the damages caused by the processing of personal data are subject to the
discipline of article 2050 Italian Civil Code, with the consequence that the injured party
is only required to prove the damage and the causal linkwith the activity of data processing,
while it is up to the defendant to prove that he has taken all appropriate measures to avoid
the damage.
44 Cass. Civ., 11 November 2008, No. 26972; Consiglio di Stato, 3 June 2014, No. 2844.
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Therefore, the damage is to be attributed to those who have processed personal data
or those who have used another party’s processing unless they demonstrate that they have
taken all the appropriate measures to avoid the damage ex article 2050 Civil Code.
Furthermore, the non-pecuniary consequences of such damage - whether contractual or
extra-contractual - are to be considered in re ipsa unless the party causing the damage
proves that there has been no such damage or that the damage is insignificant or that the
injured party has benefited from the publication of the data.45,46
Finally, concerning bank’s unlawful reporting to the Crif (Center for Research in
International Finance), the entrepreneur wrongly referred to as a bad payer, cannot have
de plano the compensation for damages, but must prove it. The ascertained violation in
the use of the customer’s personal erroneously indicated by the bank does not relieve the
customer from proving the damage to his reputation and offering means of proof to
quantify it.
Question 13
Law 31/2019 reformed the institute of the class action by bringing its discipline within the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure, to broaden its scope and strengthen it.47 In particular,
article 1 introduced into the Code of Civil Procedure the title VIII-bis called “Collective
proceedings”, composed of 15 new articles (from article 840-bis to article 840-sexiesdecies).
The reform will enter into force on 19 April 2020, the date from which the provisions of
the current consumer code and, in particular, article 140-bis, will cease to apply.
Implementing article 80 GDPR, article 142(2) of the Personal Data Protection Code
provides that the complaint pursuant to article 77 GDPR is signed by the data subject or,
on his behalf, by a third sector entity subject to the discipline of LegislativeDecree 117/2017,
which is active in the field of protection of rights and freedoms of data subjects, with regard
to personal data protection.48 The action for damages is governed by the aforementioned
article 140-bis of the Consumer Code.
The most active third sector organisations include consumer associations (e.g.,
Altroconsumo).
45 Cass. Civ., 8 January 2019, No. 207; Cass. civ., 4 June 2018, No. 14242; Cass. civ., 15.7.2014, No. 16133;
Court of Appeal of Turin, 4 February 2019, No. 26; Court of Siena, 29 October 2018, No. 1244.
46 Cass. civ., 8 January 2019, No. 207.
47 Law, 12 April 2019, No. 31, Class Action Rules, in GURI, 18 April 2019, No. 92.
48 Leg. dec., 3 July 2017, No. 117, in GURI, 2 August 2017, No. 179.
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Question 14
AGCM, AGCom and the Data Protection Authority launched a joint survey to identify
possible issues related to the use of so-called big data and the definition of a framework
of rules capable of promoting and safeguarding: the protection of personal data, the
competition on the markets within the digital economy, the consumer protection and the
pluralism in the digital ecosystem.49 In particular, it has been observed that exploiting big
data, even in relation to anonymous or aggregated data, can result in increasingly precise
profiling, with the risk of new forms of discrimination and, more generally, of freedom
restrictions. Therefore, through the joint investigation, the three Authorities intend to
verify the impact of information aggregation and of big data accessibility obtained through
non-negotiated forms of user profiling on the digital ecosystem.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
According to the Italian Constitutional Court’s judgment 86/1977, national security
corresponds to the external and internal security of the state, that is, the need to protect
the supreme interests that apply to any community organised in a State from any violent
action or any other action contrary to the democratic spirit that inspires our Constitutional
structure.50
In particular, articles 6 and 7 of Law 124/2007, respectively, define national security as
defence of the independence, integrity and security of the Republic and internal security
of the Republic and the democratic institutions set out in the Constitution of the Italian
Republic from any threat, any subversive activity and any form of criminal or terrorist
aggression.51
Title III “State Defence and Security”, Chapter I of the Personal Data Protection Code
provides for a single article: article 58 “Specific provisions for the processing of personal
data for national security or defence purposes”, which regulates that the processing of
personal data carried out by the bodies of the Republic’s Security Information System, i.e.
data covered by State secrecy, must be in accordance with the provisions of article 160(4)
of the Personal Data Protection Code, as well as of Legislative Decree 51/2018, insofar as
they are compatible.
49 See footnote n. 23.
50 Corte Costituzionale, 24 May 1977, No. 86.
51 Law, 3 August 2007, No. 124, in GURI, 13 August 2007, No. 187.
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In the implementation within Legislative Decree 101/2018, the Authority considered
the new article 132 of the Personal Data Protection Code containing a waiver - introduced
by article 24 Law 167/2017 - regarding the storage of telephone and traffic data in order
to ensure the effectiveness of investigative tools in light of extraordinary needs of
counter-terrorism, including international terrorism, as well as for the purposes of the
investigation and prosecution of the offences referred to in article 51(3-quarter), and
407(2)(a) Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. In specific terms, the Authority noted that
the confirmation of this waiver would have led to significant criticisms with respect to the
principle of proportionality between investigative needs and limitations to the right to
Data Protection of citizens affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereinafter “CJEU”) with the rulings Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2.52 Because of the
incompatibility of this waiver with the principle of proportionality (as interpreted by the
CJEU) and in order to ensure full compliance of the national legislation with EU law, the
Authority asked the Italian government to remove any reference to the aforementioned
article 24 Law 167/2017, from the Decree. However, such instructions were not followed.
Moreover, the Italian Supreme Court recently expressed its opinion on the matter. In
its view, pursuant to articles 8 of the ECHR and articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the data
subject is not entitled to the cancellation of data in public registers. It is legitimate to retain
data when required by law and when it entails a measure necessary for national security,
public safety, economic well-being of the country, prevention of disorder and crime,
protection of health or morality and protection of third parties’ rights and freedoms.53
52 Respectively, Judgment of 8 April 2014, in joined Cases 293/12 and 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v
Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung
and Others (Digital Rights Ireland), [ECLI:EU:C:2014:238] and Judgment of 21 December 2016, in joined
Cases 203/15 and 698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Postoch telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home
Department v Tom Watson and Others (Tele2 Sverige AB), [ECLI:EU:C:2016:970].
53 Cass. civ., 9 August 2017, No. 19761.
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Luxembourg
Tine A. Larsen, Clémentine Boulanger and Annelies Vandendriessche*
A Présentation du contexte
Question 1
La réponse à cette première question s’effectuera en deux temps. A titre liminaire, il s’agira
d’identifier et de décrire les principaux instruments juridiques introduits en droit
luxembourgeois pourmettre enœuvre le RèglementGénéral sur la Protection desDonnées
(règlement 2016/679, ci-après le « RGPD ») (1) pour ensuite mettre en exergue les
principales marges de manœuvres permises par le RGPD (2).
1) L’identification et la description des principaux instruments juridiques
introduits en droit Luxembourgeois pour mettre en œuvre le RGPD
Le RGPD est directement applicable dans la législation luxembourgeoise. La loi du 1er
août 2018 portant organisation de la Commission nationale pour la protection des données
(ci-après désignée « CNPD ») et du régime général sur la protection des données a abrogé
la loi modifiée du 2 août 2002 relative à la protection des personnes à l’égard du traitement
des données à caractère personnel.
Ladite loi confère un statut juridique à la CNPD, décrit les compétences de celle-ci, ses
missions, ses pouvoirs, la composition, la nomination de ses membres et son
fonctionnement. Le processus d’enquête et les décisions prises à l’issue de l’enquête y sont
décrits, ainsi que la possibilité de la CNPD à imposer des amendes administratives.
In fine, la loi prévoit la création d’un Commissariat du Gouvernement à la protection
des données auprès de l’Etat. Celui-ci est placé sous l’autorité du Premier Ministre. Il est
chargé de « développer la protection des données à caractère personnel au sein de
l’administration étatique, de promouvoir les bonnes pratiques à travers l’administration
étatique et de stimuler la sensibilisation des agents; de contribuer à une mise en œuvre
cohérente des politiques dans ce domaine ». Il peut également assurer la fonction de délégué
* Tine A. Larsen: Présidente de la Commission nationale pour la protection des données de Luxembourg
(CNPD). Clémentine Boulanger: Conseillère Juridique auprès de la Commission nationale pour la protection
des données de Luxembourg (CNPD). Annelies Vandendriessche: Chercheur en formation doctorale à
l’Université du Luxembourg.
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à la protection des données pour les chefs d’administrations compétents du ressort ou sous
l’autorité des ministres ou encore celui des communes.
2) Mise enœuvre des principalesmarges demanœuvre permises par leRGPD
à travers les instruments précédemment identifiés
a) Mise en œuvre de l’article 6(1)(c) du RGPD
La mise en œuvre de l’article 6(1)(c) du RGPD ne fait pas l’objet de spécificités en droit
luxembourgeois.
b) Mise en œuvre de l’article 9(4) du RGPD
Le législateur luxembourgeois limite le traitement de données génétiques. En effet, l’article
66 de la loi du 1er août 2018 interdit le traitement de données génétiques en matière de
droit du travail et d’assurance.1 Une telle démarche s’inscrit dans la continuité puisque le
législateur luxembourgeois prévoyait déjà dans la loi modifiée du 2 août 2002 transposant
laDirective 95/46, des règles spécifiques au traitement des données génétiques, qui avaient
été ajoutées par le législateur à la liste de données sensibles.2
c) Mise en œuvre des articles 6(2) et 23 du RGPD
L’article 23 du RGPD prévoit des limitations quant aux droits prévus aux articles 12 à 22
et l’article 34, ainsi qu’à l’article 5 du RGPD. Il y peut être observé que certaines de ces
limitations sont prévues en droit luxembourgeois. En effet, la loi du 1er août 2018 relative
à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère
personnel enmatière pénale ainsi qu’enmatière de sécurité nationale prévoit une limitation
de la fourniture ou la non fourniture des informations à la personne concernée, limite le
droit d’accès de cette dernière, limite le droit de rectification ou d’effacement des données
et la limitation du traitement.
Un projet de loi a été introduit à la Chambre des Députés fin 20183 visant à limiter la
portée de certaines obligations et droits contenus dans le RGPD sur base de l’article 23(2)
RGPD. Le projet de loi, a pour objet de faciliter la surveillance macro prudentielle du
secteur financier et du secteur des assurances au Luxembourg par la Commission de
surveillance du secteur financier (ci-après désignée « CSSF ») et par le Commissariat aux
Assurances (ci-après désigné « CAA ») et ce, dans les domaines relevant de la compétence
1 Pour plus d’informations sur ce point, J-L- Schiltz et M. Spielmann, ‘Mondialisation et Internet’ (2016) 26
Annales de Droit Luxembourgeois p. 133, p. 138.
2 Ibidem, art. 6; J-L Schiltz et M. Spielmann, op. cit. 2, p. 138.
3 Projet de loi N°7373 concernant la limitation de la portée de certains droits et obligations dans le cadre du
RGPD.
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du Fonds de résolution et du Fonds de garantie des dépôts. Des limitations aux droits de
la personne prévus aux articles 13, 14, 15, 18 et 21 RGPD sont envisagés par ledit projet
de loi.4 Dans son avis la CNPD a souligné que le législateur doit fournir des motivations
précises justifiant la nécessité et proportionnalité des limitations prévues aux fins d’intérêt
public poursuivis par la CSSF et le CAA.5
Un autre projet de loi en cours vise à adopter des limitations aux droits prévus aux
articles 15, 16 et 18 du RGPD en matière fiscale, également en vertu de l’article 23(2)
RGPD.6 Le but serait de limiter la portée de ces droits en respectant le principe de
proportionnalité afin de ne pas entraver la procédure de collecte des impôts par
l’Administration des contributions directes.7 Ici encore, la CNPD a souligné dans son avis
que les limitations adoptées en vertu de l’article 23(2) RGPD doivent respecter l’essence
du droit fondamental à la protection des données.8 A cet égard, la CNPD s’est révélée très
critique quant au projet de loi, en affirmant que le projet de loi en question vide de son
essence le droit fondamental de la protection des données en limitant les droits garantis
par le RGPDdans leur ensemble.9 Le projet de loi est actuellement renvoyé en commission
parlementaire pour de plus amples débats.
d) Mise en œuvre de l’article 85 du RGPD
Le législateur a adopté des dérogations en vue de la protection de la liberté d’expression
et d’information à l’article 62 de la loi du 1er août 2018, étant donné que l’adoption de
telles exemptions et dérogations sont requises par l’article 85(2) RGPD.10
e) Mise en œuvre de l’article 86 du RGPD
La loi du 14 septembre 2018 relative à une administration transparente et ouverte a pour
objet de définir un cadre pour la mise en œuvre d’une politique d’ouverture aux personnes
physiques et morales vers les documents détenus par les acteurs mentionnés à l’article 1er
paragraphe 1er de la loi.11 Les documents pouvant être accessibles ou délivrés sont
4 Avis de la CNPD du 5.4.2019 – Projet de loi N°7373, pp. 2 & 3.
5 Ibidem, p. 4.
6 Projet de loi N° 7250 portant exécution, en matière fiscale, des dispositions du RGPD.
7 Ibidem, p. 4.
8 Avis de la CNPD du 29.3.2018 – Projet de loi N° 7250, p. 3.
9 Ibidem, p. 12.
10 Voir la réponse à la question 8.
11 Il s’agit en effet les administrations et services de l’Etat, les communes et les syndicats de communes, les
établissements publics placés sous la tutelle de l’Etat ou sous la surveillance des communes, les personnes




exclusivement ceux relatifs à l’exercice d’une activité administrative desdits acteurs.12 Cette
loi comme son intitulé l’indique, a pour objet d’assurer la transparence des documents
administratifs favorisant l’accès à ces derniers.
L’accès aux documents contenant des données à caractère personnel est soumis à de
nombreuses conditions. En effet, la loi prévoit à l’article 6 paragraphe 1er qu’un tel document
ne peut être communiqué qu’à la seule personne concernée par ses données personnelles.
Encore est-il prévu, que lorsqu’un document ne contient pas uniquement des données
personnelles de la personne ayant introduit la demande d’accès,mais également des données
personnelles d’autres personnes, le document ne pourra être communiqué que lorsqu’il
est possible ou bien « d’occulter ou de disjoindre » ces données à caractère personnel,13
sous condition que cette opération n’occasionne pas de charge administrative excessive,
ou si les personnes concernées donnent leur accord écrit ».14
Il s’avère donc que dès qu’un document contient des données personnelles, la législation
sur la protectiondes données s’applique15 étant donné qu’une communicationde documents
ne pourra être faite que si les données personnelles peuvent être supprimées ou si la
personne concernée par les données en question a consenti par écrit à leur communication
à un tiers.
Lorsqu’une demande de droit d’accès à des documents administratifs détenus par la
CNPD est effectuée, celle-ci devra tenir compte des critères précédemment décris pour
faire droit ou non à ladite requête.
La loi prévoit certes les modalités d’accès ainsi que celles de la communication des
documentsmais ce qui attire notre attention est lamise en place d’uneCommission d’accès
aux documents (ci-après désignée « CAD »), dont un représentant de la CNPD fait partie,
veillant au respect du droit à la protection des données.16 Lorsqu’une personne demandant
l’accès aux documents se voit opposer un refus de communication, celle-ci peut saisir la
CAD qui est une instance administrative indépendante et consultative.17 Les avis de la
CAD sont purement consultatifs, ne sont en aucun cas contraignants et ne peuvent pas
faire l’objet d’un recours en justice.
12 Loi du 14.9.2018 relative à une administration transparente et ouverte. Voir également la lettre circulaire
aux départements ministériels, administrations et services de l’Etat du 26 octobre 2018 par le Premier
ministre d’Etat Xavier Bettel p. 2.
13 Loi du 14.9.2018 relative à une administration transparente et ouverte, art. 5(2)(3).
14 Ibidem.
15 Avis de la CNPD du 26.2.2016 – Projets de loi N° 6810 et 6811, p. 5.
16 Projet de loi N° 6810, Exposé des motifs, Commentaire des articles, ad art. 9, p. 9.
17 Loi du 14 septembre 2018 relative à une administration transparente et ouverte, art 10. Voir également,
Lettre circulaire aux départements ministériels, administrations et services de l’Etat du 26 octobre 2018 par
le Premier ministre d’Etat Xavier Bettel, p. 4.
406
Tine A. Larsen, Clémentine Boulanger and Annelies Vandendriessche
f) Mise en œuvre de l’article 87 du RGPD
L’article 87 du RGPD permet aux Etats membres de préciser des conditions spécifiques
du traitement du numéro d’identification national ou tout autre identifiant d’application
générale, tout en stipulant que des « garanties appropriées pour les droits et libertés de la
personne concernée » en vertu du RGPD doivent être en place. Les règles précisant les
conditions spécifiques du traitement du numéro d’identification national sont d’ores et
déjà prévues par la loi du 19 juin 2013 relative à l’identification des personnes physique.
Ces règles n’ont donc pas été adoptées lors de l’entrée en application du RGPD, mais sont
néanmoins importantes pour préciser les conditions du traitement du numéro
d’identification national.
Le registre national des personnes physiques (ci-après désigné « RNPP ») contient des
données personnelles, telles que le numéro d’identification national de chaque personne.
Lors de l’élaboration de la loi du 19 juin 2013 relative à l’identification des personnes
physique, il avait été envisagé de remplacer le numéro d’identification national actuel,
composé de 13 chiffres faisant référence à certaines données personnelles de chaque
individu,18 par un numéro non-parlant dit « aléatoire » dans le but de renforcer la protection
des données.19 Ce projet a toutefois dû être abandonné après avis du Conseil d’État pour
des raisons pratiques. La CNPD a cependant estimé qu’un numéro aléatoire serait « plus
respectueux en matière de protection des données à caractère personnel ».20 En effet, le
lien du matricule aux données personnelles telles que la date de naissance est susceptible
de créer un risque d’abus puisqu’ une fois qu’on a connaissance de la date de naissance
d’une personne, il ne reste plus qu’à se souvenir des derniers chiffres du matricule pour le
recomposer.21 Admettant que la mutation vers un numéro aléatoire comporte des coûts
financiers et techniques, la CNPD s’est référée à l’exemple de la Suisse qui a opéré cette
même mutation durant une période de transition de 1 ans et demi.22
Néanmoins, la loi du 19 juin 2013 relative à l’identification des personnes physiques
vise à renforcer la protection des données à bien des égards. Premièrement, le matricule
national comporte des chiffres de contrôle23 ce qui permet d’éliminer des erreurs de saisie
humaines ou par ordinateur. Deuxièmement, les finalités exactes des registres de personnes
physiques sont précisées à l’article 4 de la loi.24 Troisièmement, des règles concernant le
18 A savoir: la date de naissance et le sexe. Il peut être précisé que le numéro est impair pour les personnes du
sexe masculin, pair pour les personnes du sexe féminin.
19 Projet de loi N° 6330 relative à l’identification des personnes physiques, Exposé des motifs, pp.18-19.
20 Avis de la CNPD du 16.1.2012 - Projet de loi N° 6330 relative à l’identification des personnes physiques, p.
3.
21 Ibidem, p. 4.
22 Ibidem.




contrôle de l’accès aux données sont adoptées.25 Quatrièmement, le citoyen pourra savoir
quelles administrations ont consulté ses données.26 Cinquièmement, le citoyen disposera
de plusieurs moyens pour communiquer et rectifier ses données et la communication des
données aux tiers est régie par les dispositions du chapitre 3 de la loi. In fine, la cohérence
et la standardisation des procédures entre les différents registres est assurée.
Autre gage non négligeable en ce qui concerne la protection des données par ladite loi
est la mise en place d’une Commission du registre national.27 A cet égard, l’article 7 précise
que leministre n’accorde l’accès au registre national qu’après consultation de laCommission
du registre national. L’accès aux données n’est accordé par le ministre que si cela est en
conformité avec les dispositions concernant le registre national et la protection des données
mais également après avis de la Commission du registre national. Ladite Commission est
composée de sept membres, dont un délégué de la CNPD, qui veille au respect de la
protection des données, et analyse au cas par cas les demandes d’accès au RNPP.28 La
Commission doit analyser en particulier le bien-fondé des demandes d’accès qui devront
être suffisamment motivées. Il revient également à la Commission de préciser l’étendue
de l’accès aux données en limitant celui-ci à certaines données spécifiques contenues dans
le RNPP.
g) Mise en œuvre de l’article 88 du RGPD
L’article 88 du RGPD donne la possibilité aux Etats membres de prévoir « par la loi ou au
moyen de conventions collectives, des règles plus spécifiques pour assurer la protection
des droits et libertés en ce qui concerne le traitement des données à caractère personnel
des employés dans le cadre des relations de travail ». À ce titre, la loi du 1er août 2018
portant modification et organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection
des données, modifie le Code du travail Luxembourgeois en ce qui concerne le traitement
de données à caractère personnel à des fins de surveillance dans le cadre des relations de
travail.29 En effet, l’article L.261-1 du Code du travail se voit modifié. Le traitement de
données à caractère personnel à des fins de surveillance des salariés au travail doit respecter
les conditions de licéité énoncées à l’article 6, paragraphe 1er, lettres a) à f) du RGPD. Cet
article encadre la surveillance au travail dans trois cas précis à savoir: « 1. Pour les besoins
de sécurité et de santé des salariés, 2. Pour le contrôle de production ou des prestations
25 Ibidem.
26 Ibidem.
27 Loi du 19.6.2013 relative à l’identification des personnes physiques, art. 11.
28 Projet de loi N° 6330, Exposé des motifs, ad art. 7, p. 25.
29 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art.
70.
408
Tine A. Larsen, Clémentine Boulanger and Annelies Vandendriessche
du salarié, lorsqu’une telle mesure est le seul moyen pour déterminer le salaire exact, ou
3. Dans le cadre d’une organisation de travail selon l’horaire mobile […] ».30
Il incombe à l’employeur d’informer la représentation du personnel et les salariés
préalablement à la mise en place de la surveillance. Il doit fournir aux salariés une
description détaillée des finalités du traitement de données personnelles prévu, la forme
et la mise en œuvre de la surveillance, la durée et les critères de conservation des données
ainsi qu’ « un engagement formel de l’employeur de la non-utilisation des données collectées
à une finalité autre ».31
Il peut également être mentionné que la délégation du personnel ou les salariés faisant
l’objet d’une telle surveillance peuvent effectuer une demande d’avis préalable à la CNPD
dans les quinze jours suivant l’information préalable de l’installation dudit dispositif, une
telle demande ayant un effet suspensif.32 La CNPD dispose d’un mois pour formuler son
avis. Une telle disposition a fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques étant donné la cacophonie
que celle-ci peut créer si elle est mise en œuvre sachant qu’elle peut être perçue comme
étant une demande d’autorisation à la CNPD celle-ci n’ayant toutefois plus vocation à en
émettre.33
Bien que l’obligation d’autorisation préalable délivrée par la CNPD ne soit plus
nécessaire pour que l’employeur puisse prendre des mesures de surveillance envers ses
salariés, l’article 30 du RGPD impose tout de même aux responsables de traitement
l’obligation de tenir un registre des traitements de données à caractère personnel effectués.34
De plus, tout employeur souhaitant surveiller ses employés reste tenu de respecter les
principes de base du traitement licite et loyal des données à caractère personnel, en plus
des conditions spécifiques posées par l’article L.261-1 du Code du Travail. Les salariés
faisant l’objet d’une surveillance qu’ils estiment illicite, peuvent introduire une réclamation
auprès de la CNPD sur base de l’article L.261-1(5) du Code du Travail. Le Code du Travail
punit pénalement le traitement illicite de données dans le cadre de la surveillance au travail
par une peine d’emprisonnement de 8 jours à un an et une amende de 251 à 125000 euros.35
h) Mise en œuvre de l’article 89 du RGPD
L’équilibre à trouver entre le traitement à des fins archivistiques dans l’intérêt public, à
des fins de recherche scientifique ou historique, ou à des fins statistiques d’une part et les
30 Ibidem.
31 Code du Travail, art. L.261-1(2).
32 Ibidem, L.261-1(4).
33 Avis du Conseil d’Etat du 30.03.2018 – Projet de loi N°7184 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime
général sur la protection des données, p. 39. Voir également l’avis complémentaire du Conseil d’Etat con-
cernant ledit projet de loi et les avis de la CNPD.
34 Lignes directrices en matière de vidéosurveillance de la CNPD, p. 2.
35 Code du Travail, art. L.261-2.
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libertés de la personne concernée par le traitement de ses données d’autre part est également
délicat à trouver. Des garanties sont nécessaires afin de préserver lesdites libertés et
permettre que le traitement en question soit adéquat, pertinent et limité à ce qui est
nécessaire au regard des finalités pour lesquelles il est mis en œuvre.
Contrairement auRGPDqui prévoit le traitement à des fins archivistiques dans l’intérêt
public, le législateur luxembourgeois a choisi de ne pas inclure le traitement à des fins
archivistiques dans l’intérêt public au sein de la loi du 1er août 2018 portant organisation
de la CNPD pour la protection des données et du régime général sur la protection des
données.36 Ladite loi se limite au traitement à des fins de recherches scientifiques ou
historique, ou à des fins statistiques.37 La loi prévoit des dérogations aux droits prévus aux
articles 15, 16, 18 et 21 duRGPDdans lamesure où ces droits risquent de rendre impossible
ou d’entraver sérieusement la réalisation des finalités spécifiques telles que les recherches
scientifiques, historiques et statistiques.38 Une dérogation est également prévue en ce qui
concerne le traitement portant sur des catégories particulières de données à caractère
personnel dans la mesure où ce traitement est nécessaire à des fins archivistiques. Ledit
traitement doit être proportionné à l’objectif poursuivi, respecter l’essence du droit à la
protection des données et prévoir desmesures appropriées et spécifiques pour la sauvegarde
des droits fondamentaux et des intérêts de la personne concernée.39 L’ensemble de ces
dérogations doivent respecter les mesures appropriées listées à l’article 65 de la loi telles
que: la désignation d’un délégué à la protection des données;40 la réalisation d’une analyse
de l’impact des opérations de traitement envisagées sur la protection des données à caractère
personnel ou encore l’anonymisation et la pseudonymisation de ces dernières.
L’archivage dans l’intérêt public quant à lui est prévu dans la loi du 17 août 2018 relative
à l’archivage. Cette loi a plusieurs objectifs à savoir: assurer la gestion et la justification des
droits des personnes physiques ou morales, publiques ou privées, mais aussi de garantir
l’accès à la documentation d’intérêt historique, culturel, économique ou sociétal du
Grand-Duché du Luxembourg.41 Elle permet l’encadrement du versement des archives
publiques ou aux archives nationales ainsi qu’une sélection et la destruction des archives
publiques. La loi prévoit également des dispositions relatives à l’encadrement de la gestion
et de la conservation des archives publiques, ainsi que leur protection.
36 L’archivage dans l’intérêt public fait l’objet d’une loi spécifique.
37 Loi du 1er août 2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données,
Titre II, chapitre 2.
38 Ibidem, art. 63.
39 RGPD, art. 9(2)(j).
40 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art.
65(1).
41 Loi du 17.8.2018 relative à l’archivage, art. 1.
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Il ne peut pas être ignoré que les archives, qu’elles soient privées ou publiques,
contiennent des données à caractère personnel auxquelles une personne concernée par
celles-ci souhaite avoir accès. Ce droit d’accès doit s’effectuer conformément à l’article 15
du RGPD.42 Des dérogations aux articles 16, 18, 20 et 21 sont néanmoins prévues. En effet,
les personnes concernées dont les données à caractère personnel sont contenues dans les
documents archivés ne peuvent pas exiger la rectification des données et la limitation de
leur traitement, ou encore faire valoir leur droit d’opposition audit traitement.
i) Mise en œuvre de l’article 90 du RGPD
La loi du 1er août 2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la
protection des données à l’article 67, révèle que le Luxembourg se dote de règles spécifiques
afin d’encadrer les pouvoirs d’accès de la CNPD visés à l’article 58, paragraphe 1, points
e) et f) du RGPD à l’égard des responsables du traitement ou des sous-traitants soumis à
une obligation de secret professionnel ou à d’autres obligations de secret équivalentes.43
En effet, la loi prévoit des conditions d’accès spécifiques dans le cadre de l’accès auprès ou
à l’égard d’un avocat, d’unnotaire, d’un professionnel de l’audit.44 Pour assurer la protection
des obligations de secret professionnel des avocats, notaires et auditeurs quant aux données
personnelles obtenues dans le cadre d’une activité couverte par leur secret professionnel,45
l’article 67 renvoi aux lois qui régissent ces professions. Il s’agit en effet d’une généralisation
du régime de protection du secret professionnel face aux perquisitions et saisies par les
autorités répressives ou judiciaires, qui s’applique à travers l’article 67 de la loi également
à la CNPD.
Question 2
Actuellement la Constitution luxembourgeoise n’établit aucune distinction entre les deux
droits étant donné que seul le droit au respect de la vie privée est garanti à l’article 11(3)
de la Constitution. La protection de la vie privée fait également l’objet d’une loi spécifique,
celle du 11 août 1982 toujours applicable aujourd’hui. Dans l’ordre juridique national, le
droit à la protection des données est considéré comme étant d’inspiration européenne,46
un tel droit n’ayant pas existé en droit luxembourgeois avant sa création au niveau européen.
42 Ibidem, art. 19.
43 Conformément à l’article 90(1) RGPD.
44 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art.
67.
45 Ibidem, art. 67(4).
46 J-L Schiltz et M. Spielmann, opt. cit. 2, p. 135.
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La distinction entre le droit au respect de la vie privée et le droit à la protection des
données effectué par la Charte a cependant inspiré le dernier projet de réforme de la
Constitution. En effet, la création d’un droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle et à
la protection des données à caractère personnel, indépendant du droit au respect de la vie
privée, y est envisagé.47 La proposition de révision se réfère à l’article 8 de la Charte pour
justifier l’inclusion de ce nouveau droit dans la Constitution.48 Le choix de faire
explicitement mention d’un droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle indique
l’interprétation sous-jacente du droit à la protection des données dans le droit national.49
Pour éclaircir la notion d’ « autodétermination informationnelle » la Commission des
institutions et de la révision constitutionnelle se réfère à l’arrêt Volkszählungsurteil du
Bundesverfassungsgericht de 1983, qui a consacré la valeur constitutionnelle de ce principe
dans le droit allemand.50 Le principe de l’autodétermination informationnelle, étant fondé
sur les valeurs de dignité humaine et d’autonomie individuelle, est bien connu dans la
littérature académique pour avoir un lien inexorable avec la protection des données. En
revanche, il n’est pas clair quant aux conséquences qu’aura son ancrage au niveau
constitutionnel.51
Bien que la proposition de révision constitutionnelle se réfère à l’article 8 de la Charte,
le champ d’application conceptuel de la protection des données en tant que droit
fondamental indépendant par rapport au respect de la vie privée fait l’objet de débats
académiques éclaircis par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne
(ci-après désignée « CJUE »).52 En se référant à l’article 8 de la Charte comme source
d’inspiration pour l’inclusion d’un droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle dans la
Constitution luxembourgeoise, il peut être présumé que son interprétation suive la
jurisprudence de la CJUE en la matière. Toutefois, certains auteurs luxembourgeois
avertissent que la notion d’autodétermination informationnelle repose sur une logique
patrimoniale de droit de propriété individuelle, une interprétation qui serait à éviter.53 Il
est important pour cela que le législateur luxembourgeois se réfère également à la
jurisprudence de la cour constitutionnelle allemande qui ancre le droit à la protection des
47 Rapport de la Commission des institutions et de la révision constitutionnelle du 6.6.2018 – Proposition de
révision N° 6030 portant instauration d’une nouvelle constitution, Commentaire des articles, ad art. 31,
Rapport que l’on retrouve à la page https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
REF(2019)006-f. Toutes les pages Web ont été consultées pour la dernière fois le 1.2.2020.
48 Ibidem.
49 Ibidem.
50 Ibidem; BVerfGE 65, 1 para. 95: „… Das Grundrecht gewährleistet insoweit die Befugnis des Einzelnen,
grundsätzlich selbst über die Preisgabe und Verwendung seiner persönlichen Daten zu bestimmen”.
51 J-L Schiltz, ‘Coffre-fort ou désert de données?’ (Paperjam.lu, 6.4.2015) <paperjam.lu/article/rendez-vous-
coffre-fort-ou-desert-de-donnees>.
52 Rapport de la Commission des institutions et de la révision constitutionnelle du 6.6.2018 – Proposition de
révision N° 6030 portant instauration d’une nouvelle constitution, Commentaire des articles, ad art. 31.
53 J-L Schiltz et M. Spielmann, opt. cit. 2, p. 136.
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données dans les droits fondamentaux de dignité humaine et l’autonomie individuelle. En
tout état de cause, le droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle envisagé par le législateur
luxembourgeois ne serait pas un droit absolu, il pourra faire l’objet de limitations prévues
par la loi.54
B Réception des dispositions de fond du RGPD dans l’ordre juridique
national
Question 3
Dans un arrêt du tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg du 22 octobre 2014, le principe
deminimisation des données a été décrit comme exigeant que seulement «le strictminimum
nécessaire de données soient insérées dans une base de données (cf. Loi de 2002, art 4) ».55
Cet arrêt constitue cependant une exception, étant donné que les cours luxembourgeoises
répètent demanière générale la formule prévue à l’article 4 de la loi de 2002 qui transposait
mot par mot l’article 6 Directive 95/46, qu’un responsable de traitement doit assurer que
« les données traitées le soient loyalement et licitement, et que notamment ces données
soient collectées pour des finalités déterminées explicites et légitimes, et ne soient pas
traitées ultérieurement de manière incompatible avec ces finalités ».
LaCNPDplaide également en faveur du traitement loyal, pour la limitation des finalités
et la minimisation des données. Elle oriente les responsables de traitement en ce sens lors
des demandes d’informations et des réclamations qui lui sont adressées.
Question 4
Le « consentement », a sous l’empire de la loi du 2 août 2002 été interprété de façon très
protectrice par le législateur luxembourgeois comme devant exprimer une « volonté
expresse et non équivoque » pour pouvoir être valable.56 Entre temps cette interprétation
a été abandonnée.57 Le RGPD, mettant l’accent sur le caractère «libre, spécifique, éclairé
et univoque » du consentement, exige que le consommateur ait un véritable choix lorsqu’il
donne son consentement au traitement de ses données personnelles.58 Dans un contexte
54 Voir par ex. Affaire TA Lux, 2.7.2014, n° du rôle 1872/2014.
55 Affaire TA Lux, 22.10.2014, n° du rôle 2697/2014.
56 J-L Schiltz et M. Spielmann, opt. cit. 2, p. 137.
57 Ibidem.
58 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679’ (WP 259 rev. 01, 10.4.2018)
p. 5. “if the data subject has no real choice, feels compelled to consent or will endure negative consequences if
they do not consent, then consent will not be valid”.
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de services numériques, on pourrait s’interroger s’il existe véritablement un libre choix,
lorsque les seules options sont d’accepter le traitement de ses données personnelles et ainsi
pouvoir accéder aux services numériques, ou de refuser le traitement de ses données et
d’être refusé l’accès aux services numériques.
L’article 7, paragraphe 4, du RGPDprévoit que lorsque le consentement est utilisé pour
justifier un traitement de données personnelles, au moment de déterminer si le
consentement est donné librement, il y a lieu de tenir compte de la question de savoir si
l’exécution d’un contrat est subordonnée au consentement au traitement de données à
caractère personnel qui n’est pas nécessaire à l’exécution dudit contrat. De même, l’article
6, paragraphe 1, sous b), dispose que le traitement est licite lorsqu’il « est nécessaire à
l’exécution d’un contrat auquel la personne concernée est partie » (mise en italique par
nos soins).
Question 5
Aucune décision n’a été prise quant à la validité du transfert de données personnelles
comme « contrepartie » à la fourniture de contenus numériques, en droit luxembourgeois.
Il est cependant envisageable que le législateur luxembourgeois et les juridictions
luxembourgeoises s’inspirent des droits des pays voisins en cette matière. À l’exemple de
la Recommandation 2014/02 de la Commission des clauses abusives française, il pourrait
être fait usage de l’article L.122-4 du code de la consommation luxembourgeois. Cet article
prévoit que le fait de « décrire un produit comme étant «gratuit», «à titre gracieux», «sans
frais» ou autres termes similaires si le consommateur doit payer quoi que ce soit d’autre
que les coûts inévitables liés à la réponse à la pratique commerciale et au fait de prendre
possession ou livraison de l’article » est à considérer comme une pratique commerciale
trompeuse réputée déloyale en toutes circonstances.59 En outre, la Commission des clauses
abusives française a maintenu que les clauses de gratuité « laissent croire à l’utilisateur
consommateur ou non-professionnel que le service est dépourvu de toute contrepartie de
sa part, alors que, si toute contrepartie monétaire à sa charge est exclue, les données,
informations et contenus qu’il dépose, consciemment ou non, à l’occasion de l’utilisation
du réseau social, constituent une contrepartie qui s’analyse en une rémunération ou un
prix, potentiellement valorisable par le professionnel […] que ces clauses sont de nature
à créer un déséquilibre significatif entre les droits et obligations des parties au contrat au
détriment du consommateur ou du non-professionnel en ce qu’elles lui laissent croire qu’il
ne fournit aucune contrepartie, alors que celle-ci réside dans l’ensemble des traitements
59 Le texte de cette disposition est identique à l’article L.121-4(19) du Code de la consommation français.
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de ses données à caractère personnel, des informations et des contenus déposés sur le
réseau ».60
La protection du consommateur au Luxembourg étant en plein développement, de tels
raisonnements peuvent voir le jour dans un futur proche.
Question 6
Le Luxembourg n’a pas légiféré pour écarter le droit de ne pas faire l’objet d’une décision
fondée sur un traitement automatisé, y compris le profilage tel qu’autorisé par l’article 22,
paragraphe 2, sous b) du RGPD.
Question 7
Il n’y a aucune application spécifique au droit luxembourgeois par rapport au droit à
l’oubli.61
Question 8
Des dérogations au régime de protection des données prévu par le RGPD ont été adoptées
au Luxembourg pour la mise en œuvre du traitement « aux seules fins de journalisme ou
d’expression universitaire, artistique ou littéraire » à l’article 62 de la loi du 1er août 2018
portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données. Par
rapport à l’ancien article 9 de la loi du 2 août 2002 en la matière, il n’y a pas de grands
changements à noter, hormis ceux reflétant la prise en compte de l’objectif d’harmonisation
complète du RGPD. À cet égard, il y a lieu de mentionner que la référence à la loi modifiée
de 2004 sur la liberté d’expression dans les médias a été supprimée.62 Bien que l’exercice
de la liberté d’expression dans lesmédias reste régi par la loimodifiée de 2004, cette dernière
n’ajoute aucune dérogation supplémentaire au niveau de protection des données à caractère
personnel assuré par le RGPD. L’article 62 a vocation à régir totalement la conciliation
entre les deux droits fondamentaux concernés en droit luxembourgeois.
60 RecommandationN°14-02: Contrats de fourniture de services de réseaux sociaux’ (Commission des clauses
abusives, 7Novembre 2014) <www.clauses-abusives.fr/recommandation/contrats-de-fourniture-de-services-
de-reseaux-sociaux-nouveau/>.
61 J-L Schiltz et M. Spielmann, opt. cit. 2, p. 138.
62 Les dérogations spécifiques pour la protection de la liberté d’expression étaient précédées dans l’article 9
de la Loi du 2 août 2002 par la mention: « Sans préjudice des dispositions prévues dans la loi modifiée du
8 juin 2004 sur la liberté d’expression dans les médias ».
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En terme de contenu, il est intéressant de noter que ledit article a conservé l’ancienne
formulation, plus restrictive de l’article 9 Directive 95/46, au lieu d’adopter la nouvelle
formulation du RGPD qui ne mentionne plus aucun critère d’exclusivité. Dans beaucoup
d’État membres cette formulation avait été interprétée dans le cadre de la Directive 95/46
comme imposant une condition d’exclusivité à des fins du traitement. Plus précisément,
le traitement devait avoir pour seule fin l’expression journalistique, artistique ou littéraire
pour entrer dans le champ d’application de la dérogation.63 L’objet de l’article 62 est de
prévoir une dérogation globale en faveur de l’exercice du droit à la liberté d’expression et
d’information qui s’applique dès qu’un traitement de données relève des domaines
journalistiques ou de l’expression universitaire, artistique ou littéraire. Il incombe au juge
de vérifier si ces finalités sont respectées.64
La première dérogation spécifique au régime de protection des données prévue par
l’article 62(1), prévoit que la prohibition de traitement de catégories particulières de données
à caractère personnel ne s’applique pas,65 de même que les limitations de traitement de
données judiciaires aux condamnations pénales et infractions,66 et ce, si le traitement des
données remplit trois conditions alternatives:67
1. Il doit se rapporter à des données rendues manifestement publiques par la personne
concernée, il doit s’agir d’une « manifestation de volonté claire et non équivoque » de
la personne concernée.68
2. Il doit être en rapport direct avec la vie publique ou le caractère public de la personne
concernée.69
3. Le traitement se rapporte à des données en rapport avec un fait de caractère public
dans lequel la personne concernée est impliquée de façon volontaire.70
La deuxième dérogation prévue par l’article 62(2) est une dérogation au chapitre V du
RGPD, ce qui implique que le mouvement transfrontalier des données vers des pays tiers
ou à des organisations internationales qui ne peuvent pas assurer un niveau de protection
adéquat est permis dans le cadre de traitement de données à des fins journalistiques ou à
des fins d’expression universitaire, artistique ou littéraire.71
63 D. Erdos, ‘From the Scylla of Restriction to the Charybdis of Licence? Exploring the Scope of the “Special
Purposes” Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data Protection’ (2015) 52 CMLRev p. 119, p. 140.
64 Projet de loi N° 7184, Exposé des Motifs, ad art. 56, p. 27.
65 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art
62(1)(a).
66 Ibidem, art. 62(1)(b).
67 Affaire TA Lux, décision du 11.10.2007, n° du rôle 2656/2007.
68 Projet de loi N° 7184, Exposé des Motifs, ad art. 56, p. 27.
69 Ibidem.
70 Ibidem, p. 28.
71 Ibidem.
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La troisième dérogation prévue par l’article 62(3) permet de déroger à l’obligation
d’information lorsque celle-ci « compromettrait la collecte des données auprès de la
personne concernée ».72 Cette dérogation aurait le but d’assurer une liberté d’action aux
journalistes, pour qu’ils ne soient pas contraints de divulguer le sujet de leurs travaux
journalistiques ou leurs méthodes journalistiques à une personne concernée.73
La quatrième dérogation prévue par l’article 62(4) permet de déroger à l’obligation
d’information de la personne concernée lorsque des données sont collectées auprès d’une
personne autre que celle concernée par les données, dans quatre cas de figure:74 (1) lorsque
remplir cette obligation compromet de quelquemanière que ce soit la collecte des données,
(2) lorsque remplir cette obligation compromet une publication en projet, (3) lorsque cela
compromet la mise à disposition du public des données et enfin, (4) lorsque remplir cette
obligation fournirait des indications permettant d’identifier la source d’information
journalistique.75
La dernière dérogation prévue par l’article 62(5) limite le droit d’accès de la personne
concernée.76 En ce qui concerne la source de l’information, le droit d’accès doit être mis
en balance avec les intérêts du journaliste.77 Le droit d’accès concernant la source
journalistique est donc indirect, et ne pourra qu’être accordé par l’intermédiaire de la
CNPD.78 A cet égard, il peut être ajouté qu’en cas d’accès de la CNPD aux lieux de travail
journalistiques, la présence du Président du Conseil de Presse est requise pour veiller au
respect des obligations déontologiques des journalistes, en particulier la protection des
sources.79
C Application interne de la législation en matière de protection
des données
Question 9
La CNPD est notamment compétente en ce qui concerne la bonne application du régime
général sur la protection des données ainsi que pour contrôler et vérifier le respect des
72 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art.
62(3).
73 Projet de loi N° 7184, Exposé des Motifs, ad art. 56, p. 28.
74 Ibidem.
75 Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la protection des données, art.
62(4).
76 Ibidem, art. 62(5).





dispositions de la loi du 1er août 2018 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à
l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel en matière pénale ainsi qu’en
matière de sécurité nationale.80 En revanche, la CNPD n’est pas compétente pour contrôler
les opérations de traitement de données à caractère personnel effectuées par les juridictions
de l’ordre judiciaire, y compris leministère public, et de l’ordre administratif dans l’exercice
de leurs fonctions juridictionnelles. Cette mission revient à l’autorité de contrôle de la
protection des données judiciaires.81 Il s’agit dans un premier temps de faire état des
changements structurels qu’a connu la CNPD occasionné par l’entrée en application du
RGPD (1) pour ensuite effectuer le bilan de la mise en œuvre du RGPD par la CNPD (2).
1) Les changements structurels connus par la CNPD
L’entrée en application du RGPD et son application directe en droit luxembourgeois à
travers la loi du 1er août 2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur
la protection des données, ont eu pour effet de créer de nouvelles missions de la CNPD
ou de renforcer celles existantes.
A l’aube de l’ère digitale et au lendemain de l’entrée en application du paquet «
protection des données », la CNPD a dû se préparer à contrôler, auditer, sanctionner,
répondre aux préoccupations grandissantes du public enmatière de protection des données,
à former et à sensibiliser les acteurs concernés afin de permettre une exploitation encadrée
des données à caractère personnel des individus. Elle se doit également d’assoir de son
autorité à l’échelle européenne au sein du CEPD.
Cette conjoncture entraîne des besoins de personnel conséquent. C’est la raison pour
laquelle, en mars 2015, la CNPD a élaboré un « Concept de développement stratégique
pour la période 2015-2019 » validé par le Gouvernement. Ce dernier a fait l’objet de
nombreuses révisions afin de correspondre davantage aux changements occasionnés par
le RGPD. Emane des dites révisions un besoin prévisionnel d’un effectif s’élevant à 62
postes à plein temps afin de permettre à la CNPD d’assurer son bon fonctionnement, de
répondre à ses missions et de pouvoir respecter les délais imposés par le nouveau système.
Les effectifs de la CNPD comprennent des fonctionnaires et employés de catégories
différentes.
Au début de l’année 2019, l’effectif de la CNPD s’élevait à 39 personnes et ce nombre
devrait s’élargir à 48 d’ici la fin de cette même année.
Mais cet apport en effectif ne s’arrête pas là. La CNPD a toujours et encore besoin de
ressources. En effet, pour la période 2020-2023, 14 personnes supplémentaires à savoir 12
agents de la carrière A1, appartenant au sous-groupe de traitement administratif ou
80 Loi du 1.8.2018 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à car-
actère personnel en matière pénale ainsi qu’en matière de sécurité nationale, art. 39.
81 Ibidem, arts 40 sqq.
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scientifique et technique, 1 agent de la carrière A2, appartenant au sous-groupe de
traitement administratif et une personne de support administratif de la carrière B1 et toutes
à plein temps pourraient venir rejoindre les équipes de la CNPD.
2) Le bilan d’activité de la CNPD favorisant la mise en œuvre du RGPD à
l’échelle nationale82
En 2018, la CNPD a été plus fortement sollicitée que les autres années. Cette sollicitation
émane à la fois de la nouvelle approche dite de responsabilisation émanant du RGPD et
de la prise de conscience des enjeux de protection des données par les professionnels et
les particuliers.
A titre d’exemples, la CNPD a reçu 1.112 demandes de renseignement par écrit en
2018, soit plus que le double qu’en 2017 où elle en avait reçu 528. Ce nombre élevé s’explique
par l’effet médiatique du RGPD et des acteurs de plus en plus sensibilisés.
De nombreuses questions ont porté sur la mise en conformité à la nouvelle législation.
D’autres demandes récurrentes concernaient notamment la vidéosurveillance (du domicile
privé et sur le lieu de travail), le délégué à la protection des données ou encore le droit
d’accès et les autres droits des personnes concernées (droit à l’effacement, droit d’opposition,
droit de rectification, etc.).
La CNPD a par ailleurs, participé au processus législatif avec 27 avis (soit 5 de plus
qu’en 2017) sur des projets de loi ou mesures règlementaires en lien avec la protection des
données.
D’autre part, le nombre de réclamations traitées est jusqu’à présent le plus important
de toute l’histoire de la CNPD.
Le nombre de réclamations de personnes qui ont estimé qu’il y a eu une violation de
la loi ou une entrave à l’exercice de leurs droits a plus que doublé par rapport à l’année
précédente, de 200 en 2017 à 450 en 2018. Le RGPD a eu un impact important: lors des 5
premiers mois de l’année, la CNPD a reçu en moyenne 18 plaintes par mois, tandis que
pour les 7 mois qui ont suivi, elle en a reçu 51 par mois.
En termes de sensibilisation, la CNPD a été on ne peut plus active. En effet, à l’occasion
de l’entrée en application du RGPD, la CNPD a lancé sa campagne de sensibilisation « Vos
données? Vos droits! ». Du 25 mai au 11 juin 2018, l’autorité de protection des données a
organisé plusieurs événements, a distribué 12,000 brochures et gadgets dans de nombreux
endroits stratégiques du Grand-Duché du Luxembourg et est intervenue dans les médias.
Le 4 juin 2018, la CNPD a réuni de prestigieux orateurs afin de célébrer 4 décennies
de protection des données. Le premier Ministre, Monsieur Xavier Bettel, la Commissaire
européenne à la justice, aux consommateurs et à l’égalité des genres,MadameVera Jourova,




et la présidente du Comité Européen de la Protection des Données, Madame Andrea
Jelinek, y sont notamment intervenus.
La CNPD a également pris de nombreuses mesures de sensibilisation et de guidance
en 2018.
Il y a également lieu de préciser que la CNPD a renforcé sa méthodologie d’enquête
en ce qui concerne les audits et les contrôles sur place. En effet, La CNPD a adapté sa
stratégie et mis en place des enquêtes dites « proactives ». Ces enquêtes sont effectuées
sous la forme d’audits thématiques portant sur les nouvelles obligations du RGPD. En
termes de chiffres, 12 enquêtes sur place ont eu lieu en 2018 dans les domaines de la
vidéosurveillance, de la géolocalisation, de la publicité et du marketing.
En termes de violations de données, 172 violations de données ont été déclarées à la
CNPD en 2018. La principale cause de violation de données à caractère personnel reste
l’erreur humaine.
Il ressort de la présente réponse que la CNPD est en perpétuel mouvement afin de
répondre tant au développement de l’ère digitale qu’aux obligations dictées par le RGPD.
L’encadrement de l’exploitation des données à caractère personnel afin que celle-ci soit
en accord avec les valeurs de l’Union européenne et les droits fondamentaux est au cœur
des préoccupations de la CNPD.
Question 10
Il a été précédemment fait mention de l’important nombre des réclamations occasionné
par une prise de conscience de l’importance des droits au respect de la vie privée et du
droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel suite à l’entrée en application du
RGPD.Avec un nombre de 450 réclamations adressées à la CNPDen 2018, une adaptation
en termes de gestion de ces dernières est incontournable. Ladite adaptation s’est concrétisée
à travers l’augmentation de l’effectif du département des réclamations permettant ainsi de
traiter l’ensemble de ces dernières. Toutefois, un ordre de priorité peut être donné en
fonction de la gravité ou du caractère urgent de la réclamation. Il peut également être
précisé que dans lamesure du possible, le traitement des réclamations s’effectue à l’amiable.
La loi du 1er août 2018 portant organisation de la CNPD et du régime général sur la
protection des données ne prévoit pas de contraintes légales quant à la gestion des
réclamations.
Question 11
A l’heure où le rapport est écrit, la CNPD n’a pas fait usage des nouveaux mécanismes
introduits par le RGPD permettant aux autorités de contrôle de sanctionner. Par
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conséquent, aucune sanction relative aux règles sur la protection des données n’a pour le
moment été prononcée.
Question 12
La responsabilité civile est consacrée en droit luxembourgeois à l’article 1382 du code civil
qui dispose que « tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer ». Cet article formulé en des termes
généraux permet de s’adapter à son temps, aux nouvelles situations.83 Il a favorisé la création
d’un droit essentiellement jurisprudentiel.
En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement la notion de préjudice moral, il est important
de préciser qu’elle n’est pas juridiquement définie. Néanmoins, le dommage moral peut
être perçu comme un préjudice « […] que subit l’individu dans sa personne en dehors de
toute blessure physique, et qui se traduit par une atteinte à des liens d’affection, à son nom,
à sa réputation, à l’honneur, à l’image, à la vie privée ».84
L’allocation d’intérêts est permise à travers une interprétation souple du dommage,
c’est notamment le cas lors du préjudice portant atteinte aux droits de la personnalité tel
que celui à la vie privée. En effet, il s’avère que le préjudicemoral engendré par une atteinte
aux droits de la personnalité est plus souvent théorique que réellement constitué ou
démontré.85 La jurisprudence luxembourgeoise révèle qu’en matière d’atteinte à la
personnalité, la démonstration du préjudice n’est généralement pas très rigoureusement
contrôlée dès lors que la faute, telle que l’atteinte illicite à la vie privée est établie.86
L’atteinte illicite à la protection des données à caractère personnel peut également être
considérée comme une atteinte aux droits de la personnalité. Un préjudice moral peut
parfaitement émaner d’une telle atteinte si celle-ci est établie. Pour l’heure, il n’existe pas
encore de jurisprudence relative à une telle situation. Néanmoins, il peut être précisé que
le RGPDprévoit un droit au recours juridictionnel effectif contre une autorité de contrôle87
et contre un responsable du traitement ou un sous-traitant88 en ce qui concerne tout
traitement présumé illicite de ses données personnelles. Cela signifie que, lorsque la CNPD
n’établit pas qu’il y a eu une atteinte illicite au droit à la protection des données à caractère
personnel au moment où elle est saisie d’une réclamation, la personne concernée peut
83 G. Ravarani, La responsabilité civile des personnes privées et publiques (3ème Ed, Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise
2014), p. 22.
84 Ibidem, p. 1132.
85 Ibidem, p. 1134. L’auteur précise notamment qu’en ce qui concerne la vie privée, les droits de la personnalité
sont protégés par la loi du 11.8.1982 concernant la protection de la vie privée.
86 Ibidem, l’auteur fait notamment référence au jugement de la Cour d’appel du 15.6.2000.
87 Voir également la Loi du 1.8.2018 portant organisation de la CNPD, arts 55 et 78.
88 Ibidem, art. 79.
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contester la décision de la CNPD. Par conséquent, la décision de la CNPD résultant de
l’introduction de la réclamation ne conditionne pas l’appréciation du préjudice moral à
posteriori.
Question 13
A l’heure où l’économie digitale bouleverse le droit de la consommation et crée des attentes
du côté consommateurs, des autorités ainsi que des régulateurs en termes de la protection
de leurs données notamment en matière commerciale, le RGPD donne la possibilité aux
Etats-membres de légiférer afin que tout organisme puisse avoir le droit d’introduire une
réclamation auprès de l’autorité de contrôle compétente.89
Le Luxembourg n’a pour l’instant pas introduit une telle possibilité en droit national.
L’inexistence du droit d’introduire une réclamation à la CNPD émanant de l’Association
pour la Protection des données au Luxembourg ou encore de l’Union Luxembourgeoise
des Consommateurs n’est donc pour l’instant pas possible90. La ministre de la Protection
des Consommateurs,Madame Paulette Lenert a récemment rappelé le besoin d’introduire
l’action collective en justice en droit luxembourgeois. En matière du droit à la protection
des données à caractère personnel, un tel besoin s’est notamment fait ressentir lors de
l’affaire Cambridge Analytica. Si l’introduction d’une telle action fait l’objet de nombreux
débats,91 elle devrait se concrétiser à l’avenir.92 En effet, le Luxembourg devrait suivre les
initiatives prises à l’échelle de l’Union européenne93 afin de moderniser le droit à la
consommation et renforcer la protection juridique au sein de l’Union européenne.94
Question 14
Ayant conscience de la valeur économique et de la valeur relative à la dignité humaine des
données à caractère personnel, il y a des interactions ponctuelles entre la CNPD et les
régulateurs tels que l’Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation mais aussi avec l’Union
89 RGPD, art. 80(2).
90 De Konsument 04/2019, pp. 8-9.
91 Menétrey S., Recours collectif- Défis pour le Luxembourg, Table ronde du 6.6.2018, p. 1.
92 De Konsument 03/2017, pp. 6-7.
93 Recommandation de la Commission du 11.6.2013 relative à des principes communs applicables aux
mécanismes de recours collectif en cessation et en réparation dans les Etats membres en cas de violation
des droits conférés par le droit de l’Union européenne.
94 Ibidem, voir également, la proposition de Directive du 11.4.2018 relative aux actions représentatives dans
le domaine de la protection d’intérêts collectifs des consommateurs.
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Luxembourgeoise des consommateurs lors de réclamations relatives au traitement de
données par les services de communications électroniques.95
En outre, la coopération entre les différentes autorités est essentielle. Compte tenu de
l’absence de possibilité d’action collective en justice comme précédemment mentionné ou
encore de la récente création du ministère de la protection des consommateurs,96 la
collaboration entre la CNPD et les autorités compétentes n’est qu’à ses débuts et vise à se
renforcer. De surcroît, la CNPD fait partie du réseau Digital Clearinghouse97 dont le but
est de créer une plateforme favorisant la coopération et le partage d’expérience entre les
autorités, les décideurs ainsi que des chercheurs. Prendre part à un tel réseau permet de
traiter des sujets liés à la concurrence, à la protection des données à caractère personnel
et la protection des consommateurs.
D Traitement de données pour des motifs de sécurité nationale
Question 15
La notion de « sécurité nationale » est définie en droit luxembourgeois par l’article 2 point
13, de la loi du 27 juin 2018 relative au contrôle des exportations qui définit la sécurité
nationale pour les besoins de ladite loi comme « l’indépendance et la souveraineté de l’État,
la sécurité et le fonctionnement des institutions, les droits fondamentaux et les libertés
publiques, la sécurité des personnes et des biens, le potentiel scientifique et technique ou
les intérêts économiques du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg». Il est évident que la sécurité
nationale n’est pas exercée uniquement lors du contrôle des exportations, elle va bien
au-delà de ce domaine et concerne bons nombre d’acteurs tels que le Service de
renseignement de l’Etat98 et la Police grand-ducale. A ce titre, il peut être noté que le
législateur luxembourgeois a fait le choix d’étendre le champ d’application de la loi
luxembourgeoise de transposition de la directive 2016/680, à savoir, la loi du 1er août 2018
relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à
caractère personnel en matière pénale ainsi qu’en matière de sécurité nationale, aux
traitements de données personnelles effectués pour des motifs de « sécurité nationale ».
95 En 2018, le nombre de demandes de médiation relatives au domaine des services de communications élec-
troniques était le plus important (117) par rapport à celles introduites dans le domaine de l’électricité (8)
et dans le domaine des services postaux (4). In rapport d’activité annuel du service « Médiation » 2018, voy.
web.ilr.lu/mediation/FR/Mediation/Informations-utiles/Publications/Pages/default.aspx/.
96 Depuis le 9.12.2018, Arrêté grand-ducal du 5.12.2018 portant constitution des Ministères, art. 1, point 19.
97 Ce projet est une initiative du contrôleur européen de la protection des données. Voy.
www.digitalclearinghouse.org/.
98 Loi modifiée du 5.7.2016 portant réorganisation du Service de renseignement de l’État, art. 3.
423
Luxembourg
Le législateur luxembourgeois a donc fait le choix d’étendre le champ d’application de la
loi du 1er août 2018 précitée à la sécurité nationale.
A ce jour, la loi luxembourgeoise n’a pas effectué de modifications suite aux affaires
jointes Tele 2 et Watson. A titre d’exemple, l’article 5 de la loi modifiée du 30 mai 2005
concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques
dispose que « pour les besoins de la recherche, de la constatation et de la poursuite des
infractions pénales, et dans le seul but de permettre, en tant que besoin, lamise à disposition
des autorités judiciaires d’informations, tout fournisseur de services ou opérateur qui traite
des données relatives au trafic est tenu de conserver ces données pendant une période de
douze mois ».99 Ce même article détaille le traitement de ces données de trafic à des fins
pénales dont la liste apparaît conséquente.100 La loi prévoit également le traitement de
données de localisation autres que les données relatives au trafic à des fins pénales.
Par conséquent la loi luxembourgeoise ne prévoit pas pour le moment un traitement
ciblé des données de trafic à des fins pénales. Des garanties101 et des voies de recours102
pour les personnes concernées sont néanmoins prévues par la loi du 1er août 2018 relative
à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère
personnel en matière pénale ainsi qu’en matière de sécurité nationale. Un projet de loi est
également en cours d’élaboration de rendre la loi luxembourgeoise conforme au droit de
l’Union européenne et à la jurisprudence de la CJUE.103
99 Loi modifiée du 30.5.2005 concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications
électroniques, art. 5(1).
100 Règlement grand-ducal du 24.7.2010 déterminant les catégories de données à caractère personnel générées
ou traitées dans le cadre de la fourniture de services de communication électroniques ou de réseaux de
communications publics.
101 Loi du 1.8.2018 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à car-
actère personnel en matière pénale ainsi qu’en matière de sécurité nationale, chapitre 3.
102 Ibidem, chapitre 7.
103 Projet de loi N°6763 portantmodification duCode d’instruction criminelle et de la loimodifiée du 30.5.2005
concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des communications électroniques.
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Malta
Mireille M. Caruana*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The main national legal instrument introduced to implement Regulation (EU) 2016/679
(General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter “GDPR”)1 inMalta is theData Protection
Act 2018 (hereinafter “DPA”),2 which repealed and replaced the Data Protection Act of
20013 whichwas the legislation that transposedDirective 95/46/EC.4 Subsidiary legislation
has also been passed under the main Act, for example the Data Protection (Processing of
Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation,
Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties)
Regulations,5 transposing Directive (EU) 2016/680.6
Restrictions
Regulations enacted under article 5 DPA state that any restrictions to the rights of the data
subject referred to in article 23 GDPR only apply where such restrictions are a necessary
* Lecturer, Department of Media, Communications and Technology Law, Faculty of Laws, University of
Malta. The author would like to thank Ian Deguara and David Cauchi at the Office of the Information and
Data Protection Commissioner, as well as David E. Zammit and Antoine Camilleri for their input when
writing this report. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Chapter 586, Laws of Malta.
3 Chapter 440, Laws of Malta.
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
5 S.L. 586.08.
6 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA,
[2016] OJ L 119/89.
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measure required for the interests listed therein,7 and provide for broadly formulated
safeguards including retention periods.8
Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research
purposes or statistical purposes
Article 9 GDPR provides that processing of defined ‘special categories of personal data’ is
allowed if such processing ‘is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest,
scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with article
89(1) GDPR based on Union or Member State law (…).’9 The DPA provides that the
controller must consult with, and obtain prior authorisation from, the Information and
Data Protection Commissioner (hereinafter “IDPC”)
where the controller intends to process in the public interest:
a. genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health for statistical or
research purposes; or
b. special categories of data in relation to the management of social care
services and systems, including for the purposes of quality control,
management information and the general national supervision and
monitoring of such services and systems:
Provided that, where genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health
are required to be processed for research purposes, the Commissioner shall
consult a research ethics committee or of an institution recognised by the
Commissioner for the purposes of this article.10
The research ethics committee consulted by the IDPC is the University Research Ethics
Committee’s sub-committee on data protection (hereinafter “UREC-DP”).11 It is doubtful
that this national law satisfies the description provided by the GDPR (that the law must
‘be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection
and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and
the interests of the data subject’). In effect, the requirement of a law is replaced by a
requirement of prior authorisation; and arguably it is envisaged that the Commissioner,
having consultedUREC-DP, will ensure that there is proportionality, respect of the essence
of the right to data protection, etc. prior to granting authorisation.
7 S.L. 586.09 Restriction of the Data Protection (Obligations and Rights) Regulations, regulation 4(a)-(i).
8 Ibid, regulations 5-7.
9 Art. 9(2)(j) GDPR.
10 Art. 7 DPA.
11 Webpage: www.um.edu.mt/urec. All webpages referred to were visited on 31 January 2020.
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Article 6 DPA provides that (subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and
freedoms of the data subject) controllers and processorsmay derogate from the provisions
of the GDPR relating to the right of access,12 the right to rectification,13 the right to
restriction of processing14 and the right to object15 to the processing of personal data for
scientific or historical research purposes or official statistics.16 Controllers and processors
may also derogate from the aforementioned provisions and additionally from the GDPR
provisions relating to the notification obligation regarding the rectification or erasure of
personal data or restriction of processing,17 and the right to data portability18 for the
processing of personal data for archiving purposes in the public interest. In both instances
such derogations are allowed ‘in so far as the exercise of the rights set out in those Articles:
(a) is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of those purposes;
and (b) the data controller reasonably believes that such derogations are necessary for the
fulfilment of those purposes.’ Where such data processing serves at the same time another
purpose, the derogations apply only to processing for the purposes referred to in the said
article. This national provision is an implementation of the exemptions allowed in article
89(2) and (3) GDPR, transposed in terms which closely follow those of the GDPR.
Processing of the national identification number
Article 8 DPA provides that an identity document19 may only be processed when such
processing is ‘clearly justified having regard to the purpose of the processing and – (a) the
importance of a secure identification; or (b) any other valid reason as may be provided by
law: Provided that the national identity number or any other identifier of general application
shall be used only under appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data
subject pursuant to the Regulation.’ This is clearly an implementing provision of article
87 GDPR. The terminology of the GDPR is closely followed and the local implementation
does not add anything of substance thereto. In practice, in Malta it is not uncommon for
12 Art. 15 GDPR.
13 Art. 16 GDPR.
14 Art. 18 GDPR.
15 Art. 21 GDPR.
16 ‘Official statistics’ is a term defined in the legislation as ‘information collected, analysed and produced for
the benefit of the society to characterize collective phenomena in a considered population and produced
by the National Statistics Office as provided for by law, or by other national authorities as designated by
Eurostat following recommendation by the National Statistics Office.’
17 Art. 19 GDPR.
18 Art. 20 GDPR.
19 ‘Identity document’ is defined as a legally valid identity document as provided in the Identity Card and
Other Identity Documents Act (chapter 258 of the Laws of Malta).
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national identity numbers to be collected and processed and such is often done without
regard to strict necessity requirements.20
Processing and freedom of expression and information
Article 9(1) DPA provides that ‘personal data processed for the purpose of exercising the
right to freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic
purposes or for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, shall be exempt
from compliancewith the provisions of theGDPR specified in sub-article (2) where, having
regard to the importance of the right of freedom of expression and information in a
democratic society, compliance with any of the provisions as specified in sub-article (2)
would be incompatible with such processing purposes: Provided that when reconciling
the right to the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and
information, the controller shall ensure that the processing is proportionate, necessary
and justified for reasons of substantial public interest.’
Article 9(2)DPA is an implementation of article 85(2)GDPR. This includes exemptions
from chapters II (principles relating to processing) (but no exemption from article 9GDPR,
processing of special categories of personal data), III (rights of the data subject), IV
(controller and processor) and VII (co-operation and consistency). Specific articles of the
GDPR are cited in the national law, omitting those articles or sub-articles where exemptions
would be unwarranted or inapplicable to the data processing envisaged; for e.g. it is not
unreasonable to exclude the right to rectification provided for in article 16 GDPR from
the list of articles compliance with which may be exempted in the situations envisaged by
article 85 GDPR and article 9 DPA. The national legislation of Malta does not provide for
exemptions from GDPR chapters V (transfers of personal data to third countries or
international organisations), VI (independent supervisory authorities) and IX (specific
data processing situations). This assessment of the exemptions ‘necessary to reconcile the
right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of expression and information’
(article 85(2) GDPR) does not appear to be problematic.
Article 9(2)DPA excludes article 9GDPR from the list of articles fromwhich exemption
is granted where personal data are processed ‘for the purpose of exercising the right to
freedom of expression and information, including processing for journalistic purposes or
for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression’ where compliance with any
of the said provisions (specified in sub-article (2)) would be incompatible with such
processing purposes. Is this potentially problematic, e.g. reporting that a politician who
campaigns for criminalisation of homosexuality turns out to be gay? Article 9(2)(g) GDPR
could provide the appropriate legal base, but then that should be ‘on the basis of Union
20 This practice is generally uncontroversial in Malta and as a result documentary evidence to support this
claim is not available.
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or Member State law’, where reference would, in this author’s opinion, need to be made
to the Media and Defamation Act.21
Transborder Data Transfers
Article 10 DPA provides that in the absence of an adequacy decision pursuant to article
45(3) GDPR, the Minister responsible for data protection may, following consultation
with the IDPC, by regulations set limits to the transfer of specific categories of personal
data to a third country or an international organisation for important reasons of public
interest. This appears to be an implementation of article 49(5) GDPR. Rather than actually
implement the option, the DPA allows for such possible future implementation by
subsidiary legislation.
The Information and Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC)
The office of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner (hereinafter “IDPC”) is
set up under article 11 DPA. In implementation of article 58(1)(f) GDPR, the national law
provides that in the exercise of the investigative powers pursuant to article 58 GDPR, or
any other law, the Commissioner may request the assistance of the executive police in
order to enter and search any premises.22 The national law further provides that in the
event of joint operationswith supervisory authorities of one ormore otherMember States,
the IDPC may, where appropriate, ‘confer powers, including investigative powers, on the
seconding supervisory authority’smembers or staff: Provided that such powers are exercised
under the guidance and in the presence of the IDPC.’23 This provision appears to be
implementing article 62(3) GDPR.
Question 2
Unlike the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter “Charter”), our national legal
order does not distinguish between the right to respect for private life and the right to data
protection.
Article 3224 of the Constitution of Malta provides:
21 Media and Defamation Act 2018, chapter 579, Laws of Malta.
22 Art. 16(1) DPA.
23 Art. 16(2)DPA.Under national law, ‘Commissioner’means the Information andData ProtectionCommis-
sioner appointed under article 11 and includes any officer or employee of the Commissioner authorised
by him in that behalf.
24 Which, while entrenched, is at the same time declared by art. 46 to be non-justiciable, unlike the rest of the
provisions in Chapter IV of the Constitution, which are declared to be justiciable.
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Whereas every person in Malta is entitled to the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of
origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex, sexual orientation or gender
identity, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for
the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely –
a. life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and the
protection of the law;
b. freedom of conscience, of expression and of peaceful assembly and
association; and
c. respect for his private and family life,
the subsequent provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose
of affording protection to the aforesaid rights and freedoms, subject to such
limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions being
limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of
others or the public interest.25
This pre-ambular set of limitations is reflected in specific provisions legitimising derogation
in the case of each right (except for protection from inhuman or degrading treatment),
such as by a provision of law which is ‘reasonably required in the interest of public safety,
public order, public morality or decency, public health or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others’. Several provisions speak both of ‘reasonably required’ and ‘reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society’. The standard is substantially similar to that of the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of 1950 (hereinafter “ECHR”).
Article 38 of theConstitution ofMalta refers in a very limited fashion to the fundamental
right of bodily and spatial privacy (‘no person shall be subjected to the search of his person
or his property or the entry by others on his premises’) without any trace of a reference to
modern concerns regarding for example informational and communications privacy.
The protection of fundamental rights inMalta is enhanced by theECHR, as incorporated
into Maltese law by virtue of the European Convention Act,26 which extended the same
right of action to the new rights derived therefrom.27
There is no tangible evidence regarding the manner in which the Charter right to data
protection may have influenced the interpretation of national law.
25 Emphasis added.
26 Chapter 319, Laws of Malta.
27 Art. 3, European Convention Act.
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Nevertheless, article 8 of the Charter was quoted in the judgment of Dr Jeffrey Pullicino
Orlando v the Information and Data Protection Commissioner.28 This case concerned the
sharing on the blog ‘Running Commentary: Daphne Caruana Galizia’s Notebook’, of
articles including pictures of the claimant, a public figure (formerly a member of the
national Parliament, later theChairman on theMalta Council for Science andTechnology),
in public but not while exercising his official functions, and disclosing elements of his
private life, for e.g. at a restaurant or at the airport with his partner. The right to privacy,
as well as the right to data protection, and the rights relating to freedom of expression and
journalistic freedoms were all mentioned in this judgment. The Hon. Mr Justice Anthony
Ellul, the judge in the case, was not concerned with distinguishing the right to privacy
from the right to data protection, but he did note that the definition of ‘personal data’ in
terms of article 2 of the DPA 2001 is a wide one, and therefore also includes information
regarding the geographical position of a person at a particular time.
Referring to the Lindqvist case,29 the judge explicitly considered the collection of this
data and its uploading and sharing on Daphne Caruana Galizia’s blog to be an instance of
‘processing’ of personal data. The fact that that information concerned matters that
happened in public did not change the fact that processing of personal data had occurred.
Quoting article 8 of the Charter, the judge proceeded to consider the appropriate balance
of the fundamental rights to privacy and to freedom of expression.30 Case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR”) was referred to and quoted.31
Overturning an earlier decision of the IDPC, the judge ruled that although the claimant
was photographed in public places, nevertheless the publication of that information on-line
amounted to processing of personal data, and concluded that the claimant’s rights had in
fact been breached as a public interest in sharing that private information had not been
made out.
28 Court of Appeal (Civil, Inferior), 30 April 2019.
29 Judgment of 6 November 2003 in Case C-101/2001, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist,
ECLI:EU:C:2003:596.
30 Court of Appeal (Civil, Inferior), 30 April 2019, at para. 14.




B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
In Maltapost p.l.c. vs Information and Data Protection Commissioner,32 the Maltese Court
of Appeal (Inferior Competence) annulled a decision of the Information and Data
Protection Appeals Tribunal33 and confirmed the original decision of the IDPC. Referring
to the ‘European Document Retention Guide 2013’,34 as well as to the 2010 Guidelines
published by the Office of the EDPS,35 the Court ruled that the IDPC was right to establish
that CCTV footage should, as a general rule, be deleted after a maximum period of seven
(7) days. It also agreed that the IDPC was correct to establish a maximum retention period
of twenty (20) days for a high-risk area in view of the special circumstances and the nature
of work carried out in that area. The judgement interprets the former national Data
ProtectionAct, which transposedDirective 95/46 and has now been repealed and replaced
by the GDPR and the DPA.
Question 4
To the best of this author’s knowledge, there have been no such interpretations handed
down by our national courts.
Question 5
To the best of this author’s knowledge there is to date no evidence of any debate or decision
at national level regarding the validity of personal data as ‘counter-performance’ for the
provision of digital content. However this author submits that personal data could be
considered as a ‘lawful consideration’ in terms of s.966(d) of the Maltese Civil Code,36 and
thus the validity of the contract would be upheld by a court of law.37
32 Court of Appeal (Inferior competence), Appeal number 26/2017, 5 October 2018.
33 Set up under art. 24 DPA.
34 See: www.project-consult.de/files/Iron%20Mountain%20Guide%202013%20European%20Retention%20
Periods.pdf.
35 The EDPS Video-Surveillance Guidelines, Brussels, 17 March 2010: edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/
publication/10-03-17_video-surveillance_guidelines_en.pdf.
36 Civil Code, chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta.
37 Civil Code s.987: ‘Anobligationwithout a consideration, or founded on a false or an unlawful consideration,




No; Malta has not introduced legislative measures to ensure the right not to be subject to
automated decision-making, including profiling, does not apply in certain situations,
pursuant to article 22(2)(b) GDPR.
Question 7
In Malta there has been considerable controversy surrounding the decision to allow the
request for erasure of certain on-line (criminal) court judgments from the public record.38
The request was made to the court registrar who is the Courts’ data controller. The Malta
IT LawAssociation (hereinafter “MITLA”) expressed concern, stating that: ‘The application
of the right to be forgotten with respect to public records needs transparent, justifiable
rules.’39
It was reported in the local press that the Justice Minister had reported in Parliament
that a total of 176 requests for court judgements to be removed from the public domain
had been filed; of those, 112 judgements weremade anonymous,meaning that the personal
details of individuals were removed; 41 requests were rejected; one request was invalid;
and another 22 requests were under consideration. One request was made in 2014; 21
requests in 2017; 121 requests in 2018; and 33 requests in 2019.40
Question 8
Malta has not introduced a law pursuant to article 85(2) GDPR beyond that described in
the response to Question 1 above, i.e. article 9 DPA.
that such agreement was founded on sufficient consideration, even though such consideration was not
stated.’
38 See for example Times ofMalta, Court judgment can now ‘be forgotten’ – formerminister expresses disbelief
at the decision, 9March 2018, www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180309/local/law-students-request-
to-be-removed-from-database-accepted.672714?utm_source=tom&utm_campaign=top5&utm_medium=
widget; Times of Malta, 22 judgments removed from the court’s online database, 12 April 2018,
www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180412/local/22-judgments-removed-from-courts-online-
database.676092.
39 Statement byMITLA, 16March 2018, accessed at www.mitla.org.mt/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/MITLA-
Statement-16032018-MITLA-Right-to-be-Forgotten.pdf.
40 The Malta Independent, Court judgments removed from internet: Right to be forgotten must be respected
– Bonnici, 17 May 2019, www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-05-17/local-news/Court-judgments-
removed-from-internet-Right-to-be-forgotten-must-be-respected-Bonnici-6736208252. Note: In Malta
the decisions of the Office of the IDPC are not made publicly available for consultation.
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C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The relevant public authority is the IDPC.41
The Commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with the
Leader of the Opposition, to perform the duties of supervisory authority for the purposes
of chapter VI of the GDPR.42 The IDPC is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the
application of the provisions of theDPAand theGDPR, in order to protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing of personal data and to
facilitate the free flow of personal data between Malta and any other Member State.43 The
DPA also provides a list of disqualifications to hold office as Commissioner, for e.g. if s/he
is a Minister or a Member of the House of Representatives, or a judge or magistrate of the
courts of justice.44 The IDPCmust have the qualifications, experience and skills, in particular
in the area of the protection of personal data, required to perform his or her duties and
exercise his or her powers in accordance with article 53(2) GDPR.45
In the exercise of his tasks and powers, the Commissioner acts with complete
independence and is free from external influence, whether direct or indirect, and must
neither seek nor take instructions or direction from any person or entity.46 Any officers
or employees of the Commissioner are chosen by the Commissioner and are subject to
his exclusive direction.47
The IDPC has a separate and distinct legal personality and is capable of entering into
contracts, of acquiring, holding and disposing of any kind of property for the purposes of
his tasks and powers, of suing and being sued, and of doing all such things and entering
into all such transactions as are incidental or conducive to the effective performance of
his tasks and exercise of his powers.48
The tenure of office of the IDPC is of five years and he is eligible for reappointment
on the expiration of his term of office.49 The Commissioner may not be removed from his
office except by the Prime Minister upon an address of the House of Representatives
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members thereof and praying
41 Webpage: https://idpc.org.mt/en/Pages/Home.aspx.
42 Art. 11(1) DPA.
43 Art. 11(2) DPA.
44 Art. 11(3) DPA.
45 Art. 11(4) DPA.
46 Art. 12(1) DPA.
47 Art. 12(3) DPA.
48 Art. 13(1) DPA.
49 Art. 14(1) DPA.
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for such removal on the ground of proved inability to perform the duties of his office
(whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or proved
misbehaviour.50
The Commissioner performs the duties assigned to him under the DPA and the GDPR
and the functions assigned to him under the Freedom of Information Act51 and any other
law.52 S/he has the power to institute civil judicial proceedings in cases where the provisions
of the DPA or the GDPR have been or are about to be violated.53 The IDPC may seek the
advice of, and may consult with, any other competent authority in the exercise of his/her
functions under the DPA and the GDPR.54
It has been reported that, for the period 25 May 2018 to 28 January 2019, in Malta,
over one hundred (100) personal data breaches were notified to the IDPC, with seventeen
(17)GDPR fines being imposed by the same. Per capita, theMaltese figures are significant.55
Question 10
The Office of the IDPC informed the author that all complaints received by the Office are
investigated and that the degree of investigation may depend on the nature of the case,
but as such no ‘selective to be effective’ approach is taken.56
Question 11
On 18 February 2019 the IDPC issued a decision to the Lands Authority after concluding
an investigation of a data breach, that was brought to his attention by the media.57 The
findings of the investigation established that the online application platform available on
the Authority’s web portal lacked the necessary technical and organisational measures to
ensure the security of processing. The Lands Authority was found to have infringed the
provisions of article 32 GDPR and, in terms of article 21 DPA was served with an
administrative fine of 5,000 euro. The level of the fine was stated to have been reached
50 Art. 14(2) DPA.
51 Chapter 496, Laws of Malta.
52 Art. 15(1) DPA.
53 Art. 15(2) DPA.
54 Art. 15(3) DPA.
55 DLAPiperGDPRdata breach survey, www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2019/01/gdpr-data-
breach-survey/.
56 Meeting at the Office of the IDPC held on 23 May 2019.





after the Commissioner took into account the circumstances set out under article 83(2)
GDPR. The temporary ban imposed on the Authority’s web portal was lifted. It was stated
that the Lands Authority offered their full and unrestricted collaboration to the IDPC
during the course of the entire investigation.58
Article 21DPA implements article 83(7)GDPRandprovides that the IDPCmay impose
an administrative fine on a public authority or body of up to 25,000 euro for each violation
and additionally 25 euro for each day duringwhich such violation persists, which fine shall
be determined and imposed by the IDPC in accordance with the procedure stipulated in
article 26 DPA, for an infringement under article 83(4) GDPR.
The fine that the IDPC may impose on a public authority or body for an infringement
of article 83(5) or (6) GDPR (in accordancewith the same procedure under article 26DPA)
must not exceed 50,000 euro for each violation and additionally 50 euro for each day during
which such violation persists. Administrative fines on a public authority or body are to be
imposed by the IDPC after giving due regard to the circumstances of the case pursuant to
article 83(2) GDPR.
Further to the GDPR, article 22 DPA provides that any person who – (a) knowingly
provides false information to the IDPC when so requested by the IDPC pursuant to his
investigative powers under article 58 GDPR, or any other law; or (b) does not comply with
any lawful request pursuant to an investigation by the IDPC – shall be guilty of an offence
and shall, upon conviction, be liable to a fine (multa) of not less than one thousand, two
hundred and fifty euro (1,250) euro and not more than fifty thousand (50,000) euro, or to
imprisonment for six months, or to both such fine (multa) and imprisonment.
Question 12
Malta’s legal system awards damages for intangible harm in some areas, most notably in
cases dealing with human rights, defamation and intellectual property law. Save for a
recently introduced exception,59 the right of the plaintiff in an ordinary tort action to
recover damages for intangible harm is not acknowledged by statute in Malta. When
awarding damages for intangible harm (termed ‘moral damages’ in the Maltese legal
system), and in the absence of concrete evidence to calculate damnum emergens60 and/or
58 Press release ‘Lands Authority Personal Data Breach’ Reference Number: IDPC011, 18 February 2019,
https://idpc.org.mt/en/Press/Pages/Lands-Authority-Personal-Data-Breach.aspx.
59 See Act XXXII of 2018, article 15 (discussed below).
60 Actual damages sustained.
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lucrum cessans,61 the Maltese courts tend to use their discretion arbitrio boni viri62 in
establishing the amount of compensation to be awarded.
Civil damages
In Malta the courts have traditionally affirmed that moral damages are not awarded in an
ordinary action for civil damages under the law of tort or quasi-tort, but admitted this
possibility under human rights law.63 However, this traditional position has been contested
and challenged as this means that moral damages may be awarded against the State in a
case brought before the Civil Court, First Hall (in its Constitutional jurisdiction),64 and
potentially appealed before the Constitutional Court, but not in a case brought against a
private individual (or the State65) before the (ordinary) Civil Courts (First Hall, and
potentially appealed before the Court of Appeal.) While the argument has been made for
the horizontal effects of fundamental human rights (understood not as ‘holding individuals
responsible for human rights violations’ but as ‘keeping human rights principles in mind
when judicially interpreting private law’),66 this is not uncontroversial.67
In Busuttil v Muscat,68 the Civil Court held that the aesthetic facial injury suffered by
the applicant due to medical negligence violated the value of psycho-physical integrity
which it held was protected by the Constitution of Malta, the ECHR and article 3 of the
Charter (‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity.’)
Holding that the ordinary law must be interpreted in a manner that is ‘constitutionally
compliant’, the Civil Court interpreted the Civil Code in this light. In particular, the Court
focused on Articles 1033 and 1045 of the Civil Code:
Any person who, with or without intent to injure, voluntarily or through
negligence, imprudence, or want of attention, is guilty of any act or omission
61 Ceased/lost profits; losses of future earnings arising from any permanent incapacity, total or partial.
62 ‘According to the judgment of a fair man.’
63 For a fuller account see D.E. Zammit, ‘How human rights have influenced Maltese civil liability jurispru-
dence’, in R.Magion (Ed.),TheUNDeclaration ofHumanRights: 70 years on,Malta, Fondazzjoni Celebraz-
zjonijiet Nazzjonali, 2018, p. 34; referencing C. Micallef Grimaud, ‘Article 1045 of the Maltese Civil Code:
Is Compensation for Moral Damage Compatible Therewith?’, Journal of Civil Law Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2,
2011, pp. 481-513. Cf. also A. Wadge (2018) Moral Damages in Public Law with particular reference to
remedies arising from Human Rights Action, Unpublished LLD dissertation, University of Malta.
64 Under art. 46 Constitution of Malta.
65 Cf. article 46(2) proviso, Constitution of Malta.
66 Zammit, 2018, p. 36.
67 SeeG. Bonello, ‘Misunderstanding theConstitution – 2: Can individuals be sued for human rights violation?’,
Sunday Times of Malta, 14 January 2018, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/Misunderstanding-the-
Constitution-2-Can-individuals-be-sued-for-human.667891.
68 Linda Busuttil illum Cordina et. v. Dr Josie Muscat et. Civil Court (First Hall), 30 November 2010.
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constituting a breach of the duty imposed by law, shall be liable for any damage
resulting therefrom.69
The damagewhich is to bemade good (….) shall consist in the actual losswhich
the act shall have directly caused to the injured party, in the expenses which
the latter may have been compelled to incur in consequence of the damage, in
the loss of actual wages or other earnings, and in the loss of future earnings
arising from any permanent incapacity, total or partial, which the actmay have
caused.70
The Court held that the words ‘any damage’ and ‘actual loss’ were broad enough to
encompass damage to psycho-physical integrity as a justification for a compensatory
damages award to the victim. It then proceeded, arbitrio boni viri, to compensate plaintiff
by awarding 5,000 euro in damages, which were stated by the court to be non-patrimonial
(that is to say, ‘moral’) in character.
However, the Court of Appeal in Fenech & Others v Malta Drydocks71 and subsequent
cases72 did not follow the same approach to human rights envisaged in Busuttil v Muscat,
which itself was revoked on appeal.73 In the latter judgment, the Court of Appeal reiterated
the orthodox position, simultaneously affirming the non-compensability of moral damage
in the context of ordinary civil liability litigation and the adequacy and sufficiency of the
compensation thus granted, even understood as an ordinary remedy for a human rights
violation.
Harm to the patrimony (civil damages) in Malta is quantified, where lucrum cessans
damages are concerned, by means of the orthodox multiplier/multiplicand formula.74 In
the aforementioned judgments, it appeared to be the settled position of the Maltese courts
thatmoral damages, provided theywere expressed in terms of the categories of compensable
patrimonial damages, were rendered indirectly compensable. This usually required the
individual judge to interpret the applicable heads of damage flexibly enough, to incorporate
or exclude particular forms of non-patrimonial damage according to his or her sense of
what was required to achieve a restitutio in integrum75 in the case at hand and by relying
69 Art. 1033 Civil Code. Emphasis added.
70 Art. 1045 Civil Code. Emphasis added.
71 Court of Appeal, 3 December 2010, Writ Number 1427/1997.
72 See for e.g. JohnMaryAbela et. v. PolicyManager tal-Malta Shipyards fi hdan il-Ministeru ghall-Infrastruttua,
Trasport u Komunikazzjoni noe. et. Constitutional Court, 11 April 2011, Writ Number 25/2009/1.
73 Linda Busuttil et. v. Dr Josie Muscat u Tania Spiteri, delivered by the Court of Appeal on 27 June 2014,
Writ Number 2429/1998/1.
74 Cf. Grech Trevor vs Agius Lawrence, Civil Court, First Hall, 17 October 2018, Reference 1030/2013, Mr
Justice Grazio Mercieca (currently under appeal). See also C. Bugeja, ‘The court’s calculator’, Times of
Malta, 11 February 2019, https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/the-courts-calculator.701658.
75 ‘Full restitution’, that is that an injured party is, through the awarding of damages, restored to the state
which would have prevailed had no injury been sustained.
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on the court’s discretion to adapt its damages awards to the particular circumstances of
the case before it under article 1045(2) Civil Code:
The sum to be awarded in respect of such incapacity shall be assessed by the
court, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and, particularly, to the
nature and degree of incapacity caused, and to the condition of the injured
party.
The developing status quo was dramatically impacted by Brincat and others v Malta,76 a
case which concerned ship-yard repair workers whowere exposed to asbestos for a number
of decades beginning in the 1950s to the early 2000s which led to them suffering from
asbestos related conditions. The ECtHRheld that the non-compensability ofmoral damage
in the context of ordinary civil liability litigation (for damages arising out of tort or
contractual liability)meant that access to a human rights remedy could no longer be denied
whenever an alleged victim of a human rights violation sued the Government for
compensation of moral damages. The ECtHR ordered the payment of non-pecuniary
(‘moral’) damages to the applicants/victims.
A further development occurred in the case of Agius v the Attorney General et, which
concerned the death of an inmate at Malta’s main prison resulting from an incorrect
administration of methadone to a drug addict. In this case, following the case being tried
before the Civil Court and the Court of Appeal,77 a Constitutional case was filed.78 On
appeal, the Constitutional Court79 held that since Articles 1045 and 1046 of the Civil Code
fall under the sub-title ‘Of Torts and Quasi-Torts’, it is clear that any prohibition of the
award ofmoral or non-patrimonial damages could only apply to actions in tort or quasi-tort.
The Constitutional Court’s classification of the action in this case as originating from a
breach of a contractual and/or legal (ex lege) relationship does evoke an uncomfortable
future scenario in which non-patrimonial damage will only be compensated if the
underlying relationship can be construed as contractual or legal, and not if it is understood
as tortious.80
As aforementioned, in 2018 the Civil Code underwent some amendments, including
the addition of a proviso to article 1045(1), which provides that ‘in the case of damages
arising from a criminal offence, other than an involuntary offence, (…) the damage to be
76 Brincat and Others v. Malta, ECHR 232 (2014) Applications Nos 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11,
and 62338/11.
77 Civil Court, First Hall, 6 October 2010; Court of Appeal, 1 April 2014.
78 Civil Court, First Hall (Constitutional Jurisdiction), 15 January 2015, Reference 33/2014.
79 Jane Agius v. the Attorney General, the Minister for the Interior and National Security and the Honourable
Prime Minister, Constitutional Court, 14 December 2015, Writ number 33/2014/1.
80 Zammit, 2018, p. 61.
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made good shall also include any moral harm and, or psychological harm caused to the
claimant.’81 (my emphasis)
Zammit opines that this recent enactment, while introducing the explicit right of the
plaintiff in an ordinary action in tort to recover moral and/or psychological damages
(within the parameters set out therein), may have (possibly, unintended) consequences
insofar as the provisomay be interpreted tomean thatmoral and/or psychological damages
may now only be (expressly) awarded within the limits contemplated in the said proviso,
but not in all cases, for e.g. where the harm is caused by an involuntary offence; thus
foreclosing potential further judicial developments particularly in light of the effects of
judgments by the Constitutional Court awarding moral damages in, for example, the
asbestosis cases.82
Other specific branches of Maltese law
An award of damages may be regulated by a specific branch of Maltese law outside the
ambit of the Civil Code; namely: human rights cases, the Media and Defamation Act,83 the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Regulation) Act,84 the Consumer Affairs
Act,85 the Promises ofMarriage Law,86 and, of course, theDPA. For example, in proceedings
instituted under the Media and Defamation Act, the Court may order the defendant to
pay a sum not exceeding eleven thousand, six hundred and forty eruo (11,640 euro) by
way of moral damages in addition to actual damages; in actions for slander the maximum
amount to be awarded by way of moral damages is five thousand euro (5,000 euro).
Intellectual Property law
In intellectual property cases, a court that concludes that the defendant has knowingly
engaged in infringing activity will order the payment of damages to the rightholder
‘commensurate with the actual prejudice suffered by the said rightholder as a result of the
infringement’:
In setting the amount of damages due, the Court shall take into account all
relevant aspects, including all the negative economic consequences that may
have been suffered by the injured party including lost profits, as well as any
unfair profits made by the infringer and, where it deems appropriate, other
81 Added by Act XXXII.2018.15.
82 G. Caruana Demajo et al, (2018) XVIII. Malta, in E. Karner et al. (Eds), European Tort Law Yearbook, Vol.
7, No. 1 (2018), p. 372.
83 Chapter 579 Laws of Malta.
84 Chapter 488 Laws of Malta.
85 Chapter 378 Laws of Malta.
86 Chapter 5 Laws of Malta.
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elements such as the moral prejudice caused to the rightholder by the
infringement:
Provided that instead of the above method of calculation of damages, the Court
may, where it so considers appropriate, choose to apply an alternative method
of calculation involving the setting of a lump sum of damages payable which
shall include elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which
would have been due had the infringer requested authorisation to use the
intellectual right in question.87 (emphasis added by author)
Therefore, the Court has the discretion to award damages on an arbitrio boni viri basis
under both article 12(2) and article 12(2) proviso (quoted above). It is unclear under which
of these methods the Court has wider discretionary powers; in particular whether moral
prejudice and/or similar elements are precluded from being included in the lump sum
that can be awarded by the Court under the proviso to article 12(2).88
Article 12(2) is one of the few instances inMaltese lawwheremoral prejudice is explicitly
taken into considerationwhen liquidating damages. One of the first IP judgments to award
damages invoking moral prejudice explicitly is the case Air Malta P.L.C. vs Efly Company
Limited.89 However, this was done on an arbitrio boni viri basis and therefore no explanation
of the methods of calculation in question were entertained by the Court.
In the case Av. Dottor Antoine Camilleri noe (acting as special mandatory for and on
behalf of Bacardi & Company Limited) vs Patrick Cellars Limited,90 the court – in a case
concerning the ‘exhaustion of rights’/ trademark infringement by importing/
commercialising goods in Malta which were not destined for the EU/EEA market –
liquidated the damages caused to Bacardi, in terms of article 12, in the amount of fifty-two
thousand six hundred and fifty (52,650) euro in damages, including thirty thousand euro
(30,000) euro in other damages (particularly ‘moral damages’, which include reputational
damage). The Court stated that it was applying article 12(2)proviso and, having taken into
consideration all the aspects of the case, awarding arbitrio boni viri the global amount of
30,000 euro in other damages.
87 Art. 12(2), Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Regulation) Act, Chapter 488 Laws of Malta;
transposing the provisions ofDirective 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004]
OJ L157/45.
88 C. Micallef Grimaud, ‘Damages in Maltese Intellectual Property Cases: A Brief Look at Article 12 of Chapter
488 of the Laws of Malta’, Mamo TCV Advocates, 25 March 2014 https://www.mamotcv.com/resources/
news/damages-in-maltese-intellectual-property-cases-a-brief-look-at-article-12-of-chapter488-of-the-laws-
of-malta.
89 Air Malta PLC (C-2685) vs Efly Company Limited (C-46370) – 30 March 2010 – First Hall, Civil Court.
90 Civil Court, First Hall, 19 May 2015 (Application No. 406/2011).
441
Malta
In Av. Dottor Antoine Camilleri noe (acting as special mandatory for and on behalf
ofNando’s Limited) vsMirale and Lamare Limited,91 the court awarded ten thousand euro
(10,000 euro), with interest running from the data of the filing of the case, inmoral damages
calculated on the basis of arbitrio boni viri for the breach of rights suffered.
The onus of conducting an assessment arbitrio boni viri is placed upon the judge as
the learned professional capable of delivering an amount based on equity. The author has
been unable to trace any judgment of our courts which specifies in further detail how
damages for ‘moral prejudice’ are calculated/ quantified/ liquidated in terms of article 12,
since in the case-law identified no further deliberations were specifically entertained by
the Courts on this point.
Data Protection law
Article 30(1) DPA states: ‘Without prejudice to any other remedy available to him (…), a
data subject may, where he believes that his rights under the GDPR or this Act have been
infringed (…) by sworn application filed before the First Hall of the Civil Court, institute
an action for an effective judicial remedy against the controller or processor concerned.
(2) A data subject may also, by sworn application filed before the First Hall of the Civil
Court, institute an action for damages against the controller or processor who processes
personal data in contravention of the provisions of the GDPR or this Act.’
The DPA also explicitly provides in article 30(3) that ‘If in determining an action [for
damages] the court finds that the controller or processor is liable for the damage caused
pursuant to Article 82 of the [GDPR], the court shall determine the amount of damages,
including, but not limited to, moral damages as the court may determine, due to the data
subject.’92
There are so far no decided cases awarding damages for intangible harm in the area of
data protection law.
Question 13
Malta has to the best of this author’s knowledge not introduced any legislative measures
intended to facilitate representative actions pursuant to article 80 GDPR. Neither have
any such representative actions been brought in practice.
A ‘representative action’, defined as ‘proceedings that are brought on behalf of a number
of class members by a representative body’, is possible according to the provisions of the
Collective Proceedings Act,93 enacted in 2012 – but only with regard to an infringement
91 Civil Court, First Hall, 13 June 2019 (Application No. 853/2017).
92 Emphasis added.
93 Laws of Malta, chapter 520.
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of the Acts listed in Schedule A of the Act, i.e. the Competition Act,94 and articles 101 or
102 TFEU, the Consumer Affairs Act95 and the Product Safety Act.96 In a representative
action, the Court shall approve a registered consumer association or a ‘constituted body’
to act as a class representative according to the terms of article 12(1) of the Act. In this
author’s opinion, the DPA and the GDPR should be brought within the purview of this
Act.
MITLA97 has reacted to certain developments at the local level, for examplewith regard
to the government’s announced plans to introduce public, smart CCTV surveillance
cameras (with facial recognition technology) in selected locations in Malta to address
“ant-social behaviour” hotspots.98 MITLA has also pronounced itself on the matter of the
erasure of criminal court judgements from the publicly accessible online judgments
database.99 This author believes that in principle MITLA should qualify to bring a
representative action in terms of Article 80(1) GDPR.
Question 14
Malta has recently established a new authority – the Malta Digital Innovation Authority100
– to regulate innovative technologies. However the scope of this authority is limited to
certifying the functionality of ‘innovative technology arrangements’ and does not extend
to dealing with complaints relating to data protection. Any data protection issues in the
application of any innovative technology arrangement would need to be referred to the
Office of the IDPC.
94 Laws of Malta, chapter 379.
95 Laws of Malta, chapter 378.
96 Laws of Malta, chapter 427.
97 MITLA is registered as aVoluntaryOrganisation (VO/1166) in terms of art. 3 of theVoluntaryOrganisations
Act 2007 (Act No, XXII of 2007), Malta.
98 MITLA, ‘Specific laws are required for mass-scale facial recognition applications’, 7 December 2017,
www.mitla.org.mt/specific-laws-required-mass-scale-facial-recognition-applications/. Reported in the
news: M. Vella, ‘IT experts warn of greater privacy risks with facial recognition CCTV: Plans for facial
recognition CCTV in Paceville require new rules to safeguard fundamental rights, Malta IT law association
says’,MaltaToday, 7December 2017, www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/82918/it_experts_warn_of_
greater_privacy_risks_with_facial_recognition_cctv#.XS7f5i2Q1sM; M. Vella, ‘Facial recognition CCTV
for Paceville and Marsa by 2019: The facial recognition software is expected to be deployed in Paceville and
Marsa, after data protection concerns are addressed with the Information and Data Protection Commis-
sioner’,MaltaToday, 22October 2018,www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/budget-2019/90331/facial_recognition_
cctv_for_paceville_and_marsa_by_2019#.XS7gFi2Q1sM. Cf. also: F. Zammit, ‘Safe City Malta’: Is Privacy
the Real Crux of the Matter?’, Isles of the Left, 16 January 2019, www.islesoftheleft.org/safe-city-malta-is-
privacy-the-real-crux-of-the-matter/, expressing concern about potential uses of data collected from smart
CCTV surveillance for social profiling and resultant discrimination.
99 See above response to question 7.
100 Established by the Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act, chapter 591 Laws of Malta, mdia.gov.mt.
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Cooperation between the Office of the IDPC and other regulators has to date been
informal and on an ad hoc basis.101
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
In Malta communications data is retained according to the provisions of S.L. 586.01
Processing of Personal Data (Electronic Communications Sector) Regulations. Article
19(1) states that ‘Data retained under this Part shall be disclosed only to the Police or to
the Security Service, as the case may be, where such data is required for the purpose of the
investigation, detection or prosecution of serious crime.’
The closest to a definition of the Security Service of Malta is that found in article 3 of
the Security Service Act,102 as follows:
1. There shall continue to be a Security Service … under the authority of the
Minister.
2. The function of the Service shall be to protect national security and, in
particular, against threats from organised crime, espionage, terrorism and
sabotage, the activities of agents of foreign powers and against actions
intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political,
industrial or violent means.
3. It shall also be the function of the Service to act in the interests of – (a) the
economic well-being of Malta; and (b) public safety, in particular, the
prevention or detection of serious crime.
Subsidiary legislation 586.09 Restriction of the Data Protection (Obligations and Rights)
Regulations, article 4(4), provides: ‘Any restriction to the rights of the data subject referred
to in article 23 GDPR shall only apply where such restrictions are a necessary measure
required:(a) for the safeguarding and maintaining of national security, public security,
defence and the international relations of Malta; …’103
It is unclear whether our national authorities accept the application of the Charter to
data retention for national security purposes as the issue has never really been a
controversial matter in this country.
101 Discussion/interview held at the Office of the IDPC on 23 May 2019.
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A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The main national legal instrument introduced to implement the General Data Protection
Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) in The Netherlands is the GDPR Implementation Act
(inDutch:UitvoeringswetAlgemene verordening gegevensbescherming,hereinafter “UAVG”).
It was published in the Official Journal of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 22 May
20181 and applies as of 25 May 2018.2 The Netherlands therefore completed their main
legislative procedure for the GDPR just in time.3
The UAVG revokes the former Dutch personal data protection act (in Dutch: Wet
bescherming persoonsgegevens, hereinafter “Wbp”), it re-establishes the institution and
powers of the Dutch supervisory authority, the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (hereinafter
AP),4 and it supplements the GDPR by including certain derogations from the GDPR and
by using so called opening clauses where the GDPR left some discretion to individual
Member States.5
The GDPR Adaptation Bill (in Dutch: Aanpassingswet Algemene verordening
gegevensbescherming, hereinafter “Adaptation Bill”) – published in the Official Journal on
* DominiqueHagenauw: Independent Expert on privacy and the protection of personal data; Data Protection
Officer atVrijeUniversiteit Amsterdam (untilMarch 2020); previously Principal LegalAdvisor at Considerati
and Senior International Officer at the Dutch Data Protection Authority. Hielke Hijmans: President of the
Litigation Chamber of the Belgian Data Protection Authority; Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Brussels;
Member of the Meijers Committee. With contributions of Christiaan van Dissel, Sophie van der Hoeven-
Bots, Violet Mantel, Olga Nijveld, Edmon Oude Elferink, Barbara Schenk, Merle Temme, Sybe de Vries
and Martine Wijers.
1 UAVG, www.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-144.html. All webpages referred to were last visited on
19 June 2019. On the UAVG, see Hielke Hijmans, De AVG en de UAVG: Het grondrecht op gegevens-
bescherming wordt door de EU beschermd. De werking van dit recht in de Nederlandse rechtsorde roept
vragen op, NJB 2018, afl 7.
2 Royal Decree, www.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-145.html.
3 P. Breitbarth, “The GDPR Implementation in the Netherlands”, p. 1,
https://blogdroiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/paul-1.pdf.
4 Website AP, www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/node/1930. See answers to questions 9-11.
5 Articles allowing for the Member States to derogate are sometimes referred to as “opening clauses”.
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27 July 20186 – adapts existing references to the previous data protection legislation in a
number of legislative acts in the Netherlands.
In implementing theGDPR, theNetherlands has refrained frommaking policy decisions
where this would lead to a shift from the former data protection regime under the Wbp.
Instead, the idea was to retain existing national standards and maintain the status quo as
much as possible in order to enable a smooth transition to the new regime.7
This approach is referred to as “policy-neutral”, consistent with the general approach
in theNetherlands when implementing EU legislation.8 Beforemaking decisions to deviate
from the status quo, the Dutch legislator intended to gain some experience with the GDPR
for a number of years first.9
Existing national particularities, such as a stringent restriction on the use of social
security numbers,10 the treatment of data related to criminal behaviour as “special” personal
data11 and the minimum age for consent of 16,12 have thus been retained. Especially the
latter point, the age at which children can consent independently, is being debated
extensively in the Netherlands.13
Concerning the articles specifically mentioned in the question:14
– Article 6 GDPR, including article 6(1)(c) has not been separately implemented in the
Netherlands.15
– With regard to article 23 GDPR, this has been implemented in articles 41, 42 and 47
UAVG.
– Article 41UAVG is almost exactly the same as article 23GDPR,with one interesting
deviation: the UAVG does not allow for the restriction of articles 22 and 5 GDPR.16
6 Adaptation Bill, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-247.html.
7 EM UAVG, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-
uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
8 P. Breitbarth, “The GDPR Implementation in the Netherlands”, p. 4,
https://blogdroiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/paul-1.pdf.
9 EM UAVG, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-
uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
10 Art. 46 UAVG.
11 Art. 31, UAVG.
12 Art. 5(1) UAVG.
13 Letter of 1 April 2019 (32761, nr. 132), p. 12.
14 EM UAVG, Implementation table (Implementatietabel), p. 70, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-
gegevensbescherming.
15 EMUAVG, p. 29, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-
uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
16 EMUAVG, p. 106,www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-
uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
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– Article 42 UAVG provides that article 34 GDPR is not applicable to financial
operators.17
– Article 47 UAVG creates exceptions to the rights of data subjects with regard to
public registers.18
– The use of social security numbers has been under a strict regime before, and article
46 UAVG stipulates that national identification numbers may only be used when
explicitly provided for by law.19
The policy-neutral approach of the Dutch legislator has been subject to criticism. The
Dutch parliament requested the government to make an inventory on a number of issues
and take action where necessary.20 Examples are the processing of data by smaller
organizations (such as charities, sports associations, church communities and others), the
processing of personal data at work in the event of sickness and the minimum consent age
for children. In a letter of 1 April 201921 the minister for Legal Protection addressed and
evaluated these concerns. Legislative steps to change the UAVG regarding some of these
issues are being investigated.
Question 2
Article 10 of the Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands22 contains the
fundamental right to respect for one’s private life (in Dutch: persoonlijke levenssfeer).23
The article has been introduced in the Constitution in 1983. Article 10 of the Constitution
also instructs the legislator to create rules protecting private life relating to the recording
and provision of personal data, the right to be informed, the right to have access to such
data and to have it corrected.
The preamble of theUAVG, governing the protection of personal data, explicitly refers
to article 10 of the Constitution.
17 EMUAVG, p. 106,www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-toelichting-
uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
18 Art. 21 GDPR (Right to object) is declared as generally not applying to public registers. Articles 15 GDPR
(Right of access by the data subject), 16 GDPR (Right to rectification), 18 GDPR (Right to restriction of pro-
cessing) and 19 (Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of
processing) GDPR do not apply insofar as a special procedure has been established by law.
19 In other cases article 46UAVGalso allows for deviation by general administrative order (Algemenemaatregel
van Bestuur) but also then no purpose for processing are acceptable which are incompatible with the original
purpose for which the number has been processed (art. 5(1)b GDPR).
20 Motie Koopmans (34851, nr. 19) of 8 March 2018.
21 32761, nr. 132.
22 Constitution of The Netherlands, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2019-33.html.




Article 13 of the Constitution is also worth mentioning in relation to the protection of
personal data, as it addresses the secrecy of correspondence, telephone and telegraph. An
amendment aimed at broadening the scope of article 13 to “newer” kinds of communication
has already been approved by bothChambers of theDutch parliament.24 For the amendment
to come into force, the proposal to change the Constitution must be confirmed again by
both Chambers after a general election has taken place.
A particularity of the Dutch Constitution is that no constitutional review of formal
laws is possible. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution provides that no judge will rule on
the constitutionality of laws and treaties (in Dutch: toetsingsverbod).25
However, regulations of lower administrative bodies may be tested against the
Constitution by the courts. Also, article 94 of the Dutch Constitution does allow for any
law to be tested against any self-executing treaty. The ECHR is the treaty most commonly
tested against by Dutch courts in this context.
Where appropriate, Dutch courts have in the past referred to Article 8 ECHR, because
they could not directly invoke article 10 of the Constitution. In recent years, Dutch courts
increasingly refer to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
In two Dutch cases where Article 8 of the Charter played a role, albeit in addition to
article 8 ECHR.26 Both were high-impact cases which eventually reached the Supreme
Court of the Netherlands (in Dutch: Hoge Raad):
– An action by several individual citizens and anNGO (Privacy First) was brought against
an amendment to the Passport Act, which obliged citizens to provide their fingerprints
to be added to their travel documents. According to Privacy First, this requirement
was contrary to Article 8 ECHR and Article 8 Charter.27 Privacy First held that the
creation of a central registry, the central storage (or not) of the data, the regime of
providing data to others, the lack of necessary additional rules, the infringements on
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity and the amount of purposes for which
the personal data would be stored, led to the new rules being unjustified. Eventually,
the case was not resolved on the merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the case in 2015
due to a lack of standing of both Privacy First and the individuals concerned.
– The association of practicing General Practitioners (GPs) brought a case against a
newly established system allowing for the (far-reaching) electronic processing ofmedical
24 Proposal to change the Constitution, www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20170914/publicatie_wet_2/
document3/f=/vkhlc89peuxz.pdf.
25 Nor does the Netherlands have a Constitutional Court.
26 Cases which referred to article 7 of the Charter generally concern criminal law, immigration law and social
security law-issues and are therefore not further elaborated on.
27 ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1296, 22 May 2015, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1296.
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personal data in the Netherlands.28 The system would allow primarily for GPs29 to
access personal data of a patient, in addition to a “professional summary” created on
the basis of the GP’s own patient file. This system, according to the association,
unnecessarily infringed upon patients’ rights to privacy, specifically article 10 of the
Dutch Constitution, article 8 ECHR and article 8 Charter.30 The Hoge Raad however
agreedwith previous instances that the proportionality and subsidiaritywere sufficiently
respected.
Both cases were decided before the GDPR came into effect, which means that it cannot be
said with certainty that future cases invoking article 8 of the Charter will be assessed
similarly by Dutch courts.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
In theNetherlands the interpretation of the principles of fair processing, purpose limitation
and data minimisation varies strongly per sector, hence no ‘one true answer’ can be given
for their application, but some examples are worth mentioning.
In June 2018, the AP has looked into the processing by the Netherlands Tax and
Customs Administration of the national identification number (BSN) in the
VAT-identification numbers of freelancers.31 The AP states in its final report that by
converting the BSN and using it as (part of the) VAT-identification number, the BSN is
used improperly as this would result in essence that a person is forced to reveal his or her
BSN publicly and to third parties, in violation of the UAVG and the principles of fair and
lawful processing of article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR. The Dutch Tax and Customs
Administration is required to take measures to address the situation before 1 January 2020.
28 ECLI:NL:HR:2017:3053, 1 December 2017, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=
ECLI:NL:HR:2017:3053.
29 Thus GPs who are temporarily filling in for the patient’s own GP.
30 Another main complaint brought forward by the association was that the system relied on consent of the
patient as a legal basis for processing (as opposed to an obligation established by law) and could, on that
ground, not provide a basis for infringing medical confidentiality. It is worth noting that a legal proposal
which intended to create a proper legal framework for such as systemhad been rejected by theDutch Senate
in 2011.




Another interesting example concerns the Dutch system of credit registration. Credit
providers are obliged to take part in a system of credit registration and need to register
credits above € 250. Whenever a debtor doesn’t commit to paying instalments, that person
gets a ‘negative registration’ in the system. The information in the system can be used by
new credit providers to determine whether the consumer has a financial situation
(un)suitable for a newly requested credit. There are a myriad of court cases against the
credit providers registering a consumer in the systemconcerning their negative registrations,
which consumers become aware of when learning that they are not eligible for new credits
and mortgages as a result of these negative registrations.
In 2011, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the registration should at all times be in
accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.32 It further held that
under certain circumstances itmay not be the negative registration itself, but theminimum
registration period of five years, that is disproportionate with regard to the purpose of the
processing of the data, which is combating over-crediting consumers and protecting credit
providers from financial risks.
Question 4
Similar to the answer to question 3, there is no ‘one true answer’ for the use of the legal
grounds of legitimate interest and consent. There are nevertheless interesting cases to be
mentioned.
First of all, a recent ruling from a local court reaffirms the use – under certain conditions
- of the legal ground of legitimate interest for processing personal data by using security
cameras.33 In the case at hand, the security camera was only recording a small part of a
public road and people walking there would not be recorded fully. The owner of the camera
demonstrated that less-intrusive security means were not sufficient to protect his property
and the people and goods on it. Recording of images was needed to support any filing to
the police. Moreover, people were informed that a security camera was recording and the
owner of the security camera had verified its compliance with necessary safeguards. These
reasons led the Court to rule that the “legitimate interest” could be used in this case.
With regard to the legal ground of consent, a relevant court case is on the national
linking point for patient data (“LSP”).34 Following concerns of doctors, a case went up to
the SupremeCourt onwhether the consent of a patient who needsmedical attentionwould
be sufficient to allow access to his or hermedical record in case the doctor who had received
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the consent and kept the recordwas not available. The SupremeCourt upholds judgements
of the lower courts in affirming that the patient’s consent did sufficiently meet the
requirements of freely given, specific and informed sufficiently and could therefore be
relied upon for accessing and processing personal data of patients in absence of their
“regular” doctor.
Question 5
In the Netherlands the debate on the validity of personal data as a counter-performance
for the provision of digital content is not only related to the GDPR, but also to consumer
law, especially the Digital Content Directive.
Even though there is no clear indication that public debate in the Netherlands mostly
opposes to the use of personal data as counter-performance per se, both Chambers of the
Dutch Parliament have put questions to the government concerning the lack of clear
coordination between the Directive and the GDPR.35
The discussion inter alia revolved around which would be the correct lawful basis for
processing personal data to deliver digital content, mainly focusing on whether this can
only be the consent of person concerned or whether also other legal grounds would be
possible.
Another important question that was raised is whether personal data in case of
terminating the agreement should be valued in money and whether the consumer as a
consequence should be financially compensated. The Dutch government, without further
explanation, simply states that this is not necessary. The organization should either return
the personal data to the consumer, or, if this is not possible, pay money as a form of
compensation. The problemobserved in legal literature iswhether industry can be burdened
with potentially millions of euros in collective actions initiated by consumers.36
Question 6
Article 40 UAVG provides for exemptions from the prohibition on automated individual
decision-making. These exemptions take into account that not all cases of automated
decision-making pose high risks in terms of a potential discriminatory effect. For example,
automated individual decision-making regarding ‘closed’ decisions, that are based on the
fulfillment of objective requirements, do not inhibit a high risk. Think of processing income
35 file:///Users/gebruiker/Downloads/beantwoording-aanvullende-kamervragen-over-richtlijnvoorstel-levering-
digitale-inhoud-en-diensten.pdf.
36 H. Schulte-Nölke, ‘Personal data is not a counter-perfomance –Plea for a data driven rethinking of contract
and consumer law’, Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 2018, nr. 2, p. 75.
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data for taxation purposes or basing traffic fines on photographs in combination with
license plates.
The article also provides for several safeguards. First, a controller can only apply these
exemptions for processing based on article 6(1)(c) or (e) GDPR.37 Furthermore, the
controller needs to take adequate measures for the protection of personal data.
For controllers that are not administrative bodies, such appropriate measures shall
have been taken if the right to human intervention, the data subject’s right to express his
or her views and the right to contest the decision, are safeguarded. Provided other adequate
measures are being taken by the controller to safeguard the data subject’s rights, freedoms
and legitimate interests, the requirement of human intervention may be set aside.
For automateddecision-makingby a government institution, theGeneralAdministrative
LawAct (inDutch:Algemenewet bestuursrecht, hereinafter “Awb”) is applicable, in addition
to the GDPR. This general law provides for comparable safeguards and principles that
must be taken into account in decision making, including the principles of diligence and
proportionality. It also provides for a subject’s right to appeal decisions.
In its letter to theHouse of Representatives of April 2019 regarding the first experiences
with the UAVG38 the government responded to the request of the Dutch Trade
Association,39 to create a more generous exemption to offer more options for innovation
regarding new profiling-based techniques. The government stated it would uphold its
decision not to include an exemption in the UAVG for automated decision-making using
profiling-techniques. It held that the risk that group-characteristics are attributed to an
individual whilst it is not 100% certain that this individual, although belonging to the
group, also has those specific characteristics, in combination with automated
decision-making, is considered too great a risk.
The government has furthermore informedTheHouse ofRepresentatives that aworking
group is creating guidelines for the transparency of algorithms used by the government
aswell as guidelines for informing the public about big data applications by the government.
The government is also looking into the possibility to create extra legal safeguards for big
data applications by the government.40
37 Processing necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject or processing
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller.
38 TK 2018/19, 32 761, nr. 132.
39 VNO-NCW and MKB Nederland.
40 TK 2018/19, 26 643, nr. 601.
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Question 7
After the Google Spain and Google ruling41, Google immediately put in place a search
removal form on its website and made available a Transparency Report.42 Between May
2014 and May 2019, somewhat over 150,000 requests for delisting URLs were made by
users in theNetherlands. Out of this total, 49,4% of requests were granted (about 3%higher
than EU average). After 25 May 2018, the percentage of URLs that were delisted increased
from 47,8% to 56,3%, an increase of almost 10%. This may be explained by the strong
awareness campaign for privacy led by the AP and the government in the months prior
to this date.
Consumers may also, instead of addressing search engines directly, turn towards the
AP to act as an intermediary. The AP uses the guidelines of the Working Party 29 as well
as conditions derived from national and EU case law to determine whether the listing of
the URL after a search inquiry is justified. However, only 5% of all incoming complaints
were requests for intermediary action.43
Between 2014 and July 2019, 24 cases can be found where the right to be forgotten was
invoked before a Dutch court. Only in six of the 24 cases did the judge rule in favour of
the plaintiff.
Question 8
Article 85 of the GDPR relating to processing of data for journalistic purposes and for
academic, artistic and literary expressions is implemented in article 43 UAVG. Given the
‘policy neutral’ implementation of the GDPR in the UAVG, most of the exemptions that
were already created in the Wbp still apply.44 Thus, a majority of articles of the GDPR do
not apply to the processing of personal data solely for journalistic purposes and for the
purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, including articles 9 and 10 of the
GDPR concerning the prohibition to process special categories of data or data relating to
criminal convictions and offences.
The fact that not all provisions of the GDPR are applicable to data processing for
journalistic purposes or for the purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression, does
not mean that the privacy of the subjects is not being weighed. First, the general provisions
and basic principles of the GDPR are still applicable. Second, a balancing of the right of
41 Judgment of 13May 2014 inCase C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (es), Mario Costeja González (Google Spain and Google),ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 13 May 2014.
42 Transparency Report “Search removals under European privacy lawi”, Google.
43 “Klachtenrapportage: facts & figures. Overzicht 25mei tot 25 november 2018”, Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens.
44 Arts 7(3) and 11(2), Chapter III, Chapter IV (with the exception of Articles 24, 25, 28, 29 and 32), Chapter
V, Chapter VI and Chapter VII GDPR.
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freedom of expression and the right to privacy in concrete cases will be executed by the
court, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case.45
Furthermore, some new elements have been introduced to keep in line with
jurisprudence, like the exemption to the right of the data subject to withdraw his or her
consent at any time.46 This would mean for example that, once permission has been given
for publication of an interview, this can generally not be withdrawn.
The Board of Journalism (in Dutch: Raad voor de Journalistiek) and the Dutch Society
of Journalists (in Dutch: Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten) both have a code of
conduct. These contain guidelines on the proportionality of interferences with privacy for
journalistic purposes.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
TheAP is established as the sole data protection supervisory authority of theNetherlands.47
According to Dutch public law, the AP is an autonomous administrative authority (in
Dutch: zelfstandig bestuursorgaan,hereinafter “ZBO”) at the level of the central government;
it is endowed with legal personality.48 In the Netherlands, autonomous administrative
authorities are authorities that have been vested with public authority, but are not
hierarchically subordinate to a minister. These authorities are created for instance where
strict regulations have to be applied in large numbers of many individual cases, where
independent experts have to be called in to carry out quality checks, issue licenses or grants,
or where independent experts have to monitor the implementation of regulations.49
General provisions on autonomous administrative authorities are included in the
Autonomous Administrative Authorities Framework Act (in Dutch: Kaderwet ZBO’s).
This act creates a legal framework that deals with the responsibilities of the minister on
the one hand and the administrative body on the other hand.50 The minister responsible
45 De pers en privacy. Hoe verhoudt de AVG zich tot het juridisch kader voor de journalistiek? Noot bij
Rechtbank Amsterdam, 12 oktober 2018, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:7397 (Oudkerk/Sanoma).
46 An exemption to ar. 7(3) GDPR.
47 Art. 6(1) Implementation Act.
48 Art. 6(1) Implementation Act.
49 See also https://www.overheid.nl/english/about-the-dutch-government/what-government-consists-of/
autonomous-administrative-authorities.
50 See also Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Evaluatie Kaderwet zelfstandige
bestuursorganen 2012-2016, May 2018.
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has a limited number of powers, like the power to approve the budget.51 These matters are
specified when a ZBO is set up. The minister is only responsible for using these powers
and not for the decisions made by the ZBO itself.
In order to fully guarantee the independence of theAP, certain sections of the Kaderwet
ZBO’s do not apply to the AP. As a consequence, the Minister for Legal Protection does,
inter alia, not have the power to lay down policy rules relating to the way in which the AP
performs its tasks52 and to annul decisions of the AP.53
Composition; appointment process for members and staff
The AP comprises of a Chair and two other members.54 The Chair, who shall satisfy the
requirements for appointment as a judge, and the other members of the AP are appointed
by royal decree on the nomination of the Minister for Legal Protection.55 The term of office
for chairman and members of the AP is 5 years.56 They can once be re-appointed for a
term of another 5 years.57 TheAP has a Secretariat whose officials are appointed, promoted,
disciplined, suspended and dismissed by the AP.58
Powers and duties
The Awb regulates the process of administrative decision-making in a general sense and
provides a general framework for the right of appeal to an administrative court against the
orders issued.59 Chapter 5 of the Awb relates to administrative enforcement action by
administrative authorities, including general rules formonitoring compliance by inspectors
and for administrative sanctions. As a result, at a national level, both the Awb and the
UAVG deal with powers of the AP.
Under the UAVG, the AP is competent to perform the tasks and exercise the powers
that are conferred on supervisory authorities by or pursuant to the GDPR.60 The members
and the officials of the AP, as well as other persons designated by the AP, are responsible
for monitoring compliance with the GDPR and with other relevant legislative provisions.61
51 Cf. Chapter 4, Division 1, Autonomous Administrative Authorities Framework Act. See also:
www.overheid.nl/english/about-the-dutch-government/what-government-consists-of/autonomous-
administrative-authorities.
52 Art. 13(1) Implementation Act.
53 Art. 13(1), ibid.
54 Art. 7(1), ibid.
55 Art. 7(3), ibid.
56 Art. 7(5), ibid.
57 Art. 7(6), ibid.
58 Art. 10(1), ibid.
59 See also: T. Barkhuysen et al, ‘The Law on Administrative Procedures in the Netherlands’, NALL 2012,
april-juni, DOI:10.5553/NALL/.000005.
60 Art. 14(1) Implementation Act.
61 Art. 15(1), ibid.
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As a result, the investigative powers with which ‘inspectors’ are empowered according to
Chapter 5 of the Awb are also entrusted to the AP.62
The investigative powers granted to supervisory authorities by the GDPR closely
resemble the investigative powers mentioned in the Awb. In some cases, the Awb seems
to be more wide-ranging, for instance when it comes to the subject of the investigation.
The Awb states that “everyone” shall be obliged to cooperate fully with a supervisor63,
whilst Article 31 of theGDPR stipulates only that the controller and the processor (or their
representative) should cooperate with the authority. There seems to be no legal obstacle
to combine the investigative powers granted by the Awb and the GDPR.64
In addition to the enforcement powers provided by the GDPR, the AP has extra
enforcement powers pursuant to article 58(6) GDPR, in particular administrative
enforcement orders, either under the threat of enforcement action by or on behalf of the
AP itself (in Dutch: last onder bestuursdwang) or under periodic penalty payment (in
Dutch: last onder dwangsom). The power to impose these orders is derived from theAwb.65
With such an administrative order, the AP can for example order a controller to comply
with the GDPR and the UAVG. If the controller fails to comply with the order within the
prescribed time limit, a specified amount of money must be paid. Furthermore, the AP
can order any company or person to cooperate with the AP.66
The UAVG also provides that the administrative fines of article 83 GDPR may be
imposed on public authorities and bodies, using the option given in article 83(7) GDPR.67
Lastly, the Implementation Act provides the AP with the power to mediate. The
interested party may file a request with the AP to mediate in or advise on his or her dispute
with the controller in cases concerning articles 15-22 of the GDPR.68 In 2018, the AP has
mediated in 129 cases.69 These cases mainly concerned requests to delist search results on
a person’s name in a search engine (see also question 7). In most cases the search results
were delisted after mediation by the AP.
The AP is not only responsible for monitoring compliance with the GDPR and the
UAVG, but also ensures compliance with – among others – the Elections Act (in Dutch:
Kieswet), the Basic Registration of Persons Act (in Dutch: Wet basisregistratie personen)
and theDutchActs implementingDirective (EU) 2016/680: the PoliceDataAct (inDutch:
62 See also: V.N. Mantel et al, ‘De (U)AVG en de Awb: toezicht, sanctionering en rechtsbescherming’, JBplus
2019/01.
63 Art. 5:20 Awb.
64 See also: V.N. Mantel et al, 2019.
65 Art. 16(1) Implementation Act and arts 5:21 and 5:32 of the Awb.
66 Art. 16(2) Implementation Act.
67 Art. 18(1) Implementation Act in conjunction with art. 83(7) GDPR.
68 Art. 36(1) Implementation Act.
69 Annual Report 2018, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ap_bijlage_2018.pdf.
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Wet politiegegevens) and the Judicial Data and Criminal Records Act (in Dutch: Wet
justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens).
Question 10
The starting point for complaint handling is that the AP will investigate the subject matter
of complaints to the extent appropriate.70 The AP has published policy guidelines on how
it will prioritize the handling of complaints lodged with it under the GDPR (Beleidsregels
prioritering klachtenonderzoek AP).71 According to these guidelines, the AP will firstly
determine whether the complaint concerns the processing of personal data relating to the
complainant72, and whether basic desk research leads to the conclusion that there is a clear
violation of theGDPR – or to the conclusion that it is clear there is no breach of theGDPR,
in which case the complaint will be rejected.
As a general rule, according to Dutch administrative law, the AP is required to take
legal action (by means of a reparatory sanction) when it establishes an infringement of the
GDPR after receiving a complaint in writing, lodged by an interested party, aimed at
enforcing compliance with data protection rules.73
However, if theAP is able to resolve a complaint successfully by – for instance – offering
guidance to the controller (thus taking ‘informal enforcement action’), after which the
controller brings its processing into compliance and the complainant is satisfied, the AP
will close the case.
If the desk research points out that an infringement of the GDPR might occur, but a
more thorough investigation is necessary in order to come to more definitive conclusions,
the AP will secondly determine whether there is reason for further investigation. Criteria
include:
a. How harmful is the alleged violation for the individual(s)?
This depends on nature of the personal data involved and on the nature of the alleged
violation.
b. What is the broader social significance of the case, taking into account the areas of
special focus the AP publishes on a regular basis?
70 Art. 57(1)(f) of the GDPR. See also O.S. Nijveld and W. van Steenbergen, ‘Het Awb-landschap door een
AVG-filter’, TvT 2018-4, p. 95-102.
71 Stcrt. 2018, 54287.
72 Also a not-for-profit body, organisation or association that is active in the field of the protection of data
subjects’ rights and freedoms and can be considered an ‘interested party’ in terms of art. 1:2(3) Awb, inde-
pendently of a data subject’s mandate, has the right to lodge a complaint with the AP.
73 ABRvS 11 August 2004, AB 2004, 444 (m.nt. F.R. Vermeer).
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The AP issues focal areas for the coming year,74 and takes into account the number of
individuals concerned and whether or not the complaint concerns cross-border
processing.
c. To what extent will the AP be able to act effectively?
The AP will take into consideration other complaints filed with the AP, its available
manpower and budget.
Question 11
Besides sanctions and corrective measures as referred to in article 58(2) GDPR and
additional sanctions adopted at national level75, the AP also uses ‘informal’ enforcement
instruments to obtain compliance (for instance, in reaction to a complaint76). Examples
may include meeting with a controller to offer guidance on a specific GDPR provision
violated (in Dutch: “normoverdragend gesprek”) or issuing a guidance letter (offering
guidance on compliance with the requirements of the GDPR).77
GDPR sanctions and additional sanctions
In 2018, the AP took enforcement actions against 17 private companies, public authorities
and other organisations. TheAP imposed sanctions in six cases, four ofwhich are published:
– The AP imposed an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83 GDPR on Uber B.V.
and Uber Technologies, Inc. of €600,000 for violating the data breach regulations.78
– The AP imposed a ban on processing as referred to in Article 58(2)(f) GDPR against
the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration which may no longer process the
national identification number as part of the VAT number of self-employed persons
(see further answer 3).79
– TheAP imposed an administrative enforcement order under periodic penalty payment80
– an additional sanction adopted at national level – against the Employee Insurance
74 See the Supervisory framework, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
toezichtkader_autoriteit_persoonsgegevens_2018-2019.pdf, visited 2 August 2019.
75 See Question 9 on the additional enforcement powers provided for in the Implementation Act and the
Awb.
76 See also Question 10.
77 Annual Report 2018, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ap_bijlage_2018.pdf.
78 ‘AP legt Uber boete op voor te laat melden datalek’, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/ap-
legt-uber-boete-op-voor-te-laat-melden-datalek.
79 ‘Belastingdienst mag BSN niet meer gebruiken in btw-identificatienummer’, https://
autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/belastingdienst-mag-bsn-niet-meer-gebruiken-btw-
identificatienummer.
80 Cf. art. 16(1) Dutch General Data Protection Regulation Implementation Act in conjunction with art.
5:32(1) Dutch General Administrative Law Act and art. 58(6) GDPR.
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Agency for violating the requirements set out in Article 32 of the GDPR with respect
to its Employer Portal.81 The Employee Insurance Agency has to be compliant by
31 October 2019.82
– The AP imposed, for the second time, an administrative enforcement order against
the Dutch National Police for inadequate security of an IT system.83 National Police
has complied with the order.84
In 2019, the AP issued a €460,000 fine to a hospital in The Hague for insufficient internal
security of patient records, in a case where dozens of hospital employees had had access
to the medical records of a Dutch TV celebrity. The AP found that the hospital did not
use two-factor authentication and failed in control of logging (article 32 GDPR). The
hospital has announced that measures will be taken.85
Other violations found by the AP were stopped by other means such as informal
enforcement action.86 In 2018, theAP took informal action in 1,018 cases (298 data breaches
and 720 complaints).87
Publication of sanctions
TheAPhas the power, based on theDutch Freedomof InformationAct88 and in accordance
with its publication policy guidelines, to publish, for instance, investigative findings and
sanctions ordered against private companies or public authorities and other organisations,
stating the name of the relevant organisation, even before a sanction has become final.
The (primary) purpose is to inform andwarn the public. Such publication by a supervisory
81 ‘APdwingtUWVmet sanctie gegevens beter te beveiligen’, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/
ap-dwingt-uwv-met-sanctie-gegevens-beter-te-beveiligen.
82 ‘APdwingtUWVmet sanctie gegevens beter te beveiligen’, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/
ap-dwingt-uwv-met-sanctie-gegevens-beter-te-beveiligen See also https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/
nl/nieuws/uwv-heeft-werkwijze-verzuimbeheer-aangepast-na-onderzoek-ap.
83 ‘Nationale Politie beschermt politiegegevens nog steeds niet goed genoeg’, https://
autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/nationale-politie-beschermt-politiegegevens-nog-steeds-niet-
goed-genoeg.
84 ‘Nationale Politie voldoet aan last onder dwangsom’, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/
nationale-politie-voldoet-aan-last-onder-dwangsom.
85 ‘Haga beboet voor onvoldoende interne beveiliging patiëntendossiers’, https://
www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/haga-beboet-voor-onvoldoende-interne-beveiliging-pati
%C3%ABntendossiers.
86 Annual Report 2018, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ap_bijlage_2018.pdf.
87 Ibid.
88 See i.a. Administrative JurisdictionDivision of theCouncil of State 31May 2006, ECLI:NL:RVS:2006:AX6362,




authority is not to be considered as a sanction in itself89, although this point of view is
criticised in Dutch legal literature.90
Fining guidelines
On14March 2019, theAPpublished its newpolicy guidelines for calculating administrative
fines.91 In short, the AP divides infringements into several categories and assigns to each
category a specific fine bandwidth and a ‘basic fine’ (the minimum of the bandwidth +
50% of the amount of the bandwidth). When calculating a fine, the AP will increase or
decrease the amount of the basic fine depending on factors such as those referred to in
article 83(2) GDPR. The previously mentioned fine imposed on the hospital is the first
example of the application of the new fining guidelines.92
Question 12
Dutch law dictates that damagesmay consist ofmaterial loss or other disadvantages, though
the latter only as far as the law implies that there is an entitlement to compensation. In
that respect, by law the aggrieved party has a right of compensation for damages not
consisting of material loss (such as injured honour or reputation) as well as a harmed
memory of a deceased (provided that the deceased himself, if he would still be alive, could
have claimed damages for injuring his honour or reputation).
In contradiction with compensation for material loss – which is in principle subject to
full compensation – the extent of the compensation for intangible harm is assessed in
conformity with the standards of reasonableness and fairness. Judges in the Netherlands
have a discretionary power in assessing the extent of the compensation, meaning also that
they may choose not to award any compensation at all.93
Notwithstanding the above, compensation for intangible damages is not easily awarded
in theNetherlands, in any case not in large sums. In a court rulingwhere freedomof speech
was juxtaposed with the freedom to privacy, compensation was awarded to an employee
89 See i.a. the Explanatory memorandum to the Instellingswet ACM (33 622), p. 57-58, Administrative Juris-
diction Division of the Council of State 2 August 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2086, point 6.1 and District
Court of Rotterdam 24 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5041, point 13.3. See also Court of First
Instance 30 May 2006, Case T-198/03 (Lombard Club), ECLI:EU:T:2006:136 on the decision to publish the
non-confidential version of a Commission decision.
90 See e.g., Handhavingsrecht (HSB) 2016/5.4.2.
91 ‘APpast boetebeleidsregels aan’, https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/ap-past-boetebeleidsregels-
aan.
92 For that, see the EDPB Guidelines on the application and setting of administrative fines for the purposes
of the Regulation 2016/679, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611237.
93 HR 27 April 2001, NJ 2002/91.
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of a phone company whose name was repeatedly mentioned in a blog post by an angry
journalist who had had a bad experience with the customer service, more specifically with
the aforementioned employee.94 The court ruled that the employee suffered from injured
reputation, as it was easy to find the (disproportionate) allegations against her via search
engines, putting her in a negative light and possibly making it difficult for her to find a
new job. Even though the court refers to the injury of reputation as being “substantially”,
only € 500 was awarded.
Question 13
The Dutch Civil Code provides that a foundation or an association with full legal capacity
can start legal proceedings aiming to protect similar interests of other persons, insofar as
it is laid down in their statutes that they promote such interests.95 In addition, the Awb
provides for the possibility of the party / parties concerned to file an objection in an
administrative procedure, whereby a party concerned may also be a legal person that
protects general or collective interests following their stated purposes or factual activities.96
The UAVG provides though that a processing activity cannot be subject to legal
proceedings under the Civil Code nor a formal objection in an administrative procedure
under theAwb, if the person that is affected by the processing activity has objections against
this.97 Thismeans that representative actionsmay only be initiated if the affected person(s)
do not object. At the time of writing, no examples of such cases are until now available.
There are however several NGOs and initiatives in the Netherlands that play an
important role with regard to pursuing the public interest in relation to privacy and the
protection of personal data.
Bits of Freedom has, for example, developed a tool called “My Data Done Right”. With
this tool, over 17,000 people filed a request to get access to their data. Also, it organizes an
annual and widely media-covered event giving a Big Brother award to the person or
organization that has been deemed the biggest violator of privacy of that year.
Civil society has also campaigned for organizing a consultative referendum on the
Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act (In Dutch: Wet informatie en
veiligheidsdiensten, hereinafter “Wiv”). Of the 6,7 million Dutch inhabitants that voted in
94 Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 21 November 2007, KG 07/1158.
95 Art. 305a Civil Code - https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005291/2019-01-01/#Boek3_Titeldeel11_
Artikel305a.
96 Art. 1:2 3rd indentAwb - https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005537/2019-04-02/#Hoofdstuk1_Titeldeel1.1_
Artikel1:2.
97 Art. 37 UAVG.
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this referendum, a majority voted against. Although the referendum was not binding, the
government did adjust the Wiv to meet some of the worries of the public.
Question 14
In the national context, the AP cooperates with different other supervisory authorities and
has signed cooperation agreements laying down the cooperation arrangements.98 Usually
a covenant is used to lay down how the supervisory authorities will cooperate and how
they share the tasks and reach the goals that they have in common and for which they may
cooperate. The AP has signed a covenant with the following organisations:
– The Dutch Media Authority (in Dutch: Commissariaat voor de Media)
– The Dutch central bank (in Dutch: De Nederlandsche Bank)
– The health and Youth Care Inspectorate in formation (in Dutch: Inspectie
Gezondheidszorg en Jeugd in oprichting (IHJ i.o.)) –
– The Consumer and Market Authority (in Dutch: Autoriteit Consument en Markt
(ACM))
– The Dutch Healthcare Authority (in Dutch: Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit)
– The Inspectorate of Education (in Dutch: Inspectie van het onderwijs)
– The government service for identity data (inDutch:Rijksdienst voor Identiteitsgegevens)
– Radiocommunications Agency (in Dutch: Agentschap Telecom)
Arguably, the cooperation between the ACM and the AP is the most relevant one with
regard to the protection of personal data, as these two authorities have a shared
responsibility concerning the use of personal data in relation to Dutch implementation of
the ePrivacy Directive. The cooperation agreement mainly regulates the general exchange
of information between the authorities and situations in which their competences overlap
Another covenant that warrants specific mention is the covenant between de AP and
the DNB. Following the introduction of the Payment Services Directive 299, where third
parties may get access to the banking details of a consumer after (s)he has given his / her
consent, the AP and the DNB have entered into an agreement in which they demarcate
their responsibilities towards the use of banking information.
In addition to bilateral agreements with the mentioned organizations, the AP also
participates in the Markttoezichthoudersberaad, which is the meeting of regulators who
(partly) focus on the functioning and behavior of market players. In addition to the AP,
98 https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/over-de-autoriteit-persoonsgegevens/nationale-samenwerking.
99 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of theCouncil of 25November 2015 on payment
services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regu-
lation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, [2015] OJ L337/35.
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also the ACM, Financial Market Authority, The Dutch Media Authority, the DNB, the
Netherlands Gambling Authority and the Dutch Healthcare Authority participate in the
MTB.
There is no covenant or other agreement between de AP and the Dutch Ombudsman.
However, where the Ombudsman deems the AP to be in a better position to help a citizen
with a specific issue between the citizen and public authorities, he can refer a case to the
AP. At the same time, the Ombudsman is able to hear and investigate complaints about
the AP by citizens.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The Dutch Government has concluded that the processing of personal data for national
security purposes as derogation from the regimes provided by the GDPR and the Law
Enforcement Directive coincides with the processing of data as part of the work of the
intelligence and security services.100
The UAVG “does not apply to the processing of personal data referred to in Article
2(2) of the GDPR.”101 However, by means of exception, it does apply, “to the processing
of personal data […] in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union
law”102. However, the processing of personal data by or for the benefit of the Military
Intelligence and Security Service and the General Intelligence and Security Service (in
Dutch: AIVD) in relation to their tasks is again excluded.103
As a result, personal data processed by a private party but destined for use by one of
the intelligence services does not fall within the scope of the UAVG nor the GDPR.
However, the GDPR is applicable to the processing of personal data by other public bodies
in the interest of national security, for example the processing as part of the performance
of the tasks and competencies incumbent to theMinister of Justice in the interest of national
security (for instance counterterrorism).104
100 EM UAVG, para. 2.2, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-
toelichting-uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
101 Section 2, para. 3, GDPR Implementation Act.
102 Section 3, para. h 1, sub a), and para. 2 GDPR Implementation Act. Art. 2(2) under a) of the Regulation is
thus brought within the ambit of the Implementation Act and the GDPR.
103 EMUAVG, para. 2.2, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/12/13/memorie-van-
toelichting-uitvoeringswet-algemene-verordening-gegevensbescherming.
104 Idem, see also H.R. Kranenborg and L.F.M. Verhey, De Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming in
Europees en Nederlands perspectief, Deventer, Kluwer 2018, p. 126.
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The Netherlands
The Wiv does not provide a detailed definition of the term ‘national security’. It follows
from the definition of the tasks of the AIVD that national security coincides with the
maintenance of the democratic legal order, with security or with other important interests
of the Dutch state.105 Concerning the Military Intelligence and Security Service, the
protection of national security requires mainly the maintenance of the international legal
order and the readiness of the armed forces.106
The processing of personal data covered by theWiv is broadly defined.107 It encompasses
data related to persons concerning whom there is a serious suspicion that they form a
threat to the democratic legal order, to security or to other important interests of the Dutch
state.108 Data concerning enquiries or analyses related to other states and data related to
persons who have been examined by foreign intelligence services fall under the Wiv as
well.109 Personal data necessary for the correct functioning of the services can also be
processed under the Wiv, even as personal data needed to perform more general analyses
of threats and risks.110 Not only data concerning the persons directly related to these goals,
but also to persons involvedmore indirectly can be collectedwhen they form an inextricable
part of a larger set of data.111
According to the AIVD the Wiv not only applies to names and addresses of its targets,
but also data related to its suppliers and to applicants or persons or companies related to
the service in any other way.112 The AIVD indicates as well that certain categories of private
companies, for instance providers of telecom services, have the legal obligation to provide
data to the security services when required. They are not allowed to inform, amongst
others, the person concerned of the transmission of these data.113
The laws implementing Directive (EU) 2016/680 do not define the terms ‘national
security’ either. The Police Data Act provides for the transmission of personal data to the
two aforementioned intelligence services for the purpose of the fulfillment of their tasks.114
This possibility or obligation is contained as well in the Wiv.115
105 Section 8, para. 2, sub a) Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017.
106 Section 10, para. 2, sub a), ibid.
107 Section 19, para. 1, 2 and 5, ibid.
108 Section 19, para. 1, sub a), ibid.
109 Section 19, para. 1, sub c) and d), ibid.
110 Section 19, para. 1, sub e) and g), ibid.




114 Section 24 Police Data Act.
115 Sections 91-94 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017. This obligation to cooperate with the security
and intelligence services, also exists for the military police, the tax authorities, the social security services
and the immigration office. Section 93 provides for the transmission of data by the Prosecutors office.
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Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
According to the Explanatory Note to the Wiv, the acts of the intelligence and security
services fall, pursuant to article 4, paragraph 2, TEU, outside the scope of the powers of
the Union. Hence, the processing and retention of personal data by these services do not
fall under the EU privacy legislation. The Charter is only applicable to the implementation
of EU law by the Member States.116 The privacy rights of the constitution and the ECHR
are however applicable.
The Council of State considered in this respect that EU law and the case law from the
Court of Justice do not apply to the intelligence and security services. However, it is likely
that the principles developed by the ECJ are relevant for the scope and limitation of their
powers.117
116 E.M. Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017, p. 250, www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/
2016/10/28/memorie-van-toelichting-inzake-wijziging-wet-op-de-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdiensten.





Milos Novovic and Martin Hennig*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
In Norway, the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) has been
implemented through the Norwegian Personal Data Protection Act (“PDPA”, Lov om
behandling av personopplysninger (personopplysningsloven), LOV-2018-06-15-38). The
PDPA is a relatively concise law, which, in addition to implementing GDPR, introduces
several provisions aimed at supplementing GDPR requirements, or making use of
flexibilities offered under the GDPR.
Of special interest is chapter 3 of the law, which is specifically geared towards
introducing supplementary provisions into the national law.
Article 5 deals with the question of the consent of children to personal data processing,
and sets the age of consent to 13 years, in line with art. 8(1) of the GDPR.
Article 6 deals with use of special categories of data in employment relationships, and
prescribes that such data processing is lawful insofar as it is necessary in order to fulfil
rights and duties under employment law.
Article 7 establishes the possibility for the Norwegian Data Protection Authority to
authorize processing of special categories of personal data, where such processing is in the
public interest. In Article 8, the possibility to process personal data for research, archival
or historic purposes is retained, provided that safeguards mentioned in article 89(1) of the
GDPR are implemented.
Article 11 stipulates that comprehensive criminal records shall only be processed by
public authorities, and Article 12 stipulates that national ID numbers are to be used only
where there is an actual need for secure identification, and their use is needed for such
identification. Several provisions point to the possibility of future administrative acts
stipulating the use of data in further detail.
* Milos Novovic: Associate Professor, Department of Law and Governance, BI Norwegian Business School.
Martin Hennig: Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, UiT, The Arctic University of Norway.
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Furthermore, Chapter 4 deals with exceptions to data subject rights. Article 16 details
exceptions to the right of information and right of access, whereas Article 17 details the
exceptions applicable in cases where personal data is being processed for research purposes.
According to article 17, a data subject’s right to information and access can be limited
in cases where information:
a. is of importance to Norway’s foreign policy interests or national defense and security
interests, when the controller can exempt the information pursuant to the Norwegian
Freedom of Information Act;
b. itmust be kept secret for the purposes of prevention, investigation and legal prosecution
of criminal offenses
c. itmust be considered unreasonable for the data subject to become aware of information
in order to safeguard his or her health or the relationship with persons close to him or
her;
d. is subject to the duty of confidentiality in law or pursuant to law;
e. is only found in texts prepared for internal case preparation, and which have not been
disclosed to others, insofar as it is necessary to refuse access to ensure sound internal
decision-making processes
f. it would be contrary to obvious and fundamental private or public interests to disclose
information.
Articles 20 and 22 establish the work of supervisory authorities, and detail the scope of
their tasks. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority (Datatilsynet) has the general
responsibility for oversight of the implementation of PDPA, whereas The Privacy Appeals
Board, (Personvernnemnda), acts as a second-instance administrative authority in individual
cases.
Question 2
There is no explicit distinction between these rights, although in the context of private
parties, violation of someone’s right to private life is also retained as a tort under the
Norwegian Tort Act (Skadeerstatningsloven). There is no case law clearly outlining the
scope of either one of these rights, or elaborating on the differences between violation of
the right to data protection versus the right to private life.
In this regard, it should be mentioned that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(hereinafter “Charter”) is not part of the EEA Agreement, and is thus, at least formally
speaking, not binding upon Norwegian authorities. However, The EFTA Court has long
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held that the EEA Agreement must be ‘interpreted in the light of fundamental rights.’1
Thus, the influence of the case law from the European Courts concerning the Charter and
data protection will undoubtedly be monitored closely by Norwegian courts and public
authorities.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The Norwegian National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”) has issued several
guidelines which deal with these topics and has made a reference to these principles,
although without going into much depth. While there is no new case law as of date, the
courts have ruled in a few cases under the law implementing the Directive.
NSA-issued Guidelines on “basic privacy principles” explain these concepts, but are
quite short and superficial. They do not offer any in-depth coverage of examples, and do
not offer any insights into enforcement practice.
The court cases dealing with implementation of the Directive have focused on the
purpose limitation principle when assessing whether processing qualified as compatible
further processing. The most famous case made its way to the Supreme Court
(HR-2013-234-A). A driver who had been dismissed because of discrepancies between his
time sheets and the electronic (GPS) log of his vehicle, requested damages for non-economic
loss under section 49 subsection 3 of the Personal Data Act. The SupremeCourt’smajority
concluded that reusing information collected for a different purpose than the original one
cannot be anchored directly in Section 8(f) of the Personal Data Act (legitimate interest).
The conditions in Section 11(1)(c) (purpose limitation)must also be satisfied. In the specific
case, the employer’s comparison of the log and the time sheets represented a reuse that
had no basis in Section 11(1)(c), as the purposes were not compatible. This led to the Court
declaring the processing unlawful, even though the legitimate interest test was apparently
satisfied. It should be noted that the case was decided under the old law, implementing
the Directive.





There is limited case law on interpretation of these topics, both under the Directive and
under GDPR. The Norwegian Supreme Court has not examined the validity of consent in
individual cases, and remarks on legitimate interest have been quite sporadic, and mostly
limited to the aforementioned case LOD-2013-114-24. In the case “legelisten.no”, decided
byOsloDistrict Court, 17December 2019, the court found that the performance assessment
of individual medical doctors (general practitioners) provided by “legelisten.no”, was
compatible with article 6 of the GDPR. The case concerned the processing of evaluations
by patients of their experience with individually named medical practitioners in Norway.
The Norwegian Medical Association argued that the processing of information about the
general practitioners constituted personal data that required protection under article
6(1)(f). TheDistrict Court disagreed, and ruled that the legitimate interest of “legelisten.no”
in publishing their experience with general practitioners was protected by freedom of
speech and outweighed the need for the protection of the practitioners’ personal data.2
Question 5
Such debate has largely been absent, although several research projects are currently
exploring data commodification as a topic. Some criticism has been issued against the
EuropeanData Protection Board’s (hereinafter “EDPB”)Draft Guidelines on article 6(1)(b)
GDPR which take a firm stance against use of personal data as a contractual
counter-performance, suggesting the need to balance the right to data protection with the
right to freedom of contract. As Novovic surmised, criticizing the EDPB’s statement on
the fact that personal data cannot be a contractual counter-performance, exceeds the scope
of authority of the EDPB and goes beyond questions of the GDPR:
“Contract interpretation – and contractual validity – is clearly and firmly within the
domain of national courts to decide under the governing law. By making sweeping
statements on the “general purpose of the contract” for the entire categories of online
services,3 and consequently engaging in contract interpretation, the EDPB is seriously
overstepping its authority and the scope of tasks conferred on it by the virtue of article 70
of the GDPR.
2 See the judgment of 17 December 2019, Oslo District Court, TOSLO-2019-98312. As of 18 February 2020,
it is not known whether or not this case has been appealed by the Norwegian Medical Association.
3 See, for example, Guidelines, para. 50: “Further to this, Article 6(1)(b) cannot provide a lawful basis for
online behavioural advertising simply because such advertising indirectly funds the provision of the service.
Although such processing may support the delivery of a service, it is separate from the objective purpose of the
contract between the user and the service provider, and therefore not necessary for the performance of the
contract at issue.” Emphasis added.
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This becomes even more problematic when, in the context of discussing a particular
type of online service, EDPB states that “personal data cannot be a tradeable commodity”,
and underlines that that “data subjects can agree to processing of their personal data, but
cannot trade away their fundamental rights”.
There are at least three issues with placing such statement in this context.
First, there is still a deep scholarly discussion on the commodification of personal data,
and the GDPR itself does not address the issue directly. Such strong statements on the
issue are best left to the legislative branch, or alternatively, the judiciary – as it is
questionable how the EDPB reaches such sweeping conclusion in theGuidelines, and from
where it derives authority to do so.
Secondly, implying that entry into a certain type of a contract would, in itself, entail
“trading away fundamental rights” has no basis in the law. Once again, this assessment
would need to bemade on a case by case basis, with a full due reference to national contract
laws, and careful balancing of different rights.
Thirdly, the EDPB seems to surprisingly ignore the fact that freedom of contract is also
seen as one of the fundamental rights within EU, falling under the scope of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of EU. This discussion should have been given a central place in the
Guidelines; as pointed out by various authors, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of
the EuropeanUnion (hereinafter “CJEU”) on the topic extends to the topics such as freedom
to enter into a contract, freedom from contract, freedom to choose a contractual partner,
and freedom to determine the content of a contract. Additionally, the CJEUhas onmultiple
occasions clearly stated that EU instruments cannot be implemented or interpreted in a
way which would jeopardize protection of other fundamental rights:
“It must be borne in mind, in the first place, that, according to the case-law of
the Court, EU law requires that, when transposing directives, the Member
States take care to rely on an interpretation of them which allows a fair balance
to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the EU legal
order. Subsequently, when implementing the measures transposing those
directives, the authorities and courts of the Member States must not only
interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but
also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would
be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general principles
of EU law.”4




In other words, the data subject’s right of data protectionwould need to be balanced against
the right of freedom of contract on an individual basis. It is outside the purview of EDPBs
authority to prioritize one fundamental right over another in a generalized manner, and
the Guidelines should be consequently amended.”5
Question 6
No such acts have been introduced as of yet, although there have been some discussions
on the scope of this right in the proposal for the new Public Administration Act (Norway).6
Whether such measures will be introduced remains to be seen.
In the comments to the proposed Public Administration Act, the Law Commission is
aware of and adresses the imminent challenges presented by automated decision-making.
As regards this issue, the Law Commission states that (English summary):7
“The draft act facilitates further digitalisation of administrative activities. The
individual provisions are in principle intended to be technology-neutral. The
draft act envisages that administrative proceedings may be fully automated
following detailed assessment of relevant areas, subject to a requirement that
the legal content of the systemmust be publicly documented. TheCommission
has also examined particular challenges presented by digitalisation and
automation in the data protection context. These raise difficult issues both
nationally and under international law; see particularly the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). The Commission is proposing an expanded
power for administrative bodies in the central government, county and
municipal sectors to share confidential information. In the case of personal
data, it is proposed that this power be granted subject to conditions that satisfy
GDPR requirements.”
5 MilosNovovic, Answer to the Public Consultation of the EDPB onGuidelines onArticle 6(1)b in the context
of online services.
6 See NOU 2019: 5, “Ny forvaltningslov — Lov om saksbehandlingen i offentlig forvaltning (forvalt-
ningsloven)”, published by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, see https://www.regjeringen.no/no/
dokumenter/nou-2019-5/id2632006/. All webpages referred to were visited 18 February 2020.
7 See NOU 2019: 5, “Ny forvaltningslov — Lov om saksbehandlingen i offentlig forvaltning (forvalt-
ningsloven)”, published by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Summary in English, 2.2.2 General
comments on the Commission’s proposals, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2019-5/
id2632006/?ch=3.
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Question 7
Case law on the application of the right to erasure is very sparse. Most court cases and
enforcement actions were connected with employers’ failure to erase employees’ email
accounts. However, instead of referring to the right of erasure, the courts referred to specific
provisions found in the bylaw implementing PDPA, and found employers in the violation
of this specific provision.
Question 8
No such law has been introduced to date.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Although no single Norwegian public authority has been charged with the responsibility
of enforcing the rights and obligations laid down in the GDPR, it is the Norwegian Data
Protection Authority which has been entrusted under the Norwegian Personal Data
ProtectionAct (hereinafter “PDPA”) to enforce theGDPR. TheNorwegianData Protection
Authority handles complaints as the first instance, and the Privacy Appeals Board is the
appellate administrative body. The procedures relating to supervision and complaints
regarding the enforcement of the GDPR are found in Chapter 6 of the PDPA.
As of today, there is little “enforcement record” to speak of. However, in March 2019,
the Norwegian Data Protection Authority imposed an administrative fine of 1.6 million
Norwegian kroner, or the equivalent of €170,000, on the Municipality of Bergen. The fine
stems from inadequate security measures in place for the protection of usernames and
passwords belonging to over 35,000 user accounts in the municipality’s computer system.
Due to insufficient security measures, these files had been left unprotected and openly
accessible. The Municipality of Bergen later stated that it did not wish to appeal the
decision.8






The Norwegian NSA has taken a few high-profile cases, most of which were tied to data
protection practices in the public sector (education and healthcare). Almost all enforcement
actions stemmed from breaches of article 32 of the GDPR, so there is a clear focus on data
security as an enforcement mechanism trigger. This might be a flawed strategy long-term,
seeing as itmight encourage a rather narrow reading of data protection obligations by data
controllers.
Aside fromprioritizing highly publicized cases, theNSA seems to be discouraging data
subjects from submitting complaints. The website instructs data subjects to submit written
complaints, claiming that electronic submission forms are not ready for public use due to
security concerns. The website also urges data subjects to resolve their issues directly with
data controllers.
Question 11
We are not aware of such sanctions being imposed at this point.
Question 12
The Norwegian legal system does make it possible to claim damages for intangible harm
(oppreisning). The PDPA makes this explicitly possible in cases of harm suffered as a
consequence of its breach.
Calculation of damages is discretionary and depends on the nature and scope of
violation, as well as severity of consequences. Traditionally, very low monetary amounts
have been awarded in data protection cases, with the highest amount being around €5,000.
Question 13
There are no such movements in Norway as of date, to the best of our knowledge.
Question 14
To the best of our knowledge, our national NSA, theNorwegianData ProtectionAuthority
does not cooperate, or at least not formally, with other regulators or the Norwegian
Ombudsman. However, cooperation with other public authorities is not inconceivable,
for instance in the case of collaboration on specific projects.
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D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
So far, Norwegian regulatory authorities have notmade any attempt in national legislation
at defining, or in any way restricting, what constitutes “national security” under article
23(a) of the GDPR. It is worth noting, that in the Norwegian Personal Data Protection
Act, article 23(3) states that the processing of personal information which is necessary
from the point of view of safeguarding national security, is completely excluded from the
GDPR. This provision also states that personal information relating to the security of our
allies, foreign states or relating to other vital national security interests, are excluded from
the GDPR.
In comparison to the text of the GDPR, at least at first glance, the Norwegian Personal
Data Protection act seems to have a wider scope of exception than article 23 of the GDPR.
Especially in regards to the possibility of excluding personal information relating to our
allies, the scope of the exception seems wider under the Norwegian act than in the GDRP.
However, it would be remarkable if the GDPR would block the exclusion of information,
which Norwegian authorities considered sensitive to our allied countries. Time will show




Agnieszka Grzelak and Mirosław Wróblewski*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The main legal instruments adopted in order to implement the General Data Protection
Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”)1 in Poland are as follows:
1. the Act of 10 May 2018 on personal data protection2 (PDPA), which repealed the Act
of 29 August 1997 on personal data protection (hereinafter “PDPA97”);3
2. the Act of 21 February 2019 amending some acts as regards ensuring the application
of GDPR (hereinafter “GDPRImpl”).4
Moreover, on 14 December 2018 the Polish Parliament adopted the Act on personal data
protection processed with regard to the prevention and fight against crime5 (hereinafter
“PDPACrime”), implementing the Directive 2016/6806.
PDPA specifies, among others, general conditions for imposing administrative fines,
a new DPA – data protection authority (the President of the Office for the Protection of
Personal Data – PUODO), public entities obliged to appoint a Data Protection Officer,
the administrative procedure pertaining to the personal data breach procedure, civil and
criminal liability for breaches of personal data protection legislation. This is also the Act
inwhich the Polish legislator decided to introduce some derogations fromGDPR, however,
* AgnieszkaGrzelak: Professor of European and International Law at Kozminski University,Warsaw, Poland;
Mirosław Wróblewski: Attorney at law, Director of Constitutional, International and European Law
Department in the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Warsaw, Poland.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Journal of Laws (JL) 2018, item 1000 as amended.
3 JL 1997, No 133 item 883 as amended; PDPA in English, www.uodo.gov.pl/en/594. All webpages referred
to were visited on 15 January 2020.
4 JL 2019 item 730.
5 JL 2019 item 125.
6 Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ
L119/89.
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flexibilities of GDPR were availed by the Polish legislator only to some extent. This can be
illustrated by the following examples. Articles 3 and 4 PDPA avail generally of the flexibility
of article 23 GDPR, limiting information obligations foreseen by articles 13 and 14 GDPR
with regard to controllers being a public authority. The ability to take advantage of this
possibility depends on compliance with the following conditions: 1) changing the purpose
of processing is used to implement a public task; 2) failure to comply with the information
obligation is necessary to achieve the objectives referred to in article 23GDPR; 3) providing
information required by article 13(3) GDPR: a) prevents or significantly hinders the proper
performance of a public task, the interest or fundamental rights or freedoms of the data
subject are not superior to the interest arising from the implementation of this task public,
or b) violates the protection of classified information. Article 5 PDPA, which limits the
application of Article 15(1-3) GDPR is constructed in a similar way.
GDPRImpl amended other sectoral acts allowing for even further limitations of GDPR
norms. For example, laws regulating legal professions (Act on advocates and Act on
attorneys at law7) limit application of GDPR (especially articles 15, 18, 19 and 21) to the
scope not infringing professional secrecy. Those laws also avail of the possibility foreseen
by article 90 GDPR – competences of the DPA do not prevail over the duty to keep
professional secrecy.8
As regards article 6(1)(c)GDPR,GDPRImpl amended sectoral acts, in order to – among
others – secure the legality of data processing. GDPRImpl therefore amended i.a. Code of
administrative procedure,9 Labour Code,10 Act on public roads,11 Act on fisheries12 and
more than 160 others sectoral laws, in cases necessary for compliancewith a legal obligation
to which the controller is a subject.
As for articles 86-90 GDPR, it should be stated that the legislator has not taken any
special actions to amend any provisions regarding the access to public information or the
national personal identification number (PESEL), which were in force already before 2018.
In turn, in relation to the processing of personal data in employment, the legislator has
originally decided on the preservation of provisions of the Labour Code being previously
in force (art. 221§ 1) and on adding new rules on the admissibility of the application of
visual surveillance and other forms ofmonitoring employee at work. Later on (in February
2019) the Parliament modified the Labour Code by changing the scope of data that an
employer may request from an employee in connection with employment. For example,
7 The Act of 26 May 1982 (JL 2018 item 1184 as amended) and the Act of 6 July 1982 (JL 2018 item 2115 as
amended).
8 See e.g. art. 5b of the Act on attorneys at law.
9 The Act of 14 June 1960 (JL 2018 item 2096 as amended).
10 The Act of 26 June 1974 (JL 2019 item 2046).
11 The Act of 21 March 1985 (JL 2017 item 2222 as amended).
12 The Act of 18 April 1985 (JL 2018 item 1486 as amended).
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since 4May 2019 the employermay not request the job applicant to provide parents’ names
and place of residence (correspondence address). However, the employer is entitled to
request contact details from the applicant (e.g. telephone number, e-mail address). Another
example illustrates the way in which the legislator introduced derogations from article 89
GDPR in relation to academic activities. In article 2(2) PDPA it was decided that with
regard to the academic activity, the provisions of articles 13, 15(3) and (4), 18, 27, 28(2-10)
and article 30 GDPR do not apply.
On the other hand, article 8 GDPR allows to reduce the age limit from 16 to 13 of a
child whose data is processed in the context of information society services. Although this
was the subject of a public debate, ultimately the Polish legislator decided not to use this
option and to remain the 16 years limit. Interestingly, the same age is applied in Poland
as a threshold for independent decision making capacity as regards medical services.13
Question 2
The Constitution of Poland distinguishes between right to privacy and right to protection
of personal data. According to article 47 of theConstitution (hereinafter “Const”), everyone
shall have the right to legal protection of private and family life, of honour and good
reputation and to make decisions about personal life. This provision reflects article 7 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter “Charter”) and article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”). However, the protection
of freedom and privacy of communication is safeguarded by a separate provision (article
49 Const).
The constitutional protection of personal data, being a specific emanation of right to
privacy, ismuchmore detailed. Article 51Const explicitly establishes specific requirements
securing informational autonomy of an individual: 1. No one may be obliged, except on
the basis of statute, to disclose information concerning his person; 2. Public authorities
shall not acquire, collect nor make accessible information on citizens other than that which
is necessary in a democratic state ruled by law; 3. Everyone shall have a right of access to
official documents and data collections concerning himself. Limitations upon such rights
may be established by statute; 4. Everyone shall have the right to demand the correction
or deletion of untrue or incomplete information, or information acquired bymeans contrary
to statute; 5. Principles and procedures for collection of and access to information shall
be specified by statute. Constitutional protection is thus far-fetched, in a manner similar




to the requirements arising from article 8 Charter (with the exception regarding Charter’s
institutional requirements).14
Public authorities are obliged to prevent violations of privacy, since the protection by
both civil and penal law is a post factum protection, thus cannot be treated as sufficient.
The right to privacy is guaranteed by civil law (protection of personal goods – articles 23
and 24 Civil Code15) and by penal law (e.g. prohibition of defamation – article 212 Penal
Code16). Only on the basis of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP, article 755)17 any interim
measure regarding privacy can be established by a court.
Data protection is basedmostly on the administrative law system, including institutional
protection by DPA. However, civil and penal law mechanisms may also be used, as it is
clearly provided by PDPA and GDPR. A set of legal measures and sanctions is broader
and more diversified in comparison with the protection of privacy.
The rights to privacy and data protection, as set out in the Charter, have influenced
the interpretation of the Polish law only to a certain extent. This is most evident in the
case law of theConstitutional Court (CC). For example, theCourt of Justice of the European
Union (hereinafter “CJEU”) judgment in Digital Rights Ireland Case,18 in which articles 7
and 8 Charter were interpreted, influenced the judgment of CC in the surveillance case.19
Recently, the concept of independence of an authority referred to in article 8(3) Charter,
together with the relevant case law of CJEU20, was the subject of discussions during the
work on provisions regulating the systemic aspects of functioning of the DPA.21
14 See M. Wild, ‘Komentarz do art. 47’, in M. Safjan & L. Bosek (Eds), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
Vol. I, Komentarz do artykułów 1-86, Warszawa, C.H.Beck, 2016, pp. 1161-1182.
15 The Act of 23 April 1964 (JL 2019 item 1145).
16 The Act of 6 June 1997 (JL 2018 item 1600 as amended).
17 The Act of 17 November 1964 (JL 2018 item 1360 as amended).
18 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others
(Digital Rights Ireland), ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
19 Judgment of CC of 30 July 2014 in case K 23/11, OTK-A 2014, No 7, item 80.
20 See for example judgment of 8 April 2014 in Case C-288/12, European Commission v. Hungary,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
21 A. Grzelak & M. Wróblewski, ‘Niezależność Prezesa Urzędu Ochrony Danych Osobowych w świetle prawa
UE’, in M. Gumularz et al. (Eds), Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych. Komentarz, Warszawa, MustRead-
Media Ed., 2018, p. 219.
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B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
On the basis ofGDPR, neitherDPAnor Polish courts interpreted these basic data protection
principles in a way that could be subject to reporting here. However, in the first case in
which the financial penalty was imposed byDPAon the company, the administrative court
of first instance analysed the legitimacy of the penalty and shared DPA’s statement that
the infringement is of a serious nature, as it also violates the principle of transparency and
fairness22. Therefore, the information can be given on the basis of the previous legislation,
with an indication that it may also be applied accordingly to the basis of new provisions.
PDPA97, which implementedDirective 1995/46/EC,23 did notmention specifically the
‘fairness’principle. Although the Polish text of article 6(1)(a)Directive 1995/46/EC explicitly
used this term, PDPA97 in article 26 stipulated ‘due diligence’ as a controller’s duty. Such
a difference was interpreted in the literature either as a proper implementation of Directive
1995/46/EC or as a deviation from the EU legislation – the latter meant that PDPA97
missed the fairness principle, concentrating only on lawfulness. On the other hand, one
may also say that in practice the duty of ‘due diligence’ in processing data served as a
synonym of ‘fairness’.24 The administrative courts’ case law followed such interpretation,
e.g. the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) emphasized that no organizational or
financial reasons can justify unfair and illegal processing of personal data by banks.25 That
means, that in practice also the Polish DPA used concepts of ‘due diligence’ and ‘fairness’
in assessing the processing of personal data on the basis of PDPA97.26 At the moment,
GDPR leaves no room for such discussion anymore, however the concept of ‘fairness’ is
broad. Currently, in the doctrine it is interpreted as a demand to find a proportionate
balance between the interests of data subjects and controllers.27
The principle of purpose limitation was implemented already in article 26(1)(2)
PDPA97. PDPA97 protected i.a. the execution of a controller’s information duties and
22 This topic of fairness was not further explored. Cf. judgment of 11December 2019 inCase II SA/Wa 1030/19,
orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/30EDD316DA.
23 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
24 P. Barta & P. Litwiński, Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych. Komentarz, Warszawa, C.H.Beck, 2015, p.
288.
25 Judgement of 4 March 2002 in case II SA 3144/01, Monitor Prawniczy 2002, No 8, p. 340.
26 Annual reports of DPA until 2018 are available on the webpage: giodo.gov.pl.
27 E. Bielak-Jomaa&D. Lubasz (Eds),RODO.Ogólne rozporządzenie o ochronie danych. Komentarz,Warszawa,
Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 327.
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introduced the principle that data collected for a specified purpose cannot be used otherwise.
The latter principle shall be understood as a prohibition of data processing for a purpose
which is incompatible with the original purpose.28 GDPR introduces no further changes
in the understanding of this principle.
The principle of data minimisation was also present in PDPA97, in the concept of
‘adequacy’ of data processing (article 26(1)(3) PDPA97). According to the decisions of the
Polish DPA, data was adequate when the processing was ‘necessary’.29 Data processed by
a controller had to be necessary to achieve a purpose of processing; the scope of the data
processed could not be broader. This line is confirmed in DPA’s decision on the grounds
of GDPR.30 Adequacy of data was also protected both in well-established administrative
courts’ case law,31 as well as in the judgments of CC, which interpreted article 51(2) Const
and emphasized that public authorities cannot collect all useful, but only necessary data.32
Question 4
On the basis of PDPA97, administrative courts acknowledged that each legal basis of data
processing, enumerated in article 23 PDPA97, had an autonomous and independent
character, thus they had been granted, as a rule, the equal status.33 This case law remains
applicable also as regards the legal basis enlisted in article 6(1) GDPR.34
The previous case law regarding the consent – as a legal basis of data processing – also
seems to be up-to-date and useful in interpretation of article 6(1)(a) and article 7 GDPR.
According to the judgments, both the consent as well as all aspects of it must be clear in
the moment the consent is given.35 The consent thus shall be informed.36
As regards digital environment one shallmentiondisputableDPA’s decisions concerning
the consent given via electronicmeans of communication (mail, Internet forms). TheDPA
decided that within one’s will only one consent can be given at one time, therefore a data
subject cannot give in a single action a consent to process data and to make them available
28 P. Barta & P Litwiński, 2015, p. 294.
29 Ibid, p. 297.
30 E.g. DPA’s address to Minister of Finance of 12 February 2019 (case ZSPU.023.38.2019.EKR) concerning
data processing of coal’s consumers, https://uodo.gov.pl/pl/file/1951.
31 P. Barta & P. Litwiński, 2015, p. 298.
32 Judgment of 21 November 1995 in case K 12/95, OTK 1995, No 2, p. 132.
33 Judgment of the Regional Administrative Court (RAC) in Warsaw of 1 December 2005 in case II SA/Wa
917/05; judgment of RAC in Warsaw of 31 March 2006 in case II SA/Wa 2395/04.
34 P. Litwiński et al,Rozporządzenie UEw sprawie ochrony osób fizycznychw związku z przetwarzaniem danych
osobowych i swobodnym przepływem takich danych, Warszawa, C.H.Beck, 2018, p. 276.
35 Judgment of SAC of 4 April 2003 in case II SA 2135/02, Wokanda 2004, No 6, p. 30.
36 M. Jagielski, ‘Pojęcie świadomej zgody w naukach prawnych’, in K. Łakomiec & M. Wróblewski (Eds),
Realizacja zasady informed consent w kontekście realizacji lekarz-pacjent: wyzwania i bariery rozwojowe w
Polsce, Warsaw 2012, p. 21.
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at the same time, because of different purposes (one consent based on the Act of electronic
services,37 second consent based on data protection legislation). Such interpretation of
digital consent has been criticized from the perspective of electronic telemarketing realizing
in practice one and the same economic purpose.38 It is however to be noted that the DPA’s
position was upheld by the judiciary.39
As for the legitimate interest, article 23(4) PDPA97 pointed out two examples: direct
marketing of the controller’s own products and services, as well as pursuing claims for
business activity. It seems that the cases referred to in this provision may still be considered
as a legitimate interest based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. There have been doubts whether
the legitimate interest basis (article 6(1)(f) GDPR) calls for the controller’s interest to be
based on specific provisions of law.40 However, these doubts are to be rejected since the
legitimate interest basis is not aimed at public authorities, it would also limit the scope of
application of article 6(1)(f) GDPR and would compromise the purposes of GDPR.
Therefore the interpretation of a legitimate interest basis shall be broad, covering economic,
factual and legal interest of a controller.41
Question 5
The debate as regards the validity of personal data as ‘counter-performance’ for the
provision of digital content has been very limited in Poland. Those problemswere analyzed
only by some civil society organizations, like the “Panoptykon” Foundation (dealing with
fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of fast-changing technologies and growing
surveillance), e.g. in the report “Tracking and profiling in the net. How from being a client
you become a commodity”,42 and by academia.43 Recently the problem of handling of data
was shortly discussed in the media in the context of the FaceApp application, which was
suspected of violating privacy principles. Eventually the Minister of Digitization took
action demanding from institutions subordinated to him (CERT, NASK) to analyze safety
from a technical angle, but also addressing PUODO. In his letter, the Minister drew
attention to, among other things, the need for such applications to ensure their compliance
with the provisions of GDPR, which requires that all information and all communications
37 The Act of 18 July 2002 (JL 2019 item 123).
38 P. Barta & P. Litwiński, 2015, p. 227.
39 The administrative court judgement of 19 November 2001 in case II 2748/00, www.giodo.gov.pl/data/
filemanager_pl/110.pdf.
40 P. Barta & P. Litwiński, 2015, p. 222.
41 W. Chomiczewski, ‘Komentarz do art. 23’, in E. Bielak-Jomaa & D. Lubasz (Eds), 2018, p. 391.
42 K. Szymielewicz, K. Iwańska, ‘Śledzenie i profilowanie w sieci. Jak z klienta stajesz się towarem’, January
2019, panoptykon.org/biblio/sledzenie-i-profilowanie-w-sieci-jak-z-klienta-stajesz-sie-towarem.




related to the processing of personal data should be easily accessible and understandable,
and formulated in clear and simple language.44
Of course also in Poland, following the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, there
has been some public interest and debate regarding the processing of data by technology
giants. On 30 March 2018, the Ombudsman (hereinafter “RPO”) sent the general letter to
the General Inspector of Data Protection (GIODO – DPA until 2018)45 in which he
addressed that problem as well, recognizing the Cambridge Analytica problem as a threat
not only to the right to privacy of the internet user, but also for broadly understood
democratic processes and protection of other rights of citizens. GIODO has not answered
at all.
Question 6
GDPRImpl introduced many amendments in legislation to ensure that the right of not
being subject to automated decision-making does not apply in certain situations. Onemay
point at:
– article 105a Banking Law,46
– article 55a Road Transport Law,47
– article 98d and 136c Act on Obligatory Insurance, Insurance Guarantee Fund and
Polish Motor Insurers’ Bureau,48
– article 41 Insurance and Reinsurance Activities Law,49
– article 47c National Tax Administration Law,50
– separately – Tax Ordinance was amended (article 119zn § 2).51
As regards measures to safeguard the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of data
subjects, they were incorporated in above enlisted amendments, or already existing legal
measures were deemed to be sufficient. These regulations provide i.a. for a right of a natural
person to question decisions made in automated decision-making procedures, a right to
express one’s opinion in thematter and a right to appeal to a human being. The controllers
using profiling were obliged to explain the basis of decisions made out of a profiling. The
44 MinisterstwoCyfryzacji, ‘Bezpieczeństwo aplikacjimobilnych: akcja – reakcja’, www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/
bezpieczenstwo-aplikacji-mobilnych-akcja-reakcja.
45 RPO, ‘Pismo RPO do GIODO w sprawie Cambridge Analytica’, www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Pismo
%20RPO%20do%20GIODO%20w%20sprawie%20Cambridge%20Analytica.pdf.
46 The Act of 31 January 1989 (JL 1992 No. 72 item 359 as amended).
47 The Act of 6 September 2001 (JL 2019 item 58 as amended).
48 The Act of 22 May 2003 (JL 2018 item 473 as amended).
49 The Act of 11 September 2015 (JL 2019 item 381 as amended).
50 The Act of 16 November 2016 (JL 2018 item 508 as amended).
51 The Act of 29 August 1997 (JL 2019 item 900 as amended).
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legal measures specify exhaustive categories of personal data, which can be used in
automated decision-making. Thus other data cannot be used by a controller. Such legal
measures were included, i.a. in the Banking Law and in the Insurance and Reinsurance
Activities Law, to secure individual rights in profiling processes aimed at analyzing credit
or insurance risks.
Question 7
The right to erasure established by Directive 1995/46/EC was implemented in article
32(1)(6) PDPA1997. According to this provision, every person had a right to ask for data
erasure only when they were incomplete, not updated, inaccurate, collected illegally or no
longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected. This provision
has been rather consistently applied by DPA. However, there have been some divergences
in the administrative courts’ case law. One of the most prominent examples is the case of
the withdrawal from the Catholic Church (apostasy), where the issue of personal data
erasure of apostates arose. RPO pointed at three different lines of case law as regards that
problem.52 As a result, SACdecided thatDPA is not entitled to control internal regulations
of theCatholic Church, and the sole document confirming apostasymay only be a transcript
of a baptism certificate with an apostasy annotation.53
The right to erasure may be realized in practice by decisions of DPA or in procedures
of the protection of personal goods before civil courts. One shall pay attention to the
Supreme Court (SC) judgment referring to the right to be forgotten within such a
procedure.54 A telephone conversation of a policeman with an elderly woman was made
public on the internet – in fact such a publication lampooned her, since she had difficulties
in communication. The SC confirmed that a data subject in such a situation is entitled to
ask the controller to take reasonable steps to inform those controllers, who are processing
the personal data, that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of
any links to, or copies or replications of, those personal data. One may however point at
the SC’s requirement that the judgment, acknowledging such a right, must be unequivocal
and cannot give any room for interpretation by the parties.55
The problem of the right to erasure, however not particularly in the context of search
engines, but with relation to the right of information, also arose in an earlier legal situation
52 RPO, ‘Motion of 19 October 2017‘, www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Wniosek%20RPO%20Naczelny%20
S%C4%85d%20Administracyjny%20-%20apostazja%2019.10.2017.pdf.
53 Judgment of 21 May 2018, I OPS 6/17, http://orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/C7E540AFDB.
54 Supreme Court judgment of 15 January 2015, II CSK 747/13, not published.
55 B. Baran&K. Południak–Gierz, ‘Perspektywa regulacji prawa do bycia „zapomnianym”w Internecie. Zarys
problematyki’, Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ Nauki Społeczne, 2017, No 2, p. 139–159.
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in a casewhich endedwith a judgment of the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights (hereinafter
“ECtHR”).56 In this judgment, the ECtHR stated that the court’s refusal to order a newspaper
to remove an article damaging the applicant’s reputation from its internet archive constitutes
no violation of article 8 ECHR. The theses were then repeated in the judgments of the
Polish courts. For example, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw heard a case brought by J.G.
against M.M. and Z.G. for the protection of personal rights.57 The Court considered that
since the internet publications fall within the press category and the task of the press is to
describe events that are currently taking place, there are no grounds for the published
articles to be monitored by the publisher or journalist as to their accuracy – even if the
circumstances have changed. The press is not obliged to re-describe the issues raised earlier,
and outdated articles can be a valuable source of information on the state of the art at a
given time. Removing an article from the networkwould be a prohibited formof censorship
and interference with the autonomy of the press by means of the possibility to collect and
archive journalistic material. As a result, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw in this case
accepted the line of argumentation presented in the ECtHR judgment. Polish courts also
ruled similarly in other cases.58
Also the DPA used the concept of the right to be forgotten in its decisions, following
the Google Spain judgment,59 ordering the erasure of personal data. DPA in its decision of
2016, addressed to the Polish branch of US Facebook, enforced the erasure of personal
data of the claimant processed illegally.60
Question 8
Article 85(1) GDPR sets out the competence of the Member States to adopt national
provisions to reconcile the right to personal data protection and the right to information
and freedom of expression. Paragraph 2 authorises Member States to provide for
derogations or exceptions, indicating the scope of the provisions which may be affected.
56 Wegrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland (2013), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0716JUD003384607.
57 Judgment of 17 June 2014 in a case I ACa 74/14; LEX No. 1515313.
58 Judgment of a Provincial Court inWarsaw of 10 July 2014, caseVIACa 19/13. Formore: A. Grzelak, ‘Prawo
do bycia zapomnianym: dwa trybunały, różne stanowiska?’, in L. Brodowski & D. Kuźniar-Kwiatek (Eds),
Prawomiędzynarodowe aUnia Europejska. Księga jubileuszowa poświęcona Prof. E. Dyni, Rzeszów,Oficyna
Zimowit, 2015, pp. 102-112.
59 Judgment of 13May 2014 in caseC-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Google Spain), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
60 GIODO, ‘Decision DOLiS 50/16 of 29 January 2016’, di.com.pl/giodo-nakazuje-facebookowi-usuniecie-
danych-pierwsza-taka-decyzja-wazna-dla-polakow-54404.
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On the basis of article 85(2) GDPR, Poland introduced such derogations in PDPA.61
According to article 2(1) PDPA, the provisions of articles 5-9, 11, 13-16, 18-22, 27, 28(2-10)
and article 30 GDPR shall not apply to activities consisting in editing, preparing, creating
or publishing press materials within the meaning of Press Law,62 as well as the statements
made as part of literary or artistic activities. The legislator interpreted GDPR term
“journalistic purposes” as various kinds of press activities, defined by Press law. All press
activities relate to pressmaterial, which is defined by article 7(2)(4) Press Law, as everything
published, or conveyed to be published, in press text or picture of informational, publicist,
documentary or other character, genre, form or purpose, regardless the medium.63 The
press clause excludes the application of certain rules of GDPR irrespective of the means
of communication – journalistic activities concern not only the traditional press, but also
radio, television or the internet.
This mainly concerns the following exemptions:
– exclusion of the rules on the processing of personal data, including (what may be
particularly intrusive for the data subject in the context of his or her journalistic
activities) the rules on the accuracy of data;
– exclusion of the application of provisions on the basis of data processing (except for
information on convictions) – no consent is required for processing personal data for
the purpose of editing, preparing, creating or publishing press materials; unless such
a publication would concern the private sphere of life of the person whose data is the
subject of publication, what stems directly from the prohibition introduced in article
14(6) Press Law;
– exclusion of the information obligation – as part of the press activity, it is not necessary
to inform data subjects that their data are processed for the purpose of editing,
preparing, creating or publishing press materials;
– limitation of the rights of the person whose data are processed in connection with the
editing, preparation, creation or publication of press materials, including the right to
access to their data, their rectification, limitation of their processing, transfer and data
and the objection to the processing of their personal data.
However, neither GDPR nor PDPA excludes the right to be forgotten, other provisions
regulating the status of data controller or general requirements regarding personal data
security – privacy by default and privacy by design. However, from the point of view of
61 So called “press clause” were already included into PDPA97, however then it did not refer to academic
expression. Formore:M. Sakowska&A.Młynarska-Sobaczewska, ‘„Klauzula prasowa" z ustawy o ochronie
danych osobowych jako gwarancja wolności wypowiedzi’, Państwo i Prawo, 2005, No. 1, pp. 68-77.
62 JL 2018 item 1914.
63 M. Gawroński et al, ‘Wyjątek dziennikarski (art. 2)’, in: M. Gawroński (Ed.), Ochrona danych osobowych.
Przewodnik po ustawie i RODO z wzorami, Warszawa, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 468.
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the interests of a person whose data may be processed in connection with a press release
– understood as a suspension of possible publication – it does not matter. In particular,
the right to be forgotten – the right to erasure pursuant to article 17(3)(a) GDPR does not
apply to the extent that processing is necessary, that means for the exercise of the right to
freedom of expression and information.
The press clause should not be understood as an absolute exception to the application
of GDPR – it applies only to journalistic activities, hence GDPR applies to all other
processing of personal data not covered by the concept of journalistic activities. A journalist
editing an article on negative marketing practices makes use of the press clause, but the
same journalist, while carrying outmarketing activities, cannotmake use of such a privilege.
This means that it is not the status of a person conducting business activity (a journalist),
but the type of activity conducted – editing, preparing, creating or publishing pressmaterials
– that determines the exclusion from the application of certain provisions of GDPR and
PDPA.
The Polish legislator slightly differently regulated the relation between GDPR and
academic expression. According to article 2(2) PDPA, the provisions of article 13, 15(3)
and (4), article 18, 27, 28 (2-10) and 30 GDPR shall not apply to academic expression.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Until 2018, the body responsible for personal data protectionwasGIODO, acting pursuant
to PDPA97. The legislator decided, by the virtue of article 166 PDPA, to transform the
institution of the GIODO into PUODO.64 The person appointed for the post of GIODO
remained in the office until the end of the term, from then on as PUODO.The newPUODO
was nominated by Sejm in April 2019 and took on his duties on 16 May 2019.
The appointment process and structure of the DPA in Poland is regulated by PDPA.65
According to article 34, PUODO is the authority competent in matters of personal data
protection and acts as the supervisory authority within the meaning of GDPR, but also
Directive 2016/680 andRegulation (EU) 2016/794 on the EUAgency for LawEnforcement
Cooperation (Europol).66
64 Webpage of the Office, uodo.gov.pl/pl.
65 A. Grzelak & M. Wróblewski, ‘Commentary to Chapter VI “President of the Office”’, in M. Gumularz et
al, (Eds), 2018, p. 261.
66 OJ 2016, L135/53.
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PUODO is appointed and recalled by the Sejm upon the consent of the Senate for a 4
years term (renewal is possible only once). The term of office of PUODO expires only in
situation directly foreseen in the legislation. PUODO performs his or her tasks through
the Personal Data Protection Office (UODO), he may also appoint up to three deputies
(currently only one deputy has been appointed). PUODO lays down the UODO’s statute
defining the internal organization and the scope of tasks of his or her deputies. PUODO
nominates and dismisses his/her deputies. The staff of UODO (including directors of
departments) is employed on the basis of 1982 Act on employees of state offices.67
According to article 48a PDPA, the Personal Data Protection Council, which is a
consulting and advisory body, consisting of 8 members, shall be affiliated to PUODO. Up
to now theCouncil has not been appointed by PUODO, althoughPDPAentered into force
on 25 May 2018.
As for the enforcement record, there is no detailed and accurate information yet. Some
of the decisions of PUODO are published on the webpage of the office.68 Up till now
(15 January 2020) eight financial sanctions were imposed (see question 11).
It should be also added that a separate supervisory structure has been established for
courts and prosecutors’ offices, acting as data controllers solely in the context of the
administration of justice.69 In that case, as a general rule, data processing is supervised by
judicial authorities/senior prosecutors of a higher level. Finally, the National Council of
Judiciary (NCJ) supervises the processing of data by the Tribunal of State, appellate courts,
SC, SAC and the CC. As for the composition of the NCJ it should be noted that it is
currently subject of controversy in the context of the rule of law principle.70
Moreover, the churches and religious associations which apply specific rules in
accordance with article 91(1) GDPR shall be subject to supervision by an independent
supervisory authority. For example, the Catholic Church established the Church Data
Protection Supervisor (KIODO).71 One should notice that the decisions of such organs
are not subject to any judicial control in Poland at the moment.
67 The Act of 16 September 1982 (JL 2018 item 1915 as amended). Cf also article 113 PDPA.
68 PUODO, ‘Decisions’ uodo.gov.pl/pl/p/decyzje.
69 Art. 175dd of the Act of 27 July 2001 on the system of common courts (JL 2019 item 52 as amended) and
art. 191 of the Act of 28 January 2016 on the prosecution service (JL 2019 item 740), as well as art. 1(3)
PDPACrime.
70 Cf. judgment of 19 November 2019 in Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A. K. and Others v
SądNajwyższy, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982 or pendingCaseC-824/18,KrajowaRada Sądownictwa. Cf. alsoVenice
Commission, ‘Opinion adopted at its 113th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 December 2017)’,
www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)031-e.




One cannot observe any of the DPA’s strategies regarding the complaint handling task.
There are no legal grounds to apply a strategy (in particular – prioritization) as regards
complaints by PUODO. However, in January 2019 the yearly sector control plan was
accepted by PUODO. Those cases are taken by PUODO ex officio. According to this plan,
in 2019 PUODO shall verify the processing of personal data in areas such as: telemarketing,
profiling in the banking and insurance sector or the waste identification and monitoring
system. It will be also checked whether the disclosure of data in the Public Information
Bulletin by entities obliged to do so does not violate the provisions on the protection of
personal data. In themonths to come, a closer look shall be taken at such entities as: police,
border guard and detention centres, by checking their use of technical and organizational
measures aimed at preventing unauthorized access, copying, changing or deleting data.
Scheduled inspections are dictated mainly by numerous signals (including complaints,
questions and reports of violations of personal data protection) indicating the threat of
violation of the provisions on the protection of personal data in the above mentioned
areas.72
Question 11
The system of personal data protection provides for a diverse system of liability:
administrative, criminal and civil.
Starting with penal sanctions, the possibility to impose ‘other penalties’ (article 84
GDPR) was used by the legislator to enact penal sanctions in PDPA (articles 107 and 108).
Still, as is it noted by commentators, one cannot exclude application of other sanctions of
a penal nature (like disciplinary penalty) or sanctions interlinked with specific crimes,
regulated by the Penal Code73. One shall however emphasize that the legislator was aware
of the fact that the operation of the system of penal sanctions under PDPA97was relatively
inefficient. Therefore, PDPA introduced only three types of crimes regarding data
protection. On the basis of PDPA, firstly, the data subject’s right to informational
self-determination is protected. Article 107(1) PDPA provides that any person who
processes personal data, although processing thereof is not permitted, or is not authorized
to process them, shall be subject to a fine, restriction of personal liberty or imprisonment
for up two years. Article 107(2) lifts the imprisonment limit up to three years if the crime
affects sensitive data. Secondly, the sound investigation activities of the personal data
72 PUODO, ‘Plan’, uodo.gov.pl/p/kontrole.
73 The Act of 6 June 1997 (JL 2018 item 1600 as amended). Cf. T. Banyś, in: M. Gumularz, K. Kozieł, P. Kozik,
2018, p. 469.
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protection inspectors are secured by article 108(1). According to that provision, any person
who prevents or hinders the inspector from checking the compliance with the personal
data protection provisions shall be subject to a fine, restriction of personal liberty or
imprisonment for up to two years. In May 2019, on the basis of GDPRImpl, a third type
of crime was added. The same sanctions, as provided by article 108(1), shall apply to any
person who does not provide the data necessary to determine the basis of the assessment
of an administrative fine or who provides the data which make it impossible to determine
the basis of the assessment of an administrative fine (article 108(2)).
Administrative fines, as regulated by article 83GDPR and articles 101-105 PDPA,were
applied by PUODO eight times by now (as of 15 January 2020). On 26 March 2019, by the
virtue of an administrative decision,74 an administrative fine of 943.700 PLN (around
225,000 EUR) was imposed on a company. The company in question processed data of
persons obtained from publicly available sources (including the Central Register and
Information on Business), and processed them for profit. The controller fulfilled the
information obligation, providing information required by article 14(1-3) GDPR only to
those persons with the established e-mail addresses. In case of other people, an information
clause was posted on the website of the company. Therefore, the reason of the fine was a
violation of the obligations enshrined in article 14 GDPR. The decision is at the moment
subject of judicial control.75
Another financial penalty was imposed on 25 April 2019. The main reasons for the
imposition of the penalty on the controller were ineffective attempts to remove the violation
consisted of the publicizing of a too wide range of personal data.76 The football association
made public the personal data of the football judges who were granted the judges’ licenses.
Not only their names and surnames were public, but also their residence addresses and
PESEL. By setting the fine – PLN 55 750.50 (around 12 800 EUR), account was taken of
duration of the infringement and the fact that it concerned a large group of persons (more
than 550).
The highest financial penalty (PLN 2 800 000, around 651 162 EUR) up till now was
imposed on 10 September 2019.77 The organizational and technical measures of personal
data protection used by the companywere not adequate to the existing risk associatedwith
their processing, which resulted in leakage of data of approximately 2million 200 thousand
people. The company – according to PUODO – had no adequate procedures to respond
in the event of unusual traffic in the network.
74 PUODO, ‘Decision ZSPR.421.3.2018’, uodo.gov.pl/360.
75 Cf. judgment of 11 December 2019 in Case II SA/Wa 1030/19, orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/30EDD316DA.
76 PUODO, ‘Decision ZSPR.440.43.2019’ uodo.gov.pl/decyzje/ZSPR.440.43.2019.
77 PUODO, Information, uodo.gov.pl/pl/138/1189.
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One of the penalties (PLN40 000, around 9800 EUR)was imposed on the public organ.
One of the reasons for imposing a penalty on the mayor of the city was that he did not
conclude a contract entrusting the processing of personal data with the entities to which
he provided these data. This applies, among others, to running the Public Information
Bulletin and the software to create it. This decision of PUODO is also subject to judicial
control at the moment.78
There is no information regarding triggering penal proceedings by the prosecution
service on the basis of the information fromPUODOor ex officio. However the proceeding
initiated ex officio by PUODO on 21 August 2019, regarding the leakage of personal data
of judges and their relatives by Ministry of Justice officials,79 may lead to such proceeding.
Question 12
The concept of compensation for damages suffered for intangible harmhas been developed
in Poland by the virtue of Civil Code.80 This Act protects personal goods, including legal
measures sanctioning intangible harm (articles 23 and 24). According to article 24, any
person whose personal interests are threatened by another person’s actions may demand
that the actions be ceased unless they are not unlawful. In case of infringement he/she may
also demand that the person committing the infringement performs the actions necessary
to remove its effects. On the terms provided for in Civil Code, he/she may also demand
monetary compensation.
The above mentioned provisions of Civil Code may also be used, apart from other
procedures, by the victims of personal data violations. Article 92 PDPA stipulates that in
matters not regulated by GDPR, the provisions of Civil Code shall apply to claims related
to the infringement of the personal data protection provisions referred to in articles 79
and 82 GDPR. That provision is interpreted as a referral to Civil Code regulations
foremostly on delicts and the protection of personal goods.81
As regards the calculation of damages, the size of the harm done has fundamental
significance – the suffering, pain or mental loss is decisive. The amount to be paid as a
compensation should be significant for the victim and bring back emotional balance. The
amount to be paid depends also on protected good, size of loss and its character. Therefore
the purpose to remedy the damage is primary. The average economic conditions of the
society have secondary significance.
78 PUODO, ‘Decision of 18 October 2019’, uodo.gov.pl/decyzje/ZSPU.421.3.2019.
79 PUODO, ‘Decision ZSPU.440.1111.2019’, uodo.gov.pl/pl/138/1148.
80 The Act of 23 April 1964 (JL 2019 item 1145).
81 P. Fajgielski, Ogólne rozporządzenie o ochronie danych. Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych. Komentarz,
Warszawa, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 868.
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Question 13
In Polish legislation, participation of NGOs in administrative process is foreseen by article
31 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP).82 An NGO can intervene in a matter
involving another person with a request to commence proceedings, or to participate in
proceedings, if such participation is justified by its statutes and where there would be a
public benefit in allowing it. An NGO participates in proceedings with the rights of a party.
NGO’s participation in judicial civil proceedings is regulated by article 61 CCP.83 An
NGO can in the field of their statutory tasks, with the consent of the individual expressed
in writing, bring an action on its behalf in areas specified by CCP. In such cases NGO can
in the field of their statutory tasks, with the consent of the individual expressed in writing,
join the ongoing proceedings. Some of the commentators argued that CCP should be
amended in order to make article 80 GDPR fully effective,84 since it does not enumerate
neither the data protection nor protection of privacy or personal goods as areas NGOs can
play their role.
With regard to data protection law, the possibility given by article 80(2) GDPR has not
been used to legislate on the right to lodge a complaint independently of a data subject’s
mandate. According to article 61 PDPA, an NGO – referred to in article 31 CAP – can
also participate in the procedure upon the consent of the data subject, in its name and on
its behalf. AnNGOcannot act independently and its participation calls for subject’s consent.
As a consequence, NGOs in Poland in data protection cases cannot act exclusively in the
public interest.
One shall point at the Foundation “Panoptykon” which, by today, is the most active
NGO in the area of privacy and data protection. However, there are also otherNGOs active
partially in the field of data protection or access to information.
Question 14
For many years, GIODO cooperated closely with national Ombudsman (RPO). Apart
from the shared perspective – protection of privacy and personal data as human rights –
GIODO approached RPO in some cases regarding data protection, because of RPO’s
competences the data protection authority did not possess. Firstly, RPO is entitled to lodge
complaints to CC – therefore GIODO having constitutional doubts regarding legislation
82 The Act of 14 June 1960 (JL 2018 item 2096 as amended).
83 The Act of 17 November 1964 (JL 2019 item 1460 as amended).
84 P. Litwiński et al, 2018, p. 816.
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used to turn to RPO.85 Secondly, RPO is entitled to lodge motion with the SC and SAC to
decide in a 7 judges panel (or even the whole chamber) on divergences in case law, also
regarding data protection.86 GIODO did not possess such competences (the situation has
not changed with PUODO).
It is uncertain whether this trend remains unchanged. One shall take notice of the
exceptional (first after a decade) complaints of RPO, addressed to administrative courts,
directed against PUODO’s decisions forbidding publication of supporters’ names for
candidates to the new NCJ.87 It is difficult to foresee how this delicate and partially
constitutional issue, can influence the above mentioned trend.
There is no information or additional data as regards PUODO’s cooperation with
regulatory bodies, but it cannot be excluded.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
There is no definition of “national security” in domestic legislation.88 The obligation to
ensure the national security shall secure fundamental values crucial for the very existence
of the nation and the national identity. The pillar of the national security is the protection
and defence of the nation’s primary interests, such as national identity, territorial integrity
and constitutional structure. This issue turned out to be controversial. According to article
6 PDPA, neither PDPA nor GDPR applies to: 1) processing of personal data by entities of
public finance sector referred to in specific provisions of the Act on Public Finance, to the
extent that processing is necessary to perform tasks aimed at guaranteeing national security,
if special provisions stipulate necessary measures of protecting the rights and freedoms of
the data subject; 2) activities of special forces within the meaning of article 11 of the Act
on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency. Moreover, according
to its article 3(2), PDPACrime is not applied to personal data processed in connection
with the provision of national security, including the statutory tasks of the Internal Security
85 Cases K 33/13 (health registries) and K 25/13 (registry of marrow donors), brought before CC by RPO,
were in fact initiated by GIODO’s letter to RPO.
86 One example is the decision of SAC as of 21 May 2018, case I OPS 6/17, regarding processing personal data
byCatholicChurch,whichwas triggered byRPO.RPO, ‘webpage’, www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/nsa-odmowil-
wydania-uchwaly-w-sprawie-kompetencji-giodo-wobec-apostatow.
87 RPO, ‘Skarga’, www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-skarzy-decyzje-puodo-ws-list-poparcia-kandydatow-do-
krs.
88 J. Kurek, ‘Zakres stosowania ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych i dyrektywy
2016/680/UE – wyzwania związane z wyodrębnieniem działań państwa w obszarze bezpieczeństwa naro-
dowego i bezpieczeństwa publicznego’, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2017, No. 5, p. 43.
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Agency, the Intelligence Agency, the Military Counterintelligence Service, the Military
Intelligence and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. According to the doctrine, these
exclusions are not only too broad in the absence of a definition of the term "national
security", but also include institutions whose activities go far beyond the common
understanding of the term. For example, theCentral Bureau ofAnticorruption is responsible
for fighting corruption in public and economic life, in particular in state and local
government institutions, but also for example in sport, as well as fighting activities
detrimental to the economic interests of the state. This – in most cases – has nothing to
do with national security.89
89 A. Grzelak (Ed.), Ustawa o ochronie danych osobowych przetwarzanych w związku z zapobieganiem i zwal-




Filipa Calvão and Clara Guerra*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
In Portugal, the national legal instrument introduced to implement Regulation (EU)
2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation, hereinafter “GDPR”) is Law 58/2019, of
8 August 2019. It also amends Law 43/2004 of 18 August 2004, that rules the composition,
organisation and functioning of the National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”).1
It should be stressed that the late publication of the national implementing lawprevented
Portugal from having its data protection legal framework completed. This can explain
some lack of doctrine and of case-law, resulting from somehow limited practical application
of the GDPR.
It identifies the NSA, providing for similar provisions to those who have been ruling
the constitution and activity of this public authority for the past two and a half decades
with the novelty of recognising the NSA financial autonomy and legal personality (articles
3 to 5 of Law 58/2019). Moreover, the Portuguese NSA is the public authority entitled to
supervise and monitor the compliance with the GDPR, the Law 58/2019 «as well as further
legislative and administrative provisions related to data protection, in order to ensure
rights and freedoms of individuals in the context of personal data processing».2
To accredit certification bodies the law appoints the national accreditation body
designated in accordance with Regulation (EC) 765/2008 (article 14(1) of Law 58/2019).
There are some provisions onData ProtectionOfficers, in particular on the designation
by public authorities or bodies (articles 9 to 13 of Law 58/2019), and also a provision related
to article 8GDPR, determining the age threshold of 13 years old (article 16 of Law 58/2019).
* Filipa Calvão: Associate Professor, Faculty of Law (Oporto School), Catholic University of Portugal;
Researcher, Católica Research Centre for the Future of Law; President of the Portuguese Data Protection
Authority. Clara Guerra: Senior Consultant, Portuguese Data Protection Authority; Guest Lecturer, Faculty
of Law, Catholic University of Portugal.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Art. 4(2) of Law 58/2019 of 8 August 2019.
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It also contains several provisions referring to the exercise of the right to remedies and
liability (articles 32 to 35 of Law 58/2019).
It is important to highlight that, under recital 27 of the GDPR, the Portuguese law has
extended to deceased persons the protection of personal data listed in article 9(1) of the
GDPR and those related to private life, image and telecommunication (article 17 of Law
58/2019).On this aspect, the Portuguese legislator has partially reaffirmed the interpretation
of the previous legal regimen on data protection based on the legal provisions of the
Portuguese Civil Code that protect the personality of deceased persons (articles 71 and 80
of the Civil Code), just not covering personal data outside the special categories of data
and outside data of a highly personal nature.
In what concerns the flexibilities provided for in the GDPR, apart from provisions
related to the processing in the context of employment and health and genetic data (articles
28 to 30 of Law 58/2019), the Portuguese Law does not fully avail them.
In particular, the provision referring to the balance between data protection and freedom
of expression and information does not provide for limits or specific guarantees, beyond
those already reflected in the Portuguese Constitution (article 24 of Law 58/2019). In what
concerns processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes, it has derogated with no exception, and with
poor guarantees, the rights referred to in articles 15, 16, 18 and 21 of the GDPR (article
31(2) of Law 58/2019). Also some rights provided for by the GDPR, such as the right to
information provided by Article 13 and the right of access, are restricted by the national
law in breach of the requirements stated by article 23 of the GDPR (article 20 of Law
58/2019).
Finally, there is a set of provisions on administrative fines that are in breach of the
GDPR, concerning the infringements settled by article 83 (4) and (5), whichwere developed
in articles 37 to 39 of Law 58/2019. On the one hand, the maximum amounts of
administrative fines determined by article 83(4) and (5) of the GDPR are lowered, taking
into account the nature of the controller or processor, in particular if it is an individual or
a small and medium enterprise; on the other hand, the infringements that have a negligent
character cannot be sanctioned by theNSAunless, after an “advise” to correct the situation,
the infringements continue; in some cases negligent infringements are not sanctioned at
all (e.g. infringement of the principles provided by article 5 of the GDPR).
In what concerns the Law 58/2019, the Portuguese SA has given a very critical opinion
on its draft proposal during the legislative proceeding and has taken the resolution not to
apply in its future decisions the provisions that are clearly in breach of the GDPR.3
3 Deliberação/2019/ 494 of 3 September 2019 of the Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados (hereinafter
“CNPD”), www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/decisoes.asp?primeira_escolha=2019&segunda_escolha=20. All
webpages referred to were visited on 9 February 2020.
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Question 2
The Portuguese Constitution differentiates, since its approval on 2 April 1976, the right
to respect for private life and the right to data protection (articles 26 and 35, respectively),
being the first written Constitution in the world to recognise the protection of personal
data as a fundamental right.
Beyond the legal protection ensured by national civil law (article 80 of the Civil Code
of 1966), the PortugueseConstitution recognises the respect for private life as a fundamental
right in article 26(1) and (2) and provides for specific guarantees in the context of
telecommunication in article 34(4).4
Article 35, with the title ‘Use of computerized data’, of the Portuguese Constitution of
1976 provided for a set of fundamental rights related to data processing through automated
means, that intended to ensure the right to informational self-determination.5,6
Later, by the revision of the Constitution that occurred in 1997 in order to adjust this
article to Directive 95/46/EC, the material scope of this provision was extended to the
processing of personal data other than by automated means.7
It is worthwhile mention that since its first wording, article 35 (3) relates both
fundamental rights, specifying that private life is, among other personal data (sensitive
data), subject to reinforced protection.8
Hence, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter
“Charter”) has not had such a significant impact in Portugal as it might have had in other
Member-States.
Nevertheless, the Charter is frequently invoked for supporting the guarantee of the
right to data protection before national courts as well as by the NSA, in particular in its
written advices on drafts of legislative and administrativemeasures as well as in its concrete
4 Rectius, the Portuguese Constitution provides for the right to the intimacy of private and familiar life.
Though this formulation seems to be more restricted than the one of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, the truth is that the Constitutional Court has affirmed a broad interpretation of
that right, covering also a patrimonial dimension of private life – see judgments 278/95 and 355/97, in
www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/.
5 J.J. Gomes Canotilho &Vital Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada, 4th ed., Coimbra,
Coimbra Editora, 2007, vol. I, pp. 551-556.
6 P. Ribeiro de Faria, ‘Anotação ao artigo 35.º’, in Jorge Miranda & Rui Medeiros, Constituição Portuguesa
Anotada, 2nd Ed, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2010, Vol. I, pp. 779-801.
7 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with the regard of the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
[1995] OJ L281/31.
8 Explaining the history of this constitucional provision, see Joaquim Seabra Lopes, ‘O artigo 35.º da Consti-
tuição: da génese à atualidade e ao futuro previsível’, in Forum de Proteção de Dados, n.º 2, Jan. 2016, pp.
14-51, www.cnpd.pt/bin/revistaforum/forum2016_2/index.html. See alsoAlexandre Sousa Pinheiro,Privacy
e protecção de dados pessoais: a construção dogmática do direito à identidade informacional, Lisboa, AAFDL,
2015, pp. 695 ss.
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decisions regarding the balance between that fundamental right and other rights or interests
in conflict.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Before 2018, the national law that transposedDirective 95/46/EC (Law 67/98, of 26October
1998) provided for the need to obtain a prior authorisation from the NSA to process
sensitive data, as well as to further process data for new purposes. Therefore, only under
GDPRapplication have data controllers started applying themselves directly these principles
and processing data accordingly to their own assessment.
In this new context, most data controllers reveal difficulties in assuming this new task,
especially in interpreting and applying the principles of purpose limitation and data
minimisation.
With regard to purpose limitation principle, data controllers tend to a generous
evaluation of the compatibility test between the original and the newpurposes. In particular,
when controllers are public bodies there has been an intense reaction from civil society
signalizing an abuse in some cases of further processing for new purposes, which led to
the correction of the processing or simply a more careful and rationalized decision for
future processing of data.
As to the dataminimisation principle, data controllers tend to have increased difficulties
in implementing it. The same occurs with the implementation of the storage limitation
principle. Actually, praxis reveals a tendency to collect and store more data than necessary
for the specified purpose of the processing as well as a difficulty to determine the adequate
period of retention and to justify the option made.
For a better application of those principles, the Portuguese SA issued guidelines on
specific kinds of data processing – most of them still under the Law that transposed
Directive 95/46/EC – developing and adjusting the interpretation made by Article 29
Working Party and by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), to the specificities
of the national legal order, in particular in some sectors of activity.
Furthermore, the NSA has issued decisions advising moderation on the reuse of data
for other purposes than the one for which personal data had been collected.
Although so far there are no judgements by the Portuguese Courts under the GDPR,
as the principles remain unchanged in relation to Directive 95/46/EC, the following should
be noticed: domestic Courts do not ignore the guidelines of Article 29 Working Group
nor of the Portuguese SA, given that the parties involved in the process do usually invoke
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them in their submissions, and in most cases share the same perspective; in spite of that,
the case-law is not always in accordance with the interpretation of the NSA.9
Question 4
As already pointed out, there are no judgements by the Portuguese Courts under theGDPR
until now, so the national Courts’ interpretation on the legal basis for data processing is
related to the legal basis provided for by the law that transposed Directive 95/46/EC (Law
67/98), which is similar to the conditions of lawfulness provided for by the GDPR.
In this context, the case-law shows somediscrepancies on the evaluation of the attributes
of consent, particularly with regard to the legal requirement of specific consent (e.g.,
consent given by a person for access to his/her health data by insurance companies).10
With respect to legitimate interests there are notmany judicial decisions, in part because
the balance between data protection and other interests, like administrative transparency
or the exercise of a right in a judicial process, is done by the Courts on the grounds of other
specific laws. Furthermore, regarding legitimate interests in the digital environment,
although there are some interesting judgments on the disclosure and on the reuse of
personal data in the context of social networks, the majority of the case-law focuses on the
right to respect of private life and not on the right to data protection and its specific legal
regimen11.
On balancing of interests, it should be highlighted a judgement by the Court of appeal,
forbidding parents to disclose photographs or any other information that could lead to
the identification of their child in social media, on the grounds of the prevalence of private
life and data protection over the freedom of expression of the parents, in the name of the
superior interest of the child.12
9 About the proportionality of the data retention period, see the judgment of the Supreme Administrative
Court of 21 March.2019, Proc. No. 220/17, at www.dgsi.pt.
10 See the judgment of the SupremeAdministrativeCourt of 08August 2018, Proc.No. 0394/18, atwww.dgsi.pt,.
Concerning the access by a third party to health data, the Court ruled that it should only be given access to
the data expressly covered by the statement of consent. About consent, see also Alexandre Sousa Pinheiro,
‘Anotação ao artigo 4.º, 11)’, inAlexandre Sousa Pinheiro (Ed.)Comentário ao RegulamentoGeral de Proteção
de Dados, Coimbra, Almedina, 2018, pp. 166-173.
11 Within this context, following the criteria of the expectation of privacy, see, for all, the judgment ofTribunal
da Relação do Porto (an intermediate court of appeal) of 08 September 2014, Proc. No. 101/13.5TTMTS.P1,
at www.dgsi.pt.





In regard to the validity of personal data as ‘counter-performance’ for the provision of
digital content, this issue has been debated in Portugal,mainly in the context of conferences
and seminars.13
Recently the new Law 58/2019 has contributed to this debate through a provision that
seems to admit that the legitimacy of processing personal datanecessary for the performance
of a contract might be found on consent. Actually, article 61(2), regarding data processing
that existed prior to the application of the GDPR, intends to ensure that consent fulfils the
attributes provided for by article 4(11) of the GDPR, determining the end of a contract to
which the data subject is party if the consent is not in accordancewith theGDPR. Although
this provision is not necessarily headed to contracts on digital services or goods, yet it has
surely the consequence of generating confusion on an issue that seemed relatively pacified
by the GDPR.
It should also be highlighted that the NSA has decided not to apply in concrete cases
that national provision on the ground that is in breach of articles 4(11) and 6(1)(a) and
(b) of GDPR.
Question 6
In what concerns the rights provided by the GDPR to data subjects, the Portuguese Law
is quite restrained. Actually, Portugal did not introduce so far any national legislative
measure concerning automated decision-making, making use of the possibility provided
by article 22(2)(b) of the GDPR.
Question 7
With regard to the right to erasure towards search engines, the NSA has handled some
requests from data subjects in order to have their right guaranteed, following standard
answers received from the data controllers denying to de-list the results presented when
searching by a name, always invoking public interest in providing such information,
regardless of the context or the notoriety of the person concerned.
13 About the difficulties to legitimate the colletion of personal data in the digital environment under theGDPR,
see also A. Leal Alves, ‘Aspetos jurídicos da análise de Dados na Internet (Big Data Analytics) nos setores
bancário e financeiro: proteção de dados pessoais e deveres de informação’ in A. Menezes Cordeiro et al.
(Eds), FinTech. Desafios da Tecnologia Financeira, Coimbra, Almedina, 2017, pp. 75-150.
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In general, theNSAdid not recognize the arguments of the companies, for goingmuch
beyond the interpretation of the CJEU ruling in the CaseGoogle Spain; therefore, it decided
in favour of the data subjects and it issued deliberations ordering the de-listing.14,15
The search engines either compliedwith theNSAdecision or challenged it in the court,
there being no apparent reason for the different ways taken. Those cases are still pending
at the national courts.
Still in respect to the right to erasure, national law implementing theGDPRhas notably
introduced a provision on how this right can be ensured when personal data is published
in the official journal.
It states that the right to erasure of personal data published in the official journal has
an exceptional nature and can only be applied in the conditions laid down by article 17 of
the GDPR in the cases where it is the only way to safeguard the right to be forgotten, after
due balance of the interests at stake. This is done through the deindexation of personal
data from the search engines, but always without erasure from the official publication
(article 25(4) and (5) of Law 58/2019).
It is also determined by this law that, in case of publication of personal data by the
official journal, the data controller is the body requesting the publication (article 25(6) of
Law 58/2019).
Definitely, there is no right to erasure from the official journal, but a right, in certain
circumstances, not to have the personal data published by the official journal processed
by search engines. This is exercised not directly towards the search engines, as data
controllers, but has to be exercised via the official journal which is the body that controls
the online publication and is able to make the deindexation, yet not being the data
controller.
Question 8
About national legislative measures to reconcile the right to data protection with the right
to freedomof expression, Portugal did not really regulate how this balance could be achieved
nor did introduce any actual derogations. Article 24 of Law 58/2019 disposes that the
GDPR and national rules on data protection are without prejudice of the freedom of
expression and of the freedomof information and of the press. It provides in general terms
that the exercise of the right to information shall respect the principle of human dignity
14 Judgment of 13 May 2014, in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Pro-
tección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (Google Spain), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
15 About the grounds for the decisions of the Portuguese SA, see J. Marques, ‘Direito ao esquecimento. A




and the personality rights, in particular whenever discloses special categories of data or
personal data of deceased persons.
Then a specific provision affords special protection to data subjects’ addresses and
contacts, expressly providing that the right to freedom of information does not legitimate
such disclosure, unless when data is already of public knowledge (article 24(4) of Law
58/2019).
The GDPR implementing law introduced though a clear distinction between data
processing within freedom of expression and data processing for journalistic purposes,
when requiring that in the latter case such processing shall comply with national law on
access and exercise of the professional journalism.
In Portugal there is already specific legislation regulating the activity of the press and
other social communicationmeans, including journalists’ activity, and there is a dedicated
independent regulator to monitor compliance with such legal framework. However, such
legislation does not contain any provisions on personal data protection or provide for the
exercise of GDPR data subjects’ rights.
It should be noted, in this context, that the Press Law16 provides that the freedom of
the press is only limited by the Constitution and the law, in order, namely, to ensure the
accuracy and objectivity of the information and to guarantee the rights to good reputation,
intimacy of private life and image.
Apart from these general restrictions, which can be related to the processing of personal
data, there are no other provisions intended to strike the balance between data protection
and the freedom of expression and information.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
In what regards the national enforcement of data protection law, it should be underlined
that the Portuguese data protection supervisory authority is ComissãoNacional de Proteção
de Dados (hereinafter «CNPD»).17
It is an independent administrative legal body with powers of authority and
administrative and financial autonomy that operateswithin the Parliament. Its composition,
statute and staff are approved by law of the Parliament.
The CNPD is a public legal person directed by a collegiate body, composed of seven
members of recognized merit and integrity: one President elected by the Parliament; two
16 Art. 3 of Law 2/99, of 13 January 1999.
17 Arts. 3 to 6 of Law 58/2019 and Law 43/2004, amended by Law 58/2019.
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members elected by the Parliament by Hondt’s highest average rule; one judge appointed
by the Judiciary Superior Council and one magistrate from the Public Prosecutor’s Office
appointed by its own Superior Council; two members appointed by the Government.
The members have a five-year mandate that can be renewed twice. They take office
before the President of the Parliament. All activities, paid or unpaid, are considered
incompatible with the NSA membership, with the exception of teaching in the University
and researching. TheCNPD acts with independencewhen fulfilling its tasks and exercising
its powers.
The CNPD is provided with its own staff, only bound by the general rules governing
public administration.
The national law implementing the GDPR provides for the following additional
competences for the NSA: to issue non-binding opinions on draft legal instruments in
preparation at European or international institutions related to personal data protection;
to monitor the compliance of the GDPR and other legal provisions on the protection of
personal data and of the rights, freedoms and guarantees of the data subjects, as well as to
correct and sanction any non-compliance; to define criteria allowing to densify the concept
of ‘high risk’ referred to in article 35(4), in connection with the list of data processing
operations requiring a Data Protection Impact Assessment; to draft and submit to the
EDPB the criteria for the accreditation of the monitoring bodies for codes of conduct and
of the certification bodies, pursuant articles 41 and 43 of the GDPR; to cooperate with the
NationalAccreditationBody (IPAC, IP), entrustedwith the task provided by article 43(1)(b)
of the GDPR, in particular in the definition of additional requirements for accreditation.
In what concerns enforcement under the GDPR, for the period 25 May 2018-31 July
2019, the NSA presents the following statistics:18
– Number of investigation proceedings (resulting from complaints, referrals from other
national authorities and the NSA’s own initiative): 1075
– Number of data breaches notifications (article 33 GDPR): 326
– Number of inspections on the spot: 325
– Number of organisations (public and private) to which fines were applied: 5
– Total amount of the fines applied: ± 425 000 euro
Besides the enforcement activity carried out at national level, the consistency mechanism
provided by the GDPR has brought a new line of work requiring involvement of NSAs
upon the likelihood of data subjects in that Member State being affected by data processing
even when there is no establishment of the controller in that territory. Consequently,
18 These figures were provided by CNPD for the 1st anniversary of GDPR application and then updated with
reference to the end of July, in a time frame of 14 months still with no national GDPR implementing law.
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additional efforts on enforcement are required. In spite of being not converted into these
statistics, they have a real impact on the enforcement activity at national level.
Question 10
As to the strategy of the NSA for complaints-handling, it is important to recall that the
right to data protection is a fundamental right, not only recognised by the Charter but also
by the Portuguese Constitution.
Therefore, there is a legal obligation to ensure to each individual that his/her rights are
guaranteed. In view of the possible great amount of complaints, several strategies can be
envisaged to handle complaints in an effective manner, such as sorting them according to
similarity, planning inspection activities having due account of the main or recurrent
problems detected or redefining internal working methods to cope with new scenarios.
However, the Portuguese SA cannot, according to the national legal order, ignore
complaints based on an assessment of minor pertinence of the complaint. In fact, all
admissible complaints have to be dealt with, according to the law, since it imposes such
obligation to the NSA leaving no margin of discretion.
Though prioritization is indispensable, mainly because of the lack of resources of the
NSA to fully complywith its tasks, it cannot lead to setting aside a case where a fundamental
right of an individual is or might be at risk. In that sense, the effectiveness in the action of
the NSA cannot be affirmed with prejudice to fundamental rights.
Question 11
Law 58/2019 adds sanctions to those explicitly provided for by the GDPR, maintaining a
tradition of recognising criminal relevance to some infringements of data protection
provisions: further processing of personal data for a purpose incompatible with the initial
purpose; undue access to personal data; invalidation or destruction of personal data; data
deviation; entry of false data; violation of the duty of secrecy; non-compliance with an
order of the NSA (articles 46 to 52 of Law 58/2019).
Besides criminalising those conducts, national law also provides for administrative
fines for some infringements of the GDPR not covered by article 83(4) and (5) of the
GDPR: the infringement of articles 10 and 41(4); and the monitoring of codes of conduct
by bodies not accredited by theNSA – articles 37(1)(e) and 38(1)(q) and (r) of Law 58/2019.
The Law, in article 37(1)(l), also sanctions with administrative fines the infringements
of the limits and conditions stated on its chapter VI, relating to specific processing
operations under articles 85 to 89 of the GDPR.
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As mentioned supra, Law 58/2019 has provisions that are in breach of the GDPR,
concerning the infringements settled by article 83(4) and (5). The Portuguese legislator
determined different maximum amounts of administrative fines from the ones provided
in the GDPR, depending on the controller or processor being an individual or a small and
medium enterprise – articles 37 (2) and 38(2). Besides, the national implementing law
prevents the NSA to sanction negligent infringements unless, after an “advise” to correct
the situation, the infringements continue – article 39(3). Though having replicated the list
of infringements provided by article 83(4) and (5), it has omitted the negligent infringement
of the principles provided by article 5 of theGDPR, reducing the provision to an intentional
infringement.
In what regards the exercise of corrective powers by the Portuguese SA, it should be
noticed that such powers are not, in fact, new in the national legal order. The previous
data protection law (Law 67/98) already endowed the SAwith corrective powers, specifying
the power to apply administrative fines. The only difference has to do with the legal
framework of the administrative fines, which is now much more impressive than the one
provided by the Portuguese law twenty years ago.
Despite the fact that the national law that implements the GDPR is in force only since
9August 2019, the CNPD has been exercising the powers provided by the GDPR on the
ground that the Law 67/98 had not been implicitly revoked in full, keeping in force the
national provisions that did not contradict the GDPR, in particular the one that appointed
the CNPD as national SA.
Therefore, during the past year the CNPD has applied, under the GDPR, several
corrective measures mainly to data controllers, among which stands out four decisions
sanctioning data controllers.19
Question 12
Article 82 of the GDPR, providing data subjects for a right to receive compensation for
material or non-material damages as a result of an infringement of the GDPR, does not
represent a real innovation in the Portuguese legal order.
Indeed, the previous data protection law (Law 67/98) already provided for the right to
compensation, and it was interpreted combined with further legal provisions that specified
the coverage of non-material damages.
Article 496 of the Civil Code (of 1966) and article 3 of the Rules of non-contractual
civil liability of State and other Public Entities, approved by Law 67/2007, of 31December





2007, provide for the compensation for non-material damage, although limiting it to the
damages that, for its gravity or seriousness, deserve legal protection. This last precision,
explicitly stated in article 496 of the Civil Code, has been interpreted as to exclude the
minor harm – and this is the only aspect of national law that may raise some difficulties
in ensuring the implementation of article 82 of the GDPR in accordance with the case law
of the CJEU, according to which “Reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals as
a result of breaches of Community law must be commensurate with the loss or damage
sustained so as to ensure the effective protection for their rights”.20 However, there are
some Portuguese authors that consider this national legal requirement as a short add, since
it has to be evaluated in each concrete case.21
Hence, Portuguese Courts have long condemned those who inflicted non-material
damages, taking into consideration not only physical pain and emotional suffering, but
also damage caused by the disclosure of facts related to private life.22
More recently there are judgments recognising the right to receive a compensation for
the infringement of provisions that protect personal data.23
In what concerns the criteria for calculating such damages, the case-law follows an
“equity judgment”, taking into account the degree of fault as well as the economic situation
of both the one who inflicted the damage and the injured person.24
Question 13
Concerning the information and power asymmetries between data controllers and data
subjects and the purpose of the EU legislator to mitigate them by providing for the
possibility of representative actions pursuant to article 80 of the GDPR, it is important to
20 Judgement of 5 March 1996 in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Federal
Republic of Germany and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, para 82.
21 See M. Rebelo de Sousa & A. Salgado de Matos, Direito Administrativo, 2nd ed., Lisboa, D. Quixote, Ed.,
2009, Vol. III, p. 496.
22 See, for instance, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 3 November 2016, Proc.
No.323/12.6TVLSB,L2.S1, recognizing the right to compensation for non-material damages caused as a
result of negligent breach of the duty to store a video that registered an intimate moment between the
legitimate holder of the video and the person injured.
23 See the judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice of 16 October2014, Proc. No.679/05.7TAEVR.E2.S1, in
a case where privacy and reputation of several data subjects (civil servants) was at stake as a result of the
disclosure of personal data by the intentional action of a public office holder (notice that such data disclosures
were judged, in the prior criminal law suit, as infringements to criminal law provisions related to data
protection).
24 See the judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice of 4 May2010, Proc. No. 256/03.7TBPNH.C1.S1, at
www.dgsi.pt.
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recall that the new legal framework is very recent, being still difficult to assess potential
trends in civil society in this regard.
Portugal does not have in general a high level of involvement ofNGOs in representative
actions. However national administrative law and administrative process law recognise to
associations their legitimacy to defend ‘collectively’ the individual interests of its members
provided that those interests are covered by the object matter or scope of the association.
This possibility has been availed by unions to complain or report to theNSA infringements
of data protection legal regimen, but seems insufficient – without a mandate from the data
subject – to the exercise of the right to redress.
National law implementing the GDPR does not further develop Article 80 (1) of the
GDPR, only admitting representation through a mandate of the data subject (Article 35
of Law 58/2019). Nevertheless, it is predictable that such kind of actions may significantly
increase in the near future.
Question 14
In what concerns the intervention of further regulatory agencies or public authorities in
data processing related complaints, it should be highlighted that in Portugal the supervision
of data protection issues has been centralised in the CNPD for the last 25 years. Even in
the e-Privacy legislation, where there are shared competences with the telecom regulator,
the competences are well distinguished and data protection matters are only assigned to
the NSA.25
In view of that, other regulators or authorities usually forward to the NSA complaints
related to data protection and, moreover, they report to the NSA facts found in their own
investigations, such as in the employment context, economic activities, consumer protection,
financial sector and so forth.
TheNSAhas also a cooperationmechanismwith theOmbudsperson in place for several
years, for the exchange of information and complaints handling. Furthermore, there are
some bilateral discussions with public bodies dealing with convergent matters to data
protection and privacy, such as ethics, scientific research, e-voting and the national statistic
system. Especially after theGDPR, informal cooperation between theNSA andRegulatory
Agencies has increased, due to the consciousness of the importance to avoid contradictions
in its respective guidelines or administrative measures.
25 Law 41/2004, of 18 August 2004, as amended by Law 46/2012, of 29 August 2012.
509
Portugal
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
There is no legal definition of ‘national security’, but it is commonly perceived that national
security is ensured by intelligence services, due to their tasks, and not by law enforcement
authorities. Consequently, as there is a constitutional prohibition for the intelligence
services to carry out any criminal prevention or investigation, the scope of the application
of Directive 2016/680 and its transposition into national Law 59/2019, of 8 August 2019,
make it clear that excluding national security means in Portugal excluding the intelligence
services from the application of the Law Enforcement Directive (LED).26,27
The intelligence services (SIRP) are regulated by specific legislation and their activities
are supervised by two different bodies: a parliamentary oversight commission and another
body composed of magistrates to monitor some aspects of the data processing, including
the exercise of the rights of the data subjects.
Being the right to data protection a fundamental right in Portugal since 1976, the first
data protection law, dated from 1991 (Law 10/91 of 10 January 1991), already covered the
law enforcement sector with the same data protection rules as the other public bodies and
private organizations, with only two derogations concerning the right to information and
the right of access which had specific provisions.
Actually, apart from the intelligence services, all other sectors were governed by the
same data protection legal framework. Therefore, though the terminology might be
confused, especially when used in European legal texts for different national contexts, the
waters have been divided so far. It should be noted though that while excluding national
security from its scope of application, the LED invokes ‘national security’ as one of the
possible grounds to restrict data subjects’ rights. The national law transposing the LED
follows the same misleading legal provision, what might bring problems of interpretation
and application of the law.
In what regards the national data retention law – Law 32/2008, of 17 July 2008 – its
purpose is restricted to the prevention, detection and investigation of serious criminal
infractions, by competent authorities, exactly like the subject matter and scope of the
26 ‘National security’ is stated in art. 15 of the e-Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58/EC) as meaning «State
security». Without giving a definition, the European legislator clearly intended to determine the scope of
national security.
27 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
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Directive itself, which on the other hand refers to the national legislation. According to
the Portuguese data retention law, only a limited number of listed law enforcement
authorities can have access to the data retained to strike serious crime after a judicial
warrant. Within this law, there is no use of data for national security purposes or access
to data by intelligence services.28
Nonetheless, the national data retention law, after the CJEU ruling that invalidated the
Data Retention Directive, is to be considered in breach of the Charter, regardless of the
purpose for which the data is retained and further accessed.29
The NSA has expressed this view immediately after the invalidation of Directive
2006/24/EC and, after Tele 2 Judgement, it has deliberated not to apply the national data
retention law for being in violation of EU Law.30,31,32
With the Portuguese Data Retention Law still in force, the Parliament passed a specific
law to grant access by the intelligence services to the data retention database. The NSA
gave a negative opinion during the legislative proceeding and the law was considered
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2015, following a constitutionality prior
check.33,34
A second law was passed, on which the CNPD issued a negative opinion as well. The
Constitutional Court found it partially unconstitutional.35,36
In the meantime, the Ombudsperson requested the Constitutional Court to evaluate
whether the national data retention lawwas in accordance to the Portuguese Constitution,
including in what concerns the respect for the primacy of the EU law. Such request is still
pending for assessment.37
28 Law 32/2008 is the Portuguese law transposing Directive 2006/24/EC. In spite of the Directive had been
invalidated by the CJEU, the national law is still in force in Portugal.
29 Judgement of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister
for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, The
Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, Ireland and the Attorney General, and Kärntner Landesregierung,
Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and Others (Digital Rights Ireland), ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
30 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communi-
cations services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ
L105/54.
31 Judgement of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others (Tele 2),
ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
32 Deliberação 641/2017 of the CNPD, www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Delib/20_641_2017.pdf and Deliberação
1008/2017 of the CNPD, www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Delib/20_1008_2017.pdf.
33 Parecer 51/2015 of the CNPD, www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Par/40_51_2015.pdf.
34 Judgement 403/2015 of theConstitutional Court, www.ribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20150403.html.
35 Parecer 38/2017 of the CNPD www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/Par/40_38_2017.pdf.
36 Judgement 464/2019 of theConstitutionalCourt, www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20190464.html.
37 Request from the Ombudsperson of 26 August 2019, www.provedor-jus.pt/?idc=32&idi=18045.
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In spite of the national legal framework being clear in respect to the law enforcement
and the national security activities, not affecting the scope of application of the LED, it is
evident that there is an increasing trend to use data, primarily processed for commercial
purposes, for law enforcement purposes in a massive and disproportionate way, and then
becoming also available for access and further processing by national security agencies.
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Romania
Augustin Fuerea and Roxana-Mariana Popescu*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
As regards the measures for the application of the General Data Protection Regulation
(hereinafter “GDPR”),1 the following national legislation is of relevance:
1 Law no. 129/2018 amending and supplementing Law no. 102/2005
regarding the establishment, organisation and functioning of the National Supervisory
Authority for Personal Data Processing, as well as repealing Law no. 677/2001 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free
movement of such data.2 Following legislative interventions, Law no. 102/2005 was
republished in the Official Gazette no. 947 of 9 November 2018.
The new legal framework:
– strengthens the independence and autonomy of the Supervisory Authority in line with
the GDPR requirements;
– provides for the exercise of the monitoring and control competences and duties of the
Supervisory Authority and the compliance of the specific rights of natural persons in
accordance with the provisions of the GDPR;
– establishes a new chapter dedicated to “Exercising the duties of control and
complaint-handling” which sets out the main aspects regarding the carrying out of
investigations and the settlement of the complaints addressed to the Authority;
– regulates an express procedure for conducting an investigation by the Supervisory
Authority in the event that the controlled entities prevent such action;
* Respectively Professor and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Nicolae Titulescu University, Bucharest,
Romania. The authors would like to thank the assistance received from the National Authority for Super-
vising the Processing of Personal Data, the National Authority for Consumer Protection, the Ministry of
Communications and Information Society, as well as theMinistry of Internal Affairs (Directorate for Persons
Record and Databases Management).
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Official Gazette no. 503 of 19 July 2018.
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– establishes the main contravention sanctions that can be applied, namely the warning
and the fine, as well as the corrective measure with a novelty, under the form of
admonition;
– provides legal remedies against the measures ordered by the Supervisory Authority,
both for the operators and for the persons concerned;
– provides for transitional provisions in the context of repealing Law no. 677/2001, as
follows:
– The GDPR applies to complaints and notifications filed and registered with the
SupervisoryAuthority from the date of its application, as well as to those filed before
May 25, 2018 and which are now being solved.
– Investigations initiated before May 25, 2018 and not yet completed, are subject to
the GDPR provisions.
– The finding of facts and the application of corrective measures, including
contravention sanctions, after May 25, 2018, shall be carried out in accordance with
the GDPR provisions and the legal provisions for its implementation.
2 Law no. 190/2018 on the implementation of the GDPR3
Most importantly, this law:
– expressly mentions the public authorities and bodies to which the GDPR provisions
are applicable;
– the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the Presidential Administration, the
Government, the ministers, the other specialised bodies of the central public
administration, the autonomous public authorities and institutions, the authorities of
the local public administration and those at county level, other public authorities, as
well as the subordinated and/or coordinated institutions; are assimilated to the public
authorities and/or bodies andworship units and associations and foundations of public
utility;
– defines a number of terms such as: national identification number, remedial plan,
remedial measure, remediation deadline;
– establishes special rules for the processing of certain categories of personal data, such
as genetic data, biometric data or health data;
– establishes conditions for the processing of a national identification number (e.g.
Personal Identification Number);
– establishes specific provisions on the processing of personal data in the context of
labour relations;
3 Official Gazette no. 651 of 26 July 2018.
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– provides for derogations for processing done for journalistic purposes, academic,
artistic or literary expression, or for purposes of scientific, historical, statistical research,
archiving in the public interest;
– mentions the terms of appointment and tasks of the Data Protection Officer, especially
in case of public authorities and/or institutions and public bodies;
– designates the Romanian Accreditation Association (hereinafter “RENAR”) as the
national accreditation body for the certification bodies referred to in article 43 of the
GDPR;
– establishes the derogatory sanctioning regime, including pecuniary sanctions, applicable
to public authorities and bodies, giving priority to the prevention mechanism prior to
the application of the fines.
It is important tomention, regarding the provisions of article 83(7) of the Regulation, that,
as far as the public authorities or institutions are concerned, the Law establishes a
mechanism of sanctioning them in a first stage, by applying the sanction with warning
and by establishing a remediation plan. This step can be followed by the application of
administrative sanctions, expressly provided by Law no. 190/2018 insofar as the public
authorities or institutions have not fully implemented the measures provided in the
remediation plan.
At the same time, regarding the certification bodies, it is necessary to specify that the
normative act establishes that the accreditation of certification bodies, provided in article
43 of the Regulation, is performed by the Romanian Accreditation Association - RENAR,
as a national accreditation body, in accordance with Regulation (EC) no. 765/2008,4 as
well as in accordance with Government Ordinance no. 23/2009 regarding the activity of
accreditation of conformity assessment bodies, approved with amendments by Law no.
256/2011.
3 Decisionno. 133/2018 regarding the approval of theprocedure for receiving
and solving complaints5
The significant changes in the conditions of admissibility and resolution of complaints by
the Supervisory Authority, including in the context of cross-border processing, as a result
of the entry into force of the GDPR and Law no. 102/2005, republished, led to the issuance
of Decision no. 133/2018. Most importantly, this Decision provides that:
4 Regulation (EC) no. 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 9, 2008 establishing
the accreditation andmarket surveillance requirements regarding themarketing of products, and repealing
Regulation (EEC) no. 339/93 [2008] OJ L218/30.
5 Official Gazette no. 600 of 13 July 2018.
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– complaints may be filed by any person concerned, especially if his or her habitual
residence or place of work is in Romania or where the alleged violation has occurred
on Romanian territory;
– complaintsmay be filed at the headquarters of the SupervisoryAuthority or transmitted
by post, including electronic mail, or by using the electronic complaint form available
on the institution’s website6;
– complaints may be filed personally or through a representative, including through a
non-patrimonial organisation active in the field of personal data protection;
– petitioners are informed inwriting about the admissibility of their complaint, including
whether amore detailed investigation or coordinationwith other supervisory authorities
will be carried and about the progress and outcome of the investigation;
– where the person concerned is dissatisfiedwith theway the complaint has been handled,
she can address to the administrative court of the competent tribunal, after having
gone through the preliminary procedure provided by the Administrative Contentious
Law no. 554/20047, with subsequent amendments.
4 Decisionno. 161/2018 regarding the approval of the procedure for carrying
out the investigations8
This Decision establishes the conditions for carrying out investigations in the field, at the
headquarters of the Supervisory Authority or in in writing, as well as their performance
at the public authorities and/or bodies.
The investigation can be finalised by drawing up a report of finding, the imposition of
a sanction or a decision of the President of the Supervisory Authority, providing for
corrective measures and/or penalties can be ordered (warning, fine). In the case of public
authorities and/or bodies, a warning is issued before a pecuniary sanction and a remedial
plan is drawn up in accordance with the model provided by Law no. 190/2018, which must
be complied with within the deadline set by the Supervisory Authority.
The measures can be challenged within 15 days at the administrative court of the
competent tribunal.
5 Decision no. 128/2018 on the approval of the standard form for the
notification of the personal data violation in accordance with the GDPR9
This Decision establishes the standard notification form for the personal data violation,
in application of article 33(1) GDPR obliging the operators to report a violation of the
6 www.dataprotection.ro.
7 Official Gazette no. 1154 of 7 December 2004.
8 Official Gazette no. 892 of 23 October 2018.
9 Official Gazette no. 557 of 3 July 2018.
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Supervisory Authority without undue delay and, if possible, within 72 hours from the date
on which it became aware of it. The standard form is available on the institution’s website
and can be transmitted electronically.10
6 Decision no.174/2018 regarding the list of operations for which the
assessment of the impact on theprotectionof personal data ismandatory11
This Decision was issued to ensure effective protection of the rights of individuals whose
personal data are processed, especially in the case of certain personal data processing
operations that pose risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals due to the nature of
the data processed (e.g. sensitive data such as genetic, biometric, health data), scope, context
and purposes of the processing, the specific nature of the categories of targeted people (e.g.
vulnerable people, such as employees,minors), their number and/or themechanisms used
for data processing, especially those based on the use of new technologies.
The processing of data in the situations covered by this Decision obliges the operators
to carry out a data protection impact assessment in accordancewith article 25 of theGDPR.
7 Decision no. 99/2018 regarding the cessation of the applicability of
normative acts of administrative nature issued in application of Law no.
677/2001on theprotectionof natural personswith regard to the processing
of personal data and the free movement of such data12
In view of the necessity of a predictable and clear legal framework, in accordance with the
normative legal regulations, Decision no. 99/2018 was issued. It was also issued in the light
of the European Commission’s Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council of 24 January 2018 entitled “Enhanced Protection, New Opportunities -
Commission Guidelines on the Direct Application of the General Data Protection
Regulation of 25 May 2018”, specifying that “(w)hen adapting their national legislation,
the Member States must take into consideration any national measures that would result
in an obstacle to direct application of the regulation and jeopardising its simultaneous and
uniform application across the EU, it is contrary to the Treaties.”13
10 www.dataprotection.ro, the webpages referred to were visited 1 February 2020.
11 Official Gazette no. 919 of 31 October 2018.
12 Official Gazette no.432 of 22 May 2018.
13 COM(2018) 43 final, p. 9.
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8 The Decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court (hereinafter “RCC”)
no. 498/2018 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the
provisions of art. 30 paragraphs (2) and (3), as well as the phrase “system
of the electronic patient health file” in art. 280 paragraph (2) of Law no.
95/2006 regarding the health reform14
This Decision falls within the same context of ensuring coherence in the processing of
personal data.
According to the principles set out in the RCC Decision, “if the state has instituted, by
law, a measure in the application of the right to protection of the person’s health, still the
state has the obligation to protect and guarantee the confidentiality of the medical
information processed, by a normative act of the same level, respectively by law. Thus,
from this point of view, the positive obligations associatedwith the two rights are correlative
and interdependent, and theremust be a fair balance between them. The state is not allowed
to protect a constitutional right, to the detriment of the other right, also protected, because
it could reach the situationwhere the latter’s affectation is so strong that the initial advantage
obtained appears as being insignificant in this equation. Therefore, at normative level,
complementarity and proportionality must characterize the relationship between the two
constitutional rights”.
Question 2
Article 26 of the RomanianConstitution states in paragraph 1, that: “The public authorities
respect and protect the intimate, family and private life”. The provisions of Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 apply directly regarding the processing of the personal data of the people
concerned.
According to the case law of the RCC, the right to intimate family and private life
includes the right to the protection of personal data. In this regard, wemention theDecision
of the Constitutional Court no. 498/2018 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality
of the provisions of art. 30 paragraphs (2) and (3), as well as the phrase “system of the
electronic patient health file” contained in art. 280 paragraph (2) of Law no. 95/2006
regarding the health reform.15
14 Official Gazette no. 650 of 26 July 2018.
15 Official Gazette no. 650 of 26 July 2018.
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B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
Article 5 GDPR contains directly applicable provisions on the principles of processing
personal data, including the “purpose limitation” and “data minimisation” principles.
The data controller is responsible for compliance with the processing principles and
must be able to demonstrate that compliance.
Question 4
Litigations concerning the application of the GDPR are at the beginning.
Question 5
The processing of personal data in a digital context has not been widely debated at national
level.
Question 6
Decision no. 174/2018 regarding the list of operations for which the impact assessment
on the protection of personal data ismandatory provides, inter alia, that “for the processing
of personal data in order to carry out a systematic and comprehensive assessment of
personal aspects relating to natural persons, which is based on automatic processing,
including the creation of profiles, and which grounds decisions that produce legal effects
on the individual or that affect it similarly to a significant extent”, it is mandatory to assess
the impact on the protection of personal data by the operators.16
By way of exception to the above, “impact assessment on data protection is not
mandatory when processing under article 6(1)(c) or (e) of the GDPR has a legal basis in
Union or domestic law, and a data protection impact assessment has already been carried
out as part of a general impact assessment in the context of the adoption of the respective
regulatory acts.”
Article 3 of Law no. 190/2018 establishes the following: the processing of genetic,
biometric or health data, in order to carry out an automated decision-making process or
16 Official Gazette no. 919 of 31 October 2018.
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for the creation of profiles, is allowed with the explicit consent of the data subject or, if
processing is carried out on the basis of express legal provisions, with the establishment
of appropriate measures to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the data
subject.
Question 7
The provisions of article 17 of the GDPR on the right to delete data (“right to be forgotten”)
are directly applicable. We specify that, according to article 55(3) GDPR, the National
SupervisoryAuthority is not competent to supervise the processing operations of the courts
acting in the exercise of their judicial function.
Question 8
Article 7 of Law no. 190/2018 on the implementation of the GDPR provides for rules on
the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes or for purposes of academic,
artistic or literary expression. It reads: “In order to ensure a balance between the right to
the protection of personal data, freedom of expression and the right to information,
processing for journalistic purposes or for the purpose of academic, artistic or literary
expression may be made if it concerns personal data that were made public manifestly by
the person concerned or closely related to the public personality of the person concerned
or to the public interest of the facts in which he/she is involved, by way of derogation from
the following chapters of the General Data Protection Regulation:
a. chapter II – Principles;
b. chapter III - The rights of the person concerned;
c. chapter IV - The operator and the person empowered by the operator;
d. Chapter V - Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations;
e. Chapter VI - Independent supervisory authorities;
f. Chapter VII - Cooperation and coherence;
g. Chapter VIII - Provisions relating to specific processing situations.”
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The National Supervisory Authority for Personal Data Processing aims at defending the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular the right to privacy,
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family and private life, in connection with the processing of personal data and the free
movement of such data.
The duties of the National Supervisory Authority are regulated by the GDPR and Law
no. 363/2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data by the competent authorities for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating,
prosecuting and combating criminal offenses or punishments, educational and safety
measures and the free movement of such data.17
The National Supervisory Authority is headed by a president who is assisted by a
vice-president in this activity. The president and vice-president of theNational Supervisory
Authority are appointed by the Senate for a period of five years. The term of office of the
president and the vice-President can be renewed once. The procedure for appointing the
president and the vice-president is provided inChapter II of Lawno. 102/2005, republished,
and in Chapter IV of the same act, there are provisions regulating the staff of the Authority.
By Law no. 102/2005, the monitoring and control competences and duties of the
National Supervisory Authority are ensured in accordancewith the provisions of art. 55-59
of the GDPR.
Thus, the main duties of the National Supervisory Authority and its President have
been established in national law, in line with the innovations brought about by the GDPR
and Directive (EU) 2016/680. The independence and autonomy of the National Authority
Supervision have also been strengthened in accordance with the provisions of article 52
of the GDPR.
In fulfilling the duties established by articles 57 and 58 of the GDPR, a new chapter,
entitled “Exercising the powers of control and solving complaints” was introduced in Law
no. 102/2005, which establishes in detail, the procedures for handling investigations and
complaints.
At the same time, the main contravention sanctions, namely the warning and the fine,
as well as the correctivemeasure of the type of admonition, were established, taking account
of the new corrective measures that the National Supervisory Authority can take in line
with article 58, para. 2 of the GDPR.
In addition, the GDPR establishes in what way the measures ordered by the National
Supervisory Authorities can be challenged, both by the operators and by the people
concerned, in accordance with the tasks assigned to the Member State under articles 58(4)
and (5).




According to Decision no. 133/2018 regarding the approval of the Procedure for receiving
and solving complaints:18
– complaints may be filed by any person concerned, especially if his or her habitual
residence or place of work is in Romania or where the alleged violation has occurred
on Romanian territory;
– complaints may be filed at the headquarters of the Supervisory Authority or sent by
post, including electronic mail, or by using the electronic complaint form available on
the institution’s website;19
– complaints may be filed personally or through a representative, including through a
non-patrimonial organisation active in the protection of their personal data;
– petitioners shall be informed in writing of the admission of the complaint, including
whether they have undertaken a more thorough investigation or coordination with
other supervisory authorities, and of the evolution or outcome of the investigation
– the person concerned dissatisfied with the way of solving his complaint may appeal to
the administrative court of the competent tribunal after scouring the preliminary
procedure provided by the Law on administrative contentious no. 554/2004, with
subsequent amendments and completions.
Question 11
In addition to those mentioned in answer 9, Law no. 190/2018 on the implementation of
the GDPR20 establishes the derogatory sanction regime, including pecuniary sanctions,
applicable to public authorities and bodies, giving priority to the prevention mechanism,
before the application of the fines.
Question 12
From the information held, prior to the application of the GDPR, one person has been
awarded moral damages in one litigation.
18 Official Gazette no. 600 of 13 July 2018.
19 www.dataprotection.ro.
20 Official Gazette no. 651 of 26 July 2108.
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Question 13
According to the provisions of article 20 of Law no. 102/2005, republished, any person
concerned who considers that the processing of her personal data violates the legal
provisions in force has the right to file a complaint to the National Supervisory Authority,
especially if her habitual residence or place of work is in Romania or where the alleged
violation has occurred on Romanian territory.
The complaintmust be submitted personally or by a representative, with the attachment
of the mandate issued under the law by a lawyer or of a notary proxy, as the case may be.
The complaint may also be filed by the person’s representative who is a spouse or a relative
up to the second degree including.
If the complaint is filed through a body, organisation, association, or foundationwithout
a patrimonial purpose, they must prove that they have been legally constituted, with a
statute providing for public interest objectives, and that they are active in the field of the
protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects with regard to the protection of
personal data. In this case, the complaint shall also include the mandate or the notarial
proxy, as the casemay be, in which the limits of themandate given by the person concerned
shall be indicated.
Question 14
The GDPR establishes a new mechanism for cooperation between national supervisory
authorities involving a European bodywith legal personality - the EuropeanData Protection
Board (EDPB). It is responsible for mediating positions between national supervisors, as
well as for developing guidelines and recommendations for its unitary application across
the European Union.
The Authority also cooperates at national level with other public authorities and
institutions in the effective application of the legislation on the protection of personal data.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
Law no. 51/1991 on the national security of Romania, republished21, defines in article 1
the phrase “national security” as follows: “The national security of Romania means the
21 Official Gazette no. 190 of 18 March 2014.
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state of legality, equilibrium and social, economic and political stability necessary for the
existence and development of the Romanian national state as a sovereign, unitary,
independent and indivisible state, the maintenance of the rule of law as well as the climate
of unhindered exercise of the fundamental rights, freedoms and duties of citizens, according
to the democratic principles and regulations established by the Constitution.”
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Slovakia
Lilla Garayova*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
On 30 January 2018, a new act on the protection of personal data in the Slovak Republic
was published in theCollection of Laws under the number 18/2018Coll. TheNewPersonal
Data Protection Act replaced the former Act No. 122/2013 Coll. on the protection of
personal data. The reason for the adoption of the New Personal Data Protection Act was
primarily due to the European reform of the law on the protection of personal data,
implemented in particular by the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter
“GDPR”)1. The New Personal Data Protection Act entered into force alongside the GDPR
on 25 May 2018. The Act largely duplicated the provisions of the Regulation, while
transposing the so-called “Police Directive” or “Law Enforcement Directive” (Directive
(EU) No 2016/680, hereinafter “LED”) into the Slovak legal order at the same time. The
new national legislation mirrors the provisions of the regulation, and in some cases is in
stark contrast with the 2013 national legislation.2 The main differences include expanding
the range of traditional personal data (name and surname) to include new types of data
such as IP addresses or cookies.
The structure of the national legal framework of the Slovak Republic is as follows below.
Main Act
Data Protection Act No. 18/2018 Coll;3
* PhD, Pan-European University, Faculty of International and European Law, Bratislava (Slovakia).
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
3 Act No. 18/2018 Coll. on Personal data protection and amendments and supplements to certain Acts.
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Other relevant law
TheDecree of theOffice for PersonalData ProtectionNo. 158/2018Coll. onData Protection
Impact Assessment Procedure;4
Relevant ordinances/Other guidelines
List of processing operations subject to impact assessment (so-called Black List):5
– Legal processing of personal data related to clinical testing6
– Methodology compliance of personal data processing at schools7
– Guideline No. 2/2018 – legality of processing. Updated version as of 22 January 20198
– Frequently asked questions related to photography and audiovisual records9
– Statement of the Data Protection Office of the Slovak Republic related to delivery
writings in an administrative proceeding and administrative file inspection10
The Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic is a state administration
body with national jurisdiction over the territory of the Slovak Republic, that participates
in the protection of fundamental rights of natural persons in relation to processing of
personal data and executes data protection supervision, including supervision of personal
data protection by competent authorities for performance of the task for the purposes of
criminal proceedings.11 The Office, when exercising its jurisdiction, acts independently
and is governed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, constitutional acts, acts, other
generally binding legal regulations and international treaties binding upon the Slovak
Republic. The Office monitors the implementation of the Data Protection Act, as well as
comments on drafts of Acts and drafts of generally binding regulations governing the
processing of personal data.
4 TheDecree of theOffice for PersonalData Protection of the SlovakRepublic of 29May 2018 on the procedure
for the assessment of data protection no. 158/2018 Coll.
5 List of processing operations subject to impact assessment on the protection of personal data of the Slovak
Republic.
6 Legal processing of personal data related to clinical testing published by the Office for Personal Data Pro-
tection of the Slovak Republic.
7 Methodology compliance of personal data processing at schools published by the Office for Personal Data
Protection of the Slovak Republic.
8 Guideline No. 2/2018 – legality of processing. Updated version as of 22 January 2019.
9 Frequently asked questions related to photography and audiovisual records published by the Office for
Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic.
10 Statement of the Data Protection Office of the Slovak Republic related to delivery writings in an adminis-
trative proceeding and administrative file inspection.




Privacy and Data Protection, though connected, are commonly recognised all over the
world as two separate rights. In Europe, they are considered vital components for a
sustainable democracy.
The Constitution of the Slovak republic passed by the Slovak National Council on
1 September 1992 in its Section 2 – Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms – outlines
the right to respect for private life. The legislation on the protection of personal data at a
national level prior to the GDPR was solely based on the fundamental rights and freedoms
embodied in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Pursuant to its article 19(2) and (3)
everyone has the right to protection against unauthorized interference in private and family
life and to protection against unauthorized collection, publication, or other misuse of
personal data. Article 16 of the SlovakConstitution states that the inviolability of the person
and its privacy is guaranteed whereby we mean the inviolability of privacy in connection
with the whole area of intimate personal life and not only in terms of protecting the home
and what goes on behind the doors of our house or apartment.
The right to privacy, or as the Constitution of the Slovak republic states – the right to
private and family life – as enshrined in the constitution is one of the fundamental human
rights the country was built on. The notion of data protection originates from the right to
privacy and while both are instrumental in preserving and promoting fundamental values
and rights, there was no explicitmention of the right to data protection in theConstitution
of the Slovak republic. For many years the right to respect for private life as declared in
the Constitution of the Slovak republic, seemingly sufficed. However, justified concerns
on personal data breaches were not consistently considered as a violation of this right.
A broader interpretation of this right occurred in 2013, with the enactment of Act No.
122/2013 Coll. on the Protection of Personal Data and on Changing and Amending of
other acts, resulting from amendments and additions executed by the Act. No. 84/2014
Coll. which regulated the protection of rights of natural persons against wrongful
interferencewith their private life in connectionwith the processing of their personal data.
Moreover, it defined the rights, duties and liabilities in connection with personal data
processing, as well as it established and outlined the scope of the powers and the
organization of the Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic.
On 30th January 2018, a new act on the protection of personal data in the Slovak
Republic was published in the Collection of Laws under the number 18/2018 Coll. The
New Personal Data Protection Act replaced the former Act No. 122/2013 Coll. on the
protection of personal data. The reason for the adoption of the New Personal Data
Protection Act was primarily due to the European reform of the law on the protection of
personal data,most importantly theGDPR. TheNewPersonalData ProtectionAct entered
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into force alongside the GDPR on 25 May 2018. The Act largely duplicated the provisions
of the Regulation, while transposing the LED into the Slovak legal order at the same time.
The newnational legislationmirrors the provisions of the regulation, and in some cases
is in stark contrast with the 2013 national legislation. The main differences include
expanding the range of traditional personal data (name and surname) to include new types
of data such as IP addresses or cookies.
The new legislation tightens the requirements for consent to the processing of personal
data, which must be specific, free, informed and unambiguous. The new law no longer
regulates the obligation to prepare a security project, the obligation to keep records of the
information systemor the obligation to notify information systems to theOffice for Personal
Data Protection of the Slovak republic – all requirements under the former legislation.
Instead, it introduces an obligation to keep records of processing activities (in particular
employers employing at least 250 employees). Assessing the impact of processing operations
on the protection of personal data, is virtually very difficult to understand or estimate at
this point to the full extent. The new law introduces the right of data subjects to request
the transfer of personal data in a structured form from one controller to another (e.g. via
API or data archive). In contrast with the old legislation, the possibilities of processing
personal data of children under 16 years of age – which requires the consent of the legal
guardian – are significantly restricted. The newnational legislation introduces the obligation
to establish a data protection officer (instead of the previously existing voluntary
authorization) in cases provided by law.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The current national legislation pursuant to the GDPR requires that all personal data
processing should occur in a fair and lawfulmanner, for a specified and legitimate purpose,
while only processing the data necessary to fulfil this purpose. The official guidelines of
the Slovak National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”) – the Office for Personal
Data Protection of the Slovak republic conclude that data collected and processed should
not be held or further used unless this is essential for reasons that were clearly stated in
advance to support data privacy. This includes data that is relevant, adequate and limited
to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed.
The principle of fair processing primarily governs the relationship between the data
subject and the controller. According to the current legislation controllers should notify
the relevant data subjects, as well as the general public, that they will process data in a
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transparent and lawful way. They are also obliged to demonstrate the compliance of
processing operations with national legislation and the GDPR. Furthermore, controllers
must act in a manner that best complies with the wishes of the data subject, especially in
cases where their consent provides the legal basis for data processing. Data subjects need
to be aware of any potential risks.
When it comes to the principle of fair processing, there is a case that needs to be
highlighted. In K.H and others v. Slovakia the applicants, eight women – all members of
the Roma community in Slovakia – received gynecological and obstetric treatment in
eastern Slovakia.12 After the treatment, none of them were able to conceive a child despite
repeated attempts. The applicants recalled being asked to sign documents prior to their
discharge from the hospital, but they were unable to identify the contents of the documents
they signed. The eight women consented to representation by lawyers from the Centre for
Civil and Human Rights, but in 2002, the Ministry of Health interpreted “legal
representative” under the Health Care Act 1994 to mean only parents of underage children
or as representatives of those whose legal capacity has been limited and therefore denied
the attorneys access to view and photocopy the medical records. After suing the hospitals
in 2002, the national courts found that the hospitals should permit the applicants to consult
and make handwritten excerpts of the medical records, however found no right to
photocopy of one’s own medical records – allegedly to prevent the abuse of personal data
– and no violation of rights protected under the Constitution or the EuropeanConvention
of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”). The Applicants took their case to the European
Court ofHumanRights (hereinafter “ECtHR”). In determining the scope of state obligations
under article 8 of the ECHR (right to private and family life), the Court found that this
right must be practical and effective and therefore access to files containing one’s personal
data must be allowed. The Court also found that the cost and arrangements for making
the photocopies would have be borne by the individual making the request and the facility
must present compelling reasons for refusing to provide copies. In this case the national
courts justified prohibiting the applicants frommaking copies of their ownmedical records
primarily on the need to protect relevant information from abuse. However, the ECtHR
failed to see how the applicants could have abused information concerning themselves.13
While this case is another in a series of pronouncements from various human rights
bodies, that have been increasing the pressure on Central and Eastern European
governments to end the active discrimination against Roma peoples, especially women,
in their countries; it is also incredibly significant from a data protection perspective. The
ruling gives valuable insight to the interpretation of the principle of fair processing.
According to the Court it is for the file holder to determine the arrangements for copying
12 ECtHR, K.H. and others v. Slovakia, 28 April 2009, App. No. 32881/04.
13 ECHR 2009/13 Case of K.H. and others v. Slovakia, 28 April 2009, App. No. 32881/04.
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personal data files. However, data subjects should not be obliged to specifically justify a
request to be provided with a copy of their personal data files. It is rather for the authorities
to show that there are compelling reasons for refusing this.
Question 4
Legitimate interest is definitely the most flexible lawful basis for data processing, but the
courts do not assume it is always the most appropriate. Relying on legitimate interests
means taking on extra responsibility and can only be considered appropriate when using
personal data in away data subjects would reasonably expect and thatwould have aminimal
privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing. Public
authorities can only rely on legitimate interests if they are processing for a legitimate reason
other than performing their tasks as a public authority. Before opting to use legitimate
interest as the basis of data processing, first the legitimate interest needs to be identified.
Ensuing that, it needs to be demonstrated that the processing is necessary to achieve it,
while balancing it against the individual’s interests, rights and freedoms. If the same result
can be achieved in another, less intrusive way, legitimate interest is no longer an option.
There are cases, where there is a compelling justification for the processing and a more
intrusive impact on the individual can be warranted – any potential impact needs to be
justified. Legitimate interest is primarily considered in cases of fraud prevention and in
cases of possible criminal acts or threats to public security.
Question 5
The question of personal data as “counter-performance” for provision of digital content
came up in many debates on a national level, especially in debates concerning data actively
vs. passively provisioned. Currently, Slovak legislation and legal practice draw a distinction
between passive and active personal data provision. Simply put, the protection has only
been applied so far, where the data subject had actively been providing data. Passive
provisions include the use of cookies and IP addresses.
Even though article 6(1)(a) GDPR outlines that both active and passive data require
consent, in Slovak legislative practice they are treated differently. Preservation of the IP
address in the operation log of a website from the point of view of the regulation of personal
data protection was not a problem in the prior application practice in Slovakia. To our
knowledge and experience, this data has not been subject to regulatory review in the past,
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based on annual reports from recent years.14 However, with the effect of the GDPR, from
May 2018 the processing of the IP address should be subject to increased privacy regulation.
Traditionally in Slovakia, IP addresses have not normally been considered personal data,
so it poses an interesting change in the application approach to consider passively
provisioned data as personal data, which it undoubtedly is.
IP addresses can be labeled as personally identifiable in terms of privacy. Internet access
providers and local network administrators can use appropriatemeans to identify Internet
users towhom they have assigned IP addresses because they usually systematically “record”
the file, the date, time, duration and dynamic IP address assigned to an Internet user. The
same can be said for internet service providers who keep a traffic log on an HTTP server.
In particular, when IP addresses are processed to identify computer users (e.g. copyright
owners who want to prosecute computer users for intellectual property infringement), it
is expected that resources will be available that are reasonably likely to be used to identify
persons, e.g. through a court subpoena – otherwise the collection of information would
be of no importance – and therefore such information should be considered as personal
data.
A specific case would be certain types of IP addresses that in certain circumstances do
not reliably allow the user to be identified for various technical and organizational reasons.
One example would be IP addresses assigned to a computer in an Internet cafe where no
customer identification is required. It could be argued that the data collected on the use
of a certain computer within a certain timeframe does not allow the user to be identified
by appropriate means and therefore is not personal data. However, it should be noted that
internet service providers are unlikely to know whether or not the IP address in question
is an identifying address and therefore process the data associated with that IP address in
the same way that they process the information associated with the IP addresses of users
who are properly registered and identifiable. If the internet service provider is unable to
distinguish with absolute certainty whether the data corresponds to users who cannot be
identified, it will therefore have to process all IP information as personal data just to be
on the safe side.
In general, an IP address can be defined as a unique identifier for a device connected
to the Internet or local network. The IP address allows the systems to recognize other
systems connected via the Internet protocol. For the sake of applicational clarity, it is
necessary to note the concepts and differences between a static IP address and a dynamic
IP address.
A static IP address is an address that is permanently assigned to a specific device by
the ISP for the entire duration of the related contractual relationship and does not change




even when you restart the computer. A dynamic IP address is automatically assigned to
your device by the internet service provider essentially every time the computer or router
is powered on again using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. It is controllable
and allows the administrator to identify the device, either directly or indirectly, which can
lead to the device user being identified. The ongoing debates resulted in legal guidelines
on when IP address should be considered as personal data.15 Based on these guidelines an
IP address is personal data if it is processed by the internet service provider together with
the identification (personal data) of the end user of the Internet connection. Static IP
addresses used by individuals should be considered as protected personal data. The dynamic
IP address that the online service provider maintains in relation to the data subject’s
browsing of its website content constitutes personal data for such service provider if it has
the legal means to identify the data subject, also through other information held by the
data provider’s internet connection.
Based on new trends shifting the IP address to the level of personal data, this will need
to be taken into account when formulating internal privacy policies, as well as taking
security measures and describing them in the security documentation. This also needs to
be taken into account in the legal information provided to the data subject on the website,
in defining lists of personal data that are being processed, or in fulfilling other regulatory
obligations. Alternatively, it will be necessary to mask (anonymise) the IP address so that
it cannot be considered personal information.
Question 6
Yes, some legislativemeasures– albeit not comprehensive–were taken to restrict automated
individual decision-making, which includes profiling. Companies are required to inform
data subjects about the use of profiling and how to object to profiling. Data subjects have
the right not to be subject to a decision.
Profiling and automated decision-making are used in an increasing number of sectors
in Slovakia, both in the public and the private realm. To help decision-making, profiling
is used in healthcare, taxation, banking, finance andmarketing – amongmany other areas.
Advancements in technology and artificial intelligence have made it easier to make
automated decisions with the potential to impact the rights and freedoms of individuals.
While automated decision-making has many commercial applications, and can result in
increased efficiency and resource saving, it can pose significant risks when it comes to
15 The 30 steps of compliance with the new legislation on personal data protection published by the Office
for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic.
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individual rights and freedoms, so the Slovak legislator is very clear about the need to use
appropriate safeguards.
While Slovakia actively works on Artificial Intelligence strategies, to this date the
government has not introduced a comprehensive document regulating the transparency
and accountability of automated decision making. We have not found any examples of
ethical frameworks being introduced andwhile the current legislation does introduce some
safeguard measures on automated decision making, the current legal framework does not
comprehensively describe the rights and obligations of citizens in this regard.
Algorithms used in software created for automated decision making are not subject to
transparency and access to the algorithms or the source code which includes them is not
possible, this is mostly due to copyright or security reasons. As an example, I would like
to mention the Judiciary Council in Slovakia, using a tool for the random allocation of
judges. In this case the software and the source code are owned by a third-party external
company. While the security reasoning might be considered as valid, we must note that
there are no external and independent audits set in place to monitor the fairness or the
accuracy of the algorithmic operations.
Besides the lack of external audits, we have also not detected a single institution that
would oversee or even possess comprehensive knowledge on which automated
decision-making systems exist in Slovakia, meaning there is no public institution which
is directly responsible for implementing policies and standards regarding algorithms used
in automated decision-making in the public sector. The government should introduce
ethical guidelines and legal policies to make sure that the system of algorithms is synergic.
Obligatory audits should be performed by external independent entities.
The currently existing legal provisions together with the old-fashioned public
administration system are not sufficiently responding to challenges connected with
automated decision-making and profiling. The legal framework should describe the
definition of automated decision making and profiling, keeping in mind the complex
nature of these terms. Another key aspect that should be included in the legal framework
is the guidelines on transparency of the source code of algorithms. Public institutions using
algorithms in automated decision-making currently have no information on how these
algorithms work, what data is processed and what factors are taken into account.
Question 7
Oneof themost striking additions introduced in the newGDPR, is the far stronger emphasis
on the rights of the data subject, which includes the right to erasure (also known as ‘the
right to be forgotten’). A data subject can ask that their data be deleted in certain
circumstances. This right is not absolute, it only arises in quite a narrow set of
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circumstances. These circumstances are relatively limited, for examplewhere the processing
is based on consent, that consent is withdrawn and there are no other grounds for
processing. Even where the right does arise, there are range of exemptions, for example
where there is a legal obligation to retain the data. This means the right to erasure not only
requires institutions tomanage and control the purpose and consent of processing personal
data for every individual, but it also contains provisions specifically referencing other
regulations, which may overrule the right to be forgotten. It should also be noted that this
right requires controllers to compare the subjects’ rights to “the public interest in the
availability of the data” when considering such requests.16
The Slovak legal framework recognizes the right to erasure, especially in cases in which
the personal data is no longer necessary for the purpose which it was originally collected
or processed for; the lawful basis for holding the data was a consent – which has been
withdrawn by the individual; the personal data was being processed for direct marketing
purposes and the data subject objects to that processing; the personal data was processed
unlawfully. Slovak legislation has specific provisions to protect the personal data of children.
The right to erasure exists when the personal data processed was to offer information
society services to a child. There is an emphasis on the right to have personal data erased
if the request relates to data collected from children. This reflects the enhanced protection
of children’s information, especially in online environments. Therefore, if data collected
from children is processed, particular weight should be given to any request for erasure if
the processing of the data is based upon consent given by a child – especially any processing
of their personal data on the internet. This is still the case when the data subject is no longer
a child, because a childmay not have been fully aware of the risks involved in the processing
at the time of consent. There are no legal provisions outlining how to make a valid request
for erasure. Therefore, an individual can make a request for erasure verbally or in writing.
When it comes to the reality however, to date, there have not been many cases at a
national level post-GDPR. The cases to date have mostly involved search engine results
but it is important to remember that the GDPR right to erasure is not limited to online
information, nor to search engine results. It is also worth noting that data protection law
is unlikely to be the only issue in right to be forgotten cases.
We can conclude that the rights and obligations stated in article 17 GDPR correspond
to the provisions of the national legislation. However, an additional condition is that data
subjects rights may be restricted on grounds of Slovak public policy or economic
mobilization.
16 Article 17(3) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural personswith regard to the processing of personal data and on the freemovement




Yes, the new Data Protection Act of 2018 stipulates in article 78 that personal information
may be processed without a data subject’s consent for journalistic, academic, artistic and
literary purposes. However, such processing must not breach a data subject’s right to
personality protection andprivacy. According to article 78(1)ActNo. 18/2018 the controller
shall process personal data without the consent of the data subject, if the processing of
personal data is necessary for academic purposes, for artistic purposes or for literary
purposes; this does not apply if the processing of personal data violates the right of the
data subject to protect his personality or the right to privacy or the processing of personal
data without the consent of the data subject is excluded by a special law. Section (2) of the
same act outlines processing personal data for the purposes of informing the public. The
controller may process personal data without consent of data subject where this processing
is necessary to inform the public by mass media means and where the personal data are
processed by a controller based on its field of activity; this shall not apply where controller,
by processing for that purpose, violates the right of data subject to the protection of his or
her person or the right to privacy, or where such processingwithout consent of data subject
is excluded by a special regulation or an international treaty binding upon the Slovak
Republic.
The provisions above have more depth than it might seem at first glance. Article 85
includes an obligation of balancing the freedom of expression as well as the freedom of
information. This balancing must be done by legislative measures. This is exactly how it
was created in the national legislation but reconciling the freedom of expression with the
right to privacy is proving to be a difficult task in reality.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic was established on
1 September 2002 on the basis of Act No. 428/2002 Coll. on the protection of personal
data. The establishment of theOffice as a state administration bodywas conditionedmainly
by the need for the existence of an institution with investigative and intervention powers
in this field, which results from legally binding acts of international law. Another important
attribute of the establishment of the Office is its independence from individual public
administration bodies. In order for the Office to carry out its tasks as efficiently as possible,
without undue influence from political or other entities, it is necessary to ensure the full
independence of the Office in the performance of its activities. This requirement stems
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from the ever-increasing pace of social and technological changes that have significantly
influenced theway inwhich the processing and transmission of increasingly large amounts
of personal data is conducted. Any natural or legal person shall have the right to apply to
the Office in the event of uncertainty arising from the application of the legal provisions
concerning the protection of personal data or from suspected breaches of his rights in the
processing of his personal data.
The scope of powers and list of activities have changed throughout the years as the
relevant legislationwent through various stages of evolution. Currently, in the post-GDPR
realm the Office is a state administration body with national jurisdiction over the territory
of the Slovak Republic, that participates in the protection of fundamental rights of natural
persons in relation to the processing of personal data and executes data protection
supervision, including supervision of personal data protection by competent authorities
for the performance of the task for the purposes of criminal proceedings. TheOffice, when
exercising its jurisdiction, acts independently and is governed byConstitution of the Slovak
Republic, constitutional acts, acts, other generally binding legal regulations and international
treaties binding upon the Slovak Republic. The headquarters of the Office are in Bratislava.
The Office is a budgetary organisation.
The Office is headed by the president, who is elected and recalled by the National
Council of the Slovak Republic upon proposal of the Government of the Slovak Republic.
The term of office of the president is five years. The current president of the Office is Ms
Soňa Pőtheová, who was elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 14th
May 2015. The president of the Office shall be represented by the vice-president of the
Office, who shall be elected and recalled by the Government of Slovak Republic upon
proposal by the president of the Office. The function term of office of the vice-president
is five years. The vice-president isMsAnnaVitteková, whowas elected by theGovernment
of Slovak Republic on 2nd December 2015 and with effect from 2nd January 2016.
The main tasks of the Office include:
1. Monitoring the implementation of the Data Protection Act;
2. Commenting on drafts of Acts and drafts of generally binding regulations governing
the processing of personal data;
3. Providing consultation in the area of the protection of personal data;
4. Providing methodological guidelines on personal data processing to controllers and
processors;
5. Promoting public awareness, in particular on risks and rights in relation to the
processing of personal data;
6. Upon request, providing information to any data subject concerning the exercise of
its rights under this Act and cooperatingwith supervisory authorities of otherMember
States for this purpose;
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7. Verifying the lawfulness of processing of personal data by the competent authorities
in exercising rights by a data subject pursuant to section 63 paragraph 5 and informing
the data subject about the results of the verification within 30 days of the date of
submission of the request for verification, or of the reasons why the verification was
not carried out, and of the possibility to exercise the data subject’s right to lodge a
complaint to initiate proceedings pursuant to section 100 and for other types of legal
protection pursuant to a specific regulation;
8. Monitoring development, in particular the development of information and
communication technologies and commercial practices if they have any impact on the
protection of personal data;
9. Cooperating with the European Data Protection Board in the area of personal data
protection;
10. Submitting an annual report to the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the
state of the protection of personal data at least once a year; the report on the state of
personal data protection is published by the Office on its website and it is provided to
the European Data Protection Board and to the Commission;
11. Cooperatingwith supervisory authorities of othermember states, including the exchange
of information, and providing themwithmutual assistance in order to ensure a common
approach to the protection of personal data under this Act and the special regulation.
To perform the aforementioned tasks, the Office is authorized
– to order the controller and the processor, or the representative of the controller or the
processor if so authorised, to provide information essential for performance of its tasks;
– to obtain from the controller and the processor access to personal data and information
that are necessary for the performance of its tasks; the provision of secrecy pursuant
to special regulations remains unaffected;
– to enter the premises of the controller and the processor, as well as any equipment and
means for processing personal data, to the extent necessary for the performance of his
tasks, unless permission is required under a special regulation;
– to issue warnings to a controller or processor that intended processing operations are
likely to infringe provisions adopted pursuant to this Act or special regulations;
– to impose measures for liability, a fine pursuant to section 104 or an administrative
fine pursuant to section 105 if the controller, processor,monitoring body or certification
body infringes the provisions of this Act or special regulations;
– to order the controller or the processor to comply with the data subject’s requests to
exercise his or her rights pursuant to this Act or special regulations;
– to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into compliance in




– to order the controller to communicate a personal data breach to the data subject;
– to impose a temporary restriction or definitive restriction of personal data processing;
– to ask the controller or processor to give an explanation in case of suspicion of an
infringement of an obligation under this Act, a special regulation or an international
treaty binding upon by the Slovak Republic;
– to recommend the controller or processor to adoptmeasures for ensuring the protection
of personal data in the filing systems;
– to order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or an international
organisation.
Question 10
In Slovak legislation a complaint under the Act No. 9/2010 Coll. is considered to be a filing
of a natural person or a legal person (complainant) seeking protection of his/her/its rights
or legally protected interests he/she/it considers to have been infringed by the activity or
inaction of a public authority, or pointing to specific deficiencies particularly infringements,
the removal of which falls within the competence of the public authority.
The complaint shall be submitted:
– in writing, i.e. in a paper form;
– electronically with an authorization under a special regulation or sent through an access
point that requires a successful authentication of the complainant; complaints made
electronically without an authorization under the special regulation or sent not through
an access point that requires a successful authentication of the complainant shall be
confirmed within five working days by the complainant’s own signature, by
authorization under the special regulation or by sending the complaint through an
access point that requires a successful authentication of the complainant.
According to the sec. 5 para. 2 and para. 3 of the Act No. 9/2010 Coll. the complaint shall
contain:
– name, surname and residence address of the complainant or name, seat and name and
surname of a person authorized to act on behalf of the complainant, if the complainant
is a legal person;
– identification of the entity against which the complaint is addressed;
– indication of deficiencies referred to by the complainant;
– indication of claims of the complainant.
The Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic shall handle the complaint
within 60 working days. In cases the complaint is difficult to review, this period shall be
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extended with a maximum of 30 days. The Office shall notify the complainant about the
extension in writing. The complaint shall be deemed to have been settled by sending a
written notification of the outcome of its review to the complainant.
According to the sec. 6 of the Act No. 9/2010 Coll. the Office shall postpone the
complaint if:
– the complaint does not contain the required particulars;
– the subject of the complaint is or was reviewed by a court, law enforcement authority
or is reviewed by another administrative authority;
– the complaint concerns a person different from the one who submitted it and an
authorization is not enclosed;
– more than five years have passed from the event that is subject of the complaint as of
the day when the complaint was delivered;
– the complaint is another repeated complaint;
– the complainant withdraws his/her/its complaint in writing or does not insist on its
handling before the complaint is settled.
Question 11
In 2018 the Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic has received 287
complaints, and as a result the Office lawfully imposed 38 fines totaling 132,600 euro for
breaching personal data protection legislation. The average fine was 3,489 euro. The Office
imposed the lowest fine of 500 euro for non-cooperation. The highest fine imposed was
in the amount of 40,000 euro for a breach of the security of personal data processing.
Besides the standard requirements of theGDPR, the Slovak legislation has implemented
additional sanctions, and it also empowers the Office to impose a fine of up to € 2,000 on
personswho are not the controller or the processor for failure to cooperate with theOffice.
The Office may also fine the controller or the processor if they fail to ensure adequate
conditions for the exercise of official controls under article 94 of the SlovakData Protection
Act.
The Slovak Data Protection Act recognizes only financial sanctions; however the
Criminal Code sets out a criminal offence for the unlawful processing of personal data
which was obtained under an obligation of confidentiality (punishable with up to 2 years
of imprisonment).
Question 12
The concept of damages is not concisely defined in Act no. 40/1964 Coll The Civil Code
as amended. This term has always been defined in several different ways. The broadest
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notion of damages is: “(…) any harm which has been caused to someone or property
(property or rights), except in the case of intangible harm.”17
The scope for defining the concept of damages is greatly left to judicial practice. At
present, the perception of damages in the narrower sense prevails, namely based on the
judicial interpretation of article 422 of the Civil Code the courts acknowledge “any harm
that occurred to the property of the injured party that is objectively expressible by the
general equivalent, and is therefore remedied by the granting of property, in particular by
the granting of money, unless there is a natural restitution.”18
Slovak legislation has not historically awarded damages for intangible harm; any cases
that might seem as compensation for intangible harm suffered, were in fact pecuniary
damages only for the quantifiable monetary harm – cases of health injury for example do
not include a pain and suffering, or a mental anguish component, damages are only paid
to the amount of proven monetary harm – i.e. loss of earnings, medical costs.
Question 13
Article 80 of the GDPR introduces a collective action mechanism whereby not-for-profit
bodies dedicated to personal data protection can initiate claims on behalf of data subjects
whom allege their rights have been infringed. In theory, this provision should enhance the
protection the GDPR affords to data subjects by giving authorised associations in each
Member State the power to consolidate claims and represent them on a larger scale. The
article has beenwelcomed by privacy campaigners in Slovakia. The reality is not as clear-cut
as it might have seemed at first glance. Whilst the GDPR provides that data subjects “shall
have the right to” initiate actions, it does not actually provide them with any actionable
tool or procedural framework to kick-start the process.19 It has left that particular task up
to the individual Member States. As an EU Regulation, the GDPR has direct effect, and
does not generally require transposition into Slovak law. Certain provisions give Member
States flexibility however, and in Slovakia, the Data Protection Act 2018 legislates for the
Slovak position in those areas. Article 80 is such a provision, the result being that the
implementation of the class action mechanism is almost entirely at the discretion of the
national legislature. The provision has mandatory and discretionary parts. In practical
terms, the implementation of article 80 into Slovak legislation happened by publishing a
set of guidelines providing amechanism for data subjects to authorise third parties tomake
a complaint on their behalf. While NGOs, various organisations or associations have the
right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority, it can only happen at the data
17 Act No. 40/1964 Coll. The Civil Code as amended.
18 Art. 422(1) of act No. 40/1964 Coll. The Civil Code as amended.
19 Art. 79(1) GDPR.
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subject’s instructions. The full impact of article 80 remains to be seen, but permitting
qualified organisations and NGOs to initiate claims on behalf of data subjects with their
mandate should now give ordinary litigants recourse to seek redress in circumstances
where they would otherwise not have had the resources to do so.
Question 14
No, this trend is not yet visible in Slovakia. The only body acting on data processing related
complaints is the NSA – The Office for Personal Data Protection of the Slovak Republic.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
The only act relevant in this case would be Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll. on State
Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and State of Crisis. This
Constitutional Act created legislative conditions for guaranteeing state security. According
to the level and nature of threat or disturbance of the state security and on the basis of
conditions laid down by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and by this constitutional
act, constitutional bodies can declare war, state of war, state of emergency or state of crisis
in order to solve the crisis situation. There are also defined conditions and a scope of
restriction of fundamental rights and liberties, as well as the extent of responsibilities at
the time of the state of crisis. The constitutional act lays down also the method of
performance of public authority at the time of war, state of war and state of emergency.
The act itself does not define “national security” or even “state security”. It does provide
definition to amuch broader term – security, and then goes on tomention the termnational
security in the ensuing articles.
Prior to April 2015, the Slovak data retention regime required providers of electronic
communications to store indiscriminate traffic, localization data and data about the
communicating parties, including unsuccessful calls, for a period of 6 months in the case
of internet, email or VoIP communications or for a period of 12 months for other means
of communication. In April 2015, the Grand Chamber of the Constitutional Court (PL.
ÚS 10/2014)20 effectively invalidated Slovakia’s existing data retention regime, giving effect
20 Constitutional Court of the Slovak republic, Decision PL. ÚS 10/2014-78.
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to Digital Rights Ireland.21 The Constitutional Court proclaimed22 provisions § 58(5) to
(7) and § 63(6) of the Electronic Communications Act (Act No. 351/2011 Coll.), which
until now required mobile network providers to track the communication of their users,
as well as provisions of § 116 of the Penal Code (Act No. 301/2005 Coll.) and § 76(3) of
the Police Force Act (Act No. 171/1993 Coll.), which allowed access to this data, to be in
contradiction to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens to privacy and personal
data. As a consequence, these provisions lost their binding effect.
Following the Constitutional Court’s 2015 decision, the government prepared a draft
act that aims to enhance control over the data retention process and clearly details the
situations in which data can be retained, stored and requested by state bodies. Specifically,
the proposed law permits this only for themost serious crimes, such as terrorismor threats
to the integrity of the country.
The new legislation is not in force yet. Under the current regime which consists of the
parts of the old regime not invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s ruling, traffic and
location data must be destroyed or anonymized immediately after any communication
has been finished. An exception to this is the retention of data that is necessary for invoicing
a customer, however even this data can be stored only for the extent and duration justified
by the practice of invoicing. Data retention, still regulated under the prior regime, is now
only allowed if approved by a court order.
21 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and
Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.




Nina Pekolj and Marjan Antončič*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
At the time of submission of this report, Slovenia has not yet adopted a law to support or
enable the implementation of theGeneralData ProtectionRegulation (hereinafter “GDPR”).
The 2004 Personal Data Protection Act (Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov, hereinafter
“ZVOP-1”) is formally still in force, being the third law governing personal data protection
in Slovenia since 1990.1
With a single law, the new, fourth PersonalData ProtectionAct (hereinafter “ZVOP-2”),
theMinistry of Justice, which is competent for the field of personal data protection, decided:
– To ensure the implementation of the GDPR provisions by defining, within the limits
of theGDPR authorisation clauses, the national specifics of the personal data protection
regime, thus preserving as much as possible the present high level of personal data
protection in the Republic of Slovenia and the exercise of the human right to the
protection of personal data (Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia);2
and
– To ensure the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/6803 into the legal order of the
Republic of Slovenia, with the same goals.
* Nina Pekolj: Director of the Slovenian Agency for Data Protection Law, Slovenia. Marjan Antončič: Repre-
sentative of the Slovenian Association for Electronic Identification and Electronic Trust Services.
1 The first Personal Data Protection Act of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted on 7 March 1990 (Official
Gazette of theRepublic of Slovenia,Nos. 8/90, 19/91 and 59/99–ZVOP), the secondPersonalData Protection
Act was adopted on 8 July 1999 (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 59/99, 57/01, 59/01 – corr., 73/04 – ZUP-C and
86/04 – ZVOP), and the third Personal Data Protection Act on 15 July 2004 (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 86/04,
113/05 – ZInfP, 51/07 – ZUstS-A, 67/07 and 94/07 – official consolidated text; ZVOP-1).
2 “The protection of personal data shall be guaranteed. The use of personal data contrary to the purpose for
which it was collected is prohibited.
The collection, processing, designated use, supervision, and protection of the confidentiality of personal data
shall be provided by law.
Everyone has the right of access to the collected personal data that relates to him and the right to judicial
protection in the event of any abuse of such data.”
3 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
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Question 2
Both rights were dealt with by the 2004 ZVOP-1, which provided in article 1: “This act
shall establish rights, obligations, principles and measures to prevent the unconstitutional,
illegal and unjustified interference with the privacy and dignity of an individual in the
processing of personal data.” The same approach is maintained by the draft ZVOP-2.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
ZVOP-1 is based on three principles of personal data protection: the principle of legality
and fairness (article 2), the principle of proportionality (article 3) and the prohibition of
discrimination (article 4).
Under article 2 of the ZVOP-1, the principle of fairness is a kind of general clause4
requiring the bona fide and, above all, non-deceptive behaviour of data controllers. The
breach of this principle has most often been detected by the national supervisory authority
(i.e. the Information Commissioner) in situations where the controllers of personal data
record the purpose(s) of the processing of personal data vaguely or in a way that allows
for broad interpretation5 (e.g., vaguely or incompletely written consent forms for the
processing of personal data or ambiguous general terms and conditions of the controller6).
Such actions by the controller may cause the individual to be mistaken in the belief that
his or her personal data will be processed only for a specific purpose, but not for any other
purpose, which constitutes an infringement of the provisions of the ZVOP-1, for which
fines and reprimand are imposed.
On the other hand, the principles of purpose limitation and dataminimisationwere
most commonly and narrowly interpreted by a national court (i.e. the Administrative
Court; for instance, in the case of video surveillance in the home for older adults in 20157).
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
4 N. Pirc Musar et al, Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov s komentarjem [Personal Data Protection Act – A
Commentary], Ljubljana, GV Založba 2006, p. 43.
5 Ibid, p. 43.
6 Information Commissioner, Opinion no. 092-4/2006/347, 15 June 2006.
7 The Administrative Court Judgment II U 195/2014 of 21 January 2015.
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The principle of proportionality has been interpreted frequently by national courts,
both by theAdministrative Court8 as well as theConstitutional Court. In several decisions,
the latter has already decided on possible excessive interference with human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and to this end has formulated, through its case law, the so-called
strict proportionality test. This test involves assessing three aspects of the interference: a
test of appropriateness, a test of necessity, and a test of proportionality in the narrow sense.
Only if the interference passes all three aspects of the test can it be declared constitutionally
permissible. One of the more notable cases was the Constitutional Court’s decision,9 in
which it assessed the admissibility of the public disclosure of personal data in relation to
past due and unpaid tax liability.
Although ZVOP-1 does not directly regulate the data minimisation principle, the
latter was also respected in the case law. The Administrative Court repeatedly assessed the
admissibility of the creation of new personal data filing systems based on personal data
(lawfully) obtained fromvarious publicly available official records (i.e. the business register).
In doing so, it always stated that the fact that certain personal data in a particular personal
data filing system are public does not mean that it is permitted for such personal data,
together with personal data from other publicly available personal data filing systems and
personal data from other publicly available sources, without explicit legal basis, are
combined or used to create andmaintain a new filing system that is, as such,made available
to other users.10
Question 4
Still valid ZVOP-1 (mutatis mutandis maintained by the draft ZVOP-211) separates the
legal bases for processing personal data in the public sector from the legal bases in the
private sector. Legislative provisions imply stricter rules for the processing of personal
data by the public sector than the private sector since the legal bases are narrower.12 The
public sector must have a basis in law for any processing of personal data, and the
processing of personal data based on personal consent or contract or for the exercise of
legitimate powers, tasks or obligations of the public sector is permissible only exceptionally.
Under the opinion of the Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia,13 it is
8 The Administrative Court Judgment I U 213/2016-16 of 17 May 2017.
9 The Constitutional Court Decision U-I-122/13 of 10 March 2016.
10 The Administrative Court Judgments I U 817/2016 of 6 March 2017 and U 2477/2005 of 10 October 2007.
11 Government of the Republic of Slovenia, EVA Proposal: 2018-2030-0045, Personal Data Protection Act,
6 March 2019.
12 Pirc Musar et al, 2006, p. 89.
13 Information Commissioner, Opinion No. 061-15/2005 of 13 January 2006.
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also necessary to emphasise that pursuant to article 38(2) of the Slovenian Constitution,
the “basis in the law” may be considered exclusively law, excluding by-laws.
Unlike the public sector, the processing of personal data in the private sector is most
often performed based on consent, and it is also permissible for the controller’s (from the
private sector) legitimate interests to the extent that they clearly outweigh the interests
of the data subject. In doing so, the Administrative Court interprets the legal standard
“clearly” in such a way that they must be evident as such prima facie, without a detailed
or in-depth weighing14. In the assessment of “legitimate interests”, the Administrative
Court, as a rule, referred to the more familiar test of proportionality, the content of which
was clearly defined by the Constitutional Court. Thus, with reference to Opinion no.
06/2014 of theArticle 29Data ProtectionWorking Party, relating to the notion of legitimate
interests of the data controller, Administrative Court in its decision of 201615 decided that
when applying the test of legitimate interests, it is necessary to assess:
1. The nature and source of the legitimate interests of the controller or persons to whom
personal data have been provided; and
2. Whether processing is indispensable to the pursuit of those interests; and
3. The impact of such processing on the data subjects.
Although the GDPR has not yet been implemented in the national legislative framework
by the time this report is being prepared, one can expect at least equally rigorous data
protection arrangements requirement in the digital sphere. Already according to the old
ZVOP-1, one should not deviate from the already established strict interpretation of the
general fundamental principles of the law on personal data protection, despite the pressures
and advances in information technology, which accelerates the processing of personal data
of all types of activities. Only by restrictively interpreting the provisions of the ZVOP can
we protect an individual from personal data abuse. As one can read in the commentary of
the still valid ZVOP-1:
“One has to bemindful of the fact that information technology can conceal pitfalls
that make it impossible for an individual to control all processing of personal
data through his or her consent.”16
Attention should also be drawn to the fact that, as an individual, the consumer cannot
bring action against the recipient of a personal data (company) for its alleged unlawful
conduct in a civil procedure at contractual level, since the control of respect for the law
14 The Administrative Court Judgment I U 1538/2015 of 7 July 2016.
15 Ibid.
16 Pirc Musar et al, 2006, pp. 89–90.
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on the protection of personal data is left to the competent administrative authorities. Thus,
the individual is left with only the possibility of enforcing contractual and compensation
mechanisms.
Question 5
The national Consumer Protection Act (Zakon o varstvu potrošnikov – ZVPot)17 regulates
consumers’ rights in the offering, selling and other marketing of goods and services by
companies, including digital content stored on durablemedia. In addition, some provisions
of the ZVPot also apply to contracts for the supply of digital content, which are not recorded
on a tangible medium and are concluded at a distance or outside business premises. In
practice, the latter can also have direct effects in the field of personal data protection or
the right to privacy, even if the ZVPot does not cover the supply of personal data as a
counter-charge (the so-called “purchase price”).
As an example, the limitation of the right of withdrawal per Article 43č of the ZVPot
is highlighted. Under article 43č of the ZVPot, the consumer has the possibility within 14
days from the date of conclusion of the contract to inform the company that he or she is
withdrawing from the contract. Upon expiry of this period, unless otherwise expressly
provided by the contract, the consumer loses this right. The only condition required by
law to do so is the consumer’s prior knowledge that, by entering into a contract, he loses
the right to withdraw from the contract. However, the law does not stipulate that such
consent must be provided actively. It is sufficient to include such provisions in the general,
commercial conditions of business of the company, to which consumers do not pay
attention in practice. However, in the opposite case, if the consumer would have been
clearly and unequivocally aware, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, that by
consent or by entering into a contract it loses the right of withdrawal, such a provision in
a contract for the supply of digital content in exchange for the provision of personal data
may constitute a violation of the fundamental principle of legality of the processing of
personal data, since it is inherently contrary to the concept of free consent.
In one of its opinions18, the Information Commissioner also expressed its position on
specific aspects of digital content supply contracts. In the preliminary findings summarised
below, the Information Commissioner thus stated that the actual aim of the latter is to
17 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 98/04 – official consolidated text.
18 Information Commissioner, Mnenje glede predloga Direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o nekaterih
vidikih pogodb o dobavi digitalnih vsebin, COM (2015) 634 final [Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of digital content supply contracts, COM
(2015) 634 final], 18 April 2017, www.ip-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/pripombe/MP_mnenje_o_
predlogu_Direktive_o_nekaterih_vidikih_pogodb_o_dobavi_digitalnih_vsebin.pdf. All webpages referred
to were visited on 23 August 2019.
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legitimise the situation where an individual for the supply of a particular digital service,
as a contrary fulfilment, actively provides more personal data than would be reasonably
necessary to perform the contract. This essentially constitutes consent as the legal basis
for the processing of personal data, while not all elements of the consent concept are
respected. Consent is considered valid, among other things19 given freely, so that the
individual has the ability to influence what personal data he or she will provide and for
what purpose the personal data will be processed (the so-called granularity or breakdown
of the consent20), and not the other way around, as a “take it or leave it” package – a typical
situation in delivering digital content.
For this reason, the Information Commissioner addressed to the Ministry of Justice
to unambiguously define the legal basis in terms of the GDPR in the case of contrary
fulfilment of the consumer for the supply of digital content by providing his or her personal
data, and at the same time, to avoid the ambiguity and legal uncertainty by creating new
bases and conditions for the processing of personal data or new terms (such as “other
data”, “active” provision of personal data, etc.), which do not exist within the data protection
framework because this could result in a lower level of protection than the GDPR provides.
Question 6
The ZVOP-1 already contained provisions that conditionally allowed automated
decision-making. Under article 15 of the ZVOP-1, automated decision-making that results
in legal effects for an individual or significantly affects her is permissible provided that the
decision ismade during the conclusion or performance of the contract or if it is so provided
by a statute, which also includes measures to protect the legitimate interests of the data
subject (in particular, the possibility of a legal remedy against such a decision).
Article 44 of the draft ZVOP-221 provides for the automatic processing of personal
data, including the creation of profiles, subject to the fact that such processing is expressly
stipulated by law laying downmeasures for the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and legitimate interests of the individual, such as the right to personal intervention
by the controller, to freedomof communication and to challenge the decision. Additionally,
the draft ZVOP-2 also provides for a data protection impact assessment preliminary
measure, but it is not entirely clear whether such impact assessment is required whenever
19 Other conditions introduced by the concept of consent are: the individual expresses it with an active action,
it is given in advance and the individual has the option of withdrawing the consent.
20 Information Commissioner, Consent, www.ip-rs.si/legislation/reforma-european-legislative-framework-
for-security-private-data/key-area-ordered/acceptance/#c1929.
21 Government of the RS, EVA proposal: 2018-2030-0045, Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov, 6 March 2019,
www.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/mp.gov.si/pageuploads/Mandat_2018-2022/Zakonodaja/ZVOP-2_6.3.19_splet.pdf.
548
Nina Pekolj and Marjan Antončič
automated decision-making procedures are introduced, or only in the case of processing
specific types of personal data or even if there is a risk of discrimination22. The explanatory
note to the draft ZVOP-2 reasons that:
“The focus of the impact assessmentmeans that such assessmentmust also include
an impact assessment on related human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
particular on non-discrimination, but also on freedom of movement, universal
privacy, dignity, communication privacy, etc.”
One can assume that the same provision will mutatis mutandis apply also to automated
decision-making and processing of personal data in the case of crime prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution.
Question 7
The valid ZVOP-1 distinguishes between the right of an individual to erase personal data
under article 32(1) in cases where the individual proves that his or her personal data were
collected or processed in breach of the law and between the right to request the termination
of processing in cases where the latter is implemented without a proper legal basis. The
individual exercises his or her right to erase the personal data, as well as the right to
complete, correct and block, by request, which should be addressed to the data controller.
The burden of proof that personal data is incomplete, inaccurate, not up-to-date, or
collected or processed in violation of the law, lies with the individual.
However, the right to request the termination of the processing of personal data by
complaint may only be invoked against the controller of the personal data where the
controller from the public or private sector has no legal basis for the processing of personal
data in the following cases:
– In the public sector: when the controller processes the personal data of an individual
for the exercise of legitimate powers, tasks or obligations, but through this processing
interferes with the legitimate interest of the data subject (infringement of article 9(4)
of ZVOP-1);
– In the private sector: when the controller processes the personal data of an individual
because it is necessary for the pursuit of the legitimate interests of the private sector,
22 InformationCommissioner,Predlog novegaZakona o varstvu osebnih podatkov (ZVOP-2) [Draft newPersonal





but these interests (obviously) do not outweigh the interests of the data subjects
(infringement of article 10(3) of ZVOP-1).
It is also worth highlighting the differences in the enforcement of judicial protection.
Pursuant to article 34 of the valid ZVOP-1, the following distinction applies23:
– If an individual seeks judicial protection because his or her rights have been infringed
(and the infringement has not yet ceased), such protection shall be provided by the
court in the administrative dispute procedure;
– If an individual seeks judicial protection when the infringement has already ceased,
then, as a rule, he or she shall assert his or her rights in civil litigation (e.g. a claim for
damages) and only exceptionally in an administrative dispute (e.g. a declaratory claim
for the existence of the infringement).
However, without any distinction, both the administrative dispute and the civil procedure
are considered urgent and priority, which in practice means as soon as possible, since a
judicial protection of fundamental human rights as guaranteed by the Constitution is at
stake.24
According to theMinistry of Justice’s systematic explanations,25 which are non-binding
but clearly indicate which provisions of the ZVOP-1 are still (meaningfully) applicable
from the date of entry into force and direct application of the GDPR and, in accordance
with the opinion of the Information Commissioner, presented below, new legislation may
be expected, which will implement the GDPR into national law, the right to erasure or
regulate the right to cease processing of personal data differently. The systematic
explanations indicate that provisions mentioned above are no longer applicable, except
for the provisions on the judicial protection of individual rights.
Recently, the Information Commissioner also issued an opinion, taking into account
the GDPR provisions,26 explaining that the right to the erasure of personal data is justified
only in caseswhere there is no legal basis for the processing of personal data. If the controller
processes personal data lawfully or for the performance of a task in the public interest or
for the exercise of public authority that has been assigned to the controller or needs personal
data to exercise the right to freedom of expression and information, or if there is a legal
23 N. Pirc Musar et al, 2006, p. 270.
24 Ibid, p. 272.
25 Ministry of Justice, Prva sistemska pojasnila Ministrstva za pravosodje ob začetku razvoja uporabe nove
evropske zakonodaje o varstvu osebnih podatkov, prva inačica [The first systemic explanations by theMinistry
of Justice commencing the developement of the application of the new European legislation on personal data
protection, version one], 28 May 2018, www.mp.gov.si/en/media_center/news/7568/.
26 Information Commissioner, Umik zaključnega dela [Withdrawal of Final Work], No. 0712-1/2019/1534,
GDPROpinion Search Engine, 24 June 2019, www.ip-rs.si/vop/?tx_jzgdprdecisions_pi1%5BshowUid%5D
=703.
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basis for the processing of personal data, then erasure cannot be justified. In such a case,
the conditions and retention periods laid downby the legislation for individual documentary
material must be respected. In accordance with Article 17 of the GDPR, the Information
Commissioner has taken the view that the right to erasure is not absolute27 and that prior
to any request for erasure, the controller must thoroughly verify that the erasure is justified
and, consequently, whether erasure of personal data is a valid act of the controller. If the
controller determines that a basis for data retention no longer exists, the request for erasure
must be granted, since the content of the data may no longer be retained, but evidence of
deletion without the content of the data may be retained.
Question 8
In Slovenian national law, the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression and
information are human rights, which are in conflict in the weighing of interests and are
thus restrictively interferedwith28. Those two rightsmentioned above are not absolute and
are not unlimited. A proper boundary between the two must be found following the
constitutional principle of proportionality.29
The right to freedomof expression ismultifaceted and includes, in addition to the right
to disseminate, the right to receive opinions and information. Freedom of expression is
one of the underlying conditions for the functioning of democratic rule since in a
democratic society, it is necessary to allow the circulation of information and opinions.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia stated in one of its decisions
(Up-106/01) that the right to freedom of expression helps to form an impartially informed
public, determines its ability to control all branches of government and ensures the effective
functioning of political opposition to the respective authorities. However, restrictions on
the right to freedom of expression and information are not always the same. Above all,
the position of themedia in relation to the state and to the individualmust be distinguished.
The state is in a superior position, so media rights are less restricted. Examples of
permissible restrictions are only the measures provided for by law, which are necessary in
a democratic society for the sake of the national security, the fight against terrorism, the
27 InformationCommissioner,Pravica do pozabe, Rok hrambeOP [Right to be forgotten, personal data retention
period], No. 0712-1/2019/1463, GDPR Opinions Search Engine, 14 June 2019, www.ip-rs.si/vop/?tx_
jzgdprdecisions_pi1%5BshowUid%5D=719.
28 R. Čeferin, Meje svobode tiska, Analiza sodne prakse Ustavnega sodišča Republike Slovenije in Evropskega
sodišča za človekove pravice [The Limits of Freedom of the Press, Analysis of the Case Law of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Slovenia and the European Court of Human Rights], GV Založba, Ljubljana, 2013,
p. 55.
29 Pirc Musar et al, 2006, p. 136.
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prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection of
confidential information or the protection of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.30
In contrast, media rights are more limited when it comes to the protection of the
individual. In doing so, the case law has drawn a distinction between individuals who are
“ordinary citizens” and individuals who are “public figures”. The latter are also subject to
the distinction between the absolute and relative public figures. The requirement to respect
privacy is automatically reduced in proportion to the amount of an individual’s own
entering into the public life, and their personal information is, in principle, allowed to be
published without the consent of that person. The absolute public figures are those who
are constantly under the scrutiny of the public due to their role and function in society
(e.g. politicians, entertainers and other artists, top athletes, officials, etc.). Relative public
figures are those personswho are of interest to the public only temporarily because of their
connection with a particular event (e.g. winners of various competitions or events, lot
winners, perpetrators of serious crimes and others). Information on relative public figures
is allowed to be published only when they are of interest to the public due to the event and
not later.31
Restrictions on the right to freedom of expression due to the protection of the right to
privacy are also laid down in the Media Act. According to Article 45 of the Media Act, the
media are thus not entitled to information if it would violate the confidentiality of personal
data under the law unless their publication can prevent a serious crime or imminent danger
to the lives and property of people.32 In this way, the Media Act confirms the established
case law, which was formed before it was drafted.33
On the other hand, case law has been established, according to which the right to
freedom of expression outweighs the right to privacy in the case of public interest. In its
decision No. Up-2940/07, the Constitutional Court took the view that, in all the
circumstances of the case, the journalist was entitled to disclose in the public interest the
name and surname of the suspected police station commander. The Constitutional Court
also expressed similar position in the decision Up-570/09, in which it adjudicated that a
journalist was entitled to publish the full name of a known entrepreneur, who deposited
money in his bank account in a suspicious manner, since the public has the right to be
informed of irregularities or breaches of the anti-money laundering regulations of the
bank.34
30 L.KomanPerenič, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Varstvo osebnih podatkov inmediji [InformationCommissioner,
Personal data protection andmedia], 26May 2009, www.ip-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/smernice/OP_
in_mediji.pdf.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, p. 19.
33 The Higher Court in Ljubljana Judgment II CP 476/99, 28 September 2000.
34 R. Čeferin, 2013, pp. 55–57.
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Following the latest version of the draft ZVOP-235, restrictions on the right to freedom
of expression are set in such a way that to exercise freedom of expression, it is permissible
to use, publish or otherwise disclose personal information under the following conditions:
1. If the individual has consented to the use, publication or disclosure,
2. If the individual has already disclosed or made available the personal data (exercise of
the right to information self-determination),
3. If the personal data have already been lawfully made available to the public,
4. If the personal data were obtained on the basis of the presence of the individual in
public places (e.g. public gathering) or events where, in all circumstances, the individual
cannot reasonably expect privacy protection and in amanner that does not significantly
interfere with reasonably expected privacy (reasonable expectation of privacy concept),
5. In the case of the lawful publication of an opinion or valuation, where the publication
of personal data in their context is necessary to justify the opinion or valuation,
6. If the personal data have been obtained in another lawful manner,
7. If the public interest in informing the public, the right to be informed and freedom of
expression outweighs the legitimate interests of protecting the privacy and other
personal rights of the individual, or
8. If so provided by another law (e.g. State Prosecution Service Act).
At the time of drafting this report, it was not possible to determine how and to what extent
the new legislation will regulate the subject area or how much it will deviate from the
established case law. Nor can it be stated how the new legislation will regulate the conflict
of privacy with the right to freedom of expression and information for academic, artistic
or literary expression, and not solely for journalistic purposes.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia
The national supervisory authority is called the InformationCommissioner of the Republic
of Slovenia. Its official website36 states that the InformationCommissioner is an autonomous
and independent body established on 31 December 2005 with the Information
35 Government of the RS, EVA proposal: 2018-2030-0045, Zakon o varstvu osebnih podatkov, 6 March 2019,
pp. 143–144, www.mp.gov.si/fileadmin/mp.gov.si/pageuploads/Mandat_2018-2022/Zakonodaja/ZVOP-
2_6.3.19_splet.pdf.
36 Information Commissioner, Pristojnosti [Powers], https://www.ip-rs.si/en/about/competences/.
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Commissioner Act (ZInfP). The body supervises both the protection of personal data, as
well as access to public information. The Information Commissioner has the status of an
autonomous and independent state body.
Judicial protection
There is no appeal against the decision or order issued in the inspection procedure, which
is kept as an administrative procedure with the Information Commissioner. An
administrative dispute is allowed before the Administrative Court of the Republic of
Slovenia, which is primarily intended to resolve disputes between the affected individuals
and the authorities. This is a sui generis administrative dispute pursuant to Article 34 of
ZVOP-1, which, as reasoned in one of the decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic
of Slovenia substantially represents an upgrade of protection under ZUS-1, since it provides
adequate judicial protection when it comes to the authoritative action of the authorities
in case of infringement of the rights guaranteed by the ZVOP-1. In doing so, by ZVOP-1
in conjunction with ZUS-1, the legislator provided a unique form of judicial protection
of the right to the protection of personal data (Article 38 of the Constitution), also as a
specific justification of the broader right to privacy (Article 35 of the Constitution), which
consequently excludes the need for subsidiary judicial protection of constitutional rights
pursuant to the Article 4(1) of ZUS-137.
Human Rights Ombudsman
Pursuant to Article 59 of ZVOP-1, the protection of personal data also falls within the
competence of theHumanRightsOmbudsman. TheOmbudsman, also as the Information
Commissioner RS, acts as a fully independent and autonomous body, but unlike the
Information Commissioner RS, the Ombudsman does not have any leverage for coercion
in cases where his opinions are not respected, or action upon them is not taken. The
Ombudsman also performs his duties in the field of personal data protection exclusively
in relation to state bodies, bodies of local self-governing communities and holders of public
authority. Unlike the Information Commissioner RS, as a result, the Ombudsman has no
real power to interfere with the functioning of the private sector.
Pursuant toArticle 9 of theOmbudsmanAct38, all proceedings before theOmbudsman
are informal and free of charge.
37 The Administrative Court Decision I U 808/2016 of 22 February 2017.
38 Official Gazette RS, No. 69/17 – official consolidated text.
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National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia
Pursuant to Article 61 of the ZVOP-1, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia
has a special working body for monitoring the situation in the field of personal data
protection.
Question 10
An individual who believes that the controller or someone else is violating the GDPR or
the ZVOP-1 in the part still in usemay file a complaint with the InformationCommissioner
for infringement of the right to protection of personal data. The latter initiates an inspection
procedure pursuant to the Inspection Act and performs the determination procedure and
then takes the appropriate decision. If the Information Commissioner as an inspection
body finds the infringement, in accordance with the minor offences provisions of the valid
ZVOP-1, it may also impose a sanction on the offender in the form of a fine, which is
statutory in the range depending on the gravity of the infringement.
However, if an individual believes that the infringement of his or her rights related to
the protection of personal data has occurred and that the infringement has already ceased,
he or she may file an action before the Administrative Court to establish that the
infringement existed. If an individual suffers damage due to infringement, he or she has
the opportunity to file a claim for damage with the ordinary court of general jurisdiction.
Legal action is necessary and preferential, which means that the court, both the regular
and the administrative, must complete it as quickly as possible. In the course of action,
the public is, in principle, excluded. An individual may also ask the court to impose upon
the personal data controller the suspension of any processing of the personal data in the
dispute for the time before deciding on the applicant’s action.39
Question 11
Draft Article 128 of the new ZVOP-240 determines the ways of applying the provisions of
theGDPRwith regard to administrative penalties and fines and deciding onminor offences
under this part of the Act. The draft Article is important in terms of designating a
supervisory and minor offences authority, transferring (converting) administrative fines
39 Information Commissioner, Vložitev prijave [Filing an application], www.ip-rs.si/protect-private-data/
rights-of-individual.




into minor offences and deciding on (too) strict administrative fines under the GDPR. Its
content provides legal certainty in the area of minor offences as part of criminal law.
Pursuant to draft article 76(1) ZVOP-2, the Information Commissioner must decide
on prescribed infringements and administrative fines referred to in article 83 GDPR as
minor offenceswithin the competence of theminor offences authority under the provisions
of theMinorOffences Act, unless otherwise provided by ZVOP-2. The ZVOP-2, therefore,
defines the incriminated infringements (definitions, elements thereof) from the GDPR as
minor offences within the meaning of the Minor Offences Act, and their sanctions as
sanctions for minor offences (only criminal offences and minor offences exist under
Slovenian criminal law). The draft provision also stipulates that article 17 of the Minor
Offences Act, a systematic provision of theminor offences law regarding the determination
of the range of fines by regulations of the RS, shall not apply.
It is premature to report on the rest of the draft ZVOP-2 concerning sanctions and
other consequences of infringements of the GDPR or the ZVOP-2 or other regulations
governing this area.
Question 12
Slovenian Obligations Code41 provides for the possibility of just monetary compensation
for non-pecuniary damage (article 179) for breach of personal rights. Slovenian case law
has already dealt with the cases of payment of compensation for non-pecuniary damage
for suffering mental distress, fear, the defamation of good name or reputation, and
truncation of other personality rights due to an unlawful and unauthorised processing of
personal data contrary to the purpose for which they were collected.
The Obligations Code provides in the same article:
“The amount of compensation for immaterial damage shall depend on the
importance of the good affected and the purpose of the compensation, and may
not support tendencies that are not compatible with nature and purpose thereof.”
In the assessment of the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage the legal
standard of equitablemonetary compensation shall be applied. The assessment of whether
this legal standard has been properly applied constitutes both an individual examination
41 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 97/07 – official consolidated text, 64/16 CC dec. and 20/18
– OROZ631.
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of the damages awarded for each form of damage and of the total damages awarded as well
as a comparative test taking into account known cases in the case law.42
Question 13
The draft ZVOP-2, in the article regulating the judicial protection of individual’s rights,
provides that a data subject may authorise a non-governmental organization in the field
of personal data or privacy protection in accordance with article 80(1) GDPR a
non-governmental organisation in the public interest to seek judicial protection on its
behalf in accordance with this Article. Until the GDPR came into force, the Slovenian
legislation (ZVOP-1) did not provide for such an option.
The currently valid ZVOP-1 in article 47 provides only for the possibility for the national
supervisory authority to cooperate in its work with institutions, associations and
non-governmental organisations in the field of protection of personal data or privacy and
other organisations and bodies on all issues that are important for the protection of personal
data; however, it cannot delegate powers in the part relating to judicial protection.
Pursuant to article 49 of the applicable ZVOP-1, the state supervisory authority may,
in the exercise of its competencies, as follows:
– Issue non-mandatory opinions on the compliance of codes of professional ethics,
general business conditions or their proposals with regulations in the field of personal
data protection,
– Issue non-mandatory opinions, clarifications and views on issues relating to the
protection of personal data and their publication on its website or otherwise,
– Prepare and issue non-mandatory instructions and recommendations regarding the
protection of personal data in a particular field,
Invite representatives of associations and other non-governmental organisations in the
area of personal data protection, privacy and consumers to cooperate.
Currently, there is no registered non-governmental organisation in Slovenia that would
meet the conditions set out in draft ZVOP-2. Similarly, we have not found in practice that
any non-governmental organisation with the public interest status or without such status
would have the power to provide non-mandatory opinions, instructions or
42 Thus, e.g., compensation for fear of suffering amounts to 4–5 average Slovenian net salaries; the Higher
Court in Maribor Judgment Cp 860/2018 of 12 October 2018. In the case of severe mental distress suffered
by the plaintiff as a result of unlawful and unauthorised access to information about her illness, she was
finally assessed a compensation in the amount of 6 average Slovenian net salaries; Higher Labor and Social
Court Judgment, No. VDS0006833 of 17 March 2011.
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recommendations, or otherwise have a more prominent influence on the functioning of
the Information Commissioner.
Question 14
As regards personal data protection issues, the Information Commissioner cooperates
with the Human Rights Ombudsman, also as a member of the Ombudsman’s Council.
Among the non-governmental organisations, special mention should be made to the
Consumers Association of Slovenia, which, among other things, performs numerous
activities for raising consumer awareness regarding their rights related to the processing
of personal data related to their purchases or shopping habits by merchants.
With regard to personal data breaches (Articles 33 and 34 the GDPR), the cooperation
of the InformationCommissioner with the newly establishedCybersecurity Agency, which
will act as the regulator and the inspection body in the field of information security, will
be essential43.
In addition, draft ZVOP-2 stipulates that the InformationCommissioner shall cooperate
with national authorities, the Committee, other competent authorities of the European
Union for the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, and
similar Council of Europe bodies, other international organisations, foreign data protection
supervisory authorities, institutions, associations, non-governmental organisations in the
field of personal data protection or privacy, and other organisations and bodies on issues
relevant to the protection of personal data.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
Constitutional protection of personal data without exception also applies to bodies and
agencies that are carriers of the national security system, which include internal security
bodies (e.g. police, judicial police, customs and cybersecurity agency), defence (e.g. army),
security and rescue (e.g. firefighting, civil protection) and intelligence and
counterintelligence activities44. Any restrictions on the rights of the individual related to
the processing of information about him or her must also be laid down by law for the
bodies of the national security system.
43 Information Security Act, Articles 27 and 31; Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 30/18.
44 Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia; Official Gazette of the Republic
of Slovenia, No. 27/10.
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Thus, the 2004 ZVOP-1 stipulated that an individual’s right to be informed about the
processing of his or her data, to know the purposes and content of the data being processed,
and to supplement, correct, block, erase and object, may exceptionally be restricted by
statute for reasons of protection of national sovereignty and national defence, protection
of national security and the constitutional order of the state, security, political and economic
interests of the state, the exercise of the responsibilities of the police, the prevention,
discovery, detection, proving and prosecution of criminal offences and minor offences,
the discovery and punishment of violations of ethical norms for certain professions, for
monetary, budgetary or taxation reasons, supervision of the police, and protection of the
individual to whom the personal data relate, or the rights and freedoms of others.
Restrictions could only be set to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose for which the
restriction was stipulated.
The approach to limiting the rights of the individual in draft ZVOP-2 was already
described in answer to Question 1.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia45 in the procedure for reviewing
the constitutionality of the Information Commissioner in July 2014 repealed all provisions
of the Electronic Communications Act46, which prescribed mandatory preventive and
indiscriminate storage of specific traffic data in connection with the use of
telecommunications services (telephone services in the fixed andmobile networks, Internet
access, e-mail, internet telephony), and by which the Directive 2006/24/EC was transposed
into Slovenian law. Under the aforementioned law, operators were obliged to store
information on a person’s identity, type of communication means and the time, place and
frequency of communication for 14 (telephone calls) and 8 months (internet).
The Constitutional Court emphasised that, both in terms of volume of persons and
data, it is an extremely invasive interference with the information privacy of the entire
population, and so in the absence of objective criteria for such data retention, the measure
does not meet the criterion of necessity or the criterion of proportionality in the narrow
sense. It also warned of the significant risk that unauthorised persons would be able to
access the data, or that the data would be used for illegal purposes and the sense of constant
control that such a measure produces on individuals. Unlike Directive 2006/24/EC, the
Electronic Communications Act did not restrict the compulsory retention of traffic data
to certain (serious) offences. The controversial provisions of the ElectronicCommunications
Act were repealed retroactively, so the Constitutional Court ordered the immediate
destruction of all the stored data.
45 The Constitutional Court Decision U-I-65/13-19 of 3 July 2014.




From the aforementioned decision of the Constitutional Court onwards, law
enforcement agencies have access to traffic, location and other data on the use of
telecommunication services only on the basis of a court order issued pursuant to the
Criminal Procedure Act47 if there are grounds for suspecting that it has been committed,
executed or prepared or organised a crime for which the perpetrator shall be prosecuted
ex officio and it is necessary to obtain traffic information on the electronic communications
network to detect this crime or perpetrator. Only data on telecommunication services used
by a particular individual that the operator is obliged to keep for the prescribed period for
billing for services or services may be subject to access or management of
telecommunications infrastructure.
47 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 32/12 – official consolidated text, 47/13, 87/14, 8/16 – CC
dec., 64/16 – CC dec., 65/16 – CC dec., 66/17 – ORZKP153,154 and 22/19.
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Spain
Antonio Segura Serrano and Julián Valero Torrijos*
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
The implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter “GDPR”) in
Spain has been carried out mainly through Organic Law 3/2018, 5 December, on Personal
Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights (hereinafter “LOPDGDD”).1
With regard to the regulation on administrative procedure, the legal obligation (article
89(1)(c) GDPR) about the verification of those data relevant for administrative decisions
has been reinforced and consent is no longer an appropriate basis for this purpose.
Consequently, Law 39/2015 on Administrative Procedure has been amended so that any
interested person may exercise the right to object, except if sanctioning or inspection
powers are affected. Also within the scope of the legal obligations related to article 87
GDPR, when a public body must publish an administrative act as a requirement for its
effectiveness, those concerned can only be identified by their name and surname and four
random digits of their ID number.
Concerning archiving for public interest purposes (article 89.1GDPR), the requirement
that the necessary technical and organizational measures should be adopted has resulted
in the obligation to respect those set out in the National Security Scheme (approved by
Royal Decree 4/2010) in order to comply with the level of appropriate security (article 32
GDPR).
Health data regulation has also been updated to the GDPR framework. On the one
hand, as a rule, access to medical records for judicial, epidemiological, public health,
research or teaching purposes must be carried out separating personal data from those
referred to healthcare activity, except if patient’s consent is obtained. However, some
exceptions are laid down by 17th additional provision LOPDGDD according to article 89
GDPR in order to allow research activities.
* Antonio Segura Serrano: Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Granada,
Spain. Julián Valero Torrijos: Professor of Administrative Law at the University of Murcia, Spain.
1 LOPDGDD www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2018-16673. All webpages referred to were last visited
on 27 October 2019.
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Several legal provisions have also been passed (articles 87-90 LOPDGDD) to strengthen
workers’ rights in labour environments according to article 88 GDPR: transparency
requirements have been set up, proportionality must be taken into account when
surveillancemeasures are going to be adopted and participation of workers’ representatives
is required.
However, some other areas are still under an out-of-date regulation from the perspective
of the GDPR. Even though the Organic Law of Judicial Power (hereinafter “LOPJ”) was
also modified in December 2018, that reform only affected to certain competence rules
and the use of ICT. However, an explicit reference to the 1999 data protection legislation,
adopted underDirective 95/46/EC,2 is stillmade by article 236 bis LOPJ. Therefore, although
article 23.1.f. GDPR makes it possible to justify the existence of restrictions on certain
rights and principles in this field, this authorisation to Member States is subject to basic
guarantees that are not compatible with such an updated legal framework.3
Article 23.1.d) GDPR allows some restrictions on a data subject’s rights if necessary to
safeguard the prosecution or enforcement of criminal offences and sanctions according
to Directive (EU) 2016/680,4 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.
Although LOPDGDD has stated that Organic Law 15/1999, on personal data protection
(hereinafter “LOPD”) will be in effect until then, the abovementioned Directive is directly
applicable since 6 May 2018 and, where appropriate, it will be necessary to interpret its
provisions in accordancewith EU law since it has not been adopted by Spain yet.5 Precisely,
the EU Commission has decided to refer Spain to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (hereinafter “CJEU”).6
2 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995]
OJ L281/31 (hereinafter “Directive 95/46/EC”).
3 J. Valero Torrijos, ‘La incidencia en el ámbito judicial del Reglamento General de Protección de Datos
Personales desde la perspectiva de la transformación digital’, in M.F. Gómez & M. Fernández (Ed.), Mo-
dernización digital e innovación en la Administración de Justicia, CizurMenor, ThomsonReuters-Aranzadi,
2019, pp. 110-116.
4 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and on the freemovement of such data, and repealingCouncil FrameworkDecision 2008/977/JHA
[2016] OJ L119/89.
5 J. Delgado Martín, La protección de datos personales en el proceso penal (El Derecho.com), https://
elderecho.com/la-proteccion-datos-personales-proceso-penal-directiva-2016-680.
6 European Commission Press Release 25 July 2019, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4261_en.htm.
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Question 2
Spanish law does differentiate between the right to respect for private life and the right to
data protection. However, this legal status is the end-result of a process of increasing
identification and affirmation of the autonomous right to data protection. Indeed, the
Spanish Constitution of 1978 had provided in article 18.4 for the protection of the latter
in a negative way. Therefore, originally the right to data protection was linked to the
protection of the right to respect private life,7 which was itself guaranteed in article 18.1
of theConstitution. This linkwas apparent fromOrganic Law1/1982, on the civil protection
of the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image, which provided
in its transitional provision no. 1 that violations of the right guaranteed in article 18.4 of
the Constitution would find a remedy in said Organic Law until proper and autonomous
remedies were established. However, some commentators have always maintained that
article 18.4 included a new fundamental right, even if not properly spelled out by the
Constitution.8
Organic Law 5/1992, on the automated processing of personal data (hereinafter
“LORTAD”), was the first one adopted to implement article 18.4 of the Spanish
Constitution. This Organic Law was later superseded by LOPD, adopted in order to
transpose Directive 95/46/EC. It is stated that both Organic Laws have considered the right
to data protection as an autonomous right, although still linked to the right to respect for
personal life.9
The Spanish Constitutional Court has also adopted a clear inclination to consider the
autonomy of the right to data protection. Even if the first rulings used to link it to the right
to respect for private life,10 the landmark judgment adopted in 2000 has confirmed ever
since the autonomous character of the right to data protection.11 Indeed, the right to data
protection has a wider reach compared to the right to respect for private life, as the former
protects also data which is already public. In addition, data protection is not only a right
to freedom, but it gives the citizen a group of positive powers to control personal
information aswell. Importantly, this conclusionwas adopted by theConstitutional Court
applying article 10.2 of the Constitution, whereby fundamental rights shall be interpreted
7 A. Troncoso Reigada, La protección de datos. En busca del equilibrio, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2010, p.
71.
8 A. E. Pérez Luño, Derechos humanos, Estado de Derecho y Constitución, Madrid, Tecnos, 1984, p. 370;
P. Lucas Murillo de la Cueva, El derecho a la autodeterminación informativa, Madrid, Tecnos, 1990.
9 Troncoso Reigada, 2010, pp. 72-78.
10 Judgment of the Constitutional Court 254/1993, 20 July 1993, ECLI:ES:TC:1993:254; Judgment of the
Constitutional Court 143/1994, 9 May 1994, ECLI:ES:TC:1994:143; Judgment of the Constitutional Court
11/1998, 13 January 1998, ECLI:ES:TC:1998:11.
11 Judgment of theConstitutional Court 292/2000, 30November 2000, ECLI:ES:TC:2000:292; see also Judgment
of the Constitutional Court 290/2000, 30 November 2000, ECLI:ES:TC:2000:290.
563
Spain
in accordance to international treaties towhich Spain is party. Therefore, theConstitutional
Court took into account several international texts, including the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (hereinafter “Charter”) well before its binding force was
established by the Treaty of Lisbon.
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The Agencia Española de Protección Datos (hereinafter “AEPD”), the Spanish National
Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”) has published a report on privacy policies in
the online environment related to four areas: hotels, transport, e-commerce and insurance.12
Although it emphasizes the need to detail all the purposes for which data are processed,
the report finds it admissible to sort the aims of data processing by categories in order to
make it easier for the user to understand how they will be used. When a legitimate interest
is claimed as a legal basis for data processing, the AEPD refuses generic expressions and
requires a more detailed explanation.
As the superseded LOPD established an obligation to register files before the AEPD,
a certain experience had been acquired by data controllers when it comes to evaluating
the purpose of data processing. Regarding the public sector, a legal provision obliges them
to publish their Record of Processing Activities as a transparency measure (article 6 bis of
Law 19/2013), which should imply that previously they have to evaluate if general principles
are respected, the purposes of data processing from the perspective of their own
competences and, likewise, the period for which data will be stored.
The AEPD has had the opportunity to set the scope of article 5 GDPR in several official
guides.13 Thus, as regards video-surveillance processing for security purposes, it should
be noted that this is possibly one of the most contentious areas as many of the sanctions
imposed so far under the GDPR refer to this kind of processing. More recently, the AEPD
has published a specific guide on the application of the principle of privacy by design,
which emphasizes the importance of data minimization.
Due to the short period elapsed since the GDPR came into force, there have been no
judicial decisions on the aspects referred to in the question but the AEPD has had the
opportunity to express its interpretation in several reports. Thus, with regard to using data
12 This report is available at www.aepd.es/media/estudios/informe-politicas-de-privacidad-adaptacion-
RGPD.pdf.
13 All the AEPD guidelines are available at www.aepd.es/guias/index.html.
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for purposes other than those that initially justified its collection and processing, it has
been raised the need to cross-check clinical and administrative databases for the
identification of risk factors and for the surveillance of pathologies which declaration is
not compulsory according to public health rules.14 Even admitting that consent would not
be necessary, a restrictive interpretation has been emphasised by the AEPD since public
health legislation itself uses expressions such as ‘strictly necessary’ or ‘essential’.
Consequently, general interconnections based on public interest would not respect article
5 GDPR requirements.
Regarding transfers of data between public Administrations,15 the AEPD requires not
only a legal authorisation but an analysis under the criteria of article 6(4) GDPR to be
made by the assigning entity as well. Particularly, it has to assess if the reasons that justify
data transfers are compatible with those that justified their collection, initially based on a
public interest task. However, the AEPD states that, even in the case of incompatibility,
in certain circumstances and respecting the legal guarantees (article 23.1 GDPR) data
processingwould be lawful evenwithout consent of data subjects, unless special categories
of data are involved (article 9 GDPR).
Question 4
LOPDGDD includes several provisions based on legitimate interest when enabling certain
processing of personal data. Council of State suggested thismeasure as a solution to enable
data controllers an adequate approach to GDPR.16 Specifically, certain iuris tantum
presumptions favourable to the prevalence of legitimate interest are legally established if
the requirements set out in the regulation are met: this is the case of natural persons’
contact details when acting as entrepreneurs or professionals (article 19), credit information
systems (article 20) and some commercial operations (article 21). Otherwise, if the legal
provisions are not fulfilled, the controller must carry out an evaluation of all the affected
interests, but this does not necessarily lead to the unlawfulness of data processing.17
Likewise, the Spanish Parliament has promoted a new regulation on certain digital
rights inwhich, although legitimate interest is not explicitly alluded to, it can be understood
that processing is fairly based on it if the data controller correctly evaluates all the
14 Report 121/2018, available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2018-0121.pdf.
15 Report 175/2018, available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2018-0175.pdf.
16 Report 757/2017, www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=CE-D-2017-757.
17 J. Fernández-Samaniego & P. Fernández-Longoria, ‘El interés legítimo como principio para legitimar el




implications according to the legal requirements.18 This would be the case, for example,
of labour activities (arts. 87-91 LOPDGDD). Bearing in mind this economic context, a
recent judicial decision by a lower court considers unfair using video-surveillance recordings
if, as article 89 LOPDGDD requires, workers had not been previously informed about the
specific purpose of the data processing. Consequently, the court does not admit that the
article 88 GPDR exception would be applicable.19
Anyway, it is necessary to highlight that judicial decisions on these issues are still very
scarce. However, there is one remarkable exception: LOPDGDDD modified the electoral
legislation in order to allow parties to process personal data relating to political opinions
‘in the public interest only when adequate guarantees are offered’. This provision (article
58 bis Law 5/1985 on the General Electoral System) had an enormous social impact as it
has been declared void by the Constitutional Court.20 According to the Court’s
interpretation, it did not identify what that essential public interest really was and,
furthermore, it did not state the rules and guarantees that justify such a limitation of the
fundamental right to data protection.Moreover, in this case, the Court did not understand
legitimate interest as a lawful basis since data controllers are not mere private subjects but,
on the contrary, essential instruments for political participation and, consequently, the
Court states that they carry out a public task.
As previously explained, theAEPDhas emphasized the need to specify those legitimate
interests onwhich data processing is based. It has considered inadequate generic or abstract
expressions (i.e. necessary information, get to know you better…), and it has also
recommended data controllers to document the evaluation of all the affected interests.21
Regarding public bodies, unlike other Member States’ NSAs, the AEPD considers that
legitimate interest is not applicable even when they act beyond the scope of their public
tasks (i.e. commercial activities)22.
Regarding mail preference services for marketing transmissions, the AEPD requires a
minimum level of diligence consisting of having previously checked the exclusion lists.23
As regards the justification of access to data relating to academicmarks, it admits economic
dependence as a legitimate interest without prejudice to the right of opposition.24 While
in the case of data collection by banks, the AEPD has based on article 6.1.f) GDPR the
18 F.J. Sempere, ‘Interés legítimo en el tratamiento de datos: análisis, ponderación y supuestos prácticos’, Pri-
vacidad lógica, 5March 2019, www.privacidadlogica.es/interes-legitimo-en-el-tratamiento-de-datos-analisis-
ponderacion-y-supuestos-practicos.
19 Judgment of the Social Court 3 of Pamplona, 18 February 2019, ECLI: ES:JSO:2019:281.
20 Judgment of the Constitutional Court 76/2019, 22 May 2019, ECLI:ES:TC:2019:76.
21 AEPD report available at www.aepd.es/media/estudios/informe-politicas-de-privacidad-adaptacion-
RGPD.pdf.
22 AEPD report available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2018-0175.pdf.
23 AEPD report available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2018-0173.pdf.
24 AEPD report available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2018-0036.pdf.
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evaluation of customers’ solvency index in order to offer them new services if they are
properly informed and the exercise of their right of opposition is allowed independently.
Although its interpretation is not so flexible when information has been disclosed by third
parties in open social networks and is not obtained from public registers or credit
information systems.25
As far as consent is concerned,26 no judicial decisions have been found concerning
events occurring after theGDPR entry into force.27 However, the 17th additional provision
of LOPDPGD states that consent is to be understood as given for health and biomedical
research purposes not only with respect to a specific research but for other related fields
as well. More restrictive is the understanding of AEPD when it comes to commercial
communications sent by electronic means: it fined an airline company for not having
correctly configured the use of cookies, although the AEPD’s decision in this case is not
directly based on GDPR provisions but on the information society services and the
electronic commerce legal framework.28
The most relevant case so far handled by the AEPD in application of the GDPR is
undoubtedly the one concerning Professional Football League’s app, not only because of
the media coverage but also for the € 250,000 sanction imposed. In this case, the AEPD
considers that the system for the activation of the microphone and the location of the
device does not comply with GDPR consent requirements. Even more, the NSA demands
a reinforcement of transparency because data processing is considered to be certainly
intrusive.29 Moreover, it remarked that consent withdrawal demanded an undue effort
considering the ease of providing it initially.30
Question 5
From a legal point of view, this topic has gained some traction at the national level by way
of the use of cookies by content providers. Cookies have been governed in Spain by the
25 AEPD report available at https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/2017-0195.pdf.
26 For an interpretation of article 11 LOPDGDD from the perspective of GDPR requirements, M. Vilasau
Solana, ‘Las exigencias de información en el RGPD y en la LOPDGDD, ¿contribuyen a la formación de un
consentimiento de mayor calidad?, in R. García & B. Tomás (Ed.), El Reglamento General de Protección de
Datos. Un enfoque nacional y comparado, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2019, pp. 218-220.
27 For the analysis of case law prior to GDPR entry into force, A. Puente Escobar, ‘Principios y licitud del
tratamiento’, in A. Rallo (Ed.), Tratado de Protección de Datos, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2019, pp. 129-
131.
28 Resolution PS/300/19 https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/ps-00300-2019.pdf.
29 In short, when a ‘listening’ device comes on stage a qualitative approach is needed since other fundamental
rights and freedoms may be affected. Regarding this idea, R. Martínez Martínez, ‘Internet de los objetos,
domótica e inteligencia artificial: la nueva frontera del derecho a la vida privada y familiar’, Diario La Ley,
Nº 31, 2019, p. 2.
30 Resolution PS 326/2018 https://www.aepd.es/es/documento/ps-00326-2018.pdf.
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obligations provided for in the second paragraph of article 22 of Law 34/2002, on services
of the information society and electronic commerce (LSSI). However, cookies may be
exempted if they: 1) only allow communication between the user’s equipment and the
network, and 2) strictly provide a service expressly requested by the user. In 2013, the
AEPD produced a “Guide on the use of Cookies”, according to which the legal obligations
imposed by the applicable provisions are two, namely: the duty of information andobtaining
consent.
However, the extant legal situation has been criticized by some scholars. Indeed, tacit
consent by the data subject may still be admissible, even if article 1.2 LSSI provides for the
preservation of data protection. Second, if the content to be accessed by the user is made
conditional to the previous acceptance of the cookie or, even worse, before opening the
main web page of the provider then it is difficult to state that the data treatment has been
consented. Likewise, if the treatment is not necessary for the access to the information or
the provision of the service then it is hard to label the consent as freely given.31 Moreover,
the provision set up in article 22.2 LSSI is also insufficient because: 1) it only applies to
services provided for consideration and thus it does not apply to free services, and 2) it
does not cover the abusive processing which results from web browsing.32 In sum, data
processing flowing from the use of cookies or otherwise in exchange for access to free
information or content in the web has been allowed until now under Spanish Law.
Prior to the entry into force of the LOPDPGDD, and with regard to the issue of
legitimacy for the processing of personal data, the AEPD has produced some specific
reports on the interpretation that should be given to theGDPR’s provisions on thismatter.
In this sense, the reports reiterate the AEPD’s criteria that the GDPR puts on equal footing
the legitimizing grounds set up in its article 6, compared to the provisions of the oldOrganic
Law 15/1999 for which consent became the central axis of the right to data protection.
These reports assess what legitimizing grounds other than consent apply to the various
kinds of processing, including the one provided for in article 6(1)(b) GDPR.33
Question 6
The political situation in Spain is currently unsteady and therefore those legal reforms that
should be adopted by the Parliament have not been passed yet. In this sense, in compliance
31 J. Valero Torrijos, “Las quiebras en Internet de la regulación legal del derecho a la protección de los datos
de carácter personal: la necesaria superación de un modelo desfasado”, en J. Valero Torrijos (coor.), La
Protección de los Datos Personales en Internet ante la Innovación Tecnológica, Cizur Menor, Thomson
Reuters, 2013, pp. 58-60.
32 Ibid.
33 AEPD, Memoria Anual, 2018, Madrid, pp. 11-12.
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with the criteria established by theCJEU,34 the need has been raised inCongress to promote
the reformof the Law 25/2007, 18October, on the retention of data generated or processed
in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services
or of public communications networks.
Apart from this issue, article 11 LOPDGDD obliges to inform data owners when their
information is collected, so that they can exercise their right of opposition according to
article 22 GDPR. Likewise, article 28 LOPDGDD obliges both the data controller and the
data processor to adopt the appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure
compliance with GDPR requirements. Particularly, it obliges to take into account the
greater risks arising from the use of profiles in some areas. In this respect, the AEPD has
made it compulsory to carry out a DPIA for data processing that involves automated
decision-making or that largely contributes to take such decisions.
There are also several legal provisions relating to the adoption of automated decisions
by public entities. Article 41 Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of Public Sector, requires
the setting up of a mechanism for auditing the information system and its source code, as
well as pointing out the public authority responsible for the decision in the event of
contestations. Consequently, administrative appeals settled by a public authority would
comply with the provisions of article 22.2.b) GDPR, since it does guarantee human
intervention. Specifically in the tax area, article 96.4 Law 58/2003 requires the approval of
applications used for the exercise of administrative powers.
Question 7
The Spanish NSA adopted its first Resolutions on the right to erasure (“right to be
forgotten”) in 2007,35 according to the increasing demands from Spanish citizens, who
have been a kind of pioneers in this field.36 However, search engines like Google have
labelled this kind of protection as censorship. But, on the basis of the principles of consent
and legitimate purpose, the AEPD has always decided that search engines were obliged to
erase information anddeindex links considered obsolete, or personal datawhose divulgation
does not respond to any legitimate purpose, or if those engines do not use the exclusion
protocols, such as “robot.txt”, already used bywebsite publishers. In this process, theAEPD
34 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, and Kärntner Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, in
particular para. 55.
35 AEPD, Resolution TD/00266/2007; AEPD, Resolution TD/00463/2007.
36 AEPD, Memoria Anual, Madrid, 2013, p. 31.
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has been careful to balance the right to be forgottenwith the right to freedomof expression
and information.37
In accordance to the Google Spain case adopted by the CJEU,38 the AEPD and the
Audiencia Nacional (with jurisdiction over decisions adopted by the AEPD) have followed
suit protecting the data rights of claimants as against Google Spain SL, which appealed
those decisions systematically. However, a new issue has opposed theAEPD against Google
again. The search engine used to inform website publishers about the content deindexing
of searches that affected them when implementing the right to be forgotten. This led the
AEPD to impose a 150,000 euro fine to Google in 2016. This fine has later been declared
void by the Audiencia Nacional.39
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Spain (Third Court Room, with jurisdiction
on administrative law cases) has adopted several decisions admittingmany of theGoogle’s
appeals.40 The Supreme Court’s judgment is based on the absence of Google Inc.’s legal
standing, as it is incorporated in California. This rather unreasoned argument may be
confronted with the argument developed by the First Court Room (with jurisdiction on
civil law cases),41 which in turn seems in accordance with the CJEU in the Google Spain
case. However, the Third Room has continued to decide that the only responsible for the
data processing is Google Inc., which in turn may not be the object of a claim in Spain as
it is based abroad, a result that does not effectively protect personal data from a material
point of view.42 On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has materially extended the
right to be forgotten to include internal search engines used by website publishers,43 but
not the information included in their website pages by publishers,44 a result very much
criticized from some quarters.45
37 P. Simón Castellano, El reconocimiento del derecho al olvido digital en España y en la UE. Efectos tras la
sentencia del TJUE de mayo de 2014, Barcelona, Bosch, 2015, pp. 204-221.
38 Judgment of 13 May 2014, Case C-131/12,Google Spain SL andGoogle Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
39 Judgment of the Audiencia Nacional 1801/2019, 23 April 2019, ECLI:ES:AN:2019:1801.
40 See, amongmany other, Judgment of the SupremeCourt 1055/2016, 11March 2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1055;
Judgment of the SupremeCourt 964/2016, 14March 2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:964; Judgment of the Supreme
Court 3721/2016, 21 July 2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:3721.
41 Judgment of the Supreme Court 1280/2016, 5 April 2016, ECLI: ES:TS:2016:1280.
42 P. Lucas Murillo de la Cueva, “El Tribunal Supremo y el derecho a la protección de datos”, in R. García
Mahamut and B. Tomás Mallén (dirs.), El Reglamento General de Protección de Datos. Un enfoque nacional
y comparado, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2019, p. 204.
43 Judgment of the Constitutional Court 58/2018, 4 July 2018, ECLI:ES:TC:2018:58.
44 J. López Calvo, “Últimas resoluciones judiciales sobre el derecho al olvido. Sobre la inalterabilidad de las
hemerotecas digitales”, Diario La Ley Ciberderecho, nº 20, 2018.
45 P. Romero, “Insólito límite del Constitucional a la libertad de información: ordena capar una búsqueda en
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Nevertheless, in 2018 the right to be forgotten has been included in a wider sense by
the LOPDGDD, which sets out this right regarding Internet searches (article 93) and social
networks or equivalent services (article 94), therefore going beyond the GDPR in
consolidating the case-law in this field.46
Question 8
The now superseded LOPD was largely adopted in order to transpose Directive 95/46/EC,
but did not implement any measure so as to achieve a balance between the right to data
protection and freedom of expression as provided for by article 9 of said Directive. Thus,
the relationship between both fundamental rights has been solved by the Constitutional
Court’s case-law from the 1980s,47 which has declared the superiority of freedom of
expression, wherever the information was of public interest and truthful.48 This case-law
has been followed by the AEPD ever since.49
However, the recent LOPDGDD has been used by the legislator to offer a slightly
different balance between both fundamental rights protected by the Spanish Constitution.
Indeed, article 85GDPRhas been adapted to national law through two provisions included
within Title X devoted to the “Guarantee of digital rights”. This Title X goes well beyond
what is required by GDPR and sets out digital rights such as the right to Net neutrality,
the right to universal access to the Internet, the right to digital security, and the right to
digital education, among other rights. The two mentioned provisions are article 85 and
article 86 LOPDGDD.
First, article 85.1 LOPDGDD states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression
on the Internet”. According to theConstitutional Court case-law on the right to rectification
regulated by Organic Law 2/1984,50 article 85.2, first paragraph LOPDGDD may be
interpreted as the defence mechanism that an individual has to protect her honour vis a
vis informational initiatives ormistakes thatmay endanger themoral integrity or reputation
of the interested person. Moreover, the right to rectification may serve as a complement
to the guarantee of a free public opinion, to the extent that a different interpretation of the
information published will help the collective interest in reaching the truth, as provided
for by the second paragraph of article 85.2 LOPDGDD.
46 A. Rallo Lombarte, “Del derecho a la protección de datos a la garantía de nuevos derechos digitales”, in
R. GarcíaMahamut and B. TomásMallén (dirs.), El Reglamento General de Protección deDatos. Un enfoque
nacional y comparado, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2019, p. 147.
47 See recently Judgment of the Constitutional Court 58/2018, of 4 June, ECLI:ES:TC:2018:58.
48 J. Muñoz-Machado Cañas, “Tratamiento de datos y libertad de expresión e información”, in J. Piñar Mañas
(dir.), Reglamento General de Protección de Datos, Madrid, Reus, 2017, pp. 595-596.
49 AEPD, Resolution nº 27/2005, 24 January 2006.
50 Judgment of the Constitutional Court 168/1986, 22 December 1986, ECLI:ES:TC:1986:168.
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Second, article 86 LOPDGDD serves as a complement to the right to rectification,
through the setting up of the right to update information in digital media.51
This new legal situation will have a huge impact on digital media and social networks,
and has been criticised by some experts in the field. It is said that the new provisions will
modify the extant balance, as the right to rectification may be invoked not only as against
untruthful information, but also as against information affecting the right to privacy and
honour.52 Furthermore, social media will have to rectify not only information published
by the media, but also that published by their users. This may lead them to contract out
pre-moderation services, thereby affecting freedomof expression,53 allowing for censorship
through the back-door and with no judicial control.54
To this date, there is no Court or NSA decision regarding these new provisions
introduced by the LOPDPDD. However, the extant Constitutional Court’s case-law in the
field of Organic Law 2/1984 will plausibly be applicable.
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The Spanish NSA, the AEPD, was set up in 1992 as an independent public body.55 Similar
authorities have also been created by someAutonomousCommunities: Catalonia,56 Basque
Country,57 and, recently, Andalusia.58 However, their competence extends only to data
processing carried out at the regional and local pubic sector level.
51 “Every person has the right to request from the digital media the inclusion of a sufficiently visible update
notice along with the news that concerns her when the information contained in the original news does
not reflect her current situation as a result of circumstances that had taken place after publication, causing
damage. In particular, the inclusion of such notice shall proceed when the original information refers to
police or judicial proceedings that have been affected for the benefit of the interested party as a result of
subsequent judicial decisions. In this case, the notice will refer to the subsequent decision”.
52 “Victoria para la libertad de expresión: la nueva Ley de Protección de Datos renuncia a controlar contenidos
digitales y a acabar con el anonimato en Internet”, Plataforma en defensa de la libertad de información,
10 October 2018, http://libertadinformacion.cc/victoria-para-la-libertad-de-expresion-la-nueva-ley-de-
proteccion-de-datos-renuncia-a-controlar-contenidos-digitales-y-a-acabar-con-el-anonimato-en-internet/.
53 “La nueva ley de Protección de Datos impacta en los medios de comunicación”, Ayuda ley protección datos,
23November 2018, https://ayudaleyprotecciondatos.es/2018/11/23/nueva-ley-proteccion-datos-rectificacion/.
54 T. Castillo, “La nueva ley de protección de datos es preocupante para la libertad de expresión en España:
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Specifically, in the case of the AEPD, its President must be elected among persons of
recognised professional competence. The selection process call has to be published in the
Official Journal (Boletín Oficial del Estado) and the Government will present a proposal
to the Parliament after evaluating the candidates bearing in mind their merit, capacity,
competence and suitability, which must be ratified by a qualified majority. The term of
office is five years and the person elected may only be dismissed for serious breach of
duties, incapacity, incompatibility or criminal punishment. ACouncil with only consultative
functions made up of 17 members will advise the President: there will be representatives
of the Parliament and of the regional data protection authorities, as well as a broad social,
professional and academic representation.
The Spanish NSA has the power to carry out preventive audit plans and to approve
Circulars setting out its own interpretative criteria when applying the GDPR and the
LOPDGDD. Itmay also fine data controllers/processors and, if necessary, adopt preventative
measures. Apart from fines, sanction consists of a warning in minor cases and when a
public body commits the infringement. However, in the case of complaints introduced by
data subjects article 37 LOPDGDD provides for a procedure before the
controller/processor’s Data Protection Officer (hereinafter “DPO”) under the AEPD
supervision.
With regard to its ‘enforcement record’ under the GDPR, 139 procedures have been
finished according to the AEPD’s official website. Some important sanctions should be
highlighted: the above-mentioned 250,000 euro fine imposed to the Professional Football
League; an airline companywas punishedwith 18,000 euro; a telephone company has been
penalized with two sanctions that came to more than 40,000 euro; and several video
surveillance infringements have been punished with fines between 4,800 and 20,000 euro.
Question 10
Article 50 LOPDGDD establishes the obligation to publish AEPD decisions related to
enforcement powers.59 This provision reinforces certainty since it allows to know theAEPD
interpretative criteria. In addition, an official report is published every year.
Beyond the exercise of sanctioning powers, the AEPD is making a significant
institutional communication effort within the framework of its Corporate Social
Responsibility Plan.60 AEPD’s commitment to data controllers and professionals must be
59 Its decisions are available through a useful search engine on its website https://www.aepd.es/es/informes-
y-resoluciones/resoluciones.
60 AEPD’s social commitment has been included inMarco de Actuación de Responsabilidad Social de la AEPD




emphasized, although it would be advisable to reinforce participation as a “good
governance” tool.
With regard to the promotion of preventive measures, several initiatives have been
launched, among which the following stand out:
– Availability of free tools to facilitate compliance with the GDPR and the LOPDGDD,
especially for low risk data processing and formal obligations;
– Publication of the Agency’s legal team reports in response to queries of greater interest
made by data controllers;
– Publication of specific guides on relevant areas (education, Internet privacy and security,
localAdministration) and recommendations to facilitate compliancewith some essential
obligations such as privacy by design, DPIA, management and notification of security
breaches or risk evaluation;
– Publication of practical guides and studies for some types of data processing: use of
fingerprints, drones, apps for mobile devices, video-surveillance or publication of
administrative acts;
– Implementation of a priority channel for communicating the dissemination of sensitive
content on the Internet and requesting its removal.61
Question 11
As the LOPDGDD came into force in December 2018 and the latest AEPD published
report corresponds to the year 2018,62 there is no official and updated information on the
sanctions imposed under GDPR provisions. However, there is a general tendency to apply
the warning sanction and, where appropriate, a requirement to adopt corrective measures
in cases of minor infringements.63
With regard to the role of DPOs in order to solve complaints from data subjects, 863
have been satisfactorily addressed during 2018 and 2,079 up to 15 May 201964. Therefore,
it seems to be an effective way to ensure effective respect for the rights of data subjects.
Warning is the only punishment for public bodies’ infringements, although the
Ombudsman must be notified of the sanctions imposed to them and disciplinary
proceedings against public officials may be recommended by the AEPD. The publication
61 This recent tool is available at www.aepd.es/media/infografias/infografia-canal-prioritario.pdf.
62 This official report is available at www.aepd.es/media/memorias/memoria-AEPD-2018.pdf.
63 J. Sempere Samaniego, ‘Primeras resoluciones sancionadoras de la Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos con el RGPD’, Privacidad Lógica, 29 April 2019, www.privacidadlogica.es/primeras-resoluciones-
sancionadoras-de-la-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-con-el-rgpd/.
64 AEPD Press Release 21 May 2019, available at https://www.aepd.es/es/prensa-y-comunicacion/notas-de-
prensa/dos-de-cada-tres-reclamaciones-que-se-envian-al-dpd-se.
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of sanctions in the official journal is also stated by article 77 LOPDGDD, but only for the
most serious cases.
Question 12
According to article 23 of Directive 96/45/EC, the now superseded LOPD provided in its
article 19 for a right to compensation for the data subjects in case of a breach of the
provisions of this LOPD. It also stated that the applicable liability regime would be that of
Administrative law (according to Law 40/2015), in case of public filing systems, while in
case of private filing systems that liability would be ascertained by Civil law Courts
(according to article 1106 Civil Code). However, the liability system set up in Organic Law
1/1982 on the civil protection of the right to honour, personal and familiar privacy and
the own image has also been applied by Courts in Spain because of the close link between
these constitutional rights and the data protection right, also protected by the Spanish
Constitution in the very same article 18.65
Now,Organic Law3/2018 (LOPDPGDD)has superseded the LOPDof 1999.However,
no provision has been included in the LOPDGDD on compensation for damages, which
in turn makes the GDPR the only regulation applicable in this field in Spain, according to
its directly applicable character. Nevertheless, the three systems of liability just mentioned
will continue to be applied by Courts in Spain as the only ways to give legal traction to
article 82 GDPR.66
According to what now is provided for in article 82 GDPR, the Spanish liability system
applicable to the field of data protection has always included non-material damages. The
definition of non-material damages is no easy task,67 but the real hurdle rests on its proof.
Even if some Spanish case-lawhas adopted the doctrine derived fromOrganic Law 1/1982,
where damage is presumed and awarded wherever there is a breach (iuris et de iure), the
liability system provided in now superseded article 19 LOPD was different (iuris tantum),
so the data subject had to prove the damage. As it is well known, the GDPR does not offer
any guide regarding proof, so this issue remains debatable.68
65 E. Nieto Garrido, “Derecho a indemnización y responsabilidad”, in J. Piñar Mañas (dir.), Reglamento
General de Protección de Datos, Madrid, Reus, 2017, p. 567.
66 However, the subjective liability system provided for in article 82 GDPR will be substituted for an objective
system in Spain wherever the GDPR breach is provoked by a public filing system, ibid., p. 561.
67 J. PuyolMontero, “Derecho a indemnización”, in A. Troncoso Reigada (dir.),Comentario a la LeyOrgánica
de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, Madrid, Civitas, 2010, p. 1277, stating that the Supreme Court
has defined it as “inferred pain, suffering, sadness, unease or restlessness that affects the person suffering
from it”.
68 A. Rubí Puig, “Daños por infracciones del derecho a la protección de datos personales”, Revista de Derecho
Civil, vol. V, nº 4, 2018, p. 82.
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Compensation for non-material damages has been very common in the Spanish case-law
as a result of the application of article 19 LOPD. Civil law cases where non-material damage
has been compensated include breaches such as undue inclusion in databases of consumer
credit reporting agencies like Equifax, breaches of the right to be forgotten, illegitimate
access to medical records, etc.69 However, in order to be compensated in Administrative
Courts, material and non-material damages are subjected to several conditions: they need
to be effective, real and true; economically evaluable; be able to be attributed to a single
individual or group of individuals; and the data subject must not be obliged to endure the
breach.70 Additionally, not every non-material damage must result in monetary
compensation, as often the case-law has determined that other remedies are available, i.e.,
the judicial decision itself declaring the breach is sometimes considered a just
compensation.71
Question 13
Organic Law 3/2018 (LOPDGDD) recently adopted to adapt and complement the GDPR
has not implemented any legislativemeasure in order to facilitate the representative actions
provided for in article 80 GDPR. Therefore, representative actions may only be initiated
according to the general mechanisms provided for in Spanish law. Collective actions in
Spanish law are mainly regulated in the Civil Prosecution Law (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Civil- LEC). Particular attention should be paid to article 11 LEC which provides for the
legal standing of consumer and user associations for the exercise of class actions.
Thus, consumer and user associations in Spain have carried out an important activity
regarding the legal enforcement of data protection rights, not only for their associates, but
for all consumers in general. Recently, as a result of the Cambridge Analytica revelations,
one of the largest association, the Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (hereinafter
“OCU”) initiated a class action lawsuit against Facebook. The OCU considered that
Facebook had breached data protection rights of users as it did not inform or request
express authorization fromusers for the use of their data. The lawsuit defended the interests
not only of those directly affected by the alleged data leakage, but of all Facebook users in
Spain, some 26 million users and, accordingly, the OCU asked for at least € 200 of
compensation for each of them.72
69 Ibid., p. 75.
70 U. Aberasturi Gorriño, “El derecho a la indemnización en el artículo 19 de la Ley Orgánica de Protección
de Datos”, Revista Aragonesa de Administración Pública, nº 41-42, 2013, p. 180.
71 Ibid., pp. 200-201.
72 OCU, “Mis datos sonmíos, Facebook”, 30May 2018, www.ocu.org/consumo-familia/derechos-consumidor/
noticias/demanda-colectiva-facebook.
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Moreover, another user association called FACUA has lodged five complaints with the
NSA (AEPD) against Facebook. In the latest complaint the FACUA argues that Facebook
has shared unauthorized sensitive data of its users with third parties (Netflix, Spotify, Bing,
and Microsoft).73 The other complaints related to Cambridge Analytica, the filtering of
personal data of users who used a survey app, the hacking of information due to a
vulnerability detected in the tokens of the social network, and the breach of the LOPD
regarding the procedure used for users to exercise their rights.74
Question 14
The AEPD has carried out several activities addressed not only to professional groups,
data controllers and processors but also for data subjects and society, an initiative linked
to the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan.75 One of its main axes is to enhance prevention in order
to achieve amore effective protection of citizens’ rights. Therefore, communication channels
have been strengthened, various information campaigns have been promoted and, among
other measures, collaboration with media has increased. In this regard, special attention
has been paid to minors and education, with the launch of a specialized website.76
Within the dissemination activities, the annual Open Day involves not only its own
staff but social and professional representatives as well. This workshop is also available on
the Internet, which ensures wider dissemination.77 Likewise, also on an annual basis, the
AEPD organises a summer course jointly with the Menéndez Pelayo International
University-UIMP.78
As regards relations with other public institutions, there is a legal obligation to
communicate to the Ombudsman the actions taken by the AEPD in relation to public
bodies. In the area of transparency, a joint action with the Transparency and Good
Governance Council is also legally stated in order to approve criteria for the evaluation of
conflicts between privacy and access to public sector information. A representative of that
entity has to be elected as a member of the AEPD Advisory Council.
73 Europa Press, “Facua denuncia ante la AEPD a Facebook por compartir datos sensibles de sus usuarios con
terceros”, 20 December 2018, www.europapress.es/sociedad/noticia-facua-denuncia-aepd-facebook-
compartir-datos-sensibles-usuarios-terceros-20181220165113.html.
74 La Vanguardia, “FACUA denuncia a Facebook ante AEPD por compartir datos de usuarios a tercero”,
20 December 2018, www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20181220/453657044742/facua-denuncia-ante-la-aepd-
a-facebook-por-compartir-datos-sensibles-de-sus-usuarios-con-terceros.html.
75 This Plan is available at https://www.aepd.es/es/la-agencia/plan-estrategico-aepd-2015-2019.
76 All the information is accessible at http://tudecideseninternet.es/aepd/.
77 The 2019 edition can be seen at https://www.aepd.es/es/la-agencia/transparencia/otro-tipo-de-informacion/
sesion-anual-abierta-aepd/11-edicion.




Acollaboration agreement has been signed between theAEPDand theGeneral Council
of the Judiciary (CGPJ) according to article 55(3) GDPR.79 Formal collaboration has also
been promoted with the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC).80
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
National security has been fairly recently defined in Spanish law through article 3 Law
36/2015 on National Security. Regarding public security, article 104.1 of the Spanish
Constitution governs the activities of law enforcement agencies and includes the concept
of citizen security, while its article 149.1.29ª was devoted to public security. However, these
two concepts have been interpreted as synonyms by the case-law and literature alike.
Recently, Organic Law 4/2015 on the protection of citizen security has been adopted and
there are other laws applicable in this field.81
After the Tele2/Watson case,82 case-law in Spain has accepted the application of the
Charter to data retention for public security purposes. However, national legislation
providing for data retention, in accordance toDirective 2006/24/EC,83 has not been declared
invalid as a result of Tele2/Watson. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Spain adopted two
judgments right after the Digital Rights Ireland case.84 In those two decisions, and after
explicitly mentioning article 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Court stated that Law 25/2007
on data retention (LCDCE), implementing Directive 2006/24/EC, was not affected by the
Digital Rights Ireland case as the LCDCE was already being interpreted in a very restrictive
way by national courts.85 Moreover, afterTele2/Watson, the SupremeCourt hasmaintained
the same position regarding Law 25/2007. Accordingly, two decisions adopted in 2017, in
79 The full version of this document is available at www.boe.es/boe/dias/2017/11/15/pdfs/BOE-A-2017-
13162.pdf.
80 A General Protocol of Activities has been approved, which is available at https://www.aepd.es/sites/default/
files/2020-02/protocolo-aepd-cnmc.pdf.
81 O. Tejerina Rodríguez, Seguridad del Estado y privacidad, Madrid, Reus, 2014, p. 127.
82 Judgment of 21 December 2016 in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och
telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for theHomeDepartment v TomWatson andOthers, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
83 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communi-
cations services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ
L105/54.
84 Judgment of 8 April 2014 in Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and
Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
85 Judgment of the SupremeCourt 470/2015, 7 July 2015, ECLI: ES:TS:2015:3436; and Judgment of the Supreme
Court 768/2015, 23 November 2015, ECLI: ES:TS:2015:5140.
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which the 2016 ECJ’s case is taken into account, stated that Law 25/2007 is still perfectly
applicable. The rationale of the Supreme Court is based on the guarantees provided by the
restrictive interpretation of Law 25/2007, as applied by national Courts until now. Under
this restrictive interpretation, data retention is only ordered by a judicial authority and for
serious crimes, which in turn will preserve the proportionality principle as mandated by
the ECJ.86 However, this Supreme Court’s interpretation has been the object of criticism
by the literature, which considers that it does not apply the proportionality principle in
the same way it is requested by the ECJ’s case-law.87
86 Judgment of the Supreme Court 272/2017, 18 April 2017, ECLI: ES:TS:2017:1594; and Judgment of the
Supreme Court 400/2017, 1 June 2017, ECLI: ES:TS:2017:2800.
87 J. L. Rodríguez Lainz, “La jurisprudencia del tribunal de Luxemburgo sobre regímenes de conservación






Sweden introduced the world’s first Data Protection Act in 1973.1 The same year, the first
National Supervisory Authority (hereinafter “NSA”) in the world, the ‘Datainspektionen’,
was set up. The task of the Datainspektionen was to safeguard the application of the Data
Protection Act. With the longest history of Data Protection legislation and enforcement
in the world, Sweden has extensive case law in the area.
A year after application of the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter
“GDPR”)2 commenced, theDatainspektionen conducted a number of surveys on application
and attitudes following the introduction of the GDPR. The result of these were analysed
in a report, the Nationell integritetsrapport 2019.3 Sweden has far reaching goals when it
comes to using digitalization both in private and public activities. The handling of personal
data, and not the least the general trust and perception of how personal data is processed,
is a key factor to success and development in digitalization. The Swedish view on GDPR
should thus be put in that perspective.
A Setting the Scene
Question 1
As Sweden has always been in the front as regards data protection and adopted its first
legislation already back in 1973, the Data Protection Act (Datalagen)4, a short historical
overview can be of interest. The Data Protection Act prescribed that permits be obtained
* Advokat, Partner at AdvokatfirmanLexIT andPhDcandidate at the Faculty of Law,University of Stockholm,
Sweden.
1 Datalag (1973:289).
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.
3 Nationell integritetsrapport 2019, Datainspektionens rapport 2019:2.
4 Datalagen (1973:289).
581
from the Swedish NSA, the Datainspektionen, to establish a ‘computerized’ (automized)
personal register.
Data protection principles were introduced by theCouncil of Europe’s ‘Data Protection
Convention’ of 1981 (Convention for the protection of individualswith regard toAutomatic
Processing of Personal Data, also known as ‘Convention 108’). A major difference between
the Data Protection Convention and the Datalagen was that the Convention did not only
apply to ‘computerized’ personal registers, but to all procession of personal data.
EUDirective 95/46/EU of 24October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (the Data
Protection Directive) was implemented into Swedish law by the Personuppgiftslagenin
1998.5
In parallel to theDatalagen, separate legal instruments (so called “registerförfattningar”)
were continuously introduced for specific “computerized” personal registers, such as
Patientjournallagen6 for “computerized”patient records (later replaced byPatientdatalagen7
regulating the processing of patient data in a wider perspective).
In connectionwith the entry into force of theGDPR, Sweden adopted aData Protection
Act (Dataskyddslagen)8 where the legislation complementary to the GDPR is collected. A
regulation on complementary issues (Kompletteringsförordningen)9 was issued and entered
into force at the same time, 25May 2018. In addition, the systemwith “registerförfattningar”
(see above) has been kept. A number of these statutes have been adjusted to comply with
the GDPR.
As mentioned above, the national Swedish NSA is the Datainspektionen.10 The
Datainspektionen is also Sweden’s national supervisory authority regarding processing of
personal data under the Schengen Convention, that is to say the convention on the EU’s





9 Förordning (2018:219) med kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s dataskyddsförordning.
10 See 3 § Förordning (2018:219) med kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s dataskyddsförordning, and 2 a
§ Förordning (2007:975)med instruktion förDatainspektionen (Ordinance on Instructions for the Swedish
Data Protection Authority).
11 Convention 27 November 1995.
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law enforcement cooperation (Europol)12, the VIS Regulation,13 and the Eurodac
Regulation.14
The Swedish Data Protection Authority’s tasks as a surveillance authority are stated in
its instructions.15 It should be noted that the Datainspektionen is also to monitor and
describe developments in IT regarding issues concerning privacy and technology.16 Thus,
theDatainspektionen’s surveillance competence includes the GDPR, as well as the national
legal instruments in relation to the GDPR. As concerns these legal instruments, it should
be born in mind that it follows from the long history of data protection legislation in
Sweden that there is substantial case-law, which to a considerable extent is applicable also
to the present situation, i.e. after the entry into force of the GDPR.
There are two areas where the situation in Sweden differs considerably frommost other
Member States, where Sweden holds a strong and long legal tradition. These are
transparency and the use of identification numbers (social security numbers). Thus, these
areas are of particular interest when it comes to data protection.
Firstly, Sweden has a longstanding national principle on public access to official
documents which is protected in the constitution.17 The principle is further specified in
the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act.18 It follows from article 86 GDPR19 that
personal data included in official documents can be made public in accordance with the
laws of the Member State concerned. Furthermore, the Council of Europe has already in
1991 adopted a recommendation of access to personal data in public documents.20 Hence,
the GDPR does not prevent the possibility to give public access to official documents
12 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European
UnionAgency for LawEnforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions
2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L135/53.
13 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas
(VIS Regulation) [2008] OJ L218/60.
14 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation
(EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member
States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation
(EU)No1077/2011 establishing a EuropeanAgency for the operationalmanagement of large-scale IT systems
in the area of freedom, security and justice [2013] OJ L180/1.
15 Ordinance (2007:975) on Instructions for the Swedish Data Protection Authority.
16 For further description seeDatainspektionen’s webpagewww.datainspektionen.se, also available in English.
All webpages referred to were visited 1 February 2020.
17 The so called “offentlighetsprincipen”, stipulated in 2 Chapter of Tryckfrihetsförordningen (1949:105).
18 Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen (2009:400).
19 See also recital (whereas) 154.
20 The Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R(91) 10 on the communication to third parties of personal
data held by public bodies.
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containing personal data. In addition to the stipulation in GDPR, the national Swedish
Data Protection Act contains a provision expressly excluding GDPR from being used in
a manner that would restrict or prevent the principle on public access to official
documents.21
Secondly, the other area of special interest is the handling of personal identification
numbers (social security numbers), which is widely spread in Sweden. The GDPR opens
up for national legislation within this area.22 The Data Protection Act (Dataskyddslagen)
contains a stipulation permitting personal identification numbers to be processed without
consent only in case it is clearlymotivated by the reasons of the processing, the importance
of secure identification or other considerable reasons.23 Thus the main principle is that
consent is needed for the processing of personal identification numbers. It should be
remembered that the general requirement for legal basis in article 6 and the principles in
article 5 of the GDPR must be upheld. The stipulation follows previous regulations and
consequently there is considerable case-law in the area. This case law can be summarized
with the conclusion that it is somewhat more restrictive from a legal perspective, than the
actual situation where personal identification numbers are widely processed in the day to
day life of Swedes.
Question 2
Human rights, both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EuropeanUnion is of fundamental importance to data protection
in Sweden. It can be said that it is Datainspektionen’s main task to “work to ensure that
people’s fundamental rights and freedoms are protected in connection with processing of
personal data, to facilitate the free movement of such data within the European Union and
to work to ensure that good practice is observed in credit rating and debt recovery
activities.”24
21 Chapter 1 Section 7 Dataskyddslagen.
22 Art. 87 GDPR.
23 Chapter 3, Section 10 Dataskyddslagen.




B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
In general, it can be said that awareness of the GDPR is fairly high in Sweden. According
to the National integrity report 2019, carried out by the Datainspektionen, the majority of
companies and organisations state that the implementation of GDPR into the businesses
has worked well.25 Nine out of ten citizens are aware of the fact that when browsing the
internet information is collected which is sold for marketing purposes. Only three out of
ten however, feel they have knowledge of how their personal information is used. In
organizations where a Data Protection Officer (hereinafter “DPO”) was appointed, the
survey found that three out of four DPO’s stated that relevant guidelines had been put into
place within the organization. Further, organizations without a DPO also expressed
awareness of the GDPR. Over all, seven out of ten companies state they have guidelines
and have taking actions implementing the GDPR.
As regards the interpretation and practical use of the GDPR-principles (in article 5)
the survey shows that a majority of organisations have put processes and routines in place
that ensures the upholding of the principles. At the time this report being written (early
2020) there are only two decision by the Datainspektionen.26 However, these decisions
have been appealed against, but not yet decided by any court. The first decision by the
Datainspektionen concerns facial recognition. The situation in that individual case was a
bit particular which meant that the decision by the Datainspektionen did not relate to the
general principles, such as purpose limitation or data minimization. Thus, the principles
of purpose limitation and data minimization have not yet been subject of a decision or
court proceedings However, as regards the concept of ‘fair’ processing, there was already
prior legislation, the Personuppgiftslagen.27 Hence, there is case-law dealing with this
concept.
Also the concept of purpose limitation is well known in Swedish data protection
legislation. The requirement of the purpose to be sufficient specific has been explained in
the preparatory works to previous statutes.28 In general can be said that the purpose is
sufficiently specific if the purpose cannot be realized if the personal data is not processed.29
25 Nationell integritetsrapport 2019, Datainspektionens rapport 2019:2.
26 Datainspektionen beslut DI-2019-2221, 20 August 2019 and beslut DI-2018-22737, 13 December 2019.
27 Personuppgiftslagen (1998:204).
28 SOU 1999:109 p. 156 and SOU 1998:80 p. 221 f.




The fact that the purpose must be legitimate has caught some interest in the preparatory
works. It is considered to have a direct link to the legal grounds set out in article 6.30 The
following list are examples of decisions by the Datainspektionen under the previous act,
the Personuppgiftslagen.
– Personal data cannot be used in the measurement of performance at the workplace.
– TheData protection authority also found that an organisationwas not allowed to hand
over gathered information about its members to a third party for marketing purposes.
– It was also concluded that a school could not use collected social security numbers of
its students to be used to publish the schedules of the students online.
– Lastly, it was found to not be allowed to gather personal information regarding the
performance of legislative workers. Although the restriction only becomes relevant if
the information is collected by the means of how work is performed and when the
workers would take breaks, as well as if the purpose of collection would be in order to
find grounds for performance salaries.31
According to article 5(c) GDPR, which regulates data minimization, the personal
information that is processed should be adequate and relevant in regard to the purpose of
collection. In addition, the information gathered cannot be too broad compared to the
underlying reason the information was gathered. This is in order to minimize the amount
of personal data collected and stored to further protect the individual integrity of people.32
Aswith purpose limitations, there still has not been any Swedish court case that concerns
data minimization under the GDPR. However, also here, reference can be made to the
situation under prior legislation, the Personuppgiftslagen. One example is how the data
processing at a companymay not be considered relevant or adequate. This became evident
in a case concerning a supermarket, which in a few seconds registered personal details of
customers buying beer with a degree of alcohol, in order to prevent someone underage
from buying the products as sales to persons under the age of 18 was not permitted. The
Data Protection Authority came to the conclusion that the purpose to prevent the sales of
alcoholic beer to persons under the age of 18 did not require collection of all this personal
data from all customers. Thus, it was not an adequate method and therefore was contrary
to the Personuppgiftslagen.33
Another example of a breach of the principle of data minimization concerns the
collection of personal information at a company. A company gathered information
containing for example the gender, sexual orientation and ethnicity of its employees. The
30 Prop. 2017/18:105 p 47. See also SOU 2001:32 p 122 f where it is noted that the term legitimate does not
have an independent meaning in relation to the requirement of the purpose being specified and explicit.
31 Öman, 2019, p. 121.
32 Ibid, p 126.
33 Datainspektionen beslut 1978-2004.
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reason was to prevent discrimination at the workplace, specifically as regards promotions,
salaries, etc. The collection of data was entirely voluntary, without any consequences if
not answered. The Datainspektionen found that this method violated the
Personuppgiftslagen. The decision was appealed to the Administrative County Court of
Stockholm (Förvaltningsrätten), which came to the same conclusion as the
Datainspektionen, on the following grounds. According to the court, the gathered
information would not be a large enough basis for the purpose of the process, which
consequently created an unnecessary storage of highly personal information. Furthermore,
the court considered the information to be too wide compared to the purpose of its use.
Lastly, it concluded that there would be a need for long term storage of the personal
information, which would clash with the principal of storage minimization.34
From the decisions described above, several conclusions can be drawn. The main
conclusion is that the Swedish view concerning the former legislation (Personuppgiftslagen)
which has to a large extent been transferred into the GDPR, is that when sensitive data,
such as social security numbers and facts about ethnicity and sexual orientation etc, are
collected, there need to exist a very clear purpose and specific management of said
information. Therefore, one could conclude that the Swedish interpretation of the previous
legislation and thus the GDPR clearly and accurately follows the wording in the legislation.
Question 4
Regarding consent, one of the legal bases stipulated in the GDPR, article 6(a) provides that
personal information can be registered if consent is given to use the information for one
or several specific purposes. The term consent is defined in article 4(11) GDPR. There is
a burden of proof in that the controller has to be able to show that consent has been given
for each specific processing.35 This is particularly important as a consent can bewithdrawn
at any time. Furthermore, the principles in article 5(1)GDPR, have to be upheld regardless
the legal bases for the processing and thus also when consent is used.
Concerning the legal base legitimate interest, this is stipulated in article 6(f) GDPR.
There are no general rules on what constitutes legitimate interest, but what may be
considered as legitimate interests needs to be established on a case by case basis. As of yet,
there has not been any Swedish court cases dealing with legitimate interests under GDPR.
However, the concept applied also under the previous legislation. The following examples
illustrates considerations in relation to legitimate interest.
34 The Stockholm Administrative County Court, case 13371-17, judgement 25 June 2018.
35 Art. 7(1) GDPR.
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– The Data protection authority found that ‘local authorities’ (kommunalförbund) did
not have legitimate interest in a case where the garbage collector kept detailed
information of the content of garbage of individual people.36
– The Sundsvall Administrative Court of Appeal concluded that a person who requested
thousands of grades to perform a study on the correlation between secondary school
and high school grades, in fact had a legitimate interest.37
– The StockholmAdministrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm concluded that collecting
statistics on how the healthcare system works did not serve as legitimate interest.38
– The Gothenburg Administrative Court of Appeal held that examining the terms of
contract between a parking company and its customers in order to provide feedback
was not a legitimate interest.39
These examples gives a first impression on how Swedish courts reason in cases relating to
legitimate interest. It can be concluded that a clear overstepping of personal integrity, as
with the example of the garbage disposal company, cannot be justified on the grounds of
legitimate interest. Swedish courts and the Datainspektionen seem to be more willing to
accept that there is a legitimate interest when the personal data are less intrusive. In addition,
research purposes may generally constitute a legitimate interest.
Question 5
The fast development of technology and digitalization means that digital solutions are
used in people’s everyday life to a large extent. Sweden could be considered as an advanced
high-tech countrywhere digital solutions are awidely used inmore andmore areas. Swedish
public authorities have come far in the development of digital public services. Another
interesting area is that of payments, as physical money (cash) is being phased out and is
no longer accepted inmost shops, restaurants, etc. Consequently, also quite young children
need to have access to bank-cards and other digital payment solutions (Swish). This has
contributed to a rather intense debate on ‘data as a commodity’,40 its consequences and
risks.
A considerable part of the on-going debate relates to security in different forms, that
is the protection of data and information. However, the issue of personal data as payment
36 Datainspektionen beslut 1730-2014.
37 The Sundsvall Administrative Court of Appeal, case 719-04 and 761-04, judgement 4 June 2004.
38 The Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal, case 7262-14, judgement 12 January 2015. It should be
noted that this finding has been questioned.
39 The Gothenburg Administrative Court of Appeal, case 7074-15 and 165-16, judgement 23 March 2016.
40 Personal data has in the debate often been referred to as “the new oil”.
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is also part of these discussions. The Swedish Consumer Agency published a report on
‘personal data as payment methods’ from a consumer perspective.41 The report states as a
starting point that personal data have an economic value in real terms. In fact, it is a central
part of the digital economy. Thus, it must be analyzed from a consumer rights’ perspective.
However, most consumer protection is directed towards the relationship business –
consumer, which leads to the exclusion ofmany actorswithin themore network constructed
Internet based eco-system.42
In the National Integrity Report 2019, the NSA found that some of the most common
questions received by the authority concerned direct marketing and whether it is legal to
use personal data for marketing purposes through mail and e-mail without the person’s
consent.43
It can thus be concluded that the debate is very much on-going.
Question 6
Article 22 GDPR gives the data subject the right not to be subjected to decisions based
only on automated decision-making. This general principle is subject to a number of
exemptions, one being national law. It follows from the Swedish Data Protection Act44
that the principle shall not apply if it can be considered contrary to the Swedish
Constitution, the Freedom of press Act45 or the Fundamental Law on Freedom of
Expression.46 Furthermore, the principle shall not apply where personal data is processed
for journalistic purposes or for academic, artistic or literary creation.47
In addition, the Swedish Administrative Act includes a general stipulation allowing
for automated decision-making.48 A cooperation between public authorities on the one
hand, and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKR) has interpreted
this stipulation as an exemption from Article 22(2)(b) GDPR.49
Regarding safeguarding measures, the data subject should as a minimum level have
the right to human intervention on the part of the controller to be able to articulate its
stand point and to contest the decision.50 The preparatory works to the previous Data
Protection Act (the Personal Data Act) emphasize that as a starting-point the automated
41 Larsson, S and Ledendal, J, “Personuppgifter sombetalningsmedel”, Konsumentverket, KO, Rapport 2017:4.
42 Ibid, p. 10.
43 Nationell integritetsrapport 2019, Datainspektionens rapport 2019:2, p. 42.
44 Chapter 1, Section 7 Dataskyddslagen.
45 Tryckfrihetsförordning (1949:105).
46 Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag (1991:1469).
47 Chapter 1, Section 7, para. 2 Dataskyddslagen.
48 Section 28 Förvaltningslagen (2017:900).
49 eSam, uttalande 2018-03-19, see Öman, 2019, p. 370.
50 Öman, 2019, p. 371.
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(contested) decision should be replaced by a new one in case where this is motivated and
shown by the manual (human) re-view. However, there is no legal obligation to re-view
the automated decision.51
Question 7
The so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ stipulated in article 17 GDPR may be considered
extensive, but has in fact rather extensive exemptions. Under national Swedish law, the
article cannot be applied in a manner that would restrict or prevent the principle on public
access to official documents or the freedom of press, nor where personal data is processed
for journalistic purposes or for academic, artistic or literary creation.52 Furthermore, article
17 GDPR does itself contain a number of exemptions where the right to be forgotten does
not apply.
Decisions under article 17 GDPR taken by an authority (including state, municipality
and regional organization) may be challenged in administrative courts.53
The interpretation of the phrase ‘erasure’ has been discussed in Sweden. On a general
level it should mean that the relevant personal data should be destroyed, that is deleted in
a way so they cannot be recreated. In Swedish the term ‘thin out’ (gallra) is used.54 In the
preparatory works to the previous legislation, the Personal information Act, it was stated
that personal data were not been erased in the meaning of the Data Protection Directive,
if the data could be recreated using technical means and methods commonly accessible
on the market.55
The right for the data controller not to erase personal data, has been addressed in a
number of court-cases. For instance, the SupremeAdministrative Court found that in case
publicly accessible documents, which are required to be archived, include personal data,
these personal data could not be erased.56 The Administrative Court of Appeal came to
the same conclusion in a case where the complainant requested his/her personal data to
be erased from records in the County Court.57
51 SOU 1997:39 p. 405.
52 Chapter 1, Section 7 Dataskyddslagen.
53 Chapter 7, Section 2 Dataskyddslagen. This stipulation corresponds to what was previously Section 52
Personuppgiftslagen.
54 Öman, Sören, Dataskyddsförordningen (GDPR) m.m. En kommentar, Ed 1:1, Norstedts Juridik 2019, p.
333.
55 SOU 1997:39 p. 400.
56 Supreme Administrative Court, case no 5437-18, judgment 13 February 2019.




Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Swedish constitution58, as has been described
above (see Question 6). The National Swedish Data Protection Act excludes application
of the GDPR in case it would be contrary to the Swedish constitution the Freedom of press
Act or the constitution the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.59 The stipulation
expressly states that articles 5-30 and 35-50 of GDPR and Chapter 2-5 the Data Protection
Act, shall not apply to processing of personal data for journalistic purposes or for academic,
artistic or literary creation.60 There is extensive court practice concerning the interpretation
and limits of ‘journalistic purposes’. In summary can be said that publication I of
information on the Internet with the aim to inform, criticize and create debate on current
issues of interest to the general public, has been considered as ‘journalistic purposes’. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has found that publication of information of purely
private or personal character could normally not be considered as having ‘journalistic
purposes’ even where the publication would be in a context that has ‘journalistic purposes,
in other respects.61
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
Sweden was the first country in the world to set up a NSA, the Datainspektionen, which
was established in 1973. Its task was to safeguard the world’s first Data Protection Act,
entering into force that same year.62 Consequently, theDatainspektionen, has considerable
experience as the surveillance authority for data protection in Sweden.
Presently the Datainspektionen has about 80 members of staff, most of whom are
lawyers. It is led by the Director-General, who is (as every Director-General of a Swedish
authority) appointed by the government. The other positions are appointed following a
standard recruitment process.
In addition to being the supervisory authority under the GDPR, the Swedish Data
ProtectionAuthority, is also Sweden’s national supervisory authority regarding processing
of personal data under the Schengen Convention, that is to say the convention on the EU’s
customs information systems, the Decision of the Council on the establishment of the EU
58 Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag (1991:1469).
59 Chapter 1, Section 7, para 1 Dataskyddslagen, see above Question 6.
60 Chapter 1, Section 7, para 2 Dataskyddslagen.




Agency for law enforcement cooperation (Europol), the VIS Regulation, and the Eurodac
Regulation.63
The Datainspektionen has a wide range of tasks. Its main fields of activity can be
summarized as follows.
– Information: disseminating information and providing advice is an important part of
the Datainspektionen’s tasks.
– Complaints, inquiries and tips: following up on complaints and carrying out inquiries
into the application of the legislation for whichDatainspektionen exercises supervision.
– Inspections: carrying out checks that laws and regulations are complied with through
its own observations of companies, authorities and organizations. This is done through
visits or by letter, phone or e-mail. Inspections are mostly planned, but can also be
made following complaints or tip-offs from individuals or reports in the media.
– Legislative work: drawing up its own statutes with general regulations and publishing
general guidelines with recommendations.
– Permits – issuing permits for companies to carry on debt recovery and credit rating
activities. It should be noted that permits are not required to process personal data.
Datainspektionen’s task and powers are stipulated in the Dataskyddslagen.64
Question 10
During the period 25 May 2018 to 23 April 2019, the Swedish NSA, the Datainspektionen
received around 3,100 complaints concerning data protection. Around 80 per cent of these
complaints concern private actors.65
TheDatainspektionen is not obliged to act on a tip or a complaint. The decisionwhether
to open an investigation and carry out an inspection depends among others on:
– whether it is a matter of a recurrent and systematic breach of regulations
– if there are serious shortcomings
– if it is a single case or a general breach of regulations
– if it is something that the Datainspektionen has already investigated.66
The Datainspektionen emphasizes the importance for any individual who suspects that
his/her personal data is being processed in a way that does not comply with the GDPR, to
63 See for more information Datainspektionen’s homepage: www.datainspektionen.se.
64 Chapter 6, Section 1 Dataskyddslagen.
65 Thesewere complaints under theGDPR, theCriminalDataAct, theCamera SurveillanceAct and the former
Camera Surveillance Act. Nationell integritetsrapport 2019, Datainspektionens rapport 2019:2, p. 45.
66 See Datainspektionen’s homepage: www.datainspektionen.se.
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always try to resolve the problems themselves first. People are advised to contact the data
processor with their concern and to follow-up to see what action has been taken to rectify
non-compliant behaviour.67
Decisions by theDatainspektionen can be appealed, inwhich case theDatainspektionen
will become party to the proceedings.68 As the standing of the Datainspektionen in court
cases on the appeal against its decisions has remained unchanged in subsequent legislation,
the case law in which the Datainspektionen has acted as a party is extensive.
Question 11
At the time of writing of this national report, the Datainspektionen had issued only two
decisions imposing fines.
The first case concerned a school in northern Sweden that had conducted a pilot using
facial recognition to keep track of students’ attendance in school. The test run was
conducted in one school class for a limited period of time. The Datainspektionen found
that the test violated several articles in GDPR.
The school had processed sensitive biometric data unlawfully and failed to do an
adequate impact assessment, including seeking prior consultation with the
Datainspektionen. The school had based the processing on consent, but the
Datainspektionen considered that consent was not a valid legal bases given the clear
imbalance between the data subject and the controller.69
The Datainspektionen imposed a fine on the municipality of approximately 20,000
euro. In Sweden, public authorities can receive a maximum fine of 10 million SEK
(approximately 1 million euro).70 The fine issued in this case, was the first one imposed
by the Datainspektionen. The decision has been appealed and the case is pending.
The second case concerned a credit information site, called www.mrkoll.se.71 On that
web-site the companyNusvarAB published various information, including economic and
financial information about all Swedish citizens above the age of 16. The aim of the site is
to present official information of general interest concerning private individuals, such as
for example social security number, housing situation, possession of vehicles, certain legal
information and some information that is not public whichmay include telephone number.
Further, the web-site contained economic and financial information that including
67 Ibid.
68 Chapter 7 Section 3 Dataskyddslagen. See Öman, Sören, Dataskyddsförordningen (GDPR) m.m. En kom-
mentar, Ed 1:1, Norstedts Juridik 2019, p. 730 f.
69 Datainspektionen Decision, 20 August 2019, Reference number DI-2019-2221.
70 Chapter 6, Section 2, para 2 Dataskyddslagen.
71 Datainspektionen Decision, 13 December 2019, Reference number DI-2018-22737.
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information on payment defaults. Such information was clustered in groups of 22-28
persons. In addition Nusvar AB also published information gathered from a large number
of courts, including information on criminal charges and judgements.
In its decision Datainspektionen found that Nusvar AB had processed personal data
contrary to articles 5 and 10 the GDPR. The fact that information was published about all
Swedes above the age of 16, around 8 million people was considered aggravating
circumstances, as well as the fact that information about criminal charges and judgements
were published in connection with information of payment defaults. As Nusvar AB was
a newly started undertaking, Datainspektionen estimated the turnover to at least 4,8MSEK.
Based on this the fine was set to 35,000 euro.
Question 12
Article 82GDPR is the successor of article 23 of theData ProtectionDirective.72 In Sweden
there has been a number of cases under the previous statute implementing thatDirective.73
It should be pointed out that questions of damages are dealt with under national tort law.
In general, a data subject will be granted cost-recovery in case of damage as a result of data
breaches. However, damages for intangible harm have been kept low. By way of example,
the following cases can be mentioned. In a case where a person online named five persons,
accusing them of rape, damages of 5,000 SEK (ca. 500 euro) were awarded.74 In another
case, a person had published a summary of a criminal judgment on Facebook, which
resulted in the award of damages of 15,000 SEK (ca. 1,500 euro).75 Even if examples of
higher damages can be found, generally the amount of damages in Sweden is relatively
low.
Question 13
The possibility for data subjects to be represented by an organization does not seem to be
commonly used in Sweden. Under Swedish law, the data subject does retain standing as
a party in such proceedings. Hence the data subject will have to issue a power of attorney
72 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995]
OJ L281/31.
73 Personuppgiftslagen (1998:204).
74 District Court of Helsingborg (Helsingborgs tingsrätt), case no B 3915-00, Judgment 31 January 2001.
75 District Court of Mora (Mora tingsrätt), case no B 26-16 Judgment 9 September 2016.
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in favour of the organization representing it. There is also a risk that the data subject would
be (at least partly) responsible for any litigation costs.76
Question 14
Datainspektionen emphasizes its European co-operation, such as, for example, its
participation in the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). Furtherit participates in
co-operation within Schengen, Visa Information System (VIS) and Eurodac.
Concerning participation in the legislative process, Datainspektionen submits opinions
in a large number of consultative statements which become part of the preparatory works.
These statements are especially focusing on the issue that personal privacy is protected
effectively. Further, Datainspektionen draws up its own statutes with general regulations
andpublishes general guidelineswith recommendations on various issues.Datainspektionen
also reviews drafts of statutes, requests for comment from the council on legislation and
government bills, and sits on expert commissions and committees.77
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
Directive 2016/680/EC, is implemented into Swedish law by theBrottsdatalagen.78 ‘National
security’ is excluded from its application, both national security handled by the police, as
well as national security handled by the military.79
Following the Tele2 and Watson judgments, the Swedish government issued an
investigation. Following the legislative process, the national Swedish laws on storage and
access to information on electronic communication in relation to crime-fighting, have
been adjusted to EU legislation. The new stipulations entered into force 1 October 2019.80
76 Öman, Sören, Dataskyddsförordningen (GDPR) m.m. En kommentar, Ed 1:1, Norstedts Juridik 2019, p
578.
77 See Datainspektionen’s homepage: www.datainspektionen.se.
78 Brottsdatalag (2018:1177).
79 Chapter 1, Section 4 Brottsdatalagen.
80 Lag om ändring i lagen (2003:389) om elektronisk kommunikation, Lag om ändring i lagen (2017:718) om
ändring i lagen (2012:279) om ändring i lagen (2012:278) om inhämtning av uppgifter om elektronisk
kommunikation i de brottsbekämpande myndigheternas underrättelseverksamhet, and Lag om ändring i







Im föderativen Staatssystem der Schweiz ist der Datenschutz auf mehreren staatlichen
Ebenen geregelt. Für den Umgang mit Personendaten wichtige Grundsätze finden sich
bereits in der Schweizer Bundesverfassung (BV),1 z. B. in Art. 13 BV (Schutz der
Privatsphäre) und Art. 27 BV (Wirtschaftsfreiheit). Die Einzelheiten hierzu sind im
Wesentlichen in dem im Jahr 1992 geschaffenen Bundesgesetz über denDatenschutz (DSG
1992),2 in der dazugehörigen Verordnung (VDSG)3 sowie in ergänzenden Empfehlungen
und dergleichen (sog. soft law) geregelt. Hinzu kommt das neue
Schengen-Datenschutzgesetz4 (dazu unten Frage 1.1). Im Bereich des öffentlichen
kantonalen Rechts gelten zudem kantonale Bestimmungen (auf welche in diesem Bericht
jedoch nicht eingegangen wird).5
Auf der internationalen Ebene war die Europarats-Datenschutzkonvention No. 108
(im Folgenden: Europaratskonvention 108) für die Schweiz das erste rechtsverbindliche
internationale Instrument im Bereich des Datenschutzes (für die Schweiz verbindlich seit
dem 1.2.1998).6 Sie stellt für das schweizerische Recht auch heute noch den wichtigsten
internationalen Referenzpunkt dar. Die Konvention wurde von 2011 bis 2018 inhaltlich
modernisiert (im Folgenden: Europaratskonvention 108+).7 Nach anfänglichemAbwarten
* Lic. iur. Rechtsanwalt, Zürich/Bern. Der Verfasser dankt seiner Assistentin Carla Bertossa, MLaw, für die
kompetente Mitarbeit.
1 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999 (BV), SR 101.
2 Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz vom 19.6.1992 (DSG), SR 235.1.
3 Verordnung zum Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz vom 14.6.1993 (VDSG), SR 235.11.
4 Bundesgesetz über denDatenschutz imRahmenderAnwendung des Schengen-Besitzstands in Strafsachen
(Schengen-Datenschutzgesetz) vom 28.9.2018 (SDSG), SR 235.3.
5 Zum geltenden Schweizer Datenschutzrecht in der Schweiz siehe etwa David Rosenthal/Yvonne Jöhri,
Handkommentar zum Datenschutzgesetz sowie weiteren, ausgewählten Bestimmungen, 2. Auflage, Zürich:
Schulthess 2018; Bruno Baeriswyl/Kurt Pärli (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar zum Datenschutzgesetz
(DSG), Bern: Stämpfli 2015; Urs Maurer-Lambrou/Gabor P. Blechta (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar. Daten-
schutzgesetz, Öffentlichkeitsgesetz, 3. Auflage, Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn 2014 sowie EvaMaria Belser/Astrid
Epiney/Bernhard Waldmann, Datenschutzrecht. Grundlagen und öffentliches Recht, Bern: Stämpfli 2011.
6 Übereinkommen vom 28. Januar 1981 zum Schutz des Menschen bei der automatischen Verarbeitung
personenbezogener Daten, SEV Nr. 108, für die Schweiz SR 0.235.1.
7 Änderungsprotokoll zudemÜbereinkommenzumSchutz desMenschenbei der automatischenVerarbeitung
personenbezogener Daten vom 18. Mai 2018, SEV Nr. 223; siehe hierzu www.coe.int/de/web/conventions/
full-list/-/conventions/treaty/223?_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_languageId=en_GB
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beschloss der Schweizer Bundesrat (Bundesregierung) am30.10.2019 dieUnterzeichnung8,
welche am21.11.2019 beimEuroparat in Strassburg hinterlegtwurde9.Mit derÜberweisung
an das Parlament am 6.12.2019 leitete der Bundesrat sodann umgehend das
Ratifikationsverfahren in die Wege.10 Bereits am 23.1.2020 stimmte die wichtige
Fachkommission desNationalrats derGenehmigung derKonvention deutlich zu.11 Damit
wird u.a. die Signalwirkung angestrebt, dass die Schweiz die internationale Erhöhung des
Datenschutz-Standards mittragen will.12
Vor diesem Hintergrund sowie angesichts der Neuerungen im EU-Datenschutzrecht
(dazu sogleich imRahmen der Beantwortung der Fragen) befindet sich das schweizerische
Datenschutzrecht derzeit in einem grundlegenden Erneuerungsprozess. Dieser Bericht
zielt insbesondere darauf, die gestellten Fragen im Licht der künftigen Rechtslage in der
Schweiz zu beantworten, soweit dies im Zeitpunkt der Schriftlegung (letzte Anpassungen
am 12.2.2020) und in Anbetracht der Unwägbarkeiten des noch laufenden politischen
Prozesses möglich ist.
sowie Council of Europe, Convention 108 +. Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2018, https://rm.coe.int/convention-108-
convention-for-the-protection-of-individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1.Hinweis: Die Fundstellen derOnline-
Quellen wurden zuletzt am 12.2.2020 besucht.
8 Für die Ankündigung siehe Protokoll Nationalrat 24.9.2019, Votum 14, www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/
amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=47356#votum14. Zum Beschluss des
Bundesrates siehe dieMedienmitteilung vom30.10.2019:Datenschutzkonventiondes Europarates: Bundesrat
beschliesst Unterzeichnung, www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2019/2019-10-30.html.
9 Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 223, https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/223/signatures.
10 Medienmitteilung Bundesrat: Datenschutzkonvention des Europarates: Bundesrat verabschiedet Botschaft;
https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/de/home/aktuell/news/2019/2019-12-061.html#moreinfos-tab-1. Botschaft:
Botschaft zur Genehmigung des Protokolls vom 10. Oktober 2018 zur Änderung des Übereinkommens
zum Schutz des Menschen bei der automatischen Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten; https://
www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/aktuell/news/2019/2019-12-061/bot-d.pdf.
11 Medienmitteilung der Staatspolitischen Kommission des Nationalrats (SPK-NR) vom 24.1.2020: “Grünes
Licht für die Ratifizierung des Datenschutzübereinkommens des Europarates. Die SPK-NR hat sich mit 19
zu 6 Stimmen für das Protokoll zur Änderung des Übereinkommens des Europarates zum Schutz des
Menschen bei der automatischenVerarbeitung personenbezogenerDaten (Konvention 108+) ausgesprochen
(19.068).Damit beantragt sie ihremRat, denBundesrat zurRatifizierung dieses Instruments zu ermächtigen.”,
https://www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/mm-spk-n-2020-01-24.aspx.
12 Medienmitteilung des Bundesrat vom30.10.2019 (Fn. 8): “Mit derUnterzeichnung bekennt sich die Schweiz
zu einem international anerkanntenDatenschutzstandard […].” Sieheweiter ausführlich Jacques Beglinger,
Fragen & Antworten zur modernisierten Datenschutzkonvention 108 des Europarats und zur EU-Daten-
schutzäquivalenz, Ausgabe 2019-12.1, Online-Publikation, Bern: SwissHoldings, abrufbar unter https://
swissholdings.ch/dossier-datenschutzrevision, Frage 28 ff.
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A Setting the Scene – Weichenstellung
Frage 1
Relevanz des EU-Datenschutzrechts für das Schweizer Recht
Die Schweiz nimmt in ihrem europäischen Umfeld eine besondere Stellung ein: Sie ist
zwar Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation (EFTA), nicht aber des
EuropäischenWirtschaftsraums (EWR).13 Stattdessen setzt die Schweiz in ihremVerhältnis
zur EU den bereits in den 1950er Jahren eingeschlagenen Weg der sog. bilateralen
(vornehmlich schweizerische Terminologie) bzw. sektoriellen (vornehmlich
EU-Terminologie) Abkommen fort.14
Die in der Fragestellung erwähnte SekundärgesetzgebungderEU ist zwar vollumfänglich
für den EWR relevant, nicht aber in gleichem Masse für das bilaterale Recht zwischen der
Schweiz und der EU. Unmittelbare rechtliche Berührungspunkte bestehen nur zum Teil,
insofern als die Thematik von den Schengen-15 und Dublin-Assoziationsabkommen16
erfasst wird.17 Via diese Abkommen ist die EU-Richtlinie 2016/68018 auch für die Schweiz
relevant.19 Im Revisionsprozess des Schweizer DSG wurde dieser Teil zeitlich vorgezogen.
13 Zur Rolle der Schweiz in der Entstehungsgeschichte des EWR siehe insbesondere Philippe G. Nell, Suisse-
Communauté Européenne. Au coeur des négotiations sur l’Espace économique européen, Paris: Economica
2012; Dieter Freiburghaus, Königsweg oder Sackgasse? Schweizer Europapolitik von 1945 bis heute, 2. über-
arbeitete Auflage, Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2015.
14 ZumGanzen siehe etwaMatthiasOesch,Europarecht. Band I: Grundlagen, Institutionen, Verhältnis Schweiz-
EU, 2. Auflage, Bern: Stämpfli 2019; Thomas Cottier et al., Die Rechtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der
EuropäischenUnion, Bern: Stämpfli 2014, sowie Christa Tobler/Jacques Beglinger,Grundzüge des bilateralen
(Wirtschafts-)Rechts. Systematische Darstellung in Text und Tafeln, 2 Bände (Text und Tafeln), Zürich/St.
Gallen: Dike 2013.
15 Abkommen vom 26. Oktober 2004 zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, der Europäischen
Union und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft über die Assoziierung dieses Staates bei der Umsetzung,
Anwendung und Entwicklung des Schengen-Besitzstands, für die Schweiz SR 0.362.31, für die EU und die
EG (heute nur noch die EU), ABl. 2008 L 53/52.
16 Abkommen vom26.Oktober 2004 zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft über die Kriterien und Verfahren zur Bestimmung des zuständigen Staates für die Prüfung
eines in einem Mitgliedstaat oder in der Schweiz gestellten Asylantrags, für die Schweiz SR 0.142.392.68,
für die EG (heute die EU) ABl. 2008 L 53/5.
17 Hierzu Jacques Beglinger, ‚Die Schweiz und der (digitale) EU-Binnenmarkt – Swiss country report‘, in: The
internal market and the digital economy, Proceedings FIDE Congress 2018 vol.1, Coimbra: FIDE, 2018, S.
768 f., mit weiteren Hinweisen.
18 Richtlinie 2016/680/EU zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten
durch die zuständigen Behörden zum Zwecke der Verhütung, Ermittlung, Aufdeckung oder Verfolgung
von Straftaten oder der Strafvollstreckung sowie zum freien Datenverkehr und zur Aufhebung des Rah-
menbeschlusses 2008/977/JI des Rates, ABl. 2016 L 119/89.
19 Hierzu die Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Totalrevision des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz
und die Änderung weiterer Erlasse zum Datenschutz, BBl 2017 S. 6991 ff., https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/
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Das daraus resultierte Schengen-Datenschutzgesetz (SDSG)20 ist am 1.3.2019 in Kraft
getreten.
Im Gegensatz dazu ergibt sich für die EU-Verordnung 2016/67921 (Daten-
schutzgrundverordnung, DSGVO) eine Verbindlichkeit für die Schweiz nicht aus den
erwähnten Abkommen mit der EU.22 Nach der Auffassung der Bundesbehörden erfolgt
die jetzt laufende Anpassung des Schweizer Rechts an die DSGVO deshalb unabhängig
von abkommensrechtlichen Verpflichtungen im Weg des sog. autonomen Nachvollzugs,
um so die schweizerische Datenschutzgesetzgebung insgesamt den Anforderungen der
DSGVO anzunähern.23 Diese Strategie der einseitigen Anpassung des Schweizer Rechts
an ausgewähltes EU-Recht zielt darauf, den Wirtschaftsaustausch auch ausserhalb von
formellen Abkommen zu erleichtern.24
Angemessenheitsregime
Die soeben erwähnte Strategie des autonomen Nachvollzugs will weiter erreichen, dass
die Schweiz die im internen EU-Recht für Drittstaaten vorgesehene Angemessenheits-
bzw. (nach schweizerischerTerminologie)Äquivalenzanerkennung gemässArt. 45DSGVO
beibehalten kann.25 Dabei geht es um die Angemessenheit der Schweizer
Datenschutzniveaus,wobei gemässErwägung105 inderPräambel derDSGVOder Standard
der Europaratskonvention 108 bzw. 108+ ein wesentliches Element darstellt:
Insbesondere sollte der Beitritt des Drittlands zum Übereinkommen des
Europarates vom 28. Januar 1981 zum Schutz des Menschen bei der
automatischenVerarbeitungpersonenbezogenerDatenunddemdazugehörigen
Zusatzprotokoll berücksichtigt werden. Die Kommission sollte den Ausschuss
federal-gazette/2017/6941.pdf. Nach schweizerischer Terminologie wird der einen Regierungsentwurf
begleitende erläuternde Bericht zuhanden des Parlaments als „Botschaft” bezeichnet.
20 Bundesgesetz über denDatenschutz imRahmenderAnwendung des Schengen-Besitzstands in Strafsachen
(Schengen-Datenschutzgesetz, SDSG), SR 235.3.
21 Verordnung 2016/679/EU zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener
Daten, zum freien Datenverkehr und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz-Grundverord-
nung), ABl. 2016 L 119/8.
22 Hierzu Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 6998. Anderer Auffassung Astrid Epiney, ‚Verweise auf EU-Sekundärrecht
im Bilateralen Recht. Zur Reichweite von Verweisen auf EU-Sekundärrecht in den Bilateralen Abkommen
bei der Weiterentwicklung des Unionsrechts’, Jusletter 11. September 2017.
23 Hierzu etwa Walter A. Stoffel/Claudia Seitz, ‚Autonomer Nachvollzug – Das Wirtschaftsrecht der Schweiz
zwischen Angleichung und Eigenständigkeit’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2012, 841-843.
24 Die DSGVO entfaltet in praktischer Hinsicht in der Schweiz bereits Wirkung, indem sie nicht nur
Sachverhalte innerhalb der EU, sondern geographisch auch darüber hinaus erfasst, also auch in der Schweiz
(Umschreibung des räumlichen Anwendungsbereichs nach Art. 3 DSGVO).
25 Ausführlich Beglinger, Fragen & Antworten (Fn. 12), Frage 49 ff.
600
Jacques Beglinger
konsultieren, wenn sie das Schutzniveau in Drittländern oder internationalen
Organisationen bewertet.26
Im Rahmen des früheren EU-Rechts (Richtlinie 95/46)27 liegt für die Schweiz eine
Äquivalenzentscheidung der Europäischen Kommission aus dem Jahr 2000 vor.28 Hier
stellen die neuen Regelungen der DSGVO für den Schweizer Rechtsrahmen
Herausforderungen dar, welche massgeblich zur nun laufenden Revision des Schweizer
Datenschutzrechtes geführt haben:29
“Künftig wird die schweizerischeGesetzgebung anhand der in derVerordnung
(EU) 2016/679 enthaltenen Anforderungen überprüft. Falls die Schweiz den
Angemessenheitsbeschluss beibehalten bzw. im Falle eines Widerrufs erneut
eine Bestätigung über das angemessene Datenschutzniveau erreichen möchte,
ist es insbesondere für die Wirtschaft von zentraler Bedeutung, dass die
schweizerische Gesetzgebung einen den Anforderungen dieser Verordnung
entsprechenden Schutz gewährleistet.”
Zu ergänzen bleibt, dass die Angemessenheit namentlich auch für Forschung und
Entwicklung an den Hochschulen von zentraler Bedeutung ist.
Nicht zuletzt vor diesemHintergrund hat der schweizerische parlamentarische Prozess
jüngst eine starke Beschleunigung erfahren.30 Zugleich hat sich politisch die Ansicht
durchgesetzt, dass sich der Schweizer Datenschutz inhaltlich den EU-Regeln weitgehend
annähern soll.31 Zusammen dürfte dies ermöglichen, dass die EU-Kommission in der
26 Siehe neuestens auch Medienmitteilung des Bundesrats vom 30.10.2019 (Fn. 9): “Schliesslich kommt ihr
[d.h. Europaratskonvention 108+] auch im Rahmen der anstehenden Angemessenheitsprüfung des
schweizerischen Datenschutzniveaus durch die EU grosse Tragweite zu: Die EU berücksichtigt bei ihrem
Entscheid jeweils, ob die entsprechenden Drittstaaten der Konvention beigetreten sind.”
27 Richtlinie 95/46/EG zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und
zum freien Datenverkehr, ABl. 1995 L 281/31 (in der EU nicht mehr in Kraft).
28 Entscheidung 2000/518/EU gemäß der Richtlinie 95/46/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates
über die Angemessenheit des Schutzes personenbezogener Daten in der Schweiz, ABl. 2000, L 215/1.
29 So der Bundesrat in der Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 6943.
30 Siehe etwaNeue Zürcher Zeitung,Weil ein Konfliktmit der EUdroht – der Ständerat gibt beimDatenschutz
Gas, 24.10.2019, https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/datenschutz-staenderat-beschleunigt-um-konflikt-mit-eu-
zu-meiden-ld.1516350; StaatspolitischeKommission Ständerat,Medienmitteilung, 25.10.2019: Kommission
unterbreitet dem Rat Transparenz-Initiative mit indirektem Gegenvorschlag, https://www.parlament.ch/
press-releases/Pages/mm-spk-s-2019-10-25.aspx: „Die Kommission hat die Beratungen zur Totalrevision
des Datenschutzgesetzes (DSG) (17.059) aufgenommen und hat das Eintreten einstimmig beschlossen. Da
es ihrer Ansicht nach gilt, möglichst rasch Rechtssicherheit zu schaffen im Hinblick auf die Äquivalenz zu
den Regelungen in der EU, behandelt sie das DSG in diesem Quartal prioritär […]”.
31 SDA-Meldung zur Behandlung im Ständerat als Zweitrat, 18.12.2019: “Ständerat ist bei der Revision des
Datenschutzgesetzes auf EU-Linie – Der Ständerat will den Schutz persönlicher Daten verstärken und die
Regeln für sogenanntes Profiling verschärfen. Bei der Revision des Datenschutzgesetzes weicht er damit
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aktuellenÜberprüfung derAngemessenheit betreffend die Schweiz bereits auf eine politisch
gefestigte Regulierungslage «post Revision» abstellen kann.
Frage 2
Der schweizerische Datenschutz beruht, zumindest betreffend die Bearbeitung von
Personendaten durch Private, im Wesentlichen auf dem Schutz der Persönlichkeit gemäss
Art. 27 ff. Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB).32 Auf der Ebene der Bundesverfassung sind weiter der
Schutz der Privatsphäre nach Art. 13 BV sowie die Wirtschaftsfreiheit nach Art. 27 BV
relevant.
Mit der Anpassung des DSG und weiterer Erlasse des schweizerischen nationalen
Rechts an internationaleDatenschutzstandards, namentlich an die Europaratskonvention
108+ und an die EU-DSGVO, erfährt der Schweizer Datenschutz zunehmend eine über
diese Grundsätze hinausgehende, erweiterte Prägung.
Da die Schweiz der EU nicht angehört, ist für sie die EU-Grundrechtecharta nicht
anwendbar.33 Hingegen gilt in der Schweiz die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention
(EMRK),34 welche in Art. 8 – gleich wie Art. 7 EU-Grundrechtecharta – das Recht auf
Achtung des Privatlebens schützt. Die EMRK enthält jedoch, anders als Art. 8
EU-Grundrechtecharta, keine explizite Bestimmung betreffend den Schutz der
personenbezogenen Daten. Jedoch wurde namentlich aus dem Gedanken des Schutzes
von verschiedenen Beschlüssen des Nationalrats ab. Das Ziel sind EU-kompatible Regeln.”, https://
www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20170059, sowieMedienmitteilung
Staatspolitische Kommission des Nationalrats, 24.1.2020: “Nach der Erstberatung durch die beiden Räte
wird nun dasDifferenzbereinigungsverfahren zur Totalrevision desDatenschutzgesetzes […] durchgeführt.
Die Staatspolitische Kommission des Nationalrates (SPK-NR) beantragt ihrem Rat, in mehreren wichtigen
Punkten dem Ständerat zu folgen, […]”, https://www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/mm-spk-n-2020-
01-24.aspx.
32 Die entsprechenden spezifischen Artikel sind seit dem 1. Juli 1985 in Kraft (AS 1984 778; BBl 1982 II 636).
Vgl. auch Frank Seethaler, ‚Entstehungsgeschichte des Datenschutzgesetzes‘, in: Basler Kommentar DSG
(Fn. 5), N 34 ff.
33 AndererMeinungEpiney,welche dieAuffassung vertreten, dass die EU-Grundrechte via bestimmte bilaterale
Abkommen bzw. via darin erwähntes EU-Recht auch in der Schweiz beachtet werden müssen; Astrid
Epiney, ‘ZurVerbindlichkeit der EU-Grundrechte in der und für die Schweiz‘, in: BernhardAltermatt/Gilbert
Casasus (Hrsg.), 50 Jahre Engagement der Schweiz im Europarat 1963-2013. Die Schweiz als Akteur oder
Zaungast der europäischen Integration?, Zürich: Somedia 2013, 141-158;MatthiasOesch/TobiasNaef, ‚EU-
Grundrechte, der EuGH und die Schweiz‘, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 2017 I, 117-144. Oesch
(S. 135 ff.) weist zudem darauf hin, dass die EuGH-Rechtsprechung zu Safe Harbour die Privacy
Shield-Regelung Schweiz-USA beeinflusst hat.




des Privatlebens und weiter der Freiheit der Meinungsäusserung gemäss Art. 10 EMRK35
die Idee des Datenschutzes entwickelt, die sodann in der Europaratskonvention 108 ihren
Niederschlag fand.
Die Annahme von materiell-rechtlichen DSGVO-Vorschriften in der nationalen
Rechtsordnung
Nachdem in der Schweiz die gesetzlicheAnnäherung an dieDSGVOnoch inVorbereitung
ist, besteht hierzu noch keine Praxis. Wo möglich, wird im Folgenden aber auf die
voraussichtlich künftige Gesetzeslage hingewiesen, wie sie sich im Zeitpunkt der
Schriftlegung darbietet. Die folgenden Hinweise hierzu beziehen sich auf den Entwurf zur
TotalrevisionDSG,wie er am15.9.2017 vomBundesrat zusammenmit einem erläuternden
Bericht (sog. «Botschaft») verabschiedet wurde.36 Der Entwurfstext wird im Folgenden als
E-DSG bezeichnet. Er befindet sich zur Zeit in der parlamentarischen Beratung. Mit dem
Abschluss der Parlamentsarbeiten wird im Frühling oder Sommer 2020 gerechnet. Unter
Umständen könnte das Gesetz anschliessend noch einem Referendum gemäss den Regeln
der schweizerischen Direktdemokratie unterstehen.
B Die Annahme von materiell-rechtlichen DSGVO-Vorschriften in
der nationalen Rechtsordnung
Frage 3
Nach schweizerischem Verständnis stellt die Verpflichtung zum Handeln nach Treu und
Glauben eine Fundamentalnormdar. Bereits Art. 5 Abs. 3 BV verlangt: «StaatlicheOrgane
und Private handeln nach Treu und Glauben.» Dies gilt somit auch für den Datenschutz.
Art. 5 E-DSG nimmt unter dem Titel «Grundsätze» den Gedanken der
Fundamentalnorm auf und fasst die verschiedenen Sätze – im Vergleich zum geltenden
Art. 4 DSG in leicht erweiterter Form) zusammen:
“Die Bearbeitung muss nach Treu und Glauben erfolgen und verhältnismässig
sein (Abs. 2). Personendaten dürfen nur zu einem bestimmten und für die
betroffene Person erkennbaren Zweck beschafft werden; sie dürfen nur so
35 Explanatory Report to the Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, in: Council of Europe, Convention 108 + (Fn. 7), ab S. 15, N 19.
Siehe auch Seethaler (Fn. 32), N 10.
36 Bundesrat,Medienmitteilung, 15.9.2017: DenDatenschutz verbessern und denWirtschaftsstandort stärken,




bearbeitet werden, dass es mit diesem Zweck vereinbar ist (Abs. 3). Sie werden
vernichtet oder anonymisiert, sobald sie zum Zweck der Bearbeitung nicht
mehr erforderlich sind (Abs. 4).”
Angesichts der Unbestimmtheit der Begriffe wird eine breite Auslegungstätigkeit der
Behörden und Gerichte unumgänglich sein.37
Frage 4
De lege lata sind die neuesten richterlichen Erwägungen massgeblich im Leitentscheid des
SchweizerischenBundesverwaltungsgerichtsMoneyhouse vom18.4.2019 zusammengefasst:38
Nach Art. 4 Abs. 5 zweiter Satz DSG 1992 ist zur rechtmässigen Bearbeitung von
Persönlichkeitsprofilen eine explizite Einwilligung der betroffenen Person notwendig.
Gemäss dem Bundesverwaltungsgericht erfordert die Einwilligung, dass die betroffene
Person in den Grundzügen über Gegenstand, Zweck und Umfang der beabsichtigten
Datenbearbeitung aufgeklärt sein muss, damit sie die Konsequenzen der Einwilligung
abschätzen kann.Die explizite Einwilligungmuss nachwiesenwerden;weder die persönliche
Benutzererkennung noch die Angabe eines Interessensnachweises vermögen die
Einwilligung der betroffenen Person zu substituieren. Im übrigen griff im vorliegenden
Fall die gesetzliche Vermutung von Art. 12 Abs. 3 DSG, wonach keine
Persönlichkeitsverletzung vorliegt, wenn die betroffene Person die Daten allgemein
zugänglich gemacht hat, so dass eine unbestimmte Zahl von Personen sie ohnewesentliche
Hindernisse in Erfahrung bringen kann, ohne die Bearbeitung ausdrücklich zu verbieten,
nicht. Hierfür wäre laut dem Bundesverwaltungsgericht erforderlich, dass die betroffene
Person ihre Daten mit Wissen und Willen allgemein zugänglich gemacht hat oder durch
einen Dritten zugänglich machen liess. Blosses Dulden der Handlung eines Dritten, ohne
etwas zum Zugänglichmachen beizutragen, genügt indes nicht (Moneyhouse, E. 5.4.1).
Mit Bezug auf eine Rechtfertigung aufgrund von überwiegenden öffentlichen und
privaten Interessen nachArt. 13DSGweist das Bundesverwaltungsgericht darauf hin, dass
öffentliche Interesse in der Praxis gegenüber den privaten Interessen immer eine
untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Zum einen bestehen für öffentliche Interessen häufig
gesetzliche Regelungen, die eine Datenbearbeitung auch ohne Interessenabwägung
37 Für Beispiele und Verweisungen siehe etwa Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7024 f.
38 Urteil des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts vom 18. April 2017 (A-4232/2015), EDÖB gegen Moneyhouse AG,
https://jurispub.admin.ch/publiws/download?decisionId=29c591dc-a585-4b62-b2fa-8e4efca92f73. Siehe
zur Thematik auch Tobias Fasnacht, Die Einwilligung im Datenschutzrecht. Vorgaben einer völkerrechtlich




rechtfertigen, zum anderen liegt zumeist, wenn ein überwiegendes öffentliches Interesse
gegeben ist, auch ein überwiegendes privates Interesse vor. Den privaten und öffentlichen
Interessen, die für die Datenbearbeitung sprechen, sind die berechtigten Interessen der
betroffenen Personen gegenüberzustellen; es ist folglich eine Interessenabwägung
vorzunehmen (Moneyhouse, E. 5.4.2).
De lege ferenda werden die Umstände der „Einwilligung” und des Überwiegens
„berechtigter Interessen”noch debattiert. Eine gesicherteAussage ist deshalb nichtmöglich.
Frage 5
Ein regulatorischer Niederschlag zur Verwendung von personenbezogenen Daten als
„Gegenleistung” für die Bereitstellung von digitalen Inhalten ist in der Schweiz nicht
auszumachen. In gesellschaftlicher Hinsicht wird eine entsprechende Diskussion jedoch
unter dem Schlagwort der «Datensouveränität» geführt.39
Spezifisch imPressewesenhabendie grossen SchweizerMedienhäuserTamedia, Ringier,
CH Media und NZZ sowie die öffentliche Mediengesellschaft SRG im September 2019
angekündigt, dass sie kollektiv ab September 2020 eine Registrierung für alleOnline-Inhalte
einführenwerden. «Durch die Registrierung erhalten dieMedienhäuser zusätzlichenDaten
von ihrenNutzern, was zielgenauereWerbung ermöglicht. Damit wollen dieVerleger ihre
Position im Wettbewerb mit den übermächtigen amerikanischen Technologiekonzernen
Google und Facebook stärken».40
Frage 6
Die Verpflichtung zur Vermeidung von rein automatisierten Entscheidungen ergibt sich
bereits aus Art. 9 Abs. 1 lit. a der Europaratskonvention 108+:
Every individual shall have a right […] not to be subject to a decision
significantly affecting him or her based solely on an automated processing of
data without having his or her views taken into consideration.
39 Vgl. etwa digitaleschweiz, Initiative für „Smart Switzerland”, Leitbild „Datensouveränität” – Impulse für
die Schaffung einer digitalen Privatautonomie, https://www.digitaleschweiz.ch/government/digitale-
souveranitat-ein-handlungsfeld-fur-vertrauenbildung; Florent Thouvenin, Rolf H. Weber, Alfred Früh,
Elemente einer Datenpolitik, Zürich: Schulthess 2019, S. 17, 32 ff.




De lege ferenda adressiert das E-DSG die Thematik in Art. 19 unter dem Titel
«Informationspflicht bei einer automatisiertenEinzelentscheidung».Die genauenUmstände
der Nutzung automatisierter Entscheidung werden aber noch debattiert.41 Eine gesicherte
Aussage ist deshalb nicht möglich.
Frage 7
In Art. 28 Abs. 2 lit. c. E-DSG wird entsprechend den Anforderungen von Art. 8 lit. e
Europaratskonvention 108+ ausdrücklich einKlagerecht auf Löschung formuliert, ähnlich
Art. 17 DSGVO. Dieses Recht auf Löschung entspricht im Bereich des Datenschutzes dem
«Recht aufVergessenwerden»,wie es generell aus demzivilrechtlichenPersönlichkeitsschutz
abgeleitet wird. Der E-DSG führt demnach grundsätzlich die bisherige Rechtslage fort.42
Frage 8
Ein entsprechendes Gesetzgebungsvorhaben im autonomen Nachvollzug (dazu oben zu
Frage 1) ist in der Schweiz nicht in Sicht.
C Nationale Durchsetzung von Datenschutzrecht
Frage 9
Im föderativen Datenschutzsystem der Schweiz ist die Aufsicht auf verschiedene staatliche
Ebenen aufgeteilt. Im Anwendungsbereich des DSG 1992 wird sie gemäss Art. 26 ff. des
Gesetzes durch den Eidgenössischen Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsberater (EDÖB)
ausgeübt. Auf kantonalem Niveau steht es den Kantonen frei, die Aufsicht eigenständig
und damit potentiell unterschiedlich zu gestalten. In der Praxis folgen die Kantone jedoch
in der Regel denselben Prinzipien.43 Die kantonalen Datenschutzgesetze sehen jeweils
ebenfalls eine Aufsichtsstelle vor.44 Daneben ist auch eine Vielzahl von kommunalen
Datenaufsichtsbehörden eingesetzt.
41 Vergleiche zum Aspekt, ob die Regulierung bereits beim Vorgang des Profilierens oder erst bei der Nutzung
des einmal entstanden Profils ansetzen soll, Cornelia Stengel / Luca Stäuble, Vom Persönlichkeitsprofil
zum Profiling mit hohem Risiko, Jusletter 20. Januar 2020.
42 Vgl. auch Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7077 f.
43 Siehe die Verweisungen zu den kantonalen Datenschutzgesetzen auf der Webseite von privatim, der Kon-
ferenz der schweizerischen Datenschutzbeauftragten, http://www.privatim.ch/de/privatim.
44 Idem für die Auflistung der kantonalen Aufsichtsbehörden.
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Eine im Jahr 2011 erstellte offizielle Evaluation der Wirksamkeit des DSG 1992 wies
auf Verbesserungsbedarf bei der Durchsetzung im Datenschutz hin. Zwar fehlt es nicht
an den rechtlichen Instrumenten, die grundsätzlich denjenigen in Vergleichsländern
ebenbürtig sind.45 Jedochwerden dieDurchsetzungsrechte zuwenig häufig beansprucht.46
Deshalb folgerte der Bundesratsbericht, dass in einer künftigen Revision u.a. zu prüfen
sei, ob die Aufsichtsmechanismen gestärkt und die Rechtsansprüche der Betroffenen sowie
deren Durchsetzung an die aufgrund der technologischen Entwicklungen veränderten
Verhältnisse angepasst werden sollten.47
Das E-DSG misst dementsprechend der Durchsetzung und Sanktionierung von
Datenschutzverletzungen grosse Bedeutung zu. Dabei wird am dualen Durchsetzungs-
und Sanktionsweg, an dessen grundsätzlicher Konzeption der Evaluationsbericht nichts
auszusetzen hatte, festgehalten. Dieses setzt einerseits auf administrative Aufsicht durch
den EDÖB, dem dafür die Kompetenz zu Verwaltungsmassnahmen (ohne Bebussung)
gegeben und entsprechende Durchsetzungsmittel zur Verfügung gestellt werden.
Andererseits sind Strafsanktionen gegen fehlbare Individualpersonen im ordentlichen
Strafverfahren vorgesehen. Hinzu kommt, dogmatisch aber anders gelagert, noch die
Schadensliquidation im Zivilverfahren. Damit erfüllt die Schweiz auch ihre internationale
Verpflichtung zu geeigneten Sanktionen undRechtsmitteln gemäss Europaratskonvention
108 bzw. künftig 108+.
Das E-DSG wird die Stellung der Aufsicht auf der nationalen Ebene, also des EDÖB,48
nun verstärken:
“Die Stellung und dieUnabhängigkeit des Beauftragtenwerden gestärkt. Diese
oder dieser kann zwei Mal wiedergewählt werden. Sie oder er darf nur unter
ganz bestimmten Bedingungen einer Nebenbeschäftigung nachgehen. Im
Weiteren sieht der E-DSG vor, dass der Beauftragte – wie seine Kolleginnen
und Kollegen in den anderen europäischen Ländern – nach Abschluss einer
Untersuchung, die von Amtes wegen oder auf Anzeige hin eingeleitet wurde,
Verfügungen erlassen kann, die für die Verantwortlichen und die
45 Büro Vatter, Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz, Schlussbericht, Bern, 10.3.2011, https://
www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/bj/staat/evaluation/schlussber-datenschutzeval-d.pdf, S. 72 ff. Dieser
Schlussbericht hielt auf S. 75 dazu sogar explizit fest: «Die Betroffenen von Datenbearbeitungen in der
Schweiz sind somit bezüglich ihrerDurchsetzungsrechte ähnlich gut und teilweise sogar besser ausgestattet
als die Betroffenen der im Rechtsvergleich untersuchten Staaten.»
46 Bericht des Bundesrates über die Evaluation des Bundesgesetzes über den Datenschutz vom 9. Dezember
2011, https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2012/335.pdf, S. 343.
47 Idem, S. 350.
48 Etwas verwirrendwird die Aufsichtsbehörde imGesetzesentwurf personalisiert formell als «Eidgenössischer
Datenschutz- und Öffentlichkeitsberater (EDÖB)» bezeichnet (Art. 3 E-DSG). Die individuelle
Führungsperson an der Spitze der Behörde heisst demgegenüber formell «Beauftragte oder Beauftragter»
(Art. 39 Abs. 1 E-DSG).
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Auftragsbearbeiter verbindlich sind. Nur das Bundesorgan bzw. die private
Person, gegen das bzw. die die Untersuchung eingeleitet wurde, sind in einem
Untersuchungsverfahren Partei.”49
Der EDÖBbeaufsichtigt die Anwendung der bundesrechtlichenDatenschutzvorschriften.
Von dessen Aufsicht sind die Bundesversammlung, der Bundesrat, die eidgenössischen
Gerichte, die Bundesanwaltschaft (aber nur betreffend die Bearbeitung von Personendaten
imRahmen von Strafverfahren) undweitere Bundesbehörden, soweit diese Personendaten
im Rahmen einer rechtsprechenden Tätigkeit oder von Verfahren der internationalen
Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen bearbeiten, befreit (Art. 3 E-DSG).
Die Bestimmungen zurOrganisation des EDÖBund seinenAufgaben sind im7.Kapitel
des Gesetzesentwurfs (Art. 39 ff. E-DSG) zusammengefasst. Zur Stärkung der
Unabhängigkeit wird die Bedeutung des Parlaments (Vereinigte Bundesversammlung)
bei der Organisation erhöht. So wird der Leiter des EDÖB nicht mehr – wie unter dem
DSG 1992 – vom Bundesrat als Exekutivorgan, sondern neu vom Parlament gewählt (Art.
39 Abs. 1 E-DSG); dieses entscheidet auch über eventuelle Bewilligung zur Ausübung von
Nebenämtern (Art. 41 Abs. 2 E-DSG). Zudem unterbreitet der EDÖB neu sein Budget
ebenfalls dem Parlament und nicht mehr der Exekutive (Art. 40a E-DSG). Damit werden
auch verschiedene Verpflichtungen gemäss Art. 15 der Europaratskonvention 108+
eingelöst.
In den Aufgabenkreis des EDÖB fällt namentlich die Untersuchung von Verstössen
gegen Datenschutzvorschriften (Art. 43 E-DSG). Hierzu stehen ihm im Wesentlichen
dieselben Befugnisse wie den Untersuchungsbehörden im gerichtlichen Verfahren zu,
insbesondere auch der Zugang zu allen relevanten Unterlagen sowie zu Räumlichkeiten
und Anlagen, falls notwendig auch unter Beizug der Polizeiorgane (Art. 44 E-DSG). Er
kann ferner Verwaltungsmassnahmen ergreifen (Art. 45 E-DSG). Allerdings soll dem
EDÖB weiterhin keine Kompetenz zum Erlass von Verwaltungssanktionen zukommen;
dies im Gegensatz zu vergleichbaren europäischen Behörden. Als Ausgleich dafür werden
aber – wie bereits erwähnt – die Strafbestimmungen massgeblich verschärft und
insbesondere dasMissachten derVerfügungen des Beauftragtenmit Busse bedroht.50 Siehe
zum Sanktionensystem im E-DSG ausführlicher hinten ab Frage 11.
49 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 34 f.




Der EDÖB eröffnet von Amtes wegen oder auf Anzeige hin eine Untersuchung gegen ein
Bundesorgan oder eine private Person, wenn genügend Anzeichen bestehen, dass eine
Datenbearbeitung gegen die Datenschutzvorschriften verstossen könnte. Er kann jedoch
von der Eröffnung einer Untersuchung absehen, wenn die Verletzung der
Datenschutzvorschriften von geringfügiger Bedeutung ist (Art. 43 Abs. 1 und 2 E-DSG).
Daneben verpflichtet ihn das Gesetz, auf die Sensibilisierung der Bevölkerung in Bezug
auf den Datenschutz hinzuwirken (Art. 52 Abs. 1 Bst. c E-DSG). Die Wahl der Strategie
beimAufgreifen und bei der Behandlung von Beschwerden liegt imErmessen des EDÖB.51
Frage 11
Der schweizerische Datenschutz sieht bereits vor der Revision wirksame
Durchsetzungsmechanismen vor, dies auch, umden imRahmender Europaratskonvention
108 eingegangenen Verpflichtungen zu genügen.52 Die schweizerische
Datenschutzkonzeption wird auch künftig grundsätzlich von einem – allerdings deutlich
verschärften– Strafsystemausgehen,welches sichmarkant vomSystemvonden finanziellen
Verwaltungssanktionen derDSGVOunterscheidet (zumLetzteren siehe unten betreffend
späteren Systemwechsel).
DSG 1992 – Sanktionen im Datenschutzrecht de lege lata
Strafbestimmungen
Sanktioniert wird die Verletzung der im DSG statuierten Auskunfts-, Melde- und
Mitwirkungspflichten (Art. 34 DSG 1992) sowie die Verletzung der beruflichen
Schweigepflicht (Art. 35 DSG 1992). Bei den Strafbestimmungen im DSG handelt es sich
um Nebenstrafrecht.53 Das heisst, die allgemeinen Bestimmungen des Strafgesetzbuches
(StGB)54 finden Anwendung, sofern im DSG 1992 keine Sonderregelung besteht.55 Da
51 Siehe zur aktuellen Schwerpunktsetzung 26. Tätigkeitsbericht des EDÖB 2018/19, e-paper, letzte Änderung
27.08.2019, Bern 2019, https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/dokumentation/taetigkeitsberichte/
26--taetigkeitsbericht-2018-20190.html.
52 Art. 10 Europaratskonvention 108 bestimmt: “Sanctions and remedies. Each Party undertakes to establish
appropriate sanctions and remedies for violations of provisions of domestic law giving effect to the basic
principles for data protection set out in this chapter.”
53 Kurt Pärli, in: Stämpflis Handkommentar zum Datenschutzgesetz (DSG) (Fn. 5), Art. 34 N 1.
54 Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch vom 21. Dezember 1937 (StGB), SR 311.0.
55 Art. 333 Abs. 1 StGB.
609
Switzerland
beide Straftatbestände mit Busse bedroht werden, handelt es sich um Übertretungen.56
Der Höchstbetrag der Bussen beläuft sich im geltenden Recht auf 10 000 CHF.57
Zusätzlich existieren weitere Straftatbestände zum Schutz persönlicher Daten im
allgemeinen StGB, z.B. die Verletzung des Amts- bzw. des Berufsgeheimnisses nach Art.
320 bzw. 321 StGB, die Verletzung des Schriftgeheimnisses nach Art. 179 StGB oder das
Abhören und Aufnehmen fremder Gespräche nach Art. 179bis StGB.58
Zivilklage
Sonstige Klagen gegen Verstösse gegen das DSG, die zu einer Persönlichkeitsverletzung
führen, sind im zivilrechtlichen Verfahren geltend zu machen59 (zum kollektiven
Rechtsschutz siehe unten Frage 13).
E-DSG – Sanktionen im Datenschutzrecht de lege ferenda
Verschärfung der Strafbestimmungen
Art. 12 der Europaratskonvention 108+ verpflichtet die Vertragsparteien, bei Verletzung
der Konventionsbestimmungen geeignete gerichtliche und nicht-gerichtliche Sanktionen
und Rechtsmittel vorzusehen. Wie der Explanatory Report erläutert, hat dabei jede
Vertragspartei selber festzustellen, wie sie die Massnahmen und Mittel in ihrem Land am
effektivsten zivil-, verwaltungs- oder strafrechtlich ausgestaltet, wobei die gewählten
Sanktionen wirksam, verhältnismässig und abschreckend sein müssen:60
“It is left to each Party to determine the nature (civil, administrative, criminal)
of these judicial as well as non-judicial sanctions. These sanctions have to be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The same goes for remedies: data
subjects must have the possibility to judicially challenge a decision or practice,
the definition of the modalities to do so being left with the Parties. Non-judicial
remedies also have to bemade available to data subjects. Financial compensation
for material and non-material damages where applicable, caused by the
processing and collective actions could also be considered.”
56 Art. 333 Abs. 3 StGB.
57 Art. 333 Abs. 3 i.V.m. Art. 106 Abs. 1 StGB.
58 Pärli (Fn. 5), Art. 34 N 1.
59 Art 28aAbs. 3ZGB. Siehe auchEDÖB,https://www.edoeb.admin.ch/edoeb/de/home/datenschutz/ueberblick/
datenschutz.html#193411081.
60 Explanatory Report to the Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Fn. 7), N 100.
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Auch nach Art. 57 der EU-Richtlinie 2016/680 wie auch nach Art. 84 Abs. 1 DSGVO
müssen Sanktionen wirksam, verhältnismässig und abschreckend sein. Ein zu mildes
Strafsystem im Schweizer Recht könnte zur Folge haben, dass die EU die schweizerische
Regelung nichtmehr als angemessen erachtet. Vor diesemHintergrundmuss das geltende
strafrechtliche Dispositiv des DSG1992 massgeblich verstärkt werden.
Die bereits im aktuellen Datenschutzgesetz bestehenden Straftatbestände werden im
Rahmen der Revision z.T. übernommen und angepasst (Art. 54 ff. E-DSG):
– Weiterhin strafbar ist die Verletzung von Informations-, Auskunfts- und
Mitwirkungspflichten (Art. 54 E-DSG) sowie die Verletzung der beruflichen
Schweigepflicht (Art. 56 E-DSG). Letztere wird allerdings auf sämtliche geheimen
Personendaten ausgeweitet.61
– Neu eingeführt wird ein Straftatbestand, der die Verletzung von Sorgfaltspflichten
sanktioniert (Art. 55 E-DSG) undder Straftatbestand desMissachtens vonVerfügungen
(Art. 57 E-DSG). Dies bezieht sich auf die Tatsache, dass der EDÖB seineVerfügungen
mit einer Strafandrohung versehen kann (was aber auch bedingt, dass die Verfügung
hinreichend konkretisiert wird, so dass der Adressat keine Zweifel mehr über die ihm
auferlegten Pflichten bzw. das vorgeschriebene Unterlassen hat).62 In Art. 57 E-DSG
wird die Bussenobergrenze von 10’000 auf 250’000 CHF erhöht, dies insbesondere mit
Blick auf die Annäherung des neuen DSG an die DSGVO. Die Forderung nach noch
höheren Bussen mit dem Argument, dass Unternehmen sonst zu wenig beeinträchtigt
würden, hält der Bundesrat für fragwürdig. Er führt dazu aus, dass sich die
Strafbestimmungen des E-DSG primär an natürliche Personen und insbesondere
Leitungspersonen richten63 (siehe auch nächste Frage).
– Mit Art. 58 E-DSG soll einerseits die Geschäftsherrenhaftung gem. Art 6 Abs. 2 des
Verwaltungsstrafrechtsgesetzes (VStrR)64 wie auch dieMöglichkeit, auf die Verfolgung
der strafbaren Person zu verzichten und stattdessen auf dasUnternehmen zuzugreifen,
eingeführt werden.
– Neben dem E-DSG soll mit Art. 179decies StGB zusätzlich ein neuer Straftatbestand
ins Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommenwerden, der dieVerletzung der Persönlichkeit durch
Identitätsmissbrauch sanktionieren soll.65
61 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7102; Art. 35DSG1992 schützt demgegenüber nur „geheime, besonders schützenswerte
Personendaten”.
62 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7103.
63 Idem, S. 7100.
64 Bundesgesetz über das Verwaltungsstrafrecht vom 22. März 1974 (VStrR), SR 313.0.
65 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7127.
611
Switzerland
Das Parlament wird diesen Strafkatalog weitgehend im Gesetz verankern66.
Die Zuständigkeit zur Verfolgung der Straftaten bleibt wie im geltenden Recht bei den
Kantonen (Art. 59 Abs. 1 E-DSG).67 Der EDÖB kann Anzeige erstatten und die Rechte
der Privatklägerschaft im Strafverfahren wahrnehmen (Art. 59 Abs. 2 E-DSG). Schliesslich
soll die Verfolgungsverjährung anders als im StGB für Übertretungen vorgesehen nicht
drei, sondern neu fünf Jahre betragen, dies mit der Begründung, dass Untersuchungen im
Bereich Datenschutz spezifisches Wissen benötigen und aufwendig sein können.68
Wirksamkeit der Strafbestimmungen
Sowohl der Bundesrat wie auch das Bundesparlament gehen in der bisherigen Beratung
von einer hohen Wirksamkeit des gewählten Sanktionssystems aus.69
In der sog. Vernehmlassung (Konsultationsverfahren im schweizerischen
Gesetzgebungsprozess) wurde darauf hingewiesen, dass die Mehrheit der strafbaren
HandlungendenVerantwortlichen betrifft.70 Sofern es sich dabei umUnternehmenhandelt,
wird die Straftat gemäss Art 29 StGB dem Vertreter des Geschäftsorgans, also der
Leitungsperson und nicht dem untergeordneten Angestellten, zugerechnet.71 «Dies gilt
insbesondere betreffend die Missachtung einer Verfügung des Beauftragten: in diesem
Fall macht sich diejenige Person strafbar, die innerhalb des Unternehmens hätte dafür
sorgen müssen, dass der Verfügung des Beauftragten Folge geleistet werde.»72
Der Verantwortlichkeit der leitenden Organe wird ebenfalls durch die Anwendbarkeit
von Art. 6 VStrG Rechnung getragen:73 Abs. 2 dieser Bestimmung sieht eine
Geschäftsherrenhaftung imUnternehmenskontext vor, indemderGeschäftsherr für Taten
die durch seine Angestellten begangen werden, unter Umständen einstehen muss, sofern
er die Taten nicht abgewendet oder ihre Wirkungen aufgehoben hat.
Schliesslich erlaubt Art. 58 Abs. 2 E-DSG i.v.m. Art. 7 VStrR den Strafbehörden von
der Verfolgung der verantwortlichen Person abzusehen und stattdessen u.U. direkt das
Unternehmen zur Bezahlung der gegen die natürliche Person verhängten Busse zu
verurteilen.
66 Vergleiche Medienmitteilung der Staatspolitische Kommission des Nationalrats, 24.1.2020: “[…] Was die
Strafbarkeit betrifft in Fällen, in denen die Anforderungen an die Sicherheit personenbezogener Daten
verletzt werden, hat sich die Kommission ebenfalls dem Ständerat angeschlossen. […]”, https://
www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/mm-spk-n-2020-01-24.aspx.
67 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7104.
68 Idem, S. 7104.
69 Beratung Nationalrat, 25.9.2019, Block 4, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/
amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=47369#votum58.
70 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 6974.
71 Idem, S. 6974.
72 Idem, S. 6974.
73 Idem, S. 6974 f.
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Späterer Systemwechsel hin zu pekuniären Verwaltungssanktionen?
Das Sanktionsregime wurde in der Vernehmlassung stark diskutiert.74 Der Bundesrat
adressiert deshalb in seiner Botschaft zumGesetzesentwurf u.a. den durchWirtschaftskreise
unter Hinweis auf die DSGVO hervorgebrachten Kritikpunkt der fehlenden finanziellen
Verwaltungssanktionen ausführlich.75 Er führt dazu aus, dass derartige
Verwaltungssanktionen in Bereiche gehören, in denen Unternehmen einer
verwaltungsrechtlichen Aufsicht unterstehen, weil sie eine konzessions- oder
bewilligungspflichtige Tätigkeit ausüben oder staatlich subventioniert werden.76 Weiter
weist der Bundesrat auf den strafrechtlichen Charakter solcher Verwaltungssanktionen
hin, der die Einhaltung strafprozessualer Garantien verlangt, die im anwendbaren
Verwaltungsverfahren indes nicht geregelt sind.77 Die Organisation des EDÖB müsste
dazu massgeblich verändert und ausgebaut werden.78 Schliesslich soll auch nicht die
bestehende Regelung der Unternehmsstrafbarkeit des Strafgesetzbuches durch die
Einführung von Verwaltungssanktionen mit Strafcharakter im DSG umgangen werden.79
Den genannten Bedenken soll umso mehr Gewicht zukommen, als der persönliche
Geltungsbereich des DSG deutlich breiter als derjenige von Gesetzen mit bestehenden
finanziellen Verwaltungssanktionen ist.80 Der Bundesrat verweist daher aus Gründen der
Rechtssicherheit auf die bestehendeOrdnung desVerwaltungs- undNebenstrafrechts, die
zur Anwendung gelangen soll.81 Dies hat u.a. zur Folge, dass Gewinne, die durch die
Begehung der im DSG unter Strafe gestellten Taten anfallen, gem. Art. 69 ff. StGB
eingezogen werden können. Dadurch kann der im Vergleich zur DSGVO eher niedrige
Bussenrahmen ausgeglichenwerden.Hierzu ist auch anzumerken, dass das schweizerische
Strafrechtssystem generell ohne exorbitante Strafbusshöhen die sozial erwünschte
individuelle Abschreckungswirkung erreicht82, indem die begleitende Stigmatisierung
durch Strafverfahren und Strafregistereintrag ungleich stärker in das Leben der Tatperson
eingreifen. Eine reine summenmässige Angleichung an die Busshöhen der DSGVO
ausschliesslich für den Datenschutz würde umgekehrt das soziale Verständnis zu Unrecht
und Strafe überstrapazieren und kriminologisch zum konträren Effekt führen.
74 Vernehmlassungsbericht, S. 50 ff.
75 Botschaft (Fn. 19), S. 7098.
76 Idem, S. 7098.
77 Idem, S. 7098.
78 Idem, S. 7099.
79 Idem, S. 7098 f.
80 Idem, S. 7099.
81 Idem, S. 7099.
82 Vergleiche dazu die Vorgaben des schweizerischen Strafgesetzbuchs (StGB, SR 311), welches einen ganzen
Tag Freiheitsstrafe mit einem monetären Wert von vergleichsweise tiefen CHF 30 - max. CHF 3 000 gleich-
setzt (Art. 34 StGB i.V.m. Art. 36 StGB).
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Auch die vorberatenden Parlamentskommission SPK-N (StaatspolitischeKommission
desNationalrats, also der erstenKammer des Schweizerischen Bundesparlaments)machte
sich den Systementscheid nicht leicht. Die Kommission entschied sich schliesslich nicht
zuletzt im Hinblick auf die angezeigte Beschleunigung des Parlamentsverfahrens für das
vorwiegend justizielle System. Zugleich aber beauftragte sie am 1.11.2018 als Nebenstrang
zur Datenschutzberatung den Bundesrat, die Einführung eines allgemeinen Systems der
Verwaltungssanktionen im Schweizer Recht zu prüfen, welches dann auch für das
Datenschutzrecht geltenwürde (wie auch etwa für dasWettbewerbsrecht, wo bereits früher
eine entsprechende Sanktionsrevision versucht wurde,83 weiter für das Fernmelderecht,
den Finanzbereich etc.).84 DerNationalrat stimmte demAuftrag am4.3.2019 oppositionslos
zu. Der Bundesrat wies bei dieser Gelegenheit erneut darauf hin, dass die Revision des
Datenschutzgesetzes kein geeigneter Rahmen zur Klärung dieser allgemeinen und auch
für andere Rechtsgebiete relevanten Grundsatzfrage sei.85 Das Bundesamt für Justiz ist
derzeit daran, den erforderlichen Bericht vorzubereiten. Je nach Ausgang könnte damit
das aktuell bevorzugte justizielle Sanktionssystem in der Zukunft durch die Sanktionierung
mittels finanzieller Verwaltungssanktionen wie unter der DSGVO abgelöst werden.
Frage 12
Immaterielle SchädenwerdennachdemschweizerischenHaftungsverständnis grundsätzlich
kompensiert. Im Datenschutzbereich verweisen sowohl das geltende Recht (Art. 15 Abs.
1 DSG 1992) wie auch Art. 28 Abs. 2 E-DSG für Klagen zum Schutz der Persönlichkeit
auf die Bestimmungen über die Persönlichkeitsverletzung in Art. 28 ff. ZGB. Betreffend
dieKompensation von immateriellen Schäden (Genugtuung) ist dieDelikthaftungsregelung
gemäss Art. 49 Obligationenrecht (OR)86 beizuziehen. Der Genugtuungsanspruch setzt
eine objektiv widerrechtliche Persönlichkeitsvoraussetzung voraus, die objektiv schwer
wiegt (Bundesgerichtsentscheid BGE 117 II 50). Bei der Bemessung der Genugtuung ist
wie im allgemeinenDelikthaftungsrecht dieGrösse desVerschuldenswie auch die Schwere
der Verletzung zu berücksichtigen.87
83 Bundesrat,Medienmitteilung, 22.2.2012: Bundesrat verabschiedet Botschaft zur Revision desKartellgesetzes,
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-43503.html.
84 18.4100 – Postulat - Instrument der pekuniären Verwaltungssanktionen, SPK-N: „Der Bundesrat wird
beauftragt aufzuzeigen, wie im Schweizer Recht ein allgemeines System der pekuniären Verwaltungssank-
tionen sowie die erforderlichen rechtlichen Garantien eingeführt werden können.”
85 Amtliches Bulletin, NR, 4.3.2019, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-
bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=45323.
86 Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches vom 30. März 1911 (Fünfter
Teil: Obligationenrecht), SR 220.




De lege lata orientiert sich das seit 2008 einheitlich kodifizierte schweizerische
Zivilprozessrecht88 in Fortführung der Rechtstradition am Einzelprozess, in dem sich je
eine klagende und eine beklagte Partei individuell gegenüberstehen. Sind Verhältnisse zu
beurteilen, die auf gleichartigen Tatsachen oder Rechtsgründen beruhen, kommen die
Bestimmungen über die sogenannte Streitgenossenschaft zum Tragen (insbesondere Art.
15 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)89 betreffend die örtliche Zuständigkeit, Art. 70 ff. ZPO
betreffend die Legitimation, Art. 125 lit. c ZPO betreffend die Klagenvereinigung durch
das Gericht, Art. 127 ZPO betreffend die Überweisung bei zusammenhängenden
Verfahren).
Mit der gesamtschweizerischen ZPO von 2008 wurde sodann aber eine
Verbandsklagemöglichkeit eingeführt, gemäss der Vereine und andere Organisationen
von gesamtschweizerischer oder regionaler Bedeutung, die nach ihren Statuten zur
Wahrung der Interessen bestimmter Personengruppen befugt sind, in eigenem Namen
aufVerletzung der Persönlichkeit derAngehörigen dieser Personengruppen klagen können
(Art. 89 ZPO). Diese Verbandsklage kann nur die Unterlassung, Beseitigung oder
Feststellung einer Verletzung zum Gegenstand haben, lässt aber keine Klage auf Leistung
zu. Stimmen, welche darüber hinausgehende Instrumente verlangten, blieben vorläufig
ungehört.90
Bereits am 3.7.2013 hielt der Bundesrat aber in einem Bericht fest, dass eine
Verbesserung des kollektivenRechtsschutzes einerseits imRahmender bereits bestehenden
Instrumente möglich wäre. Die Prozesskosten könnten beispielsweise neu geregelt, die
Prozessfinanzierung gefördert und dasVerbandsklagerecht erweitert werden. Andererseits
wäre auch die Einführung neuer eigenständiger Instrumente der kollektiven
Rechtsdurchsetzung denkbar.Namentlich könnte die Schaffung eines sogenanntenMuster-
oderTestverfahrens, beiwelchemdemErgebnis für gleichartigeVerfahren eine verbindliche
Wirkung zukäme, und unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen möglicherweise auch eine
Gruppenklage oder einGruppenvergleichsverfahren geprüftwerden.91 Am27.9.2013wurde
daraufhin im Parlament eine Motion betreffend Förderung und Ausbau der Instrumente
88 Davor war die Materie kantonal und unterschiedlich geregelt.
89 Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung vom 19. Dezember 2008 (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO), SR 272.
90 Vgl. etwa 13.2052 – Motion – Recht zur Sammelklage bei Datenschutzverletzungen, insbesondere im
Internet, Schwab, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20133052,
welche noch am 8.5.2013 vom Bundesrat negativ beurteilt wurde.
91 Bundesrat, Medienmitteilung, 2.7.2013: Kollektiver Rechtsschutz untersucht und mögliche Massnahmen
aufgezeigt, https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/aktuell/news/2013/2013-07-03/ber-br-d.pdf, mit Ver-




der kollektiven Rechtsdurchsetzung deponiert und am 13.12.2013 vom Nationalrat und
am 12.6.2014 vom Ständerat angenommen.92
Am 17.11.2014 deponierte die Rechtskommission des Ständerats eine im Folgejahr
vomParlament angenommeneMotion, gemässwelcher der Bundesrat nach einer Prüfung
der Praxistauglichkeit der geltenden Zivilprozessordnung dem Parlament bis Ende 2018
erforderliche Gesetzesanpassungen zu beantragen habe].93 Im Vordergrund stand dabei
auch eine eventuelle generelle Einführung von Instrumentendes kollektivenRechtsschutzes.
Das 2016 in Vernehmlassung gegebene E-DSG enthält vor diesem Hintergrund keine
datenschutzspezifischen Bestimmungen zum kollektiven Rechtsschutz. In der Revision
des DSG solle keine auf das Datenschutzrecht beschränkte Regelung der kollektiven
Rechtsdurchsetzung (Erweiterung des Verbandsklagerechts und Einführung einer
Sammelklage bzw. eines Sammelvergleichs) eingeführt werden. Stattdessen sollen die
Instrumente der kollektivenRechtsdurchsetzung imRahmenderUmsetzungder erwähnten
Motion in einem grösseren, möglichst sektorübergreifenden Kontext geprüft werden.94
Am 2.3.2018 eröffnete der Bundesrat eine Vernehmlassung über eine Revision der
Zivilprozessordnungmit dem erklärten Ziel, Privaten undUnternehmen den Zugang zum
Gericht zu erleichtern. Insbesondere sollen die Kostenschranken und das
Prozesskostenrisiko gesenkt, der kollektive Rechtsschutz gestärkt und die
Verfahrenskoordination vereinfacht werden.Mit einemGruppenvergleichsverfahren solle
eine anerkannte Lücke imRechtssystem geschlossen und damitmehrere parlamentarische
Aufträge erfüllt werden. Neu sollen Unternehmen mit einem sogenannten
Gruppenvergleichsverfahren eine einvernehmliche kollektive StreiterledigungmitWirkung
für alle Geschädigten erreichen können. Weiter wurde vorgeschlagen, die Verbandsklage
für die klageweise kollektiveDurchsetzung von finanziellenAnsprüchen zuzulassen. Diese
Massnahmen würden es Unternehmen erlauben, Ansprüche aus sogenannten
Massenschäden in einem einzigenVerfahrenmit einemVerbandskläger beizulegen.Dieser
Ausgleich rechtswidrigerGewinne soll auch störendeWettbewerbsverzerrungen gegenüber
Unternehmen beseitigen, die sich rechtskonform verhalten.95 Die vorgeseheneAnpassung
und Erweiterung der Verbandsklage führe dazu, dass auch Verletzungen des
Datenschutzgesetzes vermehrt und einfacher auch kollektiv durchgesetzt werden können,
92 13.3931 – Motion - Förderung und Ausbau der Instrumente der kollektiven Rechtsdurchsetzung, Birrer-
Heimo, http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20133931.
93 14.4008– Kommissions-Motion RK-S - Anpassung der Zivilprozessordnung, https://www.parlament.ch/
de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20144008.
94 Erläuternder Bericht zumVorentwurf für das Bundesgesetz über die Totalrevision desDatenschutzgesetzes,
a.a.O, S. 21 f.




wie dies gerade für den Datenschutz bereits spezifisch gefordert wurde.96 Ein definitiver
Entwurf zur Ergänzung der ZPO und dessen Überweisung an das Parlament wird im
Verlauf des Jahres 2020 erwartet.
Frage 14
Angesichts der Unterschiedlichkeit der Institutionen lässt sich hier keine Einschätzung
abgeben.
D Datenverarbeitung für nationale Sicherheitsbelange
Frage 15
Ausgehend von der Bundesverfassung, die eine Bundeskompetenz in gewissen sensitiven
Gebieten vorsieht, etwa Sicherheit, Landesverteidigung, Zivilschutz (Art. 57 ff. BV) bzw.
etwas weiter entfernt Aussenwirtschaftspolitik (Art. 101 BV) ergeben sich verschiedenste
Handlungsfelder, in denen regelmässig gewisse nationale Sicherheitsaspekte adressiert
werden. Wie erwähnt, unterliegt die Schweiz der EU-Grundrechtecharta nicht. Mit
ähnlichemSchutzbestand gilt jedoch die EuropäischeMenschenrechtskonvention, der die
Schweiz beigetreten ist.
Eine gezielte, übergreifende Begrifflichkeit für die «nationale Sicherheit» ist zwar nicht
bekannt, jedoch regeln das Bundesgesetz über Massnahmen zur Wahrung der inneren
Sicherheit (BWIS)97 und das Nachrichtendienstgesetz (NDG)98 die relevanten
Regulierungselemente betreffend die innere und äussere Sicherheit, insbesondere in Bezug
auf die Informationsbeschaffung, die Datenbearbeitung durch die betreffenden Stellen
und die Auskunftsrechte der Betroffenen.
Betreffend Vorratsdatenspeicherung hat das schweizerische Bundesgericht – wenn
auch nicht spezifisch zur nationalen Sicherheit – im Jahr 2018 im Leitentscheid BGE 144
I 12699 zustimmend die verwaltungsrechtliche Frage entschieden, ob die Speicherung und
96 Bundesrat, Erläuternder Bericht zurÄnderungderZivilprozessordnung (Verbesserung der Praxistauglichkeit
und der Rechtsdurchsetzung), 2.3.2018, S. 107, https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/staat/gesetzgebung/
aenderung-zpo/vn-ber-d.pdf.
97 Bundesgesetz über Massnahmen zur Wahrung der inneren Sicherheit (BWIS) vom 21.3.1997, SR 120.
98 Bundesgesetz über den Nachrichtendienst (Nachrichtendienstgesetz, NDG) vom 25.9.2015, SR 121.
99 Urteil der I. öffentlich-rechtlichen Abteilung i.S. A. und Mitb. gegen Dienst Überwachung Post- und Fern-
meldeverkehr sowieX.AGundY.AG (Beschwerde in öffentlich-rechtlichenAngelegenheiten), 1C_598/2016
vom 2. März 2018 (BGE 144 I 126).
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Aufbewahrung von mit dem Fernmeldeverkehr verbundenen Randdaten konform mit
der Verfassung bzw. der EMRK sind:
“Art. 15 Abs. 3 des bis zum 28. Februar 2018 geltenden Bundesgesetzes
betreffend die Überwachung des Post- und Fernmeldeverkehrs (aBÜPF)
verpflichtete die Fernmeldedienstanbieter – gleichwie das heute geltende BÜPF
–, die für die Teilnehmeridentifikation notwendigenDaten sowie dieVerkehrs-
und Rechnungsdaten ihrer Kunden zu speichern und während sechs Monaten
aufzubewahren (E. 3). Die Speicherung und die Aufbewahrung vonRanddaten
stellen einen Eingriff in die Grundrechte der Betroffenen dar, insbesondere in
das Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens, das denAnspruch auf informationelle
Selbstbestimmung miteinschliesst (E. 4). Die Intensität dieses
Grundrechtseingriffs ist allerdings zu relativieren: Die gespeicherten Daten
betreffen nicht den Inhalt der Kommunikation und werden von den
Fernmeldeunternehmenweder gesichtet nochmiteinander verknüpft; für einen
Zugriff der Strafverfolgungsbehörden müssen die qualifizierten gesetzlichen
Voraussetzungen der Strafprozessordnung erfüllt sein (E. 5). Art. 15 Abs. 3
aBÜPF bildete für die Randdatenspeicherung eine hinreichende gesetzliche
Grundlage (E. 6). Die Randdatenspeicherung und -aufbewahrung dient
namentlich der Aufklärung von Straftaten; damit liegt ein gewichtiges
öffentliches Interesse vor (E. 7). Die datenschutzrechtlichen Bestimmungen
sehen wirksame und angemessene Garantien zum Schutz vor Missbrauch und
behördlicher Willkür vor. Unter diesen Rahmenbedingungen ist auch die
sechsmonatige Aufbewahrungsdauer verhältnismässig (E. 8).”
Die Beschwerde führendenMitglieder desVereins digitale gesellschaft haben den Entscheid
laut Pressemitteilungen100 wegen Verletzung von Art. 8 Ziff. 1 EMRK (Recht auf Achtung
ihres Privat- und Familienlebens) an den Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte
weitergezogen. Das Strassburger Urteil steht noch aus.








This report deals with the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data
Protection Regulation, hereinafter “GDPR”)1 in theUnitedKingdom (UK) before theUK’s
exit from the EU in accordance with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as
amended. The law is stated as at 4 September 20192.
The main national legal instrument introduced to implement the GDPR in the UK is
the Data Protection Act 2018 (hereinafter “DPA18”). The national supervisory authority’s
Guidance onGDPR andBrexit is available at: ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-
and-brexit/.3
TheData Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU
Exit) Regulations 2019 (hereinafter “DPPExitRegs19”) came into force on exit day.4 The
DPPExitRegs19 will introduce the terminology of the UK GDPR into the DPA18 and
merge the existing ‘applied GDPR’ provisions into the UK GDPR. However, these
amendments and clarifications were still to be implemented in the text of the DPA18 at
this writing.5
* Solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, Member of the French speaking Order of the Brussels
Bar (OBFG), established in Brussels.
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation [2016] OJ L119/1 (hereinafter
“GDPR”).
2 However, in some places it has been possible to refer to more recent developments.
3 Including ‘Guidance for SMEs on how to prepare for a no-deal Brexit’. TheUK InformationCommissioner’s
Office issued a Statement on 29 January 2020, which says, amongst other things: “During [the transition]
period, which runs until the end of December 2020, it will be business as usual for data protection”. “The
GDPR will continue to apply”. (…) ICO’s statement also acknowledges the potential for continuing
uncertainties: “It is not yet knownwhat the data protection landscapewill look like at the end of the transition
period and we recognise that businesses and organisations will have concerns about the flow of personal
data in future”. “We will continue to monitor the situation and update our external guidance accordingly”.
4 Statutory Instrument 2019 N° 419. Exit day is defined as 31 January 2020 in the European Union (With-
drawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2019, Statutory Instrument 2019 N° 1423.
5 “The applied GDPR” means the GDPR as applied by Chapter 3 of Part 2 DPA18. For processing to which
it applies see DPA18 S.21. In particular Chapter 3 applies to the automated or structured processing of
personal data in the course of an activitywhich is outside the scope of EuropeanUnion law, DPA18 S.21(1)(a).
See also DPA18 Schedule 6 on the applied GDPR.
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Question 1
The DPA18 came into force on 25 May 2018. It is a substantial piece of legislation, 349
pages long and divided into 7 Parts, with 215 Sections (hereinafter “S.”) and 20 Schedules.
It legislates for general data processing (Part 2); law enforcement data processing (Part
3);6 data processing by the intelligence services (Part 4); regulatory oversight (Part 5) and
enforcement and penalties for infringements (Part 6).
Part 7 contains supplementary and final provisions, including about the application
of the DPA18 to the Crown and to the UK Parliament.
Part 2 of DPA18 (General Processing) applies the provisions of the GDPR to the
activities of a controller or processor (as defined in the GDPR) established in the UK, and
whether or not the processing takes place in the UK, (S.207 (2)).7
DPA18 does not contain provisions specifying processing necessary to comply with a
data controller’s legal obligations underA.6(1)(c)GDPR.However, S.8DPA18does provide
a non-exhaustive list of what shall be considered processing in the ‘public interest’ or in
the exercise of the data controller’s ‘official authority’.8
DPA18 S.9 sets the age from which a child can give consent to the processing of data
for the provision of information society services at 13 years. The InformationCommissioner
(hereinafter “theCommissioner”)9 is under an obligation (underDPA18 S.123) to introduce
an age appropriate code of practice on information society services.10
For processing necessary to perform or exercise obligations or rights of the controller
or of the data subject under employment, social security or social protection law,11 DPA18
introduces a requirement on the controller to put into place an “appropriate policy
6 Implementing Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural personswith regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the exe-
cution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016], OJ L119/89 (Law Enforcement Directive, hereinafter “LED”).
7 The Explanatory Notes (hereinafter “ENs”) state at Note 1 (“N.1”): ‘The Act also helps prepare the UK for
a future outside the EU’: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20180012_en.pdf. All
webpages referred to were visited 10 February 2020.
8 Art. 6(1)(e) GDPR.
9 DPA18 Ss.3(8), 114 and Schedule 12. Note however that the abbreviation ‘ICO’ is very often used inter-
changeably to refer to either the Commissioner (currently Elizabeth Denham) or the entity which she leads,
the Information Commissioner’s Office.
10 See now ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-data-protection-themes/age-appropriate-
design-a-code-of-practice-for-online-services.
11 Art. 88 GDPR, Processing in the context of employment.
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document”.12 An appropriate policy documentmust (amongst other requirements) explain
the controller’s procedures for complying with the data protection principles.13
DPA18 Schedule 1 specifies the conditions and associated safeguards that must be met
in order for special categories of data to be processed pursuant to DPA18 S.10. Schedule
1, Part 2, specifies conditions that must be met in order for special categories of data and
personal data to be processed for reasons of substantial public interest. Schedule 1,
paragraph 13 provides an additional ground for processing special categories of personal
data in order to uncover dishonesty or mismanagement, provided it is in substantial public
interest.
DPA18 Schedules 2, 3 and 4 provide restrictions and adaptations of, and exemptions
from, the application of the GDPR rules.14 Schedule 2 paragraph 4, which provides for
exemptions in respect of ‘effective immigration control’ has been criticized.15
Schedule 2 Part 5 provides for the exemptions foreseen in article 85(2) GDPR for
journalistic, academic, artistic and literary purposes. Derogations for scientific or historical
research, statistical purposes or for archiving in the public interest (article 89 GDPR) are
set out in Schedule 2 Part 6 (paras 27 and 28).
DPA18 Schedule 2, Paragraph 19, disapplies data subject information and access rights
under articles 13-15 GDPR where legal professional privilege (known as ‘confidentiality
of communications in legal proceedings’ in Scotland) can be asserted in respect of the
personal data.
Question 2
As regards the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the
“Charter”) Articles 7 and 8, the situation in the UK will be affected by the eventuality of
the UK’s exit from the EU. A distinction needs to be drawn between a withdrawal from
the EUon the basis of an arrangement implementing the revisedWithdrawal Agreement16
adopted on 19 October 2019 (an ‘orderly Brexit’) and an unmanaged withdrawal (‘hard
Brexit’).
12 Schedule 1, Paragraph 1, DPA18.
13 As set-out in A5. GDPR and DPA18 S.34.
14 DPA18 S.15(1).
15 See for example Liberty’s submission to theHouse ofCommonsPublic Bill Committee on theData Protection
Bill, March 2018, pp. 10-25.
16 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the





What is clear is that, whether there is an orderly or a hard Brexit, the Charter will cease
to apply in the United Kingdom.
In the political events surrounding the UK Parliament’s failure to adopt the original
Withdrawal Agreement, little attention was paid to the provisions of the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 (hereinafter “EU(W)A2018”). Apart from other fundamental
changes in the relationship between EU law and laws in the United Kingdom,17 S.5(4)
EU(W)A2018 excludes the Charter from retained EU law18 even if S.5(5) goes on to state
that “subsection (4) does not affect the retention in domestic law on or after exit day in
accordance with this Act of any fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective
of the Charter” (…).
The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has commented:
“Exactly what fundamental rights and principles are preserved (…) is not clear.
The Charter itself, on the other hand, is a clear statement of articulated rights
and principles. Indeed, this was the very purpose of drawing up the Charter,
to provide a clear and accessible list of the rights and freedoms considered
fundamental in the EU legal order”.19
In contrast, in the EU (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill, the Scottish government has
expressed an intention to retain the Charter in Scots Law following EU exit. However, the
retention of the Charter would only apply to devolved retained EU law.20
B The Reception of Substantive GDPR Provisions in the National
Legal Order
Question 3
The Information Commissioner’s Office (hereinafter “ICO”) includes a discussion of
fairness in its Guidance:
17 For a clear explanation of which see J. Segan, The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018: Ten Key
Implications forUKLaw andLawyers, July 2018 at https://www.blackstonechambers.com/news/european-
union-withdrawal-act-2018-ten-key-implications-uk-law-and-lawyers/.
18 “The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day”.
19 For an analysis of the application of the EUCFR in the case of exemptions concerning a civil law dispute
see RFU v. Viagogo [2012] UKSC 55 at paras 25 et seq.
20 See: The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill -A Reference by the
Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland (Scotland) [2018] UKSC64.
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“In general, fairness means that you should only handle personal data in ways
that people would reasonably expect and not use it in ways that have unjustified
adverse effects on them. You need to stop and think not just about how you
can use personal data, but also about whether you should”.21
Three ICO decisions, (the first two decided in accordance with DPA1998), give an insight
into what that general guidance means in practice:
1. True Visions Productions
TVP are a television production company. They installed cameras, with permission,
in a maternity assessment unit for the purpose of filming patients for a documentary on
stillbirths. TVP posted filming notices in the vicinity of the cameras and the waiting room
area but did not directly and specifically inform patients that they would be filmed.
The ICO fined TVP £120,000 for failing to process patients’ data fairly and lawfully. It
said:
“The processing was not fair. The patient attending (…) would not have
reasonably expected there to be fixed cameras which could not be stopped in
examination rooms. The patientwould reasonably expect such filming expressly
to be drawn to her attention. TVP did not provide sufficient fair processing
information to patients, and did not sufficiently draw the information which
was provided to the attention of patients”, (…)22
2. Bounty (UK) Limited
An ICO investigation found that Bounty (UK) Limited, a pregnancy and parenting
club, collected personal information for the purpose of membership registration through
its website and mobile app, merchandise pack claim cards and directly from new mothers
at hospital bedsides.
But the company also operated as a data broking service until 30 April 2018, supplying
data to some thirty-nine third parties including credit reference and marketing agencies.
The ICO fined Bounty (UK) Limited £400,000 for illegally sharing personal information
belonging to more than 14 million people.
It said:
21 What is fairness? ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/principles/lawfulness-fairness-and-transparency/?q=record.
22 Para. 29 of ICO’s Monetary Penalty Notice (‘MPN’), 8 April 2019.
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“Bounty failed to use the personal data of the affected data subjects fairly in
this case. As indicated above, data subjects registering with a pregnancy and
parenting club would not reasonably have expected their personal data to be
disclosed to the likes of credit reference, marketing and profiling agencies”.23
3. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) Voice ID Service
This case was an investigation made under the GDPR. It concerned the voice profiling
of users of the HMRC’s helplines using the words: “My voice is my password”. ICO found
that the voice data was collected unlawfully and issued an Enforcement Notice under
DPA18 S.149 requiring HMRC to delete all of the biometric data held for which it did not
have specific consent (about 5.5 million records). It said:
“TheCommissioner considers that the contravention is a significant onewhich
warrants enforcement action. Her reasons for this conclusion include that (…)
HMRC appears to have given little or no consideration to the data protection
principles when rolling out the Voice ID service”.24
Question 4
Consent
In practice, questions about obtaining informed consent have arisen most frequently in
relation to direct e-mail marketing for which consent, as defined in article 4(11) GDPR is
required under the e-Privacy Directive.25 In three pre-GDPR decisions ICO found that
certain customer verification requests had in fact been sent for direct marketing purposes.
The ICO sanctioned suchmessaging in: FlyBe, Honda (March 2017)26 andBT (June 2018)27.
It recently confirmed this approach in EE (June 2019).
ICO fined EE Limited, a telecoms company, £100,000 for sending over 2.5 million
directmarketingmessages to its customers without consent. During the ICO investigation
EE stated the texts were sent as service messages and were therefore not covered by
electronic marketing rules. The ICO disagreed. It said:
23 Para. 37 of ICO’s MPN of 9 April 2019.
24 Para. 24 of ICO’s Enforcement Notice of 9 May 2019.
25 Directive 2002/58/EC as amended (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)
26 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2017/03/ico-warns-uk-firms-to-respect-
customers-data-wishes-as-it-fines-flybe-and-honda/.
27 MPN of 20 June 2018.
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“Theseweremarketingmessages which promoted the company’s products and
services. The direct marketing guidance is clear: if a message that contains
customer service information also includes promotional material to buy extra
products for services, it is no longer a service message and electronic marketing
rules apply”.28
Legitimate interests
ICO has issued detailed Guidance on legitimate interests.29 The Guidance includes useful
practical examples:30
In Bounty (supra Q.3) at paragraph 39 of the MPN, ICO commented, as regards the
balancing of the controller’s legitimate interests against the interests or fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subjects:
“(…) Bounty has not indicated to the Commissioner that it relies upon this
condition, however theCommissioner’s assessment is that this conditionwould
not have been met (…). Given its failure to inform data subjects that their
personal data may be shared with [named third-party] organisations or indeed
any organisations of a similar nature, the balance of interests (…) tipped against
Bounty”.
As regards the benefit of conducting what it calls a Legitimate Interests Assessment
(hereinafter “LIA”) ICO comments:
“An LIA is a type of light-touch risk assessment based on the specific context
and circumstances of the processing. You need to record your LIA and the
outcome. There is no specific requirement in the GDPR for you to do this.
However, in practice you are likely to need an audit trail of your decisions and
justification for processing on the basis of legitimate interests”.
In light of that guidance, future decisions may show that seeking to rely on legitimate
interest without having the support of an LIA report is unwise when faced with an ICO
investigation.
28 Statement of Andy White, ICO Director of Investigations in ICO’s Press Release of 24 June 2019. See also
the MPN of 20 June 2019 at para. 41.
29 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/legitimate-
interests-1-0.pdf, v1.0.20 of 22 March 2018, 46 pp. The section titled How do we apply legitimate interests
in practice begins at p. 35 of the Guidance.




No, there does not seem currently to be intense debate about the freedom to provide and
consent to the processing of personal data in order to obtain digital content.31 Indeed, the
most serious debate on the subject seems to have been conductedwithin the Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (LIBE)32 before the
20 May 2019 adoption of EU Directive 2019/770 on contracts for the supply of digital
content and digital services.33
The apparent lack of debate may result from the common law’s traditional laissez-faire
attitude to the freedom to contract; it may reflect the imminence of the UK’s EU exit; or
as BEUC, the European consumer organisation, reported, in September 2015 (before the
adoption of the digital content and digital services Directive):
“The only country to our knowledge that has adopted a specific law for B2C
contracts of digital content products is the UK.34 This is a positive development
for British consumers but at the same time it increases the risks of fragmentation
across the EU if national legislators start developing their own systems to protect
consumers in digital content contracts”.
There is currently some speculation about whether the test for ‘informed consent’ will be
found to be workable in practice where online direct marketing is concerned.35
31 See however, ‘Why Facebook should pay us a basic income’, John Thornhill, FT 7August 2017 and Leonard
Murphy, Personal Data: The Ultimate Commodity? Greenbookblog.org, 21 September 2017.
32 See: Briefing, ‘Contracts for the supply of digital content and personal data protection’:
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635601/EPRS_BRI(2019)635601_EN.pdf (PE 635.601,
March 2019, and the documents cited there).
33 OJ L136/1 of 22 May 2019. EU Member States are to transpose the Directive by 21 July 2021, and it will
apply from 1 January 2022.
34 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 gave consumers of digital content (software, apps, eBooks, music, videos
and electronic games) new statutory rights from 1October 2015where purchasing digital content, or where
it is supplied together with other paid for goods or services, under a contract.
35 For the ICO’s recent report on AdTech see ‘Update report into adtech and real time bidding”, 20 June 2019
and, more recently, the 17 January 2020 blog post by Simon McDougall, ICO Executive Director of Tech-
nology and Innovation, at ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-adtech-the-reform-of-real-time-
bidding-has-started/. See also the Norwegian Data Protection Authority, Datatilsynet’s, report: ‘How
commercial utilisation of personal data challenges privacy’, November 2015, and Reuben Binns, Ulrik
Lyngs, Max Van Kleek, Jun Zhao, Timothy Libert, Nigel Shadbolt ‘Third Party Tracking in the Mobile





DPA18 S.14 provides safeguards (as foreseen by article 22(2)(b) GDPR), for significant
decisions based solely on automated processing that are authorised by law. For the purposes
of the section, a decision is a ‘significant decision’ if it either (i) produces legal effects
concerning the data subject or (ii) similarly significantly affects the data subject, DPA18
S.14(2).
ICO’s Guidance offers the following clarification:
“A decision producing a legal effect is something that affects a person’s legal
status or their legal rights. For example, when a person, in view of their profile,
is entitled to a particular social benefit conferred by law, such as housing
benefit”.
“A decision that has a similarly significant effect is something that has an
equivalent impact on an individual’s circumstances, behaviour or choices.
In extreme cases, itmight exclude or discriminate against individuals. Decisions
that might have little impact generally could have a significant effect for more
vulnerable individuals, such as children.”36
According to DPA18 S.14(4), where a controller takes a qualifying significant decision in
relation to a data subject based solely on automated processing,37
a. the controllermust, as soon as reasonably practicable, notify the data subject inwriting
that a decision has been taken based solely on automated processing, and
b. the data subject may, before the end of the period of 1 month beginning with receipt
of the notification, request the controller to -
i. reconsider the decision, or
ii. take a new decision that is not based solely on automated processing.
The ICO guidance takes the pragmatic view that:
“If you have a statutory or common law power to do something, and automated
decision-making/profiling is themost appropriate way to achieve your purpose,
then you may be able to justify this type of processing as authorised by law.
36 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/automated-decision-making-and-profiling-1-1.pdf. Version 05 June 2018 - 1.1.49.
37 i.e. a significant decision required or authorised by law and not necessary to a contract or made with the
data subject’s consent, DPA18 S.14(3).
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However, you must be able to show that it’s reasonable to do so in all the
circumstances”.
The ICO provides the following example:
“In the financial services sector, an organisation might use automated
decision-making, including profiling, to identify fraud, in order to comply with
a high level regulatory requirement to detect and prevent crime. It identifies
cases of potential fraud by comparing data from credit reference agencies, bank
accounts, the Land Registry, the DVLA, credit card sales, online marketplaces
and social media”.
Question 7
The leading authority on the right to erasure is the judgment in NT1 & NT2 v Google.38 In
that judgment Mr Justice Warby decided on two separate claims for erasure (‘de-listing’
or ‘de-indexing’) involving Google’s Internet Search Engine (“Search”). The claims were
made under the (previous) 1998 Data Protection Act (hereinafter “DPA1998”),
implementing the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter “DPD”). They were
considered during the period when the GDPR was in force but not yet applicable.39
The Court took account of the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(hereinafter “CJEU”) inGoogle Spain40 and noted that the CJEUdrew a distinction between
the processing of information for journalistic purposes on the one hand, and its processing
by operators of internet search engines (hereinafter “ISEs”) on the other, suggesting that
the rights of data subjects will vary accordingly.
The Court qualified the right to erasure (by reference to its description as a right to be
forgotten) in the following way:
“… it may be misleading to label the right asserted by these claimants as the
“right to be forgotten”. They are not asking to “be forgotten”. The first aspect
of their claims asserts a right not to be remembered inaccurately. Otherwise,
they are asking for accurate information about them to be “forgotten” in the
38 Judgment of 13 April 2018, NT1 & NT2 v Google [2018] EWHC 799.
39 A summary and a copy of the judgment are available at: www.judiciary.uk/judgments/nt1-nt2-v-google-
llc-right-to-be-forgotten/. Para. 13 of the Judgment helpfully summarises the existing legal framework,
taking the enactments and the corresponding common law developments in chronological order.
40 Judgment of 13 May 2014 in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL & another v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion
de Datos (AEPD) and another [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
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narrow sense of being removed from the search results returned by an ISE in
response to a search on the claimant’s name. No doubt a successful claim against
Google would be applied to and by other ISEs. But it does not follow that the
information at issue would have to be removed from the public record … And
a successful delisting request or order in respect of a specified URL will not
prevent Google returning search results containing that URL; it only means
that the URL must not be returned in response to a search on the claimant’s
name. [para. 38] (Emphasis added.)
The ICO issued up-dated guidance on the right to erasure on 22 May 2019.41 DPA18
requires the Commissioner to produce a code of practice that provides practical guidance
and promotes good practice regarding processing personal data for the purposes of
journalism. ICO’s consultation on this code of practice was closed on 24 May 2019.42 In
the meantime, ICO’s current (2014) guidance ‘Data protection and journalism: a guide
for the media’ remains available.43
Question 8
Regarding processing and freedom of expression and information, the measures notified
by the United Kingdom44 were Ss.15, 143, 147, 152 and 174-179, and paragraph 26 of
Schedule 2 and Schedule 17 to the DPA 2018.45 In Schedule 2, Part 5 contains exemptions
or derogations from Chapters II, III, IV, V and VII of the GDPR for reasons relating to
freedom of expression, as permitted by article 85(2) GDPR.46
A courtmust stay (or, in Scotland, sist) special purpose proceedings, pending a decision
of the Commissioner or withdrawal of the claim, if the controller or processor claims, or
it appears to the court, that any personal data to which the proceedings relate is: a) only
being processed for the special purposes, b) is being processedwith a view to the publication
of journalistic, academic, artistic or literary material, and c) has not previously been







44 In accordance with art. 85(3) GDPR.
45 GDPR: notification letter of 24 May 2018 to Martin Selmayr, Secretary General European Commission,





The provisions of DPA18 S.176(1) are substantially the same as those of article 32(4)
DPA1998 (implementing the DPD) which were the subject of the Court of Appeal’s
judgment in the Stunt Case.47 In that case the Appellant (Stunt), appealed a High Court
Order granting Associated Newspapers Limited (Associated) a stay of proceedings under
DPA1998 S.32(4) on the basis that the personal data it held was being processed for
journalistic purposes with a view to publication.
The Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Stunt Case has led to a reference to the CJEU,
on whether provisions such as S.32(4) DPA1998 are compatible with the requirements of
DPA1998 S.9 that an exemption for journalistic purposes, or artistic or literary expression,
should only be permitted to the extent that it balances the right to privacy (and protection
of personal data) with freedom of expression and with articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter.48
If the reference is ever heard, it should help to clarify what margin of discretion a state
has to adoptmeasures (such asDPA1998 S.32(4) andDPA18 S.176(1)) intended to prevent
the chilling effect on free speech exemptions of applications to enforce data protection
rights and the individual’s right to protection of personal data and a remedy for failure to
respect that right.49
C Domestic Enforcement of Data Protection Law
Question 9
The ICO is the information rights regulator for the UK. It describes its mission as
‘Upholding information rights for the UK public in the digital age’. Amongst its strategic
goals it lists:
– Increase the public’s trust and confidence in how data is used and made available;
– Improve standards of information rights practice through clear, inspiring and targeted
engagement and influence;
– Enforce the laws it helps shape and oversee.50
47 James Stunt v Associated Newspapers Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 1780.
48 Notice of Application, SY v Associated Newspapers Ltd., published in OJ C 25 of 21.01.2019, at p. 27.
49 In Mosely, Mosely v United Kingdom [2012] EMLR 1 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
“ECtHR”) found that theUKwas not in breach of its obligations underArticle 8 of the EuropeanConvention
on Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) by failing to impose a duty on the News of the World to notify the
applicant in advance of publication of material which violated respect for his private life – thereby denying
him the opportunity to apply for an interim injunction to prevent such publication. See the ECtHR’s
judgment at para. 122 and the discussion of Mosely at paras 88-91 and 98 of the judgment of the majority
in the Stunt Case.
50 ICO Annual Report 2018/19 at p. 11 - mission, vision, strategic goals and values.
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The Commissioner is a corporation sole.51 The Commissioner must appoint one or more
deputy Commissioners and may appoint other officers and staff on merit on the basis of
fair and open competition. The Commissioner has responsibility for determining the
remuneration and conditions of service of her officers and staff.52
The legislation that the ICO-regulates is not only the DPA18 and GDPR, but also the:
– Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA);53
– Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR);
– Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (PECR);
– Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (NIS);
– infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Community Regulations 2009
(INSPIRE);
– Reuse of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015 (RPSI);
– Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA);
– Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Regulations 2016 (eIDAS).
TheCommissioner’s annual report and financial statements 2018-2019 concerns the twelve
months ending on March 2019.54 The report is divided into three major sections (A, B and
C). Part A deals with the implementation of the DPA 2018 and the GDPR.
The ‘Action we have taken’ drop-down tab on the ICO’s website55 shows that between
25 May 2018 and 4 September 2019 ICO took 68 enforcement actions in total. It issued
38 Monetary Penalty Notices, 18 Enforcement Notices, brought 11 Prosecutions and took
Undertakings in one case.
In addition to the statutory codes provided for in the DPA18 (on age-appropriate
design, data sharing, direct marketing and data protection and journalism56), ICO is
developing guidance for the use of personal data in political campaigns. This work emerged
51 A public office created by an act of Parliament occupied by a (single) natural person. The appointment is
made by the Crown. DPA18 Schedule 12, paras 1 and 2.
52 DPA18 Schedule 12, para. 5.
53 Regarding processing and public access to official documents (GDPR A86), the Freedom of Information
Act 2000 (FOIA) covers any recorded information held by a public authority in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland, and by UK-wide public authorities based in Scotland. (Information held by Scottish
public authorities is covered by Scotland’s own Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002.) The FOIA
does not give people access to their own personal data (health records or credit record for example).
54 Published on 8 July 2019: ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615262/annual-report-201819.pdf.
55 ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/.
56 As required by respectively S.121, S.122, S.123 and S.124 DPA18.
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from its Democracy Disrupted policy report57 published in July 2018 following its
investigation into the use of personal data in data analytics campaigns by political parties.58
Question 10
The ICO homepage provides two possibilities for making a complaint.59 There is a
drop-down tab at the top of the opening page entitled ‘Make a Complaint’ and there is a
‘Take Action’ column on the right of the opening page which has three headings one of
which is ‘Make a Complaint’.
The Commissioner’s 2018-2019 annual report60 refers to an ‘unprecedented year’. It
notes that ICO’s workforce grew from 505 to more than 700 over that period, “with
particular increases in the parts of the organisation handling data protection complaints
and customer contact”.
ICO states that its approach to its enforcement responsibilities is intelligence led.
“To make sure that our investigation and enforcement work is targeted in the
right areas, we developed an Intelligence Strategy to set out how we use the
information we gather. One important piece of work in this area is using the
information we receive from the public and other sources to inform a strategic
threat assessment, which will support all of our work, including investigations,
enforcement, guidance, codes of practice and more”. (…). [p. 28]
ICO also notes that its enforcement powers have increased:
“Under theGDPR andDPA2018, we are able to issue formal assessment notices
to any organisation, either public or private. Under the DPA 1998 the
Commissioner only had compulsory audit powers in respect of central
government and health organisations”. (…) With these new powers of
inspection, we have been able to proactively respond to complaints from the
public about unsolicited marketing communications and unfair and unlawful
processing”. [p. 23]
57 Available at: ico.org.uk/media/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf.
58 Specific findings in relation to the harvesting of Facebook data, Cambridge Analytica and Global Science






A concrete example concerned the use of mobile phone extraction for policing [p. 26].
2018-19 saw a significant increase in the number of data protection complaints reported
to ICO by the public. During 2018-19, it received 41,661 data protection complaints from
the public compared with 21,019 complaints received in 2017-18. ICO closed 34,684
complaints in 2018-19, compared to 21,364 in 2017-18, but it carried forward a caseload
of 9,503 data protection complaints into the new reporting year.
In order to maintain service standards for the public, ICO wants to reduce open
complaints across 2019-20 to below 5,000. In terms of the types of complaints received,
subject access requests (SARs) were the most frequent complaint category, representing
38% of data protection complaints received. (This was similar to the proportion before
the GDPR and DPA 2018 (39%). [pp. 30-32].
Question 11
ICO laid its Regulatory Action Policy (hereinafter “RAP”) before Parliament in July 2018
and received approval in November 2018. The objectives set out in the RAP [pp. 22-23],
include to:
– Be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and consistent in application of sanctions,
targeting the most significant powers on organisations and individuals suspected of
repeated orwilfulmisconduct or serious failures to take proper steps to protect personal
data.
Enforcement notices compel a data controller to comply with data protection laws within
a specified time. In an investigation relating to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) and its Voice ID service for customer identification ICO found that HMRC had
failed to give customers sufficient information about how their biometric data would be
processed and failed to give them the chance to give orwithhold consent.61 The enforcement
notice required HMRC to delete all biometric data held under the Voice ID service for
which they did not have explicit consent. [p. 24].
As part of ICO’s investigation into the use of personal data in political campaigns
(launched under theDPA 1998), it requested a searchwarrant, whichmeant a 17-day delay
to gain access to Cambridge Analytica’s premises. Under GDPR and DPA 2018, ICO’s
powers have broadened and ‘assessment notices’, mean that ICO is now able to gain access





to a company’s premises and data protection practicesmuch faster than under the previous
legislation.62
Outside the period covered by its annual report, ICO issued two notices of intention
to fine underGDPR andDPA2018 against BritishAirways (£183.39million)63 andMarriott
International (£99,200,396)64 respectively. In both cases ICO investigated as the lead
supervisory authority on behalf of other EU Member State data protection authorities,
who may comment on the ICO’s findings under the GDPR ‘one stop shop’ provisions.
Neither fine had been confirmed at the time of writing.
Under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, the ICO is a ‘prescribed person’ which
means that whistleblowers are provided with protection when disclosing certain
information. 319 whistleblowing disclosures were made to ICO during the period 1 April
2018 to 31 March 2019. Further action was taken on 135 of the disclosures and of those
135 disclosures:
– 55 disclosures were taken into consideration for ongoing investigations;
– 28 disclosures were considered as data protection complaints.65
Question 12
S.168 DPA18 implements the right to claim damages set out in article 82 GDPR. The fact
that article 82 GDPR makes explicit that data subject should be compensated for damages
suffered for both tangible and intangible (material and non-material) harm is to be
welcomed.
Under the previous legislation, the scope of the right to compensation for damage
under S.13 DPA1998, implementing article 23 of the Directive 95/46/EC (DPD), was
considered by the English Court of Appeal in the important Vidal-Hall case.66
The claimants in Vidal-Hall used the Safari browser on Apple computers to access the
internet. Contrary to what they had been informed, browser generated information
(hereinafter “BGI”) was collected by the defendant, to track their internet usage, without
their knowledge or permission, and the BGI was used by advertisers to send them targeted
advertising [paras 2 and 3].67 A fundamental issue in the case was the scope of the right to
62 Normally after 7 days, but it may be less (DPA18 S.146 (8) and (9).
63 ICO Statement in response to an announcement to the London Stock Exchange that the ICO intends to
fine British Airways for breaches of data protection law, 8 July 2019.
64 Statement in response toMarriott International, Inc’s filingwith theUS Securities andExchangeCommission
that the ICO intends to fine it for breaches of data protection law.
65 See further ICOAnnual Report 2018/2019 (op cit), Part A, Performance report:Whistleblowing disclosures
at p. 71.
66 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc. [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (ICO intervening).
67 On the subject of adtech and real time bidding see the ICO’s up-date report: ico.org.uk/media/about-the-
ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding-report-201906.pdf of 20 June 2019.
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‘damages’ in DPA1998 S.13, including whether there could be a claim for compensation
without pecuniary loss.
The meaning of ‘damage’ in section 13 of the DPA1998
In the second part of the judgment [paras 52-105] the court considered the problem caused
by the express limitation on the right to claim [non-tangible] damages introduced by
DPA1998 S.13(2). Whereas S.23 DPD provided (generally) that Member States should
provide that any personwho suffered damage as a result of unlawful processingwas entitled
to compensation from the controller: the DPA1998 S.13(2) limited the right for damages
for distress to cases where (a) there was also direct damage (under S.13(1)); or (b) where
the processing related to journalism, artistic or literary purposes (the ‘special purposes’)).
Neither (a) nor (b) applied to any of the Vidal-Hall claimants [para. 83].
The Court found [para. 76] that article 23 of the DPD must be given its natural and
wide meaning so as to include both material and non-material damage. However, it found
that the principles in the Benkharbouche Case, permitted it to disapply S.13(2).68 Further,
it found, relying on article 47 of theCharter, that it could disapply S.13(2)DPA1998without
needing to devise a substituted scheme (whichwould have been Parliament’s prerogative).
“As this court stated in Benkharbouche (…), (iv) in so far as a provision of
national law conflicts with the requirement for an effective remedy in article
47, the domestic courts can and must disapply the conflicting provision; and
(v) the only exception to (iv) is that the court may be required to apply a
conflicting domestic provisionwhere the courtwould otherwise have to redesign
the fabric of the legislative scheme”. [para. 105]
Although the Court of Appeal refused permission, the Supreme Court granted leave for
the Vidal-Hall judgment to be appealed on one point, but, on 30th June 2016, Google
withdrew its appeal after the parties reached a settlement.
Question 13
The area of the collective representation of claimants is undergoing important developments
in England andWales. Aside from the specific statutory provisions in the formerDPA1998
and now in DPA18, and the courts’ general powers of case management,69 Part 19 of the
Civil Procedure Rules (hereinafter “CPR”) in England and Wales foresees two main forms
68 Benkharbouche and Janah v Embassy of Sudan and others [2015] EWCA Civ 33 at paras 69 to 85.
69 CPR Part 3 CPR.
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of collective action. They are the Group Litigation Orders (hereinafter “GLO”)70 and
Representative actions (hereinafter “RA”).71,72
Where there are a number of claims that give rise to common or related issues of fact
or law (‘GLO issues’) the court may make a GLO.73 Where more than one person has the
same interest in a claim, the claim may be begun as a representative of any other persons
who have that interest (RA).74
S.187(1)DPA18 concerns the ability of representative bodies to exercise relevant rights
on behalf of data subjects, provided that they are authorized to do so by the data subjects
(opt-in). In relation to the GDPR the relevant rights75 include the right to apply for a court
order against, and the right to receive compensation from a controller or processor.76 What
qualifies as a representative body is defined in S.187(3) and (4).77
What is unclear is whether S.187(3) and (4) also need to be read subject to S.168(2)(a)
DPA1878 which apparently (indirectly) imposes the additional requirement that proceedings
for compensation must be brought by a representative body within the meaning of the
CPR. If that is right, as noted above, the claimants must all have the ‘same interest’. That,
may result in a restriction on the ability to bring such representative actions, as what
constitutes the ‘same interest’ has been narrowly defined by the courts79 as identity of
interest.80
A GLO is seemingly in course of preparation in respect of the BA Data Breach,81 where
ICO’s final decision is under consideration.82 However, no such GLO had been listed as
at 31 August 2019.83 The court’s decision not to permit a representative action in respect
of the so-called ‘Safari workaround’ in Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 2599,
70 CPR Part 19 section III CPR.
71 CPR Part 19 section II Rule 19.6 Representative parties with same interest.
72 These are all ‘opt-in’ procedures. The opt-out procedure is not currently implemented by DPA18. Note
that the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018 will permit both opt-in
and opt-out procedures before the Scottish Courts once rules of court have been introduced to give it effect.
73 CPR Rule 19.11.
74 See further CPR Rules 19.6 (1) and 19.6 (4).
75 As defined in art. 80(1) GDPR.
76 As provided by art. 82(1) GDPR.
77 By reference to the art. 80(1) GDPR criteria.
78 Payment of compensation to a representative body may be made where proceedings under art. 82 of the
GDPR - “are brought in accordance with rules of court” - by a representative body.
79 For a helpful review of the case law see the judgment of the Lord Chancellor in Emerald Supplies Ltd. v
British Airways plc [2009] EWHC 741, at paras 10-24.
80 The Emerald Supplies judgment was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal [2010] EWCA Civ







was the subject of an appeal which was heard in mid-July 2019.84 The Court of Appeal
subsequently overturned Warby J’s judgment and granted Mr Lloyd permission to serve
a representative action on Google out of the jurisdiction.85
The Morrisons Case,86 which concerns the (‘vicarious’) liability of the employer for
deliberate disclosure of employees payroll data, is the subject of an appeal to the Supreme
Court which was heard on 6-7 November 2019.87
Question 14
The ICO is a unitary regulator of information rights in the UK with a variety of
responsibilities outside the application of the GDPR. The relevant ICO webpage refers to
memorandums of understanding (hereinafter “MOU”) and other documentswhich outline
the responsibilities and agreements held between the ICO and other authorities.88 At this
writing the page and underlying documents were being updated to ensure that the MOUs
(with almost thirty regulators or ombudspersons) are compliant with GDPR and DPA18
requirements.
D Data Processing for National Security Purposes
Question 15
Part 3 of the DPA18 implements the Law Enforcement Directive (hereinafter “LED”).89
As a separate section of its Guide to Data Protection, ICO has published a Guide to Law
Enforcement Processing.90 DPA18 Part 3 only applies to processing for law enforcement
purposes by the competent authorities,91 processing which they carry out which is not for
the primary purpose of law enforcement will be covered by DPA18 Part 2.92
84 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 2599. See www.youoweus.co.uk/google-owe-us-court-appeal-
today/.
85 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599.
86 WM Morrisons Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 2339.
87 The UK Supreme Court, WM Morrisons Supermarkets plc (Appellant) v Various Claimants (Respondent),
Case ID: UKSC 2018/0213. Appeal allowed 1 April 2020 [2020] UKSC 12.
88 https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/our-information/working-with-other-bodies/.
89 Directive (EU) 2016/680, [2016], OJ L119/89.
90 25 April 2019 [version] 1.1.7. See also, for example, www.lincs.police.uk/resource-library/data-protection/
law-enforcement-processing/.
91 The list of competent authorities in Schedule 7DPA18 covers the principal police and other criminal justice
agencies in the UK which are subject to the provisions of this Part but see also S.30(1)b.
92 As regards the use of Automated Facial Recognition technology by the police see the judgment of
4 September 2019 in Bridges v Chief Constable of South Wales [2019] EWHC 2341, in which the Court
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The processing of personal data controlled by an intelligence service (the Security
Service, Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters) is
governed by Part 4 of the DPA18.
Broadly speaking, the provisions of Part 4 of DPA18 accord respect for the fair
processing principles of the GDPR93 and the rights of data subjects.94 However, Section
110 creates an exemption from provisions of Part 4 (as well provisions in Part 5 and Part
6) if that exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
UnderDPA18 S.79 aMinister of theCrownmay certify that a restriction on data subject
rights is necessary and proportionate to protect national security.95 The Commissioner is
required to publish information about the existence of national security certificates.96
The Charter will cease to be part of UK law as from the EU Exit Date. Even if the Court
of Appeal in its influentialVidal-Hall judgment expressly relied on article 47 of the Charter
in respect of the right to a remedy: the courts would seemingly not be able to apply
reasoning based on the Charter in any future case where similar issues arose.97 They might
base similar reasoning on theUK’sHumanRights Act 1998 and the EuropeanConvention
on Human Rights (ECHR) but regarding the balance between international human
convention rights and UK statute law, there may in future be less room for such judicial
interpretation.98
found that the South Wales Police’s use of its AFR Locate technology was consistent with the requirements
of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the data protection legislation. See also the report: ‘ICO investigation
into how the police use facial recognition technology in public places’ of 31 October 2019 (available at
ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2616185/live-frt-law-enforcement-report-20191031.pdf and
the InformationCommissioner’s Opinion: ‘The use of live facial recognition technology by law enforcement
in public places’, also of 31October 2019 (available at ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2616184/
live-frt-law-enforcement-opinion-20191031.pdf.
93 Ss. 85-91 DPA18.
94 Ss. 92-100 DPA18.
95 For the purposes of Ss. 44(4), 45(4), 48(3) and 68(7) DPA18.
96 The exemptions in respect of national security are provided for at DPA18 Ss.26 and 110 and in DPA18 Part
3. A list and certain details of the certificates are available at: ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/our-information/
national-security-certificates/.
97 See also the DPPExitRegs19, (op cit, note 4), and Regulation 5 in particular which clarifies, amongst other
things, that ‘retained case law’ and ‘retained general principles of EU law’ have the same meaning as in the
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (see section 6(7) of that Act).
98 See further on this point, Lord Sumption in The BBC Reith lectures 2019: Law and the decline of politics.
Lecture 3: Human rights and wrongs at p. 5, 7 and 8 of the lecture transcript.
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